The limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights for libraries, research and teaching uses by Dusollier, Séverine
   
 
 
Funded by 
 
(2013/ 
 
STUDY ON THE APPLICATION OF 
DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 
(THE "INFOSOC DIRECTIVE") 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 in collaboration with 
 
Jean-Paul TRIAILLE (ed.), partner, De Wolf & Partners and lecturer, University of Namur 
 
Séverine DUSOLLIER, professor, University of Namur, director, CRIDS 
Sari DEPREEUW, De Wolf & Partners, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
Jean-Benoit HUBIN, De Wolf & Partners 
François COPPENS, Brussels Bar 
Amélie de FRANCQUEN, De Wolf & Partners, University of Namur 
 
 
 
.
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The information and views set out in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not guarantee the 
accuracy of the data included in this study. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on 
the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the 
information contained therein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOI: 10.2780/90141 
ISBN: 978-92-79-29918-6 
 
 
© European Union, 2013. 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Introduction to the Study   3 
 
 
Introduction to the Study 
This Study ("Study on the application of Directive 2001/29/EC on copyright and related rights in the 
information society") is the result of a study which the European Commission (DG MARKT) 
commissioned, in the context of Framework Contract PN/2009-35/D, to the Belgian law firm De Wolf & 
Partners (www.dewolf-law.com). 
The team of authors was lead by Jean-Paul TRIAILLE, partner at the Brussels law firm De Wolf & 
Partners and lecturer at the University of Namur, who coordinated the Study.  With the Commission’s 
approval, Jean-Paul Triaille has worked, for part of the Study, with the CRIDS (Centre de Recherche 
Information, Droit et Société), from the University of Namur (www.crids.be), in particular with Prof. 
Séverine DUSOLLIER.  Authors are lawyers at De Wolf & Partners and/or academics or researchers with 
the CRIDS. 
The Study comprises an assessment of the extent to which the implementation of the Directive 
2001/29/EC (“the InfoSoc Directive”) is appropriate to the economic and technological realities of digital 
markets and has as its objective to evaluate whether and, if so, to what extent, further harmonisation in 
some areas of copyright is needed in order to enable the EU to capitalise on the opportunities of a digital 
single market. It takes into account the numerous and recent important decisions taken by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and national courts since the last implementation report on the 
InfoSoc Directive, completed in 2007.  
It however does not cover all provisions of the InfoSoc Directive but only a number of topics, selected 
by the European Commission and listed in the Terms of Reference of this Study.  The Study therefore 
concentrates on two important aspects of the InfoSoc Directive with regard to its assessment in the light 
of digital technologies and networks:  
Regarding exclusive rights, the "making available right" and its localisation, and some other 
aspects of rights related to transmissions of content in digital networks (including links to the 
Satellite and Cable Directive and the Rental and Lending Directive); 
Regarding exceptions, a number of key limitations and exceptions, notably in favour of: 
- libraries and archives; 
- research and educational purposes; 
- persons with a disability; 
- user-generated content (UGC); 
- press review. 
These selected topics should help the European Commission to assess to which extent the national 
copyright provisions are harmonised or not, and whether or not they form an impediment to cross-border 
exchange of services and information in the European Union. 
The Study concentrates, as was asked by the European Commission, on 11 countries (Germany, 
France, UK, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary and the Benelux countries).  It was carried out 
mainly as a desk research of accessible sources and verified by national experts in the countries under 
examination. 
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The authors also wish to thank the experts who provided useful insights and guidance for various parts 
of the study, in particular (in alphabetical order):  Maciej BARCZEWSKI (attorney-at-law, and Head of 
Postgraduate Program in Intellectual Property and High Technology Law, University of Gdansk), 
Stéphanie CARRÉ (Maître de Conférences, CEIPI, Université de Strasbourg), Alexandre 
CRUQUENAIRE (Maître de Conferences, UNamur), Estelle DERCLAYE (Professor of Intellectual 
Property Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nottingham), Marc FALLON (Professor, 
University of Louvain-la-Neuve), Stéphanie FRANCQ (Professor, University of Louvain-la-Neuve), Jane 
C. GINSBURG (Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University), 
Giuseppe MAZZIOTTI (Center for European Policy Studies), Peter MEZEI (Assistant Professor at 
University of Szeged), Sylvie NÉRISSON (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, Munich), Thomas RIIS (Professor at University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law), Alain STROWEL 
(Professor, University of Saint-Louis and University of Louvain-la-Neuve), Raquel XALABARDER 
PLANTADA (Vicerectorat d'Ordenació Acadèmica i Professorat Directora Adjunta, Universitat Oberta de 
Catalunya).   
Obviously, the responsibility for this Study and for the opinions expressed herein remains with its 
author(s). 
A detailed table of contents at the beginning of the Study and conclusions, for each topic, will assist the 
readers to browse through the numerous pages of this report. 
Some other topics are still being examined and the results will be made available to the European 
Commission before the end of the year.    
 
 
 
Jean-Paul TRIAILLE 
October 2013 
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Executive summary 
This Study first focuses on the territoriality of the making available right and its consequences for the 
functioning of the internal market.  
I. Scope of the making available right.  The Study first examines the origin of the making available right 
and its current scope.  It observes that the notion of making a work available to the public is not defined 
and an important uncertainty exists concerning its scope of protection. The national courts have 
contributed to the clarification of this exclusive economic right by applying it to various online services.  
The making available right requires not only that the protected matter be uploaded so it can be accessed 
at a distance (at any time and location), it should also be demonstrated that access is offered to members 
of the public. The exact scope of the making available right by contrast is not clear, in particular whether 
the transmission of protected matter, following the accessibility, is covered. Decisive to distinguish the act 
of making available from other forms of communication to the public (in particular broadcasting) is the 
accessibility at the time chosen by the user/member of the public (timing, order, scope). Also, the relation 
of the making available right to the rights of reproduction and communication to the public is not clarified 
(alternative or cumulative application). 
Notion of territoriality.  The notion of territoriality is then explored in the Study. Harmonisation efforts at 
the international and European levels have not altered the competence of the national legislators to 
regulate copyright. Moreover this principle of “national territoriality” is confirmed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, although the “territorial” criteria may vary. The territoriality principle is a cornerstone 
of the international protection offered by the Berne Convention. Finally, the territorial reach of the making 
available right is uncertain, while clarity on this point is a prerequisite for the application of mitigating 
principles such as the “country of origin” principle in relation to satellite broadcasting and the “exhaustion” 
principle in relation to the distribution right.  
Selected legal issues.  Because of these uncertainties, the constitutive elements of a (cross-border) act 
of making available may be found to take place in different Member States.  At the request of the 
Commission, the Study focuses on three issues and how these are affected by the absence of a clear 
definition and localisation criterion: 
 Private international law.  The lack of clarity causes issues of private international law, as 
several Member States may have concurrent jurisdiction to rule on a case regarding an 
infringement to the making available right.  Moreover, the rules determining the applicable law 
may lead to inconsistencies, as they can refer to the application of one single or several copyright 
legislations depending on the Member State in which the claim is introduced.  
 Authorship, ownership, transfer of rights.  As to these issues, the Study points out at the 
existence of disparities in the copyright legislation of the Member States of the European Union. 
Consequently, the localisation of the making available right may have an impact on the identity of 
the right holder. Several people may hold rights to relevant acts that are part of a complex 
process of making available (fragmentation of rights).  
 Reproduction right.  Turning to the relation between the making available right and the right of 
reproduction, the Study identifies the existence of different acts of reproduction in the process of 
the act of making available. This may complicate the licensing of works for online use and have 
an impact on the localisation of the protected acts in case of infringement.  Further study in this 
respect is needed. 
II. Having presented the legal issues related to the current situation, the second part of the Study 
examines whether specific localisation criteria would help solving the bottlenecks identified in the first 
part.  
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This part of the Study first examines different possibilities to define and delineate the scope of the making 
available right.  Then, the Study analyses two localisation criteria (country of origin principle and place of 
the exploitation of the work) and assesses their consequences on the issues of conflict of laws, 
authorship, transfer of rights and reproduction right: 
 Country of origin.  This approach localises the act of making available in one single Member 
State (“country of origin”).  It is reminded however that the country of origin principle may be 
interpreted in various ways (cf. several European directives with a “country of origin” principle).  
Applied to the making available right, the country of origin principle could localise the protected 
act either in the country where the act of upload takes place or in the country where the uploader 
is established.  It is then verified whether this approach would provide a satisfactory answer to the 
bottlenecks identified in the first part.  It is concluded that the country of origin principle solves 
some but not all the bottlenecks and that it may generate new bottlenecks with regard to the 
applicable law. 
 Exploitation/targeting.  The second criterion proposed to localise the making available right is 
based on an exploitation approach. According to this criterion, the act of making available is 
localised in each country where a public is targeted.  The outcome of such proposal is to reduce 
the number of countries where the making available right may potentially be localised (the mere 
accessibility of the work in a country is not a relevant criterion anymore).  The exploitation 
approach does not solve the bottlenecks identified in the first part of the Study but it helps 
reducing their impact.   
 
For a more detailed presentation of the issues being addressed or the topics described in this Executive 
Summary, please refer also to the conclusions. 
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General introduction to this part of the Study & Terms of Reference 
The Information Society Directive
1
 was adopted in 2001 and it has provided a regular reporting on its 
application (art. 12).  A first report on the implementation and application of its provisions in the national 
legislation of the Member States was delivered by the IViR in 2007
2
.  The present Study was 
commissioned to provide an updated evaluation of the impacts of the InfoSoc Directive in certain key 
areas.  Not all aspects of the Information Society Directive are treated and neither is it an update of the 
country-by-country report by the IViR.  The Commission has formulated its priorities in the Terms of 
Reference for this Study as follows: 
 
 
The "making available right" and other aspects of rights related to transmissions of content in 
digital networks 
The territoriality of online rights in the Single Market 
The protection of copyright and related rights in the EU is "territorial" in the sense that the recognition and 
enforcement of rights occurs on a country by country basis (nevertheless, the management of rights does 
not need to be territorial and right-holders are often in a position to grant multi-territorial licences). The 
balance between territoriality and the functioning of the internal market has been achieved, as far as the 
distribution of physical copies is concerned, by the principle of exhaustion developed by the CJEU and, 
as far as the act of communication to the public by satellite is concerned, by the definition of where the 
act takes place (one single Member State, often referred to as "country of origin" or uplink) in the Satellite 
and Cable Directive. 
The main right applicable to on-line transmissions – the so-called "making available" right provided under 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive – remains territorial in the sense that the act of making available is in all 
likelihood an act relevant in each of the Member States where the content is accessed (plus, probably, 
the country in which the content is uploaded). The question has arisen as to whether this is sustainable 
for the functioning of the internal market, and whether alternative approaches would not be more 
appropriate - in particular whether the "making available" should not be re-considered as a relevant 
copyright act only in the Member State in which the relevant online service originates/the service provider 
is established. This approach is similar to that applied in the copyright 'acquis', to the act of 
communication to the public by satellite. The reproduction right is equally relevant, certainly in the case of 
downloads where clearly an act relevant for copyright purposes would happen (independently of where 
the act of "making available" is defined as taking place) in each of the countries where end users 
download digital files. This is an aspect that did not arise in the context of satellite broadcasting.    
Outputs to be achieved 
With regard to Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, the Study should look into the question as to whether 
national courts assume that the Directive harmonised substantial copyright law in a way that would 
include the determination of the place where the relevant copyright act occurs. It should explore where 
                                                     
 
1
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22 June 2001, p. 10–19, hereafter referred to as “Information 
Society Directive” or “InfoSoc Dir”. 
2 L. GUIBAULT e.a., Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Institute for Information Law (IViR), Amsterdam, 2007, p. 
25-29. 
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the relevant acts that fall under the above mentioned right are deemed to occur under the applicable 
substantial national law. Where appropriate, the Study should also analyse case law dealing with related 
questions on applicable law (see Article 8 of Regulation 864/2007) and jurisdiction (see Article 5 of 
Regulation 44/2001). We do not expect a large body of jurisprudence to exist in the EU on this matter so 
important existing case law in third countries (US, Canada, Australia, Japan) on the issue of "where does 
the act of making available take place" should be examined if it exists. Discussions in academia should 
also be taken into consideration with regard to these particular questions.  
Output : Examine the implications of the application of the "country of origin" principle 
(applicable/substantive law) to: 
(a) Enforcement measures: identification of specific issues relating to the enforcement of copyright 
and related rights in the country of destination (damages and injunctive relief; examination of 
relationship with Regulation 44/2001). 
(b) Determinations of authorship: what would be the (legal and economic) consequences of 
maintaining the status quo (limited harmonisation of this matter, i.e. harmonisation of authorship 
limited to Article 2(2) of the rental directive) while implementing this principle? Is the harmonisation of 
authorship necessary or desirable in order to give effect to the country of origin principle? Are there 
other issues of substantive law that would need to be harmonised (or further harmonised) e.g. 
exceptions. 
(c) Transfer of rights/ownership:  what would be the effect of maintaining the status quo (transfer of 
rights are not harmonised in the Community acquis) while implementing the country of origin 
principle? (Relationship with Regulation 593/2008)  
(d) The reproduction right:  there will be a need also to examine the link between the application of 
the "country of origin" and the reproduction right associated with certain acts of making available e.g. 
downloads 
 
This Study will focus on the making available right (art. 3 InfoSoc Dir).  It consists of two parts, the first 
describing the current state of the law (“status quo”) and the second exploring alternative approaches to 
the making available right. 
In the first part, the current understanding of the making available right will be examined in further detail, 
i.e. its application by the national courts.  Next, the territoriality principle will be analysed and it will be 
verified how acts of making available should be localised within the European Union. Finally, a selection 
of legal issues will be presented under the national copyright laws of the Member States under 
consideration (as harmonised at the European level), i.e. issues of authorship, initial ownership and 
transfer of rights, the reproduction right and conflicts of law.  This will give us an idea of the effects of the 
making available right, in combination with the territoriality principle. 
In the second part of the Study, we propose a reflection on the making available right, both in terms of its 
definition and the localisation criteria.  We will develop two interpretations of the making available right, 
which are each connected to a specific localisation criterion:  in a “country of origin” or in the Member 
State(s) of exploitation.  Finally, it will be examined how the selected legal issues (issues of authorship, 
initial ownership and transfer of rights, the reproduction right and conflicts of law) would be affected under 
each alternative approach. 
Methodology.  For this Study we operated in two phases.  In the first phase, we have examined the 
accessible sources (in English, French, Dutch and, to a lesser extent, German) on the national copyright 
laws of a limited number of Member States (i.e. Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland, Denmark, 
Hungary and Benelux).  In a second phase we have consulted national experts to verify and complement 
our research. 
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We have consulted sources going back to 2006, the previous period being covered in the IViR studies.  
The research period ends on 30 June 2013. 
I. The right of making available to the public:  status quo 
The first part of this Study will bring together the current notion of the “making available right” and the 
current understanding of the “territoriality” principle.  The relation between the making available right and 
the “territorial” nature of copyright protection is examined in the context of the Information Society 
Directive.   
The protection and enforcement of the exclusive rights in copyright is organised on the national level, but 
this principle of national territoriality is challenged by multi-territorial transactions, in particular Internet 
transactions which (mostly) cover more than one national territory.  This tension appears sharply in the 
making available right.   
Before considering the potential issues arising from the territorial nature of the making available right, it is 
necessary to examine the content of this particular right.  First, it will be examined how the right of making 
available to the public is applied and understood in the Member States, by the national courts and in 
scholarly literature (sub A).  Then a closer look will be given to the territoriality principle, as it is 
understood by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and at the international level.  We will 
then summarise the territorial reach of the material acts protected under copyright and how the legal 
consequences are mitigated in the European copyright context (by the “country of origin” principle for 
satellite broadcasts and the exhaustion principle for the distribution of goods). (sub B).   
It is assumed that the uncertain scope of the making available right and the principle of national 
territoriality of copyright (and therefore the making available right) lead to a legal uncertainty as to the 
overall protection offered under this exclusive right.  This assumption is tested in the last section of this 
part, where selected legal issues are described (sub C).  We will describe the current state of conflict of 
law rules (jurisdiction and applicable law), the national rules on authorship, initial ownership and transfer 
of right, and finally a description of the cumulative protection under the reproduction right will be given
3
.  
A. “Making available to the public”:  notion 
As a start of our reflection on the making available right and its territorial attaches, the first challenge is to 
understand which acts are exactly protected under this particular exclusive right.  The notion of making a 
work or other protected subject matter available to the public should be delineated before it can be 
attached to the territory of one (or several) Member State(s).   
Following the Information Society Directive, the Member States are obliged to protect as an act of 
communication to the public:  “the making available to the public of their works in such a way that 
members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them” (art. 3 
InfoSoc Directive).  This right was granted, as a part of the general right of communication to the public, 
for authors and, as a specific right, for performers, phonogram producers, producers of the first fixations 
of films and broadcasting organisations
4
. 
The directive does not provide a precise definition of the making available right:  it is not clear which 
material acts are actually covered under this right and, importantly, which acts are not.  This lack of 
definition entails the risk that this exclusive economic right is interpreted differently in the Member States.  
The Court of Justice has not had the occasion to provide a definition of the right of making available to the 
                                                     
 
3 For this study, the national laws of 11 Member States of the European Union are examined :  Germany, France, United Kingdom, 
Benelux, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Italy and Spain.  No reported case law was found for Denmark on the making available right. 
4 This right was examined in the IViR Study on the implementation and effect of Directive 2001/29, p. 25-29. 
The territoriality of the making available right  26 
 
public.  It has touched upon related issues in Sportradar (reutilisation right of protected databases) and in 
UsedSoft (distribution right of computer programs) but neither case allows conclusions for the making 
available right as protected in the Information Society Directive. 
In this section, the general background of the making available right will be brought back to mind.  Then it 
will be examined in the accessible sources whether, after the 2007 IViR study on the implementation and 
the effect of the Information Society Directive, this notion has been clarified in the selected Member 
States’ court decisions or scholarly literature.  This approach will allow us to examine the implications of 
the territorial nature of this exclusive economic right. 
1. Origin 
The right of making a work available to the public in the Information Society Directive has its origin in the 
WIPO Internet Treaties (1996)
5
.  The WCT provides the “exclusive right of authorizing any communication 
to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them” in favour of authors of literary and artistic works (art. 8 WCT), thus 
completing the specific rights recognised in the Berne Convention (Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 
11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) BC).  The WPPT provides this right in favour of performers and 
producers of phonograms (for the performances fixed in phonograms resp. the phonograms – art. 10 and 
14 WPPT). 
As a contracting party, the European Union had the obligation to implement this protection in its own legal 
order (and therefore the Member States’).  The fact that the making available right in the Information 
Society Directive has its origin in the WIPO Internet Treaties entails that the WIPO documents can be 
used for the interpretation of this right at the European and national levels
6
. 
2. Scope of protection 
The Information Society Directive grants the making available right to authors (of all types of works), 
performers, producers of phonograms and first fixations of films and broadcasting organisations, each for 
their own protected subject matter.   
The making available right has a broad and general scope.  It applies regardless of the technology used 
to make the protected subject matter available to the public (Internet technology, including Web 
applications or interactive television) or to access the protected materials (computers, television sets, 
“smart phones” or other portable devices).  Consequently the making available right has its importance for 
various commercial or non-commercial sectors (the music and audiovisual sectors, book and news 
publishing, but also for less traditional sectors in which more non-professional “users” are active, such as 
blogging and social networking sites).  In this respect, the making available right is different from the right 
of satellite broadcasting, which is de facto only applied within the audiovisual sector.  
The making available right should furthermore be understood in the context of the Information Society 
Directive.  On the one hand its classification as a species of the right of communication to the public has 
certain ramifications, as does the distinction from the distribution right.  These aspects will be examined 
here, before verifying how the making available right has been applied in the Member States. 
                                                     
 
5 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), both adopted in Geneva on December 
20, 1996. 
6 See inter alia CJEU 7 December 2006, case C-306/05, SGAE v Rafael Hoteles (Rafael Hoteles);  CJEU 15 March 2012, case C-
135/10 Consorzio Fonografici v Del Corso (Del Corso). 
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a) Place in the InfoSoc Directive 
The making available right is embedded in the Information Society Directive, in which other exclusive 
economic rights are provided as well, in particular the right of communication to the public and the 
distribution right.  The place given to the making available right in this Directive may teach us something 
about its content. 
(i) Making available right as a communication to the public 
At least as far as the authors’ copyright is concerned, the making available right is protected as a species 
of the right of communication to the public, not as a sui generis right
7
.  This general right of 
communication to the public in the Information Society Directive also protects other types of 
communication, such as broadcasting, simulcasting or webcasting (rec. 23 InfoSoc Dir). For example, in 
TVCatchup, the CJEU decided that the retransmission via the Internet of works included in terrestrial TV 
broadcasts should be considered a communication to the public in the sense of art. 3 InfoSoc Dir
8
.   
The making available right is distinguished from the broadcasting right
9
.  Whereas various aspects of the 
broadcasting right have been regulated in various directives (in order to limit it in the one or the other 
respect
10
), the exclusive nature of the making available right is explicitly confirmed in the Information 
Society Directive (rec. 25)
11
.  The distinctive factor seems to be the control over the timing of 
transmission.  In case of broadcasts or so-called “push services”, the sender controls the transmission of 
the work (by contrast to the user choosing when and where to access the works at her individual 
demand).  In case of a broadcast, the broadcaster determines the linear programme and the user’s 
access coincides with the transmission of the programmes
12
.  With a sliding scale of interactivity, such 
distinction is not always easy to make
13
.  The exact delineation and relation between the rights of 
communication to the public, broadcasting and making available is beyond the scope of this Study.   
The fact that the making available right is categorised under the legal umbrella of the communication to 
the public right logically entails that the (inherent) limitations to the right of communication to the public 
also apply to the making available right
14
.  Consequently, the making available right only covers 
                                                     
 
7 This is not necessarily true for the making available right in the WIPO treaties :  see B. LINDNER, “The WIPO Treaties” in B. 
LINDNER & T. SHAPIRO, Copyright in the Information Society, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011, 18. 
8 CJEU 7 March 2013, case C-607/11, ITV Broadcasting e.a. v TVCatchup (TVCatchup). 
9 See on the difficult delineation between both rights the IViR Study on the implementation and effect of Directive 2001/29, p. 27 et 
s. ;  M. VAN EECHOUD, “Het Communautair Acquis voor auteursrecht en naburige rechten: Zeven zonden of zestien gelukkige 
jaren?”, AMI 2007, 4, 115. 
10 See Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission OJ L 248, 6 October 1993, p. 15–21 (SatCab 
Directive) and Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and 
lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version), OJ L 376, 27 December  
2006, p. 28–35 (Rental and Lending Directive). 
11 In the case Del Corso, the distinction between the broadcasting right and the making available right was touched upon but no in 
depth analysis was made.  The referring court had asked whether the listening to programmes in a dental practice is an act of 
making available to the public in the sense of the Information Society Directive.  The CJEU reformulated this question to test this 
practice to the broadcasting right of art. 8(2) Directive 92/100.  This reformulation was motivated succinctly in the sense that the 
issue in the main proceeding was the broadcasting of music in a dental practice for the benefit of the patients present and not 
interactive on-demand transmission.  See Del Corso, par. 57-60. 
12 S. VON LEWINSKI & M.M. WALTER, “Information Society Directive” in M.M. WALTER & S. VON LEWINSKI (ed), European 
Copyright Law, Oxford, University Press, 2010, 983 et s., nr. 11.3.31-33. 
13 Cf. P.B. HUGENHOLTZ e.a., The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy. IViR, 2006, accessible 
via http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006.pdf, 56; VON LEWINSKI & 
WALTER, “Information Society Directive”, 984, nr. 11.3.32-33. 
14 In this sense :  M. RICOLFI, ‘Comunicazione al pubblico e distribuzione’, Annali Italiani Diritto Autore (AIDA), 2002, 61.  This 
author considers that the concept of communication to the public should not be influenced by the various means of transmission 
through which content is delivered and by their distinct technical characteristics.  According to this author, the right of 
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hypotheses in which access to protected subject matter is given to a “public”, as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice
15
.  Furthermore, this qualification as an act of communication to the public should entail that the 
act of communicating is protected but not the act of merely receiving the work (in private)
16
.   
All this entails that any legislative or interpretative intervention on the making available right should be 
coherent with the right of communication to the public.  This is all the more pressing, considering that 
many service providers (such as streaming services) offer both “on demand” and “broadcasting” services.  
Any contradiction between the legal regimes to which either type of service is subject should be avoided. 
(ii) Making available right contrasted to the distribution right 
The making available right may furthermore be contrasted to the distribution right (art. 4 InfoSoc Directive) 
or the rental or lending rights (art. 3 Rental and Lending Directive).   
The Member States are required to provide “for authors, in respect of the original of their works or of 
copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any form of distribution to the public by sale or 
otherwise” (art. 4 InfoSoc Dir).  This distribution right is exhausted “within the Community in respect of the 
original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community 
of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent” (art. 4(2) InfoSoc Dir)
17
.   
The distribution right protects “acts which entail, and only acts which entail, a transfer of the ownership of 
that object”
18
 and the offer of such transfer of ownership
19
.  In Donner the CJEU decided that the 
distribution to the public is “characterised by a series of acts going, at the very least, from the conclusion 
of a contract of sale to the performance thereof by delivery to a member of the public”
20
.   
This right is restricted to tangible originals or copies of works or other subject matter (rec. 27 InfoSoc 
Dir
21
).  The exhaustion rule only applies to a particular copy, sold with the consent of the right holder.  The 
classification of the making available right under the right of communication to the public, instead of the 
distribution right, entails that the exhaustion principle by virtue of art. 4(2) InfoSoc Dir does not apply to 
subsequent acts of communication of the work
22
.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
communication to the public comes into play when content is transmitted in a way that a plurality of persons, who are not physically 
present where the activity of communications occurs, is placed in a position to access and enjoy copyright works, and this plurality 
of persons is qualified as a ‘public’. The author makes it clear that, in order to have distant communications with a public, what 
matters is the emission of the content signal and the making available of such content through networks, and not the actual and 
effective reception by the addressees.  
15 See CJEU 14 July 2005, Case C-192/04, Lagardère Active Broadcast v Société pour la perception de la rémunération équitable 
(SPRE) and Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL), Reports of Cases 2005 I-07199 (Lagardère) ; 
CJEU 7 December 2006, case nr. C-306/05, SGAE v Rafael Hoteles;  CJEU 4 October 2011, joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, 
Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd (C-429/08) (hereafter “FAPL” or “Premier League”);  CJEU 13 October 2011, joined cases C-431/09 and C-432/09, 
Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) (C-431/09) and 
Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA (C-432/09) (Airfield);  CJEU 15 March 2012, case C-135/10 Consorzio Fonografici v Del Corso;  
CJEU 15 March 2012, case C-162/10, Phonographic Performance v Ireland (PPI);. CJEU 7 March 2013, case C-607/11, ITV 
Broadcasting e.a. v TVCatchup. 
16 See Premier League, par. 171. 
17 We refer to the study on the exception for people with a disability for a discussion of the exhaustion rule. 
18 CJEU 17 April 2008, case C-456/06, Peek & Cloppenburg v Cassina, par.36.  Critical :  VON LEWINSKI & WALTER, 
“Information Society Directive”, 994-995.  According to these authors, forms of distribution without transfer of ownership should also 
be protected under this right, e.g. rental rights. 
19 VON LEWINSKI & WALTER, “Information Society Directive”, 996, par. 11.4.14. 
20 CJEU 21 June 2012, case C-5/11, criminal proceedings against Titus Donner, par. 26 (Donner).  
21 VON LEWINSKI & WALTER, “Information Society Directive”, 993, par. 11.4.6. 
22 It is specified that the rights of communication to the public and making available to the public are not exhausted by any act of 
communication or making available to the public (art. 3(3) Information Society Directive).  According GOLDSTEIN and 
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The Court of justice came to another conclusion in UsedSoft in relation to computer programmes under 
the Computer Programs Directive (the Information Society Directive does not apply here)
23
.   
The facts of this case can be summarised as follows.  Oracle was a software company that held the copyrights 
to the developed computer programmes.  The software (client-server software) was distributed by download via 
the Internet (from Oracle’s website to the customer’s computer).  The “user rights” granted by a licence 
agreement included the right to store the computer programme on a server and to access it from a number of 
work stations by downloading it to the main memory of their work stations.  The “user right” was meant 
exclusively for internal business purposes, for an unlimited period of time, it was non-exclusive, non-transferable 
and free of charge (UsedSoft, par. 23).  The updates and patches could be downloaded from the Oracle site (as 
part of the maintenance agreement).  Group licences were available for 25 users per licence.  UsedSoft traded 
in used software licences. It acquired user licences from Oracle customers (or part of their licences) (“first 
acquirer”).  It offers already used but “current” Oracle licences, for which the maintenance agreement was still in 
force (between the initial licence holder and Oracle).  The UsedSoft customers (“second acquirers”), who did not 
already possess a copy, downloaded the software directly from Oracle’s servers, after acquiring a “used” licence 
from UsedSoft.  The UsedSoft customers who already possessed a copy but purchased an extension of the 
licence (for additional users) from UsedSoft could copy the program to the work posts of those additional users. 
Generally, the question was whether the UsedSoft customers, who have acquired a used licence, infringe 
Oracle’s copyright under the Computer Programs Directive (CPD)
24
, by using the software.  The answer 
required the analysis of the exception for technical acts (applicable to the download and the reproductions of the 
software by the second acquirer) and of the exhaustion rule relating to the distribution right.  We will focus on the 
latter part of the decision. 
The Computer Programs Directive grants a right to control “any form of distribution to the public, including the 
rental, of the original computer program or of copies thereof” (art. 4 CPD).  However, this distribution right 
is subject to exhaustion:  “the first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with 
his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that copy, with the exception of 
the right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof” (art. 4(2) CPD).The Court decided that 
the “right of distribution of a copy of a computer program is exhausted if the copyright holder who has 
authorised, even free of charge, the downloading of that copy from the internet onto a data carrier has also 
conferred, in return for payment of a fee intended to enable him to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the 
economic value of the copy of the work of which he is the proprietor, a right to use that copy for an unlimited 
period” (UsedSoft, par. 72).   
The Court concluded that an offer for download of a computer programme, by the right holder, could in these 
circumstances lead to the exhaustion of the distribution right, taking a stance on some pertinent legal issues. 
First sale.  It was found that the authorised download of the copy and the licence, taken together as an 
indivisible whole (UsedSoft, par. 44), should be considered a “first sale”, which could lead to exhaustion (art. 
4(2) CPD).  The term “sale” encompasses “all forms of product marketing characterised by the grant of a right to 
use a copy of a computer program, for an unlimited period, in return for a payment of a fee designed to enable 
the copyright holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the copy of the work” 
(UsedSoft par. 49).  It matters not that the copy of the program was acquired by download or in the shape of a 
DVD or a CD-ROM. 
Making available to the public.  It was argued that the offer for download is not an act of distribution but an act 
of making available, which is not subject to exhaustion.  The Court ruled that the making available of copies of a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
HUGENHOLTZ this principle of non-exhaustion entails that multiple licences are required when a work is offered online in more than 
one country of the European Union.  See P. GOLDSTEIN & P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, International Copyright, Oxford, University Press, 
2010, 330. 
23 CJEU 3 July 2012, case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp (UsedSoft). 
24 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs (Codified version), OJ L 111, 5 May 2009, p. 16–22 . 
The territoriality of the making available right  30 
 
computer program does not constitute a “making available to the public” in the sense of art. 3(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive (UsedSoft, par. 50).  Therefore it cannot be derived (directly) that the exhaustion rule does not apply 
(as is the case for the making available right in the InfoSoc Directive).  The legal grounds were that computer 
programs are dealt with in the Computer Programs Directive, left intact by the younger Information Society 
Directive and a lex specialis in relation to this latter directive (UsedSoft, par. 51). 
“Intangible” v “tangible” copies.  Furthermore it was defended that the distribution right and its exhaustion 
only apply with regard to tangible copies.  According to the Court, the exhaustion rule applies to copies of the 
computer program, both in tangible or intangible form (UsedSoft par. 55).  Moreover, the exhaustion extends to 
the copy of the computer program sold as corrected and updated by the copyright holder (UsedSoft, par. 68).  
The functionalities corrected, altered or added on the basis of a maintenance agreement (patches and updates) 
form an integral part of the originally downloaded copy and can be used for an unlimited period by the acquirer 
(UsedSoft, par. 67) even if the maintenance agreement is not renewed.  The Court accepted that the distribution 
right was exhausted in respect of a copy that was not the specific copy, first sold with the consent of the right 
holder, but a “functional equivalent” instead (UsedSoft, par. 61).  The exhaustion rule is not unlimited.  It does 
not permit the first acquirer to divide the licence and sell the rights for the computer program exceeding the 
number accesses she needs (UsedSoft, par. 69).  The exhaustion rule requires the first acquirer to make her 
own copy unusable.  Similarly, the exhaustion rule does not extend to acquisition (secondary distribution) of 
additional licences.   
The consequence of this interpretation was that the second acquirer could be considered as a “lawful 
[acquirer] of a copy of a computer program within the meaning of Article 5(1) CPD and benefit from the 
right of reproduction provided for in that provision” (UsedSoft, par. 88).  The interpretation of the 
exhaustion rule of the distribution of computer programs thus affected the interpretation of the exception 
for technical acts performed by a lawful acquirer to enable the use of the computer program (art. 5(1) 
CPD). 
While it is thus admitted that the distribution right may be subject to exhaustion in case of computer 
programs offered for download with the right holder’s consent, the Court was careful to emphasise that it 
reached this decision based on the Computer Programs Directive.  It was stressed that this exhaustion 
rule constituted a lex specialis in relation to the Information Society Directive (UsedSoft, par. 51, 56).  The 
Court gives reasons to assume that this reasoning cannot be transposed as such to other works, 
protected under the Information Society Directive.   
It can be noted that a first case has been decided in Germany, on the offer for download of e-books and 
audio books
25
.  The claimant in this case (a consumer organisation) opposed the restrictive user’s 
licence, which allowed only the personal use of the e-books and audio books but not the dissemination or 
the use by third parties.  It relied inter alia on the UsedSoft ruling to demonstrate that the user’s rights 
under the licence were restricted to an excessive extent.  The court rejected the claim. Its decision was 
based on notions of German property law and contract law but also copyright law.  It was decided that the 
user’s licence did not result in an excessive disadvantage to the user with regard to inter alia the 
exhaustion of the distribution right in the German copyright act (UrhG). 
The court stated that the exhaustion rule does not apply in case of online transmission of media items 
such as audio books, neither in case of a simple download, nor when the user has subsequently copied 
(incorporated) the work on a tangible object.  In the opinion of the court, there was no act of distribution, 
since an online transmission does not entail any circulation of tangible copies.  Instead, such transmission 
should be qualified as an act of making available to the public.  The end-user alone makes a reproduction 
of the work, with the authorisation of the right holder by virtue of the use right.  The exhaustion rule in 
                                                     
 
25 Landgericht Bielefeld 5 March 2013, case nr. 4 O 191/11, accessible via 
http://www.boersenverein.de/sixcms/media.php/976/LG_Bielefeld_vom_05.03.13_Klage_Verbraucherzentralen.pdf.  See also E. 
LINKLATER, “Waiting for a lower court to rein in resale? You’d sooner herd cats”, The IPKat, 1 May 2013, accessible via 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.be/2013/05/waiting-for-lower-court-to-reign-in.html.  It is reported that the decision would be appealed. 
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§17(II) UrhG is only applicable to the dissemination of specific tangible copies of the work and to the 
distribution right (§17(I) UrhG), but not to the reproduction right nor to the making available right.  
The Court went on to consider the fate of tangible copies, which the user made after downloading the 
work.  It decided that there is no exhaustion of the distribution right for such goods, even though the 
matter was considered controversial.  The court referred to the discussions in relation to software, which 
is installed on a data support after an online transmission, and to the decisions of the courts of appeal 
dismissing exhaustion with regard to the reproduction right and forms of intangible dissemination of the 
work.  The court found support in the Information Society Directive to reject exhaustion in case of online 
transmissions (art. 3(1) and art. 3(3) and rec. 29 InfoSoc Dir).  The Court disregarded the CJEU’s ruling in 
the UsedSoft case, considering that this decision was based solely on the Computer Programs Directive.  
While the European legislator had demonstrated its will to treat tangible and intangible forms of computer 
programs equally, this was not the case in the Information Society Directive that limits the exhaustion rule 
to tangible copies.  The court finally noted that the Computer Programs Directive only applies to computer 
programs, not to music (MP3s) or books (e-books) that are only governed by the Information Society 
Directive.  Furthermore, the UsedSoft decision cannot remedy that there is no exhaustion of the 
reproduction right.  By conclusion, the UsedSoft ruling of the CJEU was not extended to the online 
transmission of e-books and audio books and the exhaustion rule could not be relied upon to invalidate 
the terms of the licence granting mere use rights and prohibiting the resale of the e-books and audio 
books. 
In the USA a District Court of New York ruled in the same sense in a case opposing Capitol Records to 
ReDigi
26
.  ReDigi was presented as a marketplace where users can re-sell the music tracks (in digital 
format) they have previously acquired and no longer want.  ReDigi’s service is used via software that 
verifies the legitimate source of the music track (e.g. iTunes) and makes sure that no copy of the track is 
kept after the resale
27
.  The user who resells her music does not receive money in return but credits, 
which can only be spent via ReDigi.  ReDigi earns a fee for every transaction.   
The question was whether ReDigi’s service constituted an infringement of the exclusive rights under 
copyright or if it benefited from any limitations of these rights, in particular the first sale doctrine.  The 
Court decided that it did not:  the operations via ReDigi’s service required that right holders’ consent.   
The Court first assessed whether the rights of reproduction, and distribution were infringed
28
, the making 
available to the public not being protected as such.  The Court found that ReDigi’s service infringed the 
reproduction right
29
, even if the first copy at the seller’s vanished when the track was “sold” to another 
user and, and at the end of the transaction, only one copy of the track subsisted.  The Court also found 
that music tracks were sold via ReDigi’s music and this resulted in an infringement of the distribution right.  
ReDigi’s fair use defence was rejected and so was its first sale defence.  Under the first sale defence, the 
exclusive right to control the distribution of a copy of a copyrighted work is exhausted once the copyright 
owner has placed it in the stream of commerce by selling it.  It was argued that the digital music tracks 
were lawfully purchased via iTunes and that the purchaser was free to resell these tracks, protected by 
the first sale defence.  The Court did not accept this defence:  the first sale doctrine does not entitle the 
owner of a particular copy to make additional copies.  The sending and storage of a copy on ReDIgi’s 
                                                     
 
26 US District Court Southern District of New York 30 March 30 March 2013, case No 12 Civ. 95 (RJS), accessible via 
http://ia600800.us.archive.org/30/items/gov.uscourts.nysd.390216/gov.uscourts.nysd.390216.109.0.pdf.  It is reported that this 
decision would be appealed. 
27 It may be observed that ReDigi cannot verify with certainty whether no other copies are kept, such as backup copies on other 
devices. 
28 In the context of the summary proceedings the Court did not find an infringement of the performance right, which allegedly 
consisted in a 30 second preview of the tracks.  The dispute on whether this preview was covered by a licence was not solved in 
this decision. 
29 If should be mentioned that under American copyright formulates the reproduction right by reference to a certain subject matter 
(« sound recording ») and a certain support (« phonorecord ») (17USC §106(1)).  The reproduction right in the Information Society 
Directive does not contain such precise indications. 
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server entailed the making of further copies, not the transfer of the “particular copy” on the user’s 
computer.  In ReDigi’s system, and given the nature of digital technology, the copy that the user 
downloaded from iTunes was not the same copy as the one re-sold via ReDigi.  Because the additional 
copies were infringing, their further distribution was also infringing: first sale defence did not protect the 
distribution of Capitol Record’s tracks by ReDigi, since the reproductions were not lawfully made.  The 
Court added, for clarity’s sake, that the first sale defence was thus restricted to the distribution of material 
items, put in the stream of commerce.  The Court refused to extend this defence to new forms of online 
exploitation, considering that such required an explicit policy stance and a legislative intervention. 
In summary, the US court decided that a platform for reselling digital music tracks, which had been 
lawfully acquired, required the right holder’s consent.  Although the US copyright law does not provide a 
right titled “making available to the public” and online transmissions of downloads are covered under the 
distribution right, the first sale did not lead to an exhaustion of the distribution right in favour of the first 
acquirer who wishes to resell her lawfully acquired copy.  The first sale defence cannot offer protection for 
such service, which functions based on distinct reproductions rather than the redistribution of a particular 
material object. 
In summary, we have placed the right of making available in the context of the Information Society 
Directive.  On the one hand, the making available right is considered a species of the right of 
communication to the public, which entails that it shares the characteristic features of its umbrella right.  
The making available right should be distinguished from other species of the right of communication to 
the public, in particular the broadcasting right.  Some forms of exploitation present features of both types 
of communication and cannot be qualified easily.  On the other hand, the making available right should be 
distinguished from the distribution right, which is subject to the exhaustion rule.  The ruling in UsedSoft 
cannot be extended directly to the making available of other works than computer programs, since it was 
issued under the Computer Programs Directive rather than the Information Society Directive.   
We will continue our examination of the making available right in the decisions of the national courts of 
the Member States.  We will discuss the following elements found in the description of the right in the 
Information Society Directive: 
 Making available  
 To the public 
 On demand accessibility (time and place) 
Hereafter it will be examined how these components have been clarified in the European and national 
legal orders. 
b) Making available 
The right of making available to the public protects the act of making a work (or other protected subject 
matter) available for interactive on demand transmissions (rec. 25 InfoSoc Directive).   
This right was designed to offer protection against the exploitation of works via computer networks (in 
particular the Web but other applications are covered as well).  The typical scheme is the following:  the 
“content” (protected works, often protected performances, phonograms or films) is stored (hosted) on a 
server (or a computer performing that function) to which users have access via a network and another 
device (client).  The transmissions are technically similar to private communications (e.g. telephone 
communications or e-mail correspondence).    To remove all doubt on the protection of interactive forms 
of exploitation, this right covers the fact that protected subject matter is offered to a public that is larger 
than the addressee of a “private” communication, even if it is followed by a one-to-one transmission. 
Starting point.  This right protects the “availability” of the work for consultation by a member of the public.  
The starting point is the stage preceding the transmission of the subject matter.  It applies regardless of 
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whether the subject matter has actually been consulted
30
.  It suffices that the public has the possibility to 
access the content, even if no one uses this possibility
31
. 
Publication v Hyperlinking.  In some cases this is fairly straightforward.  A Dutch court was seized by a 
journalist whose articles had been published on several websites without his permission
32
.  The website 
owner did not dispute that a copyright infringement had taken place but he did challenge the modalities of 
the infringement.  In particular he asserted that the publication on distinct websites did not amount to 
distinct acts of communication (although it was not clear whether the websites used the same underlying 
databases and servers).  The Court decided that the publication of the articles on each independent 
website amounted to a distinct act of communication to the public (openbaarmaking), especially since the 
intervention was more far-reaching than merely providing a hyperlink or a deeplink to another website.  
This “making available” (beschikbaarstelling”) should be considered a separate infringement. By contrast, 
mere “surface links” (which lead visitors of a certain domain name immediately to another website) did not 
constitute a distinct act of making available from the publication on the website to which the link leads.  
This decision could suggest that the practice of embedding content in a different environment (e.g. 
another website or another media space such as a social networking space) could be seen as an 
additional act of making available, but it is not conclusive given the circumstances that the Court explicitly 
mentioned that the user did more than just adding a hyperlink and that the common source of the 
websites was not established
33
. 
In another Dutch case, it was decided that an act of communication to the public (openbaarmaking) of a 
number of educational works was performed, when the owner of a website (a teacher) provided 
hyperlinks to the servers where these works were stored
34
.  The website owner’s role went further than 
the mere provision of hyperlinks, since it appeared from the publishers’ tests that the website owner had 
stored the works on the server and controlled whether the works remained available.  The combination of 
the control over the server and the publication of the hyperlinks giving access to the works constituted an 
infringement of the publishers’ exclusive rights.  The Court of appeal of Amsterdam considered that it was 
not proven that the teacher had published the textbooks on the Internet nor that he had taken special 
measures to allow third parties to access these, hence an act of communication to the public could not be 
found.  The Court of appeal did however find a wrongful act and confirmed the decision of the first court
35
. 
Meanwhile a question on hyperlinking has been submitted to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling
36
.  The 
Swedish Supreme Court asked, broadly speaking, whether providing a hyperlink to a work constitutes a 
communication to the public, if it matters whether access is restricted or not, if a distinction should be 
                                                     
 
30 S. VON LEWINSKI & M. M. WALTER, “Information Society Directive”, 983, par. 11.3.30;  B. LINDNER, “The WIPO Treaties”, 19. 
31 Similarly, in Rafael Hoteles, the CJEU has ruled that “it is sufficient that the work is made available to the public in such a way 
that the persons forming that public may access it”.  In relation to the installation of television set in hotel rooms, the Court declared 
that it is not decisive that customers who have not switched on the television have not actually had access to the works (Rafael 
Hoteles, par. 43).  The use of the term “making available to the public” is unfortunate in this context, since the transmission of a 
broadcast to individual hotel rooms was at stake. 
32 Arrondissementsrechtbank Haarlem 22 March 2006, Mom v VNU, AMI 2006, 4, 136-139, note KOELMAN. 
33 See on the subject of framing and other contextual links : A. STROWEL & V. HANLEY, “Secondary liability for copyright 
infringement with regard to hyperlinks”, in A. STROWEL (ed), Peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in copyright law, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009, 81. 
34 Rb Haarlem 17 August 2011, case nr 173726 / HA ZA 10-1325, accessible via http://ie-
forum.nl/index.php?//Onlosmakelijk+daaraan+verbonden+antwoorden////28941/.   
35 Court of appeal of Amsterdam 15 January 2013 (case nr. 200.095.838/01), accessible via http://ie-
forum.nl/index.php?//Eenvoudige+hyperlink+naar+antwoordboeken+en+uitwerkingen+onrechtmatig////31097/ and 
www.rechtspraak.nl. 
36 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt (Sweden) lodged on 18 October 2012 - Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, 
Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v Retreiver Sverige AB, case C-466/12 (Svensson).   
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made between a regular hyperlink and some type of embedded link and if the Member States are allowed 
to give a wider protection under the right of communication to the public
37
. 
The “European Copyright Society”, consisting of independent copyright scholars, has issued an opinion 
on the questions referred in the Svensson case
38
.  It was defended that hyperlinking in general should not 
be considered an act of communication to the public.  This conclusion was reached on several grounds.  
Firstly, it was contended that the right of communication to the public requires a transmission that is 
absent when merely a hyperlink is provided.  It is merely a location tool, but exists independently from the 
actual availability of the work.  Secondly, the communication should address a public or a “new” public.  
The hyperlink does not extend the public of the work, published online:  those who had access to the web 
page will still have access, those who did not have access (e.g. absent the payment of a fee) will not gain 
access through the hyperlink. 
Another preliminary question was submitted by the Swedish Supreme Court in the case opposing C More 
Entertainment AB to Linus Sandberg.  On his website, Mr Sandberg had linked to a website where C 
More Entertainment webcasted hockey matches (this website could not be found on the web and was 
protected by a paywall).  The question was asked whether the defendant performed an act of 
communication to the public by linking to C More Entertainment’s website
39
. 
Cloud services.  With the increasing use of “cloud services” the question arises which element is 
decisive for finding an act of making a work available to the public.  These services allow their users to 
store any content, including copyright protected material, online, on the service provider’s servers.  The 
user has access to its content via the hyperlink that the service provider creates and he can use this 
service as an online equivalent of storing (personal) files on a local disk (having access at any time and at 
any location without having to synchronise files on various media).  However, the user can also share the 
link with other people and consequently grant access to the stored content to a potentially large number 
of visitors.  
                                                     
 
37 Questions referred : 
If anyone other than the holder of copyright in a certain work supplies a clickable link to the work on his website, does that constitute 
communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society?  
Is the assessment under question 1 affected if the work to which the link refers is on a website on the Internet which can be 
accessed by anyone without restrictions or if access is restricted in some way? 
When making the assessment under question 1, should any distinction be drawn between a case where the work, after the user has 
clicked on the link, is shown on another website and one where the work, after the user has clicked on the link, is shown in such a 
way as to give the impression that it is appearing on the same website? 
Is it possible for a Member State to give wider protection to authors' exclusive right by enabling 'communication to the public' to 
cover a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society? 
38 EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT SOCIETY, Opinion on the reference to the CJEU in case C-466/12 Svensson, 15 February 2013, 
accessible via http://www.ivir.nl/news/European_Copyright_Society_Opinion_on_Svensson.pdf.  
39 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen (Sweden) lodged on 22 May 2013, Case C-279/13, C More 
Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg.  The following questions were referred: 
Does the expression communication to the public, within the meaning of Article 3(1) 1 of the Information Society Directive, include 
measures to make available on a website open to the public a clickable link to a work which is broadcast by the holder of the 
copyright in that work? 
Is the manner in which the linking is done relevant to the answer to question 1? 
Is it relevant if the access to the work to which the linking is done is in any way restricted? 
May the Member States give wider protection to the exclusive right of rightholders by enabling ‘communication to the public’ to cover 
a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive?  
May the Member States give wider protection to the exclusive right of authors by enabling ‘communication to the public’ to cover a 
greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive? 
See also “Mededeling aan het publiek bij aanklikbare link op toegankelijke site”, IE Forum, IEF 12808, 27 June 2013, via http://ie-
forum.nl/?//////12808. 
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While the Oberlandsgericht Hamburg had decided in 2008 that the mere upload of protected subject 
matter to a “cloud service”, such as Rapidshare, amounted to an act of making available, it has changed 
its position in 2012
40
.  It recognised that these cloud services meet users’ changed information needs (i.e. 
access to their personal files at any time and at any place due to increased mobility) and are not 
necessarily used to share works with a multitude of other viewers.  The mere upload to the “cloud service” 
is no longer decisive:  an act of making available is performed at the earliest at the moment when the 
links to the content are shared via the Internet with third parties, as a part of a download link collection
41
.   
A Dutch court of first instance issued a decision on the use of a similar service
42
.  A photographer had 
made a photo series of a Dutch celebrity for the magazine Playboy. Before the series was published in 
the magazine, the news and gossip website GeenStijl had published hyperlinks to copyright protected 
nude pictures, stored at two back-up services.  Publishing houses Sanoma and Playboy and the model 
took legal action against GeenStijl and claimed infringement of the right of communication to the public, in 
particular the making available right.  GeenStijl defended that the mere publication of a hyperlink does not 
amount to an act of making available to the public.  The Court put forward three relevant criteria:  a 
certain “intervention”, a (new) public and a profitable intent.  Firstly, the Court found that GeenStijl had 
indeed intervened in a relevant way.  The Court acknowledged that in principle hyperlinking by itself does 
not amount to an act of communication to the public.  In this case, however, the photos were available on 
a hosting and sharing site but the public could not find them (by means of a search engine) unless they 
had the exact URL.  By publishing the hyperlink on its website, GeenStijl had imparted the photos to its 
own public of 230.000 visitors per day.    The Court attributed that public accessibility to the publication of 
the URL on GeenStijl’s website, rather than to the fact that they were hosted on a server.  It mattered not 
that GeenStijl could not exert any control over the availability of the photos.  Moreover, it is apparent from 
the posts on the GeenStijl website that it indeed had the intention of making the pictures available to the 
public.  Secondly, it was verified whether a “communication to the public” must address a different public 
than the one aimed at in the original communication, i.e. a “new public”.  The court found that the visitors 
of the GeenStijl website was indeed a new public by comparison to the circle of people that had had 
access so far – which could not be seen as a public or at most as a very small public.  Thirdly, the Court 
found that GeenStijl had commercial intent by the publication of the URL.  The aim was to attract visitors 
to its website and it was established that the posts in which the URLs were communicated were among 
the most popular of that year. 
Not mere provision of physical facilities.  The making available right is further shaped by a “negative” 
delineation, as the “mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication” is not 
sufficient to be qualified as an act of making available (rec. 27 Information Society Directive).  In the basic 
proposal of what would become the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), the right of communication to the 
public as suggested by the European Community was taken over.  It was considered that “the relevant 
act is the making available of the work by providing access to it. What counts is the initial act of making 
the work available, not the mere provision of server space, communication connections, or facilities for 
the carriage and routing of signals” (note 10.10)
43
. 
Yet the providers of such facilities are often involved in cases regarding the unauthorised sharing of 
protected materials.  A number of decisions in several European jurisdictions have been issued on peer-
to-peer file sharing services.  In the most recent cases, the right holders focus rather on the 
intermediaries (the platform or software providers) than on the users who actually share the protected 
                                                     
 
40 A. SCHNEIDER, “OLG Hamburg:  Die Rapidshare-Entscheidung, ein Meilenstein?”, Telemedicus, 29 March 2012, retrieved via 
http://tlmd.in/a/2229.   
41 Press communication “Urheberrechtswidrige Downloads: Oberlandesgericht Hamburg entscheidet über Prüf- und 
Handlungspflichten des Online-Speicher-Dienstes „RapidShare“, 15 March 2012, 
http://justiz.hamburg.de/presseerklaerungen/3334434/pressemeldung-2012-03-15-olg.html in relation to the OLG Hamburg’s 
decision of 14 March 2012, Az. 5 U 87/09.   
42 Rb. Amsterdam 12 September 2012, Sanoma Media, Playboy Enterprises International and X v GS Media (GeenStijl), 
accessible via ww.iept.nl. 
43 Available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_dc_4.pdf. 
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materials.  Where these intermediaries are found responsible for the unauthorised exchanges, it is mostly 
considered that the users perform acts of making available to the public and the intermediaries are held 
responsible for these infringements based on general liability rules.   
In the case “Mininova”, a Dutch court decided in this sense that the provider of a BitTorrent platform 
(Mininova) did not perform any act of making protected material available to the public
44
, since it merely 
offered a platform via which users could share “torrents” with other users, i.e. information on the location 
of files (possibly) containing copyright protected material.  This information is by itself not protected under 
copyright and the service provider did not store the protected files (which were exchanged directly 
between the users).  By reference to the agreed statement on art. 8 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty
45
, 
the Court considered that the service provider merely facilitated the exchange of files between its users 
and therefore no direct infringement of the making available right was made.  Nevertheless, the service 
was considered unlawful under the general liability regime. 
A similar verdict was reached in a British version of the “The Pirate Bay” cases
46
.  The High Court found 
that the users of The Pirate Bay (not the provider of The Pirate Bay in this case) performed acts of 
copying, communication to the public and making available.  It was found, firstly, that the users 
communicated the recordings by electronic transmission, since “they make the recordings available by 
electronic transmission in such a way that members of the public may access the recordings from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them within section 20(2)(b)”.  Secondly, a new public was 
addressed, i.e. a public which was not taken into account by the right holders when the distribution of 
recordings was authorised (i.e. the purchasers of copies from authorised sources), according to the test 
laid down by the CJEU in “SGAE”, “Premier League” and “Airfield”.  It seems that the slightly different 
wording of the making available right in the British CPDA to the InfoSoc Directive has not prevented the 
qualification of “uploading” into a peer-to-peer network as an act of making available to the public
47
. 
Although the servers of The Pirate Bay were located outside the UK, the Court did not consider it 
necessary to determine where the restricted act took place (emission theory v transmission theory).  
Instead, it focused on the place where the users of The Pirate Bay were located, i.e. the users who allow 
copies of a sound recording on their computers to be uploaded to the “swarm”.  Since UK users are 
involved in both acts of uploading and downloading, it was held immaterial whether the act of 
communication to the public is committed at the place of origination or the place of reception
48
.  A similar 
                                                     
 
44 Rb. Utrecht 26 August 2009, LJN BJ6008; B9 8127, Brein v Mininova, AMI 2009, 215-217.  The Court of appeal of Amsterdam 
ruled in the same sense on a specialised search engines for MP3s that the search engine provider performed a wrongful act under 
the general rules of civil liability.  The first judge had decided that it did not perform any acts of communication to the public (unlike 
its users), but the Court of appeal did not take a stance on this point:  Gerechtshof Amsterdam 15 June 2006, Rolnummer 1157/04, 
“ZoekMP3”, AMI 2006/5, 173.  In this sense also Voorzieningenrechter Rb Amsterdam 22 oktober 2009, Neij c.s. v Brein, AMI 
2010/1, 18-24, note HUGENHOLTZ.  The Court of appeal of ‘s Gravenshage rejected a criminal action against such facilitator as 
non-admissible:  Gerechtshof ‘s Gravenshage 22 December 2010, “eDonkey”, AMI 2011/5, 183-186, note M.J.A. DUKER.  An 
injunction was granted against a website owner which offered a sports programme guide and links to live streams via P2P groups, 
not based on a direct infringement of the making available right but the wrongful facilitating of such infringing exchanges:  Vz. Rb. 
Den Haag 22 March 2011, KNVB and UFA Sports c.s. v MyP2P Holding, AMI 2011/3, 108.   
45 “It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to 
communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that nothing in Article 8 precludes 
a Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis(2)”. 
46 UK High Court of Justice 20 February 2012, Dramatico Entertainment Limited e.a. v British Sky Broadcasting Limited e.a. 
EWHC. (2012), retrieved from http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/268.html.  
47 Whereas the InfoSoc Directive covers the act of making available to the public by wire or wireless means, the CDPA protects 
« the making available to the public of the work by electronic transmission in such a way that members of the public may access it 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them ».  It was feared that this expression would exclude acts of uploading, since 
the uploader « does not transmit material when they upload material onto the hard drive of their computers and store in shared 
folders ».  See H. KRISTJAN LARUSSON. (2009). Uncertainty in the Scope of Copyright: The Case of Illegal File-Sharing in the UK. 
E.I.P.R., 31(3), 126. 
48 See par. 68 of the decision. 
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conclusion was reached in EMI v BSkyB
49
.  It was considered that the users of file sharing websites, who 
select a torrent file and download it without the author’s consent, copies the content in the files and thus 
infringes copyright.  It was established that users of these websites have accounts with British access 
providers and are therefore in the UK.  The Court concluded that UK users of the torrent sites infringed 
the copyrights (reproduction right).  With regard to the right of communication to the public, the Court 
considered that the torrent site users who upload content do communicate works to the public since they 
make the recordings available by electronic transmission, via the torrent websites, in such a way that 
members of the public may access the recordings from a place and at a time individually chosen by those 
members of the public.   
In another case, the UK High Court of Justice found that the provider of Usenet service “Newzbin” itself 
was guilty of making protected works belonging to major film studios available to the public
50
.  Newzbin 
not only offered a technical cataloguing and indexing system that enabled its paying premium members to 
identify films and download them, but it had also set up a sophisticated editorial system.  This led the 
Court to decide that Newzbin made the films available to a new audience, consisting of its premium 
members (by reference to the CJEU’s ruling in “Rafael Hoteles”).  Furthermore, the premium members 
themselves considered that Newzbin offered the films via the Newzbin index.  The Court concluded that 
the service provider was not remotely passive, its actions exceeded the simple linking to a film, made 
available by a third party.   
It was reported that, after this ruling, Newzbin went into voluntary liquidation and the original website 
ceased operating.  A successor website began operating from the same address, by unknown individuals, 
and its operation was moved offshore, outside the court’s jurisdiction
51
.  The right holders then turned 
against the access provider BT, which was ordered to block its users from accessing the illegal file 
sharing website. 
Endpoint.  While the starting point of this exclusive right is undisputed, it is not clear how far the making 
available right extends and, in particular, whether the transmission following the availability is part of the 
restricted act.  Some consider that this right covers “the whole act of communication, including the upload 
and the entire transmission to the download”
52
.  Others are not so sure
53
.  The legal provisions do not 
specify that the making available right extends to the transmission of the work.  Furthermore, it is often 
stated that the making available per se is protected, regardless of whether the work is actually accessed 
(and therefore transmitted).  A possibility is that the transmission alone is not protected or that it may be 
protected as a distinct act of communication.  
                                                     
 
49 UK High Court of Justice 28 February 2013 [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), EMI and others v British Sky Broadcasting and others, nrs. 
24 and 38 et s. 
50 UK High Court of Justice 29 March 2010, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Anor v Newzbin Ltd., EWHC 2010, retrieved 
from http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/608.html.  This decision was followed by an action against the internet service 
provider BT in UK High Court 28 July 2011, [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), accessible via 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2011/1981.html.   See also “Son of NewzBin: another victory for the film-makers”, The 
IPKat, 28 July 2011, accessible via http://ipkitten.blogspot.be/2011/07/son-of-newzbin-another-victory-for-film.html.  
51 A. MOIR & D. PEARCE, “High Court orders BT to block its customers from accessing an unlawful file sharing site: Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications Plc.”, E.I.P.R.2, 33(11), 736-738. 
52 A. PEUKERT, “Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law”. in G. HANDL & J. ZEKOLL (Eds.), Beyond 
Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization Queen Mary Studies in International Law, Brill Academic 
Publishing, Leiden/Boston, 2011, retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592263, p. 17.  In this sense also J. REINBOTHE & S. 
VON LEWINSKI, The WIPO Treaties 1996, London, Butterworths, 2002,108. 
53 A. OHLY, “Economic rights” in E. DERCLAYE (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2009, 225 ;  M. SCHLESINGER, “Legal issues in peer-to-peer file sharing, focusing on the making available right” in A. 
STROWEL (ed), Peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in copyright law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009, 47, 68.  S. VON 
LEWINSKI & M. M. WALTER, “Information Society Directive, 983, par. 11.3.30 (where it is indicated in footnote 145 that the 
question is controversial, with reference to J. REINBOTHE & S. VON LEWINSKI, The WIPO Treaties 1996, art. 8 nr. 21  
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This issue was one of the questions (indirectly) considered in the “Sportradar” cases
54
.  Football Dataco 
and others were the operators of a football database, Football Live, and claimed that the defendants 
under the name Sportradar (one registered in Germany, the other one in Switzerland) infringed their 
exclusive database rights, by offering football data services including data relating to British football 
matches.  In order to determine its jurisdiction in this case, the Court had to consider where the acts of 
extraction and re-utilisation took place.  With respect of the re-utilisation of the database, the question 
was whether the act took place where server is situated, where the public are or in both locations.   
The Database Directive defines “extraction” as “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial 
part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form” and “re-utilization” as 
“any form of making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the 
distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission” (art. 7(2) DBD).  
The first Court answered this question via the making available right, considering all arguments pro and 
contra the emission and reception theories.  The High Court came to the conclusion “that the better view 
is that the act of making available to the public by online transmission is committed and committed only 
where the transmission takes place. It is true that the placing of data on a server in one state can make 
the data available to the public of another state but that does not mean that the party who has made the 
data available has committed the act of making available by transmission in the State of reception. I 
consider that the better construction of the provisions is that the act only occurs in the state of 
transmission”.  The Court of appeal did not follow the first judge on this point.  After having considered 
(and refuted or nuanced) the arguments in favour of the transmission theory, the Court of appeal referred 
the matter to the CJEU (in respect of the part of the case relating to the direct liability for breach of 
database rights, but not in respect of the issues of joint-tortfeasorship)
55
.  The Advocate General and the 
Court treated the quite specific question of the Court of appeal in two steps.  First, the operation of 
Sportradar of sending data to the user, at her request, was qualified as an act of reutilisation.  Then, this 
act was localised on the territory of the Member States (cf. infra sub Part I,B,3, b). 
The Advocate General considered the act of sending to a user’s computer, upon her request, information 
obtained from a protected database an “act forming a necessary constituent part of a process of making 
available to the public, which [...] constitutes a re-utilisation” (opinion, par. 41).  Reutilisation should be 
considered as “a generally complex act made up of acts needed to produce the effect of making 
available, which, in the language of the Directive itself, comprises reutilisation” (opinion, par. 42).  The act 
of “sending” was considered one of the necessary component parts of that complex act and consequently 
shared the classification of the complex act, i.e. a reutilisation of data from a protected database (par. 42, 
47).  Agreeing with the Advocate-General on this point, the Court defined the restricted act as “extending 
to any act, not authorised by the maker of the database protected by the sui generis right, of distribution 
to the public of the whole or part of the contents of the database” and covering an act “in which a person 
sends, by means of his web server, to another person’s computer, at that person’s request, data 
                                                     
 
54 UK High Court of Justice Chancery Division 17 November 2010, Football Dataco e.a. v Sportradar e.a., EWHC 2010, 2911, 
retrieved from http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/2911.html; High Court of Justice, Court of appeal 29 March 2011, 
Football Dataco e.a. v Sportradar e.a., EWCA 2011, civ 330,retrieved from http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/330.html; 
CJEU 18 October 2012, case C-173/11, Football Dataco Ltd, Scottish Premier League Ltd, Scottish Football League, PA Sport UK 
Ltd v Sportradar GmbH,Sportradar AG ;  Court of appeal 6 February 2013, case Nos A3/2012/1349, 1352, 1364, 1366, Football 
Dataco Ltd and others and Stan James and others, Sportradar GmbH and another, [2013]EWCA Civ 27. 
55  Reference for a preliminary ruling from Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom) made on 8 April 
2011 - Football Dataco Ltd, Scottish Premier League Ltd, Scottish Football League, PA Sport UK Ltd v Sportradar GmbH (a 
company registered in Germany), Sportradar (a company registered in Switzerland), Case C-173/11:   
Where a party uploads data from a database protected by sui generis right under Directive 96/9/EC1 ("the Database Directive") onto 
that party's web server located in member state A and in response to requests from a user in another member state B the web 
server sends such data to the user's computer so that the data is stored in the memory of that computer and displayed on its screen 
a) is the act of sending the data an act of "extraction" or "re-utilisation" by that party? 
b) does any act of extraction and/or re-utilisation by that party occur 
(i) in A only 
(ii) in B only or 
(iii) in both A and B 
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previously extracted from the content of a database protected by the sui generis right.  By such a 
sending, that data is made available to a member of the public” (Sportradar, par. 20-21).   
This decision sheds some light on the scope of the reutilisation right, which in this case was applied to a 
technical scheme comparable to those protected under the making available right.  The act of sending the 
data, at the individual request of a user, to that user was considered a necessary act protected under the 
reutilisation right.  Considering that the act of reutilisation can be localised at least in the Member State 
where the public was targeted, it was not necessary to define the end-point of the reutilisation.   
Remarkably, the Court of appeal issued its decision after the CJEU’s ruling without applying the 
reutilisation right.  It established that it had jurisdiction to rule on the primary liability of Sportradar and 
found an infringement of the extraction right, protecting the Footbhall Live databases. 
Download v streaming.  Also, it does not matter in which form the works are made available:  they can 
be offered for download (copy at the user’s end) or simply made perceptible to the user by streaming
56
. 
The Criminal Court of Stuttgart decided on appeal a case relating to an on demand streaming service for 
music
57
.  It found that the service provider made music recordings available to the public:  all conditions 
were met, since each user had access, at any time, at any place (with internet access), to the songs and 
albums and could hear these as often and in any compilation at her convenience.  The condition of a 
public was met as well, since the service was meant for several members of the public and no personal 
connection existed between the 26.000 users of the service.  The circumstance that a streaming service 
(rather than a downloading service) was offered did not alter this qualification.  It mattered not that the 
user was not able to make a permanent copy of the transmitted songs: the making available right does 
not require that the user makes a new fixation of the recording (not even for the phonogram producer’s 
right). The purpose of the protection was said to safeguard the exploitation of the recordings:  if the 
recordings are available (in return for a fairly modest price) so the user can listen to them at any time and 
however often he desires, then a reproduction is of course no longer required for the exploitation of the 
recordings to suffer from it.  
c) To the public 
Public. The “public” is not defined in the Directive but it should be understood as not being present
58
 at 
the place where the act of making available originates (rec. 24 Information Society Directive).  The use of 
the notion “public” indicates however that merely “private” communications are excluded
59
.  As long as 
the work is made accessible to people or a group of people who cannot be qualified as a “public”, there is 
no restricted act.   
This requirement that a “public” should have access to the work, has proven decisive in two cases on 
online hosting services (supra sub b).  In RapidShare, the Court of appeal of Hamburg court found that 
the upload of copyright works to a cloud service alone is not sufficient to find an infringement, it should 
also be demonstrated that it was accessible in the cloud to a public
60
.  In GeenStijl the Court of first 
instance of Amsterdam found an act of communication to the public when an online news and gossip 
                                                     
 
56 S. VON LEWINSKI & M. M. WALTER, “Information Society Directive”, 983, par. 11.3.31. 
57 OLG Stuttgart 21 January 2008, Az. 2 WS 328/07; 2 Ws 328/2007, Telemedicus, available via http://tlmd.in/u/488.  
58 See on this point :  Premier League, par. 200 et s. and CJEU 24 November 2011, case C-283/10, Circul Globus Bucureşti (Circ & 
Variete Globus Bucureşti) v Uniunea Compozitorilor şi Muzicologilor din România – Asociaţia pentru Drepturi de Autor (UCMR – 
ADA). 
59 See note 10.12 of the Basic Proposal of the WCT. 
60 Press communication “Urheberrechtswidrige Downloads: Oberlandesgericht Hamburg entscheidet über Prüf- und 
Handlungspflichten des Online-Speicher-Dienstes „RapidShare“, 15 March 2012, 
http://justiz.hamburg.de/presseerklaerungen/3334434/pressemeldung-2012-03-15-olg.html in relation to the OLG Hamburg’s 
decision of 14 March 2012, Az. 5 U 87/09. 
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website published the hyperlinks to a cloud service where nude pictures were stored that were previously 
not accessible to a public
61
. 
The Court of Justice has interpreted the notion of “public” in several decisions. In Lagardère, the public 
was described as an “indeterminate number of potential listeners”, by reference to the Mediakabel 
decision
62
.  When satellite signals can only be received by equipment available solely to professionals 
there is no broadcast in the sense of the SatCab Directive (Lagardère, par. 31-32).  In Rafael Hoteles, the 
Court applied the same criterion (indeterminate number of potential television viewers”, Rafael Hoteles, 
par. 37) and found a new public, i.e. a “public different from the public at which the original act of 
communication of the work is directed” (Rafael Hoteles, par. 40).  When a hotel owner makes it possible 
for hotel guests to watch television broadcasts in their rooms, a public can be found.  The Court took into 
account the customers in the hotel rooms and customers in other areas of the hotel where televisions 
sets are installed and the circumstance that these hotel customers succeed each other quickly.  A fairly 
large number of persons were involved, so they may be considered to be a public (Rafael Hoteles, par. 
38).   
In Marco Del Corso, the Court understood that this means making a work perceptible to “persons in 
general, that is not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private group” (Marco Del Corso, par. 
85).  Furthermore, the Court interpreted the requirement of a “fairly large number of people” as being 
intended to indicate that the “concept of public encompasses a certain de minimis threshold, which 
excludes from the concept groups of persons which are too small or insignificant” (Marco Del Corso, par. 
86).  Moreover, the Court read in its previous decisions in Rafael Hoteles and Premier League, which 
took the profit-making nature of the communication into account, that “the public which is the subject of 
the communication is both targeted by the user and receptive, in one way or another, to that 
communication, and not merely ‘caught’ by chance” (Marco Del Corso, par. 91).  Several criteria were 
listed, which were complementary, not autonomous and interdependent and which called for an individual 
assessment of each case.  The Court found here that a dentist, who has the radio on in his private dental 
practice, does perform a deliberate intervention to make his patients listen to the broadcast programmes, 
but that “patients” generally form a very consistent group of persons, i.e. a determinate group of potential 
recipients – not “persons in general”.  Also, the number of persons is insignificant, whether they are 
considered as the persons present in the practice at the same time or successively.  Finally, the 
broadcast is not likely to have an impact on the income of the dentist (rise of the number of patients or 
higher prices).   
In a judgment of the same day, the Court found that a hotel owner who makes broadcast programs 
accessible in hotel rooms does address a public, since the hotel guests constitute an indeterminate 
number of potential listeners, limited only by the capacity of the establishment, and therefore “persons in 
general” (PPI, par. 41).  A fairly large number of persons may be reached this way.  Finally, the guests 
are targeted and receptive (PPI, par. 42-43)
 63
. 
New public.  In Premier League, a “new public” was found when a broadcast work is transmitted to a 
“public which was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they authorised their 
use by the communication to the original public” (Premier League, par. 197)
64
.  When a pub owner 
“transmits” a broadcast to the customers present in that establishment, the Court found a new public in 
comparison to the public of the initial broadcast.   
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In TVCatchup, however, broadcast television programmes were retransmitted via the Internet to people 
who qualified for access to the broadcasts, i.e. who had acquired a TV licence and who resided in the UK.  
In other words, the public who had access to the TV streams were exactly the public considered by the 
authors when they authorised the broadcast.  The Court nuanced its previous decisions and decided that 
when a work is put to multiple uses, each transmission by a specific technical means must be individually 
authorised by the author and that a specific technical means different from the original communication 
technique is a communication to the public in the sense of the InfoSoc Directive (TVCatchup, par. 24, 26).  
Each transmission must be authorised individually and separately by the authors, “given that each is 
made under specific technical conditions, using a different means of transmission for the protected works, 
and each is intended for a public” (TVCatchup, par. 39).  It is not necessary then to examine whether a 
“new public” can be found.  Instead, the Court stated that the right of communication to the public covers 
a “retransmission of works included in terrestrial broadcasts, where the retransmission is made by an 
organisation other than the original broadcaster, by means of an internet stream made available to the 
subscribers of that other organisation who may receive that retransmission by logging on to its server, 
even though those subscribers are within the area of reception of that terrestrial television broadcast and 
may lawfully receive the broadcast on a television receiver” (TVCatchup, par. 40). 
Bit torrent.  A UK High Court applied these principles to the use of bit torrent file sharing sites
65
.  It found 
that the users who upload content make the content available to the public and it found a “new public” as 
well.  The users “intervene, in full knowledge of the consequences of their actions, to give others access 
to the Claimants’ copyright works.  The recordings are made available to all other users of the Websites, 
a large and indeterminate class of people, without having to purchase them from authorised sources”
66
. 
The judge added that these users indirectly obtained a financial benefit, not because they make money 
out of uploading but because they anticipate that other users will reciprocate. 
Online video recorders.  The German Bundesgerichtshof has ruled in two cases on the making 
available right in relation to “online video recorders”
67
.  In both cases, a broadcasting organisation (RTL 
and Sat1) claimed that the provider of an online video recording service (“Save.tv” and “Shift.tv”) infringed 
inter alia its making available right.  These service providers made it possible for their customers to record 
free-to-air programmes via an electronic programme guide and to watch these programmes at a later time 
and at any place (provided there was an Internet connection).  Technically, the programmes that the 
customers selected were stored on the provider’s hard disk but at a space exclusively attributed per 
customer.  This amounted to a reproduction, performed by the person who made the material copy, which 
could be exempted if this person fulfilled all conditions for such exception (in particular for private use).  
The Supreme Court did not dispose of the information required to assess this in concreto.  The Court of 
appeal of Dresden, upon referral from the BGH, decided that the user of the online video recorder makes 
the reproduction, not the service provider, and therefore this reproduction can qualify as a reproduction 
for private use
68
.   
The Court found that no acts of making available to the public were made.  It was for the lower court to 
verify whether the broadcast programmes were recorded and reproduced by the service provider (not the 
customers).  If this were the case, then the service provider would make the recording available to its 
customers, since the programmes could be accessed at any time and at any place at the demand of the 
customers.  This would suggest that the reproduction right and the making available right are applied 
cumulatively, not alternatively, at the source of the accessibility.  However, the Court found that the 
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recording was not available to the “public”, since only the customer who had ordered the recording of the 
programme had access to it.  Interestingly, the Court rejected the argument that the customers, who have 
ordered the recording of the broadcast, can be collectively considered as a public.  Moreover, it was 
considered that the service provider makes a “future offer” (rather than offer immediate access to 
protected works), in the sense that it engages to record future programmes and it will make that recording 
accessible to the individual customer (not a public).  The Court of appeal of Dresden decided that there 
was no infringement of the making available right
69
.  According to this Court, the broadcast programs 
were directly transmitted to the online video recorder of an individual customer and therefore it was no 
longer within its sphere of control and thus available to a public. 
Another question was whether the transmission of the recorded broadcasts to the customers’ private 
storage spaces should be seen as a rebroadcast of the recorded programmes
70
.  The Supreme Court 
decided that this transmission could indeed be considered a rebroadcast, but it did not decide whether 
this transmission reached a “public” – this was for the lower court to decide upon referral.  The Court of 
appeal of Dresden found that this was the case:  the signals were captured by means of an antenna and 
retransmitted simultaneously to the online video recorders of the customers.  It was established that the 
retransmission was addressed to several members of the public, at least 100 independent users who 
were not connected by personal ties
71
. 
Similarly, the Australian Federal Court decided that the provider of an online time-shifting service did not 
infringe the making available right
72
.  In this case, the Australian Football League and the National Rugby 
League objected to a remote television recording service (“TV Now”), offered by telecommunication 
provider Optus (which had failed to obtain a licence for the broadcast of these sports matches).   Its 
subscribers could record free-to-air programmes and play back the recordings via web browsers or 
mobile devices.  Whenever a customer requested the recording of a programme, several copies were 
made (for each format available).  The user could then watch the recording later, via streaming (time 
shifting).  The Federal Court decided that it was not the service provider but its users who made the 
reproductions and that these could be covered under the time shifting exception in the Australian 
copyright legislation.  Furthermore, when the customer replayed the recording, it was considered that the 
customer (not the service provider) performed an act of communication – but not to the public.  Insofar as 
the recording was used only for private and domestic use and for watching or listening to it at a 
convenient time, the recordings were not communicated to a public.  This decision was however reversed 
by the full Federal Court
73
. 
In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the 2
nd
 circuit treated a dispute related to the use of a 
standalone DVR proposed by an operator of cable television called Cablevision
74
. That system allowed 
Cablevision’s customers to record cable programmes on central hard drives housed and maintained by 
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the cable company at a remote location. Similar to the German cases, the copies made were recorded on 
specific portions of Cablevision’s hard disks dedicated to each customer. The customers could then 
receive playback of the programs they had recorded. This service was offered by Cablevision without 
specific licence from the content providers, who sued the cable operator for direct infringement to their 
exclusive rights.  The Court of Appeals had to determine whether Cablevision or its customers were the 
authors of the infringing conduct. After having found “two instances of volitional conduct in this case: 
Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a  
copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program”, the 
Court considered that copies were made by the customer. It rejected Cablevision’s direct liability because 
of its contribution to this reproduction. The Court also rejected Cablevision’s liability based on the 
playback of the copies made by its customers, considering that it did not constitute a transmission to the 
public because “each RS-DVR playback transmission is made to a single subscriber using a single 
unique copy produced by that subscriber”.  It would be interesting to explore to which extent this element 
of volitional conduct could contribute to clarifying the making available right in the European copyright 
context.  
The same court reached a similar decision in a case brought by several broadcasting services against 
Aereo, an Internet based streaming service that allows its users to watch broadcast shows live or to 
record them for future viewing
75
.  Finally, a California federal district court judge has granted an injunction 
(tentative decision) against a similar service, named Aereokiller
76
.  It seems the debate in the US is not 
over yet.  
d) On demand:  access from a place and at a time individually chosen by the 
public 
On demand.  The last element is the way the works are accessed:  the members of the public may 
access the works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.  This formulation is meant to 
catch the forms of making a work available “by way of interactive on-demand transmissions” (rec. 25).  
These forms of communication allow the members of the public to decide themselves, individually, where 
and when to access the works.  This covers cases where members of the public may have access to the 
works from different places and at different times
77
.   
This does not mean that the work should be available without restrictions.  The fact that the content 
provider has determined a window of availability (geographical scope and period of accessibility) does not 
alter the qualification as an act of making available.  
This “interactive” element distinguishes the making available right from other, linear forms of 
communication (such as broadcasting)
78
.  It should therefore not be understood in a technical sense, but 
refers to distinct forms of exploitation.  As has been demonstrated in the 2007 study by IViR, “interactivity” 
is not an unequivocal feature:  works can be distributed online at various degrees of interactivity
79
.  
Nevertheless the distinction has important legal consequences, especially in terms of right clearance and 
collective management.   
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The Court of Justice contrasted the broadcasting to the making available of phonograms in Marco Del 
Corso.  The referring court was asked to decide whether a dentist was under the obligation to pay an 
equitable remuneration to the phonogram producer for the broadcasts he received in his private dental 
practice.  Before answering the questions, the Court observed that a broadcasting, free of charge, of 
phonograms within a private dental practice engaged in professional economic activity for the benefit of 
patients of this practice and enjoyed by them without any active choice on their part could not be qualified 
as an act of making available, which supposes an interactive on demand transmission (Marco Del Corso, 
par. 57-60).  The Court then reformulated the question and consider it in the framework of Directive 
92/100..  It can be derived that the classifications as “broadcasting” or “making available” are mutually 
exclusive.  The transmission without any active choice on the part of listeners indicates a broadcast, 
whereas the interactive, on demand transmission suggests an act of making available to the public. 
As indicated previously, the Criminal Court of Stuttgart clarified, on appeal, the criteria to distinguish the 
making available and the broadcasting of protected subject matter in a case on a service offering music 
streaming on demand
80
.  Via this service, users could access music (songs or albums) on demand, from 
a music archive with search function, they could even compose a personal radio programme and listen to 
it whenever and from wherever they wanted.  According to the Court, this service was not a broadcasting 
service, but an on demand service.  The circumstance that users were able to choose the time of access 
to the recordings was decisive.  Under the broadcasting right, the time of transmission and the 
chronological order of the parts of a programme are determined by the sender/broadcaster, which 
transmits the broadcasting signal to all possible receivers. By contrast, where the receiver/user decides 
on the timing, the order and the scope of the consulted works or recording and she takes the initiative for 
the transmission of the requested data, the characteristic interactive element is met.  In this case it was 
the user alone who decided on the timing and the duration of the requests, on the content of the 
programmes and the order of the songs.  The provider merely makes and keeps the records accessible.   
3. Conclusion on the making available right 
The making available right is not defined in the Information Society Directive nor in the WIPO Treaties of 
1996.  It was attempted to understand this right more clearly by establishing its outer boundaries.   
Firstly, the making available right should be understood as an implementation of the WIPO 1996 Treaties.  
It is placed in the context of the InfoSoc Directive, in which it is qualified as a species of the right of 
communication to the public and distinguished from the distribution right.  By consequence, the 
exhaustion principle does not apply after a work is “sold” via an on demand platform (although it cannot 
be excluded that the CJEU extends its UsedSoft ruling to other works than computer programs). 
In the cases examined, the courts have applied the making available right to various online services (e.g. 
web sites, hyperlinking, peer-to-peer networks, news services, online video recorders, cloud storage 
services).   
The making available right requires (i) the availability of the work (ii) to the public (ii) on demand of 
members of the public. 
The starting point of the making available right is the availability (preceding the transmission on demand 
of the member of the public).  It should however immediately be verified whether the public has access to 
the work.  The mere storage on a server where the work could theoretically be accessed by a “public” 
does not seem to suffice:  the distribution of the access key (hyperlink) that allows the public access to 
the stored content may in some cases trigger the qualification as an act of “making available”.  The work 
must be available for download or streaming.  So far the endpoint of the making available right by 
contrast has not been addressed in the national decisions (transmission resulting from a demand of a 
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member of the public or reception by the member of the public).  By contrast the reception of the work 
has been addressed under the reproduction right (infra). 
Members of the “public” should have access to the work on their demand.  As long as no “public” has 
access, the availability on demand is not protected under the making available right.  Regard should thus 
be had to the circle of people having access to the work.  Insofar as the “public” is a notion common to all 
species of the genus right of communication to the public, it seems that decisions of the CJEU on this 
point apply to the making available right.  The “public” is then an “indeterminate number of viewers” (or 
users), by contrast to a “private circle” and it should be to some extent targeted by the user and receptive 
to the communication, it is not merely caught by chance.  The use of certain “cloud” services should not 
as such be qualified as examples of making available to the public, these can be used for personal 
purposes. 
Few cases have considered the “on demand” aspect of the making available right, although this 
distinguishes the making available right from other forms of communication, in particular the broadcasting 
right. 
B.  Territoriality and localisation 
The second pillar of this research is the notion of “territoriality”.  The starting point of this Study is that “the 
protection of copyright and related rights in the EU is “territorial” in the sense that the recognition and 
enforcement of rights occurs on a country by country basis (nevertheless, the management of rights does 
not need to be territorial and right holders are often in a position to grant multi-territorial licences)” (see 
Commission’s Request for services part I, p. 2).  This “territoriality” is contrasted to the internal market 
and its proper functioning.   
Generally, the notion of “territoriality” is understood as referring to the nationally defined territory, which is 
the territory that national legislators issue regulations for. The “territoriality” of a right does not per se 
imply that the territory should be a national one (cf. the Community trademark and design rights).  The 
issues relating to the “territoriality” of the making available right can therefore be approached from two 
perspectives:  either the “territoriality” of the right is altered from a national one to a “European” one
81
, or 
the principle of “national territoriality” of the right is kept intact but it is examined how some of its 
corollaries can be mitigated.  Only the latter option will be examined in this Study. 
The “territoriality” of the making available right should thus be reconciled with the inherently international 
(cross-border) nature of many on demand exploitations, especially via the Internet.  This matter of 
territoriality cannot be severed from the elements of the definition of the making available right (supra sub 
A).  If the territoriality principle by itself leads to an accumulation of restricted acts even where only one 
act of exploitation is performed, this outcome is even more likely if the Member States are free to adopt 
their own definition of the restricted act. 
In the Commission’s request, several criteria are mentioned to link an act of making available “online” to a 
particular (national) territory:  access to the work (in all Member States), origin of the service, 
establishment of the service provider.  For the reproduction right (independently defined of the making 
available right), the pertinent territory is the country where the work is downloaded. 
It is important to reflect on the notion of “territoriality” and get an overview of the issues that are related to 
this “territoriality” of copyright.  When the “territorial” character of one aspect of the copyright system is 
tinkered with, it will have consequences for other related (though perhaps not immediately visible) 
aspects.   
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We will examine the origin of the “territoriality” principle in copyright and its application in the cases 
brought before the CJEU.  Then we will verify how the “territoriality” is dealt with in the context of the 
international protection of the Berne Convention.  Finally we will describe the territorial reach of some 
material acts protected under copyright and how the European legislator has adopted two principles to 
mitigate these consequences, i.e. the “country of origin” principle in the Satellite and Cable Directive and 
the “exhaustion” principle in the Information Society Directive. 
1. Principle of state sovereignty:  “National territoriality” of copyright 
The national territoriality of copyright is an application of the state sovereignty principle:  the national state 
alone is by principle competent to issue regulations applicable to activities occurring on their national 
territories
82
.  This means that a state cannot regulate activities taking place outside its national borders, 
on the territory of another state. 
This principle can be explained by copyright’s origins. Before the adoption of proper copyright laws, a 
similar protection was granted under a system of privileges, which belonged to public law and were 
strictly territorial
83
. Furthermore, in the 19
th
 century the majority of intellectual property disputes were 
wholly domestic and the cross-border litigations involving foreign elements were rare
84
.  
Nowadays, the territoriality principle remains:  in principle the national Member States are competent to 
legislate in the field of copyright
85
.  The protection of the national copyright is restricted to the national 
territory and the exclusive right only covers activities occurring on the territory of that state
86
.  
Consequently the national legislators are entitled to shape the copyright system according to their 
(national) insights (protected subject matter, authorship and derived ownership, restricted acts and 
exceptions, duration, enforcement,...).   
The EU legislator has not taken over this legislative competency, but national legislators are obliged to 
conform their national copyright legislation to the European directives issued in this field (harmonisation).  
2. International protection:  territoriality principle in the Berne Convention 
The principle of territoriality is one of the pillars of international protection of the Berne Convention.  This 
convention deploys various mechanisms to cope with international issues of copyright protection
87
, in 
particular the harmonisation of substantive provisions (minimum protection) and the protection of authors 
under national copyright laws (applicability of the Berne Convention and the principle of national 
treatment).   
The protection under the Berne Convention and the scope of protection depends on the link with the 
territory of a state, i.e. the nationality of the author or the place of publication of the work.  Yet the national 
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states (Berne members) are in principle free to determine their own copyright regime and their own 
copyright (and socio-cultural) policy (save substantive harmonisation
88
). 
The Convention defines which authors can benefit from this protection (art. 3 BC).  The nationals of 
countries of the Berne Union (or those who have their habitual residence there) and non-nationals whose 
works were first (or simultaneously) published
89
 in the Berne Union can invoke the protection of the 
convention.   
The nationality of the author and, subsidiarily, the country of first publication determine whether the author 
can claim protection under the Berne Convention.  Territoriality (in terms of country of first publication) 
thus only plays a role for non-Union authors
90
. 
The authors to whom the Convention is applicable following art. 3 BC enjoy the same rights as the 
nationals of the state where protection is claimed (principle of national treatment – art. 5 BC).  But the 
scope of protection further depends on whether protection is claimed outside or in the country of origin of 
the work (art. 5 BC).  It has been argued that this is not a norm to determine the applicable law but a 
norm that determines whether a foreigner is entitled to claim rights (a foreign law could be applicable by 
virtue of the rules of conflict of laws of the country of origin
91
).   
- Within the Berne Union but outside the country of origin, a foreign author can claim the same 
protection as the nationals of the country (Berne member) and the (substantive) protection of the 
Berne Convention (art. 5(1) BC).  The extent of the protection and the means of redress are 
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed (for which protection is 
claimed) (art. 5(2) BC). 
- In the country of origin, the protection is governed only by domestic law (without the minimum 
protection of the Convention), both to national and to foreign authors. 
Since it determines the scope of protection (in terms of guaranteed rights), the definition of the country of 
origin is crucial.  Now, the country of origin is determined by the publication of the work or (for 
unpublished works or works first published outside the Berne Union) the nationality of the author (art. 5(4) 
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constitute publication”.  According to RICKETSON and GINSBURG, making available for digital copies, e.g. by offering for 
download, should be understood as a “publication” in the sense of art. 3(3) BC:  S. RICKETSON & J.C. GINSBURG, International 
copyright and neighbouring rights, Oxford, University Press, 2006, vol. I, 278, par.6.52. Other authors consider that the making 
available right does not fall under the scope of the Berne Convention. They remind that there was a proposal to adapt that definition 
of published works to cover the online use of works at the WIPO Conference in Geneva in 1996, but that attempt failed as countries 
could not reach a compromise (A. DE FRANCQUEN, « L'arrêt Google contre Copiepresse et le choix de la loi applicable en matière 
d'atteinte au droit d'auteur sur Internet », R.D.T.I., 2011, 65). As a consequence, several authors consider that the making available 
of a work on internet is not a publication in the sense of article 3 of the Berne Convention (A. CRUQUENAIRE, "La loi applicable au 
droit d’auteur: état de la question et perspectives", 16, retrieved via http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/4048.pdf).  A LUCAS considers that 
“(…) simply making a work available through digital networks, which will increasingly be the rule in future, does not amount to 
publication. To avoid this conclusion which is difficult for mere mortals to understand, consideration may of course be given to 
broadening the definition of publication as to encompass disclosure through a network. However, as this “clean-up” will also mean 
revising the Berne Convention, it will also be necessary to determine the location of such disclosure.” (A. LUCAS, A. LUCAS 
“Applicable law in copyright infringement cases in the digital environment”, e-Copyright Bulletin, 2005, retrieved via 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/29336/11338009191lucas_en.pdf/lucas_en.pdf.10). 
90 S. RICKETSON & J.C. GINSBURG, International copyright and neighbouring rights, par.6.55. 
91 A. LUCAS, “Private International Law aspects of the protection of works and of the subject matter of related rights transmitted 
over digital networks”, WIPO Forum On Private International Law And Intellectual Property, Geneva 30-32 January 2001, retrieved 
from http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_pil_01/wipo_pil_01_1_prov.pdf.  
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BC)
92
.  For published works, the country of origin is the country of first publication.  In case of 
simultaneous publication in several countries of the Berne Union, the country of origin is the country of 
publication with the shortest term of protection.  In case of simultaneous publication in a country of the 
Berne Union and a country outside the Berne Union, the country of origin is the country member of the 
Berne Union.   
GINSBURG demonstrates how this criterion is problematic for works made available online
93
.  Either the 
posting on a website is not considered a “publication” in the sense of the Berne Convention (since this 
would require “copies” available in sufficient quantities according to art. 3(3) BC).  In that case, the work is 
an “unpublished” work and the country of origin is then the country of the Union of which the author is a 
national (art. 5(4)(c) BC).  Alternatively, a posting online could be considered as a publication since the 
user can make (permanent or temporary) copies of the works.  In that case, any country where the work 
is accessible via the Internet could be the country of first publication.  Each could be the country of origin, 
so only domestic law would apply and the author could in any case be deprived of the Berne minimum 
protection.  If the first publication has taken place simultaneously in several Berne countries, then the 
country with the shortest term of protection is the country of origin (art. 5(4) BC).  This would mean that 
the term of protection in the country where protection is sought is lowered to the term of the country of 
origin (art. 7(8) BC), i.e. the shortest term available in the Berne Union.  Moreover, all internet published 
works would be localised in the country with the shortest term of protection.  In order to avoid this 
outcome, GINSBURG suggests choosing one country as the country of origin.  However, she comes to 
the conclusion that none of the traditional criteria seem meaningful and neither the country from which the 
author communicated the work to the server nor the country where the website is localised through which 
the work is communicated to the public are necessarily significant
94
.  A solution to this problem could 
consist in a further harmonisation at the international copyright level, or uniform choice of law rules. 
A final note should be made in relation to new forms of exploitation.  Whether these come within the 
“rights” for which national treatment should be reserved depends on the Convention, not on the national 
legislation.  The question is whether, under the Berne Convention, national treatment should be given to 
foreign authors where the making available right is concerned
95
.   
                                                     
 
92 Art. 5(4): The country of origin shall be considered to be: 
(a) in the case of works first published in a country of the Union, that country; in the case of works published simultaneously in 
several countries of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country whose legislation grants the shortest term of 
protection; 
(b) in the case of works published simultaneously in a country outside the Union and in a country of the Union, the latter country; 
(c) in the case of unpublished works or of works first published in a country outside the Union, without simultaneous publication in a 
country of the Union, the country of the Union of which the author is a national, provided that: 
(i) when these are cinematographic works the maker of which has his headquarters or his habitual residence in a country of the 
Union, the country of origin shall be that country, and 
(ii) when these are works of architecture erected in a country of the Union or other artistic works incorporated in a building or other 
structure located in a country of the Union, the country of origin shall be that country. 
93 J.C. GINSBURG, “Berne Without Borders”.  See also S. RICKETSON & J.C. GINSBURG, International copyright and 
neighbouring rights, vol. I, 286, par. 6.59. 
94 J. GINSBURG, "Determination of country of origin when a work is first publicly disclosed over the Internet", report by the country 
of origin study group of the International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI), http://www.alai.hu/index.php/dokumentumtar/alai-
dokumentumok/70-szarmazasi-orszag-webes-nyilvanossagra-hozatalnal/file.. 
95 P. GOLDSTEIN & P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, International Copyright, 100.  RICKETSON and GINSBURG take a broader view and 
state that that the application of the principle of national treatment is determined by the identification of the persons eligible to claim 
protection, protected subject matter, protected substantive rights, duration of the protection, exceptions and remedies.  An author 
benefiting from the Convention’s protection should thus have the benefit of whatever the national provisions an these matters, 
insofar as they go beyond what is required by a specific Conventional rule.  See S. RICKETSON & J.C. GINSBURG, International 
copyright and neighbouring rights, vol. I, 315, par. 6.95. .  Regardless of the Berne Convention, there should be no discrimination 
between European nationals (art. 12 TFEU, art. 21 Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU – see also M. WALTER & L. RIEDE, 
“Principle of non-discrimination” in M. WALTER & S. VON LEWINSKI, European copyright law, 2010, Oxford University Press, 39 et 
s.. 
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While the Berne Convention leans on the national territoriality principle to structure its protection (through 
the requirement of national treatment), its application and scope of protection are uncertain in case of 
online exploitations, since it is disputable whether such forms of exploitation are “publications” in the 
sense of the Berne Convention. 
3. Territorial reach of material acts 
If national states, including Member States of the European Union, are entitled to regulate conduct 
engaged in on their national territories and if the international system of copyright protection relies on the 
coordinated effort to protect certain behaviour (and to exclude other), then it should be verified how the 
material acts are translated in copyright terms at the national level.  This may be delicate in case of cross-
border processes in which different constitutive elements can be identified and each may be qualified as 
an act protected under copyright.  
In other words, the overall protection of such cross-border process depends on the definition the Member 
States give to the protected acts and how they localise the relevant acts on their territory.  In this section it 
will be discussed how the material acts can relate to the protected act in copyright (sub a), how the 
protected acts have been localised in the cases before the Court of Justice so far (sub b) and, finally, 
which mechanisms currently mitigate the territoriality of some exclusive rights (sub c). 
a) Material act v protected act 
The reproduction right protects the making of a material copy (art. 2 InfoSoc Dir).  From the decisions of 
the CJEU, it appears that this should be taken in a technical sense:  whenever a work is fixated on a 
tangible medium (however ephemerally), an act of reproduction is performed
96
.  A Member State is 
competent to regulate the material copies made on its territory.  Such reproductions may be subject to the 
author’s prior consent or be covered under a national exception, which may be subject to mandatory 
compensations.  The localisation of such reproduction is fairly straightforward, as long as it applies to 
simple, “traditional” forms of reproduction
97
.   
In Dramatico v Sky I a UK High Court decided that a user of The Pirate Bay’s torrent file sharing service 
who selects a file and downloads it copies the content of the file on her computer and infringes copyright 
if this file contained a copyright work
98
.  Since they were customers of UK access providers they were in 
the UK.  It was thus established that the defendant access provider’s services were used for infringing 
copyright (in view of getting a blocking injunction against this ISP).  In EMI v Sky the same UK High Court 
decided in the same sense that the UK users of file sharing services, who have accounts with some 
British access providers and are therefore in the UK, infringe copyright by copying sound recordings in 
the UK
99
. 
The distribution right is related to the reproduction right in the sense that it protects the subsequent 
phase of distribution of the object in which the work is incorporated (art. 4 InfoSoc Dir).  The author (or 
holder of a neighbouring right) has the right to control the distribution by sales or any other legal 
transaction that entails a transfer of ownership (Cassina).   
                                                     
 
96 CJEU 16 July 2009, Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (Infopaq I);  Premier League;  CJEU 
17 January 2012, Case C-302/10, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (Infopaq II).  The reproduction right will 
be examined more in depth infra. 
97 The Advocate General in Pinckney considered that by principle the reproduction has no cross-border aspect :  Opinion of the 
Advocate general JÄÄSKINEN of 13 June 2013 in the case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG, par. 53. 
98 UK High Court of Justice 20 February 2012, [2012] EWHC 268, Dramatico Entertainment and others v British Sky Broadcasting 
and others (Dramatico v Sky I), par. 40. 
99 UK High Court of Justice 28 February 2013 [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), EMI and others v British Sky Broadcasting and others.  
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The distribution of an object may entail several successive operations, protected under this right.  In case 
of cross-border transactions, restricted acts can be found in several Member States, under the national 
copyright law (Donner). The effects of the territoriality principle have been controlled by the (European) 
exhaustion principle (infra).  
The right of communication to the public covers a wide range of exploitation forms.  Some may only 
have a local effect, limited to the territory of a Member State (e.g. the public screening of a television 
broadcast, on demand availability via an intranet of a company or a university).  Other forms are meant to 
be local but may have some (incidental spill-over) effect on the territory of a neighbouring state (e.g. 
traditional broadcasts)
100
.  In that case, the question is whether this spill-over to another Member State 
should be qualified as an additional act of communication to the public in that Member State.  The same 
questions arise in relation to communications via the Internet.  Both linear and on demand 
communications via the Internet have the potential to reach a worldwide public.  It is technically possible 
to restrict the addressees of such communications according to any criterion of the sender’s choice.  The 
sender may choose to impose territorial or other qualitative restrictions:  she could make it impossible to 
access the work from certain countries or select the people who may consult the work (e.g. “friends” on 
social networking media, membership of a site).   
Whether the communication with a multi-territorial reach (such as the making available to the public) 
ultimately has legal consequences in each of the countries of that reach depends on the (national) 
definition of the restricted act.  Especially in complex acts, several relevant elements may be localised in 
different Member States.  It depends on the definition of the protected act which of those elements are 
relevant from a legal point of view.  If it is considered that the making available right covers the “whole act 
of communication, including the upload and the entire transmission to the download”
101
, then every stage 
could be controlled on the national territory where it takes place.  If it is considered that it is sufficient that 
a work is accessible to the public, then the territorial reach of the right of making available will be fairly 
large and it will take place in all the Member States unless access has been blocked in some Member 
States.  When the right of making available does not protect the mere reception of a work (i.e. in private 
circles) nor the fortuitous capacity to access a work in any Member State, but requires that a certain 
public in a particular Member State is targeted by the person who performs the communication, then the 
territorial reach of the restricted act is smaller. 
In Dramatico v Sky I the UK High Court concluded that it was not clear from the CJEU’s decisions (before 
Sportradar) whether a communication to the public took place where it originated or where it is 
received
102
.  The Court did not solve this issue, it was satisfied that the users of The Pirate Bay allow 
copies of sound recordings on their computers to be uploaded to the “swarm”.  Since UK users were 
involved as uploaders and downloaders, it was not necessary to decide whether the act of communication 
to the public was committed at the place of origination or the place of reception. 
In EMI v BSkyB a UK High Court issued a decision on similar facts but after the CJEU’s decision in  
Sportradar (infra).  The Court considered the decisions of the CJEU on the right of communication to the 
public and the database reutilisation right and concluded that an act of communication to the public 
occurs “both where the communication originates and where it is received.  Where a communication to 
the public which originates outside the UK is received inside the UK, the act will be treated as occurring 
within the UK if the communication is targeted at the public in the UK”
103
.  In this case, the communication 
to the public took place via bit torrent sites.  The Court decided that the act of communication to the public 
occurs in the UK because the uploader was located in the UK.  In the judge’s view, it was more doubtful 
that the act could be localised there on account of the downloaders’ location, since it was not clear to him 
                                                     
 
100 See about the extraterritorial application of national laws:  A. PEUKERT, “Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual 
Property Law” 12, 16.  
101 A. PEUKERT, “Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law” 17. 
102 UK High Court of Justice, Dramatico v Sky I, par 68. 
103 UK High Court of Justice 28 February 2013 [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), EMI v BSkyB, nr. 38. 
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“that the act of communication by the uploaders [was] targeted at member of the public in the UK”
104
.   
The court did not consider it necessary to reach on conclusion on that point.   
The High Court also treated the question whether the operators of the file sharing site, who were located 
outside the UK, infringed the right of communication to the public.  It found, firstly, that there was an act of 
communication by electronic transmission, secondly, that a new public was reached and, thirdly, that the 
act of communication to the public occurred in the UK.  Citing the CJEU’s decisions in Sportradar, 
Pammer, L’Oréal and Donner (infra sub Part I, B, 3, b), the Court followed the claimant’s position that the 
bit torrent websites were targeted at the public in the UK:  a large number of users of the websites were in 
the UK, a substantial proportion of the visitors to the websites was from the UK, the recordings listed on 
each Websites included recordings by UK artists and recordings in demand in the UK, the default 
language of the sites was English and in one case a website had advertisements with prices in sterling
105
. 
The exclusive economic rights considered separately raise questions about the territorial reach of the 
material acts.  But it becomes all the more pressing when several acts, which could separately be 
qualified as reproductions or communications to the public, are combined in complex technical processes.   
The dissection of the process could lead to an accumulation of protected acts (and applicable exceptions) 
on different territories, so various Member States may be competent to regulate (integrated) parts of the 
same process.  For example, the storage of a work on a server from which a work is made accessible 
online could be qualified as a reproduction and as an act of making available to the public (provided that a 
“public” is granted access).  The intermediate copies during the transmission, reception or later 
consultation of the works could be reproductions, which may be exempted under the exception for 
temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive).  Finally, the transmission and the reception of 
works following an online request could be protected under the making available right as well.   
Moreover, different “layers” of exploitation may be found where works are shared online.  For example, a 
work may be uploaded to a website and subsequently be brought within the sphere of a social networking 
site by a user who wishes to share the work with her contacts.  This may be achieved either by making an 
additional copy (stored on the servers of the social networking site) or by means of a hyperlink
106
 – the 
result is that the work is visible to the users of the social networking site.  The question is whether in this 
case a distinct act of making available can be found, since a new public is reached (the contacts of the 
user of the social networking site)
107
.  On the other hand it could be argued that this finding depends on 
the underlying reproduction of the work.   
A similar uncertainty exists where a work is made available in the context of an online service (e.g. an 
online streaming service offered to paying members) and where the service provider offers the users the 
possibility of making play lists and sharing these with the members of their networks (“friends”).  Should 
such intervention be considered an act of making available, considering on the one hand that a “new 
public” may be reached but, on the other hand, that no new copy is made and that the “new public” are 
already paying members of the same service?   
Since the issue of overlap of exclusive economic rights has not been sorted at the European level, the 
territoriality principle may be another cause for concern.  
b) Territoriality and localisation in the CJEU decisions 
The CJEU has had several occasions to examine cross-border situations and rule on where the restricted 
act under consideration takes place.  In several decisions, it has explicitly confirmed the “principle of 
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territoriality” of copyright. It has considered different circumstances (terrestrial broadcast, distribution of 
blank media and furniture, distant access to a database) in the light of different directives (Rental and 
Lending Directive, Information Society Directive, Database Directive).  In each case, it has considered the 
relevant material acts per the exclusive right and how it should be connected to the territory of the 
Member State involved. 
(i) Lagardère 
Territoriality was an issue discussed in the ruling of the CJEU in Lagardère case.   
In this case, a French broadcaster had set up a complex broadcasting system, in order to transmit 
television programmes to the French public.  The signals were transmitted by Europe 1 to a satellite, 
which transmitted the broadcast to a (French) ground station, from which a terrestrial (Hertzian) signal 
was sent that could be captured by the (French) public.  The broadcast from the French ground station 
covered most of the French territory.  However it was more difficult to receive it in the border area with 
Germany, so the satellite signals were also sent to a ground station on German territory, from where it 
was then broadcast (by Hertzian waves) to the French territory (though it could also be received on the 
German side of the border area).   
Both the German and the French collecting societies claimed payment of the “single equitable 
remuneration” for performers and producers
108
.  The issue was whether the broadcaster had to pay this 
remuneration both in France and in Germany and, if this was the case, whether the amounts could be 
compensated (in order to avoid double payment). 
The obligation to pay the equitable remuneration depended firstly on the qualification of the technical 
construction, combining the satellite signal and the subsequent terrestrial broadcast of programs, as a 
“satellite broadcast” in the sense of the SatCab Directive and, secondly, on the competence of the 
Member States to determine the equitable single remuneration in the sense of the Rental and Lending 
Directive.   
It was first established that the satellite communication in Lagardère’s construction should not be qualified 
as a satellite broadcast in the sense of the SatCab Directive.  By consequence the rule that locates the 
satellite broadcast in one Member State only (country of origin) was not applicable (art. 1(2)(b) SatCab 
Dir).   
The defence that the single equitable remuneration was only due in France as the country of origin of the 
satellite broadcast therefore failed.  It was concluded that it should be determined whether a fee was due 
in the Member State, where the broadcaster was established and in the Member State where, for 
technical reasons, the terrestrial transmitter (that was broadcasting to the first state) was located.  At 
this point, the Court explicitly recognised the principle of territoriality (emphasis added):  “At the outset, it 
must be emphasised that it is clear from its wording and scheme that Directive 92/100 provides for 
minimal harmonisation regarding rights related to copyright. Thus, it does not purport to detract, in 
particular, from the principle of the territoriality of those rights, which is recognised in international law 
and also in the EC Treaty. Those rights are therefore of a territorial nature and, moreover, domestic 
law can only penalise conduct engaged in within national territory” (Lagardère, par. 46 – our 
emphasis).  
The Court identified the “conduct engaged in” as the broadcast of phonograms using terrestrial 
transmitters, situated in the French resp. German territories.  The material act of broadcasting was carried 
out in the territory of two Member States hence both the French and German copyright laws could apply 
to decide whether an equitable remuneration was due (par. 47). 
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The territoriality of the conduct – or its effect – comes into play in yet another respect, i.e. the criteria to 
calculate the amount of the equitable remuneration.  The Member States enjoy a certain freedom to set 
these criteria, as long as the European criteria are respected (i.e. a proper balance between interests of 
right holders and third parties, on reasonable terms and the assessment in the light of the value of that 
use in trade,  see Lagardère, par. 50, with a reference to the SENA, par. 37
109
).    
According to the Court, the value of the broadcast should be assessed taking into account “all the 
parameters of the broadcast, such as, in particular, the actual audience, the potential audience and the 
language version of the broadcast” (Lagardère, par. 51).  The value of the broadcast in the national 
territory is thus determined by the (commercial) exploitation in that same national territory.  In this case 
the value of the use in trade is monetised where the broadcasting company is established, i.e. France 
(Lagardère, par. 52), and the actual commercial exploitation only takes place within French territory 
(advertisement slots are offered to French advertisers, almost the entire audience is situated in France 
since the broadcast can be captured mainly in France and the broadcast programmes are in French).  In 
addition, a remuneration may be due in Germany, calculated according to German law:  the terrestrial 
transmitter is situated on the German territory so, by virtue of the territoriality principle, the German 
copyright act applies, and accordingly an equitable remuneration may be calculated in function of the 
value present in Germany.  Since it is not excluded that an actual or potential audience for the broadcast 
exists in Germany (however small), by principle a fee may be imposed.  Its rate should however be low, 
considering the low economic value of the broadcast in Germany (Lagardère, par. 54).  
The payment of the equitable remuneration is thus based on the use of a phonogram in one Member 
State and it cannot be taken into account to calculate the equitable remuneration due for use in another 
Member State.  The conclusion is that the broadcaster is not entitled to compensate the amounts of the 
remunerations and to deduct the equitable remuneration paid in the country where the transmitter is 
located (Germany) from the remuneration due in the country where the broadcaster is established 
(France).  
The CJEU’s decision in “Lagardère” not only formally recognises the territoriality principle in copyright, but 
it also clarifies which factors determine the application of copyright.   
The territoriality comes into play at two moments.  Firstly, the obligation of paying an equitable 
remuneration in a certain Member State is triggered by the material act of broadcasting and, secondly, 
the amount of the equitable remuneration depends on the exploitation within the territory of a Member 
State.  A (material or causal) relation between the material act of broadcast and the value of the use (or 
exploitation) of the protected matter is not required:  the equitable remuneration due in France for the 
broadcast of the phonograms should be determined in function of the value (exploitation) in France.  The 
fact that a part of this exploitation is realised by a material transmission from Germany is not relevant:  the 
entire value of the commercial exploitation is realised in France (French audience, French language) and 
this value should be taken into account for the rate of the equitable remuneration due in France.  The 
material act of broadcast situated in Germany may give rise to an equitable remuneration in Germany as 
well:  the broadcast is also transmitted in Germany and can be captured within Germany, by the German 
public.  Since the audience in Germany will be very small, the rate of the equitable remuneration must be 
low.   
In other words, the “territoriality” principle is thus applied in a literal way.  Firstly, the material act of 
broadcast triggers the obligation to pay an equitable remuneration in the Member State where the 
material act takes place, not the exploitation of the work or the value of the use.  Secondly, the rate of the 
equitable remuneration is determined by the value (exploitation) on the territory of that Member State, 
not by the value of the material act of broadcasting across the national borders, in function of the actual or 
potential audience materially reached by the material act of broadcasting.  Since the directive under 
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consideration aimed at minimum harmonisation, it does not follow that this rather strict interpretation of 
“territoriality” applies to other directives, in particular the Information Society Directive. 
(ii) “Stichting De Thuiskopie” 
In the case “Stichting De Thuiskopie”, the CJEU examined the relation between the territoriality of a 
national levy system (for private copies) and its extraterritorial reach to ensure the effectiveness of such 
compensation systems
110
.  At stake was the “fair compensation” due in counterpart of the private copying 
exception (art. 5(2)(b) InfoSoc Directive).  The Dutch Copyright Act provides that the fair compensation 
should be paid by the manufacturer or the importer of the copying equipment (including blank media).  
The Dutch collecting society “Stichting De Thuiskopie” claimed payment of this compensation from a 
German company, which targeted the Dutch public and sold blank media via the Internet to Dutch 
customers.  The German seller, Opus, argued that the transaction took place in Germany and that the 
Dutch customers, not Opus, were the importer of the blank media and therefore the debtors of the fair 
compensation.   
The CJEU was seized to decide to which extent the Dutch law could apply to a German company, 
involved in distance selling to Dutch customers.   
The CJEU gave priority to the obligation of Member States to ensure that the fair compensation is actually 
recovered and decided that the national law should be interpreted accordingly.   
The starting point was that Member States are entitled to provide an exception for private use, the harm 
resulting from the application of this exception being repaired by a fair compensation.  The Member 
States that had incurred an obligation to achieve the “effective recovery of the fair compensation intended 
to compensate the authors harmed by the prejudice sustained, in particular if that harm arose on the 
territory of that Member State” (Stichting De Thuiskopie, par. 34).  The harm to the author was caused by 
the final user who reproduced the work and her residence determined where the harm occurred:  “it can 
be assumed that the harm for which reparation is to be made arose on the territory of the Member State 
in which those final users reside” (Stichting De Thuiskopie, par. 35).  The Member State had the 
obligation to ensure, in accordance with its territorial competence, the effective recovery of the fair 
compensation for the harm suffered by the authors on the territory of that state, i.e. where the final users 
resided who reproduced the work in conformity with the private copying exception (Stichting De 
Thuiskopie, par. 36).   
Now, if the purchasers of the blank media as final users of the works resided in the Netherlands, the harm 
was suffered in the Netherlands.  By consequence, according to Dutch law, the levy to compensate this 
harm was payable by the manufacturer or importer of the blank media.  This meant that in casu the final 
user was the debtor of the levy (not the German seller residing and conducting its business in Germany).  
This outcome meant de facto that it was impossible to recover the fair compensation and to compensate 
the authors for the harm suffered.  To avoid this result, the CJEU allowed an interpretation that 
guaranteed the recovery of that compensation from the seller who contributed to the importation.  
Moreover, it did not matter that the seller was established in another Member State than the final 
users/importers who resided in the Member State where the harm was suffered and where the fair 
compensation was due (Stichting De Thuiskopie, par. 40).   
The conclusion was that “that Directive 2001/29, in particular Article 5(2)(b) and (5) thereof, must be 
interpreted as meaning that it is for the Member State which has introduced a system of private copying 
levies chargeable to the manufacturer or importer of media for reproduction of protected works, and on 
the territory of which the harm caused to authors by the use for private purposes of their work by 
purchasers who reside there occurs, to ensure that those authors actually receive the fair 
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compensation intended to compensate them for that harm. In that regard, the mere fact that the 
commercial seller of reproduction equipment, devices and media is established in a Member State 
other than that in which the purchasers reside has no bearing on that obligation to achieve a 
certain result. It is for the national court, where it is impossible to ensure recovery of the fair 
compensation from the purchasers, to interpret national law in order to allow recovery of that 
compensation from the person responsible for payment who is acting on a commercial basis” 
(emphasis added). 
Without explicitly referring to this principle, this decision is centred on the application of the territoriality 
principle in copyright.  The territoriality principle was first applied in a straightforward way.  It was found 
that, within its competence, the Netherlands have provided an exception for private copying and a levy 
system for compensating the harm caused by this exception.  Then it was established that the 
reproductions were made by users residing on the Dutch territory and that the harm to the authors was 
caused on the Dutch territory.  The Dutch government had the obligation to achieve the result that the 
authors actually receive fair compensation for the harm suffered on the Dutch territory.   
This obligation of the national State to ensure the reparation of the harm occurring on its territory and the 
effective recovery of the fair compensation could even justify an interpretation of a national norm that 
loosens the strict territorial application of a national norm.  A national (Dutch) norm could be applied to a 
commercial German seller of blank media, established in Germany and organising its business in 
Germany and (seemingly) not engaging in any conduct in the Netherlands, if this interpretation would 
safeguard that Member State’s obligation. 
(iii) Donner 
In Donner, the issue was the localisation of the act of distribution to the public by sale.  Titus Donner, a 
German citizen, faced criminal prosecution in Germany for his role in the organisation of cross-border 
sales of replica furniture. An Italian company sold these reproductions and targeted its marketing at the 
German public and delivered to customers in Germany (with a system for paying or taking back the 
goods).  This furniture was protected under German copyright law but not (effectively) under Italian law. 
The issue was whether the German person (heading the freight forwarding firm) could be criminally 
pursued in Germany for infringement of the distribution right.   
The Advocate General, citing the Court’s decision in Lagardère, confirmed the principle of territoriality in 
copyright law, in the sense that “domestic law can only penalise conduct engaged in within national 
territory”, while at the same time admitting certain extra-territorial effects, since the “exercise [of copyright] 
may also catch activities partly or completely situated outside of national borders” (Opinion Advocate 
General in Donner, par. 33).  The Advocate General referred to the CJEU’s decisions in L’Oréa
111
l and 
Stichting De Thuiskopie, to establish that “behaviour that takes place outside the territory where rights 
were protected, but which was aimed at that territory, fell within the reach of provisions of intellectual 
property law that have been harmonised by EU law”
 
 (Advocate General in Donner, par. 34-37).   
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The Advocate-General first described the notion of “distribution to the public” in the sense of art. 4(1) 
InfoSoc Dir as “covering the chain of activities from offers of sale through to the conclusion of sales 
contracts and their implementation” (Opinion Advocate General in Donner, par. 354).  Then he went on to 
apply the criteria of L’Oréal (consumer targeting, specific delivery arrangement and payment method) to 
summarise the main factors, i.e. whether the seller has created a targeted sales and delivery channel for 
buyers to acquire works that are copyright protected in the buyer’s Member State.  The Advocate General 
found such targeted exercise directed at the German public, given the German language website, the 
marketing material, the cooperation with the freight forwarding company engaged in sales and delivery to 
Germany. 
The Court of Justice followed the same approach and answered the question by a description of the right 
of distribution to the public and by localising this (complex) act.   
The notion of distribution to the public (art. 4(1) InfoSoc Dir) was understood as “making available to the 
public through sale” (art. 6(1) WCT) and it was characterised by a series of acts, going from the 
conclusion of the sale contract to the delivery to a member of the public.  In case of a cross-border sale, 
consisting of several acts which may take place in different Member States, the distribution right may be 
infringed in a number of Member States (Donner, par. 26).   
The Court found that, in complex operations involving different actors, a trader is responsible for acts 
carried out “by him or on his behalf”, but also for acts by a third party “where [the trader] specifically 
targeted the public of the State of destination and must have been aware of the actions of that third party” 
(Donner, par. 27).  Relevant factors were the existence of a website in German, the content and the 
distribution channels of advertising materials, a cooperation with a freight forwarding company making 
deliveries in Germany and these could be taken as proving such targeted activity.  It was stated, 
generally, that “a trader who directs his advertising at member of the public residing in a given Member 
State and creates or makes available to them a specific delivery system and payment method, or allows a 
third party to do so, thereby enabling those members of the public to receive delivery of copies of works 
protected by copyright in that same Member States, makes, in the Member State where the delivery takes 
place, a distribution to the public”
112
. 
In summary, the Court found that relevant acts, covered by the distribution right, had taken place in the 
Member State of destination, where the public had been targeted.  It was not excluded that relevant acts 
of distribution could be found in other Member State as well.  
(iv) Sportradar 
In Sportradar, the question was asked how the act sending data, at the request of a user, should be 
qualified and where this act took place, knowing that the data were stored in a database, covered by the 
sui generis protection of Directive 96/9
113
, 
The claimants, inter alia Football Dataco, organise football competitions in England and Scotland and 
Football Dataco manages the exploitation of the data relating to those matches, via the “Football Live” 
database, supposedly protected under UK law.  Sportradar is a German company that offers (live) data 
on English football matches.  Sportradar’s customers are inter alia betting companies, offering their 
services aimed at the UK market, from which it was inferred that the UK public was an important target for 
Sportradar (Sportradar, par. 10).  End-users in the UK were guided, through the betting companies’ sites, 
to Sportradar’s betradar service.   
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Football Dataco claimed that Sportradar’s data services constituted an infringement of its database rights 
in the Football Live database and brought a legal action before the UK courts. The High Court rendered a 
decision on the joint liability of Sportradar and the end-users in the UK, but declined jurisdiction on the 
primary liability of Sportradar.  The Court of Appeal referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice, 
in order to establish its jurisdiction in respect of the primary liability of Sportradar
114
.  The answer to these 
questions should allow the Court of appeal to establish whether the UK courts had jurisdiction with regard 
to the liability of both defendants (noting that the CJEU was not asked to rule directly on the issue of 
jurisdiction).  
The first question concerned the qualification of the operation. The service operator (Sportradar) 
uploaded data, from a protected database (Football Live), to a server in Member State A, and sent the 
data, at the request of the user, to the user residing in another Member State B where the data would be 
stored in the computer memory and displayed on the user’s screen.  The CJEU was asked to qualify the 
operation of sending data to a user, at that user’s request, i.e. as an act of re-utilisation or extraction in 
the sense of the Database Directive.  Secondly it was asked where this act took place:  in Member State 
A, in Member State B or in both Member States A and B. 
The Database Directive defines “reutilisation” as “any form of making available to the public all or a 
substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other 
forms of transmission” (art. 7(2)(b) Database Dir).  The directive does not contain a criterion to localise 
this act on the territory of one or more Member States. 
The Advocate General held the opinion that the act of sending to a user’s computer, upon his request, 
information obtained from a protected database, should clearly be considered an “act forming a 
necessary constituent part of a process of making available to the public, which [...] constitutes a re-
utilisation” (Advocate General in Sportradar, par. 41).  He explicitly limited his opinion to this act of 
sending, as requested by the referring court, which had severed the sending from other acts such as the 
upload of data by Sportradar (Advocate General in Sportradar, par. 34).  Reutilisation should be 
considered as “a generally complex act made up of acts needed to produce the effect of making 
available, which, in the language of the Directive itself, comprises reutilisation” (Advocate-General in 
Sportradar, par. 42).  The act of “sending” was considered one of the necessary component parts of that 
complex act and consequently shares the classification of the complex act, i.e. a reutilisation of data from 
a protected database (Advocate-General in Sportradar, par. 42, 47).   
Answering the second question, the Advocate-General localised the reutilisation in both Member States A 
and B.  He discarded the criteria of emission and reception and referred to the “intended target” criterion 
of the CJEU in L’Oréal and Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof.  He then considered that the reutilisation would 
include a “sequential succession of a number of acts, which having as their purpose the “making 
available” of certain data via a networked and multi-polar communication medium” (Advocate-General in 
Sportradar, par. 59).  By consequence, the place of that reutilisation should be the place of each of the 
acts needed to produce the result comprising the re-utilisation, i.e. the both in Member States A and B. 
The Court followed the Advocate General in his classification of the sending as an act of reutilisation.  
The Court first defined the restricted act as “extending to any act, not authorised by the maker of the 
database protected by the sui generis right, of distribution to the public of the whole or part of the contents 
of the database” and covering an act “in which a person sends, by means of his web server, to another 
person’s computer, at that person’s request, data previously extracted from the content of a database 
protected by the sui generis right.  By such a sending, that data is made available to a member of the 
public” (Sportradar, par. 20-21).   
The Court then went on to determine the Member State where the act of reutilisation took place.  It 
confirmed the territoriality principle with regard to sui generis database rights:  “the protection by the sui 
generis right provided for in the legislation of a Member State is limited in principle to the territory of that 
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Member State so that the person enjoying that protection can rely on it only against unauthorised acts of 
reutilisation which take place in that territory” (Sportradar, par. 27).  In order to decide whether the 
database right has been infringed under UK law, it should be assessed whether the “acts of sending fall, 
as acts taking place within the [UK], within the territorial scope of the protection by the sui generis right 
afforded by [UK law]” (Sportradar, par. 28).  The Court took into account that this would affect the 
establishment of jurisdiction (art. 5(3) Regulation 44/2001) and applicable law (Regulation 864/2007).   
The Court stated that the localisation of an act of reutilisation should correspond to independent criteria of 
EU law, like the definition itself.  It considered that a reutilisation may indeed consist of successive 
operations, from the placing online so the public can consult the data via the website, to the transmission 
of the data to a member of the public and that these acts may take place in several Member States 
(Sportradar, par. 34).  Considering the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, however, the Court stated that 
“the mere fact that the website containing the data in question is accessible in a particular national 
territory is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the operator of the website is performing an act of 
reutilisation caught by the national law applicable in that territory concerning protection by the sui generis 
right” (Sportradar, par. 36).  Instead, the localisation of an act of reutilisation depends on the intention on 
the part of the person performing the act to target persons in that territory (Sportradar, par. 39).  In this 
case, this intention should be demonstrated by the nature of the data (English football matches), the 
contracts with betting service operating in the UK, the remuneration scheme (access by UK users) and 
the language (different from the language of the Member State where Sportradar pursues its activities).  
Depending on the evidence, the referring court was entitled to localise the act of reutilisation in the 
Member State where the user was present to whose computer the data were transmitted, at her request, 
for purpose of storage and display on screen, i.e. Member State B (Sportradar, par. 43) 
The court concluded that this act of sending is localised – at least – in the Member State “where there is 
evidence from which it may be concluded that the act discloses an intention on the part of the person 
performing the act to target members of the public in [that Member State]”
115
.   
Both the Advocate-General and the Court accepted to qualify the isolated act of sending data to a user, at 
her request, as an act of reutilisation of a protected database.  The preceding stage (storage, upload) was 
not taken into consideration. 
As far as the localisation of the restricted act is concerned, the Advocate-General and the Court applied 
the same criteria but to different results. The act of reutilisation should be situated where the intended 
target public was located.  Mere accessibility was not sufficient.  This led the Advocate General to 
conclude that the act of reutilisation took place both in the Member States of sending and destination, 
whereas the Court decided that the act of reutilisation in this case was localised in the Member State of 
destination, provided that there was evidence of an intention to target the public residing in that Member 
State. 
Two notes should be made with regard to this criterion.  Firstly, both the Advocate General and the Court 
accept that this definition and this localisation criterion may lead to restricted acts in several Member 
States – “at least” in the targeted Member State.  Secondly, this localisation criterion allows the referring 
court to take the intention of the service provider into account and the effects of its decisions. 
c) Mitigation of the consequences of national territoriality  
An act of exploitation may cover the territory of several countries and this may result in an accumulation 
of restricted acts (territorial reach of material acts), with legal consequences on all sides of the border.  
The “territoriality” principle indeed entails that each Member State is entitled to regulate in the field of 
copyright as it pleases.  Within the limits imposed by European directives and international treaties, each 
state can define the protected subject-matter, define and interpret the restricted acts and the exceptions, 
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the duration, set the rules for authorship and transfer of rights, ...  When the constitutive elements of 
cross-border transactions are thus considered relevant acts under national copyright law, the author may 
exercise her right in every single Member State and each Member State may set their own terms for this 
exercise of rights. 
The effects of the territorial nature of copyright have been mitigated by international and European 
harmonisation and by the principle of national treatment
116
.  This means that the level of the author’s 
protection is stabilised across national borders (within a certain margin).  Moreover, copyright protection 
exists without formalities, by the mere fact of the creation of the work – regardless of where the work was 
created.   
At the international level, the most prominent instruments of harmonisation are the Berne Convention and 
the 1996 WIPO Treaties (WCT and WPPT).  At the European level, 7 directives harmonise various 
aspects of in the field of copyright and its neighbouring rights.  In the European framework, two particular 
principles have been adopted to limit the effects of the territoriality principle:  the “country of origin” 
principle in relation to communications to the public by satellite and the “exhaustion” principle in relation to 
the distribution right.   
(i) The “country of origin” principle in the Satellite and Cable Directive 
Due to its technical characteristics, a satellite broadcast covers the territories of several states (its 
“footprint”).  It was controversial whether the right holders’ consent was required in the state of broadcast 
or in each of the states of reception (the so-called “Bogsch” theory).   
At the European level, this discussion was put to an end in the Satellite and Cable Directive
117
.  This 
Directive, adopted a solution consisting of two elements:  a definition of the notion of communication to 
the public by satellite and the determination of the location where such protected act took place.  The 
definition of the protected act is “necessary to avoid the cumulative application of several national laws to 
one single act of broadcasting” (rec. 14 Satellite and Cable Directive). 
The 'communication to the public by satellite' is defined as “the act of introducing, under the control and 
responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals intended for reception by 
the public into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards the 
earth” (art. 1(2)(a) Satellite and Cable Directive).   
It is furthermore determined in which Member State the communication takes place, i.e. it occurs “solely 
in the Member State where, under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the 
programme-carrying signals are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the 
satellite and down towards the earth” (art. 1(2)(b) Satellite and Cable Directive).  If the act of 
communication to the public by satellite takes place outside the EU, alternative criteria are provided to 
attach it to a Member State (i.e. the uplink station in a Member State or the establishment of the 
broadcasting organization in a EU member State – art. 1(2)(d) Satellite and Cable Directive).  The 
territorial reach of the satellite broadcast is thus focused to the Member State where broadcast has its 
origin:  this is where the right holders’ consent should be acquired and where the remuneration should be 
paid (FAPL, par. 111).    This remuneration should however be calculated taking into account the actual 
and potential audience, both in the Member State of broadcast and in any Member State of reception 
(FAPL, par. 112).  The footprint of the broadcast is taken into account for the calculation of the 
remuneration, but the broadcaster is not required to secure the right holders’ authorisation in each 
Member State of the footprint. 
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The aim of the directive is however undermined by the practice of right holders to impose territorial 
restrictions by contract.  The Commission found that the producers sell their programmes to broadcasting 
organisations on condition that the satellite broadcasts are encrypted in order to restrict the reception of 
the programmes to the national borders
118
.   
Such contractual practices of fragmenting the internal market have been found contrary to the freedom to 
provide services and were considered an anticompetitive agreement in Premier League
119
.  In this case, 
the FAPL had licensed its exclusive right of satellite broadcast on football matches to several (national) 
broadcasters in such a way that the overall result was an absolute exclusivity on the national territory in 
the Member State of broadcast.  The CJEU decided that the territorial restrictions in the contracts resulted 
in an impediment of the freedom to provide services and in an anti-competitive agreement.  The defence 
that these restrictions were justified by the objective of protecting the intellectual property rights involved 
was rejected because such a justification can only be invoked when the restriction is necessary to 
preserve the specific subject-matter of the intellectual property right concerned (FAPL, par. 145 in 
conjunction with par. 104-105).  This includes the commercial exploitation or to make the protected 
subject matter available in return for an appropriate remuneration, though not the highest possible 
remuneration (FAPL, par. 107).   
An “appropriate” remuneration should be reasonable in relation to the economic value of the service, 
which refers for satellite broadcasts to “parameters of the broadcasts concerned, such as their actual 
audience, their potential audience and the language version” (par. 110).  It was found in this case that 
right holders were “remunerated for the broadcasting of the protected subject-matter from the Member 
State of broadcast in which the act of broadcasting is deemed to take place, in accordance with Article 
1(2)(b) of the Satellite Broadcasting Directive, and in which the appropriate remuneration is therefore 
payable” (FAPL, par. 111).  The remuneration can be determined taking into account “the actual audience 
and the potential audience both in the Member State of broadcast and in any other Member State in 
which the broadcasts including the protected subject-matter are also received” (FAPL, par. 112; 120).  In 
this case, all recipients had to acquire a decoder card and thus pay a fee (opinion Advocate General, par. 
198).  The restriction to distribute decoders across the borders that materialises an absolute territorial 
exclusivity in return for a premium went beyond what was necessary to protect the specific subject matter 
of the possible IPR. 
The case was distinguished from Coditel I in which no objection was found against partitioning a mark on 
a territorial (national) basis, to protect the exploitation of a work (opinion Advocate-General, par. 193-201; 
FAPL, par. 118-120).  In Coditel I, a renewed consent was required for the retransmission by cable on the 
Belgian territory of an (authorised) German programme showing a film, which was screened in the 
Belgian cinemas at the same time.  In Premier League by contrast, the partitioning of the internal market 
was not meant to protect t another form of exploitation and the satellite broadcast had been authorised 
and remunerated in Greece. 
The SatCab Directive thus explicitly determines the material and territorial constraints of the satellite 
broadcasting right, by providing a definition of the right of communication to the public and a localisation 
                                                     
 
118 Report from the European Commission on the application of Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, COM(2002) 430 
final, 26 July 2002, p. 7.  See also IViR Report, The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy, p. 25-26. 
119 The facts in Premier League can be summarised as follows.  The Football Association Premier League (FAPL) organised the 
first class football competition “Premier League” in England, it recorded the competition matches and it owned the “television 
broadcasting rights”. The recordings were sent to the broadcasters/licensees (images, ambient sound, logos, video sequences, on-
screen graphics, music, English commentary).  The (satellite) broadcasting rights (live transmission) were exploited via territorial 
licences, awarded based on an open tender procedure.  The licences were mostly granted to national broadcasters, which obtained 
the exclusive right to broadcast the football matched on their national territories.  Moreover, the licensees/broadcasters were obliged 
to prevent the reception of the broadcast outside the territory of broadcast.  By consequence: (1) each broadcast (especially by 
satellite) had to be encrypted securely and (2) the broadcaster had to ensure that no decrypting device (decoder) was distributed 
outside the territory of broadcast.  It was found that some bars and restaurants in the UK had bought foreign (Greek) decoders and 
used it to receive the Greek broadcast of the English football matches (for a lesser price). The decrypting devices were produced 
and distributed with the broadcaster’s consent (in Greece) but were used (in the UK) in infringement of the contractual conditions. 
The territoriality of the making available right  61 
 
criterion (“country of origin”).  The practice of reinstating the national borders and thus re-partitioning the 
common audiovisual market can be contained by reference to the freedom to provide services and 
competition law – provided that these restrictions are not necessary for the specific subject-matter of 
copyright.   
The effects of “territoriality” are thus mitigated:  the satellite broadcasting takes place in one country of 
origin, although it has effects beyond the Member State of origin.  The Member States cannot define 
other “relevant acts” and consider these act part of the satellite broadcasting right, thus giving the author 
the possibility to exercise her right (in addition to the country of origin). 
(ii) Exhaustion of the distribution right 
The Information Society Directive requires the Member States to grant a distribution right, i.e. in respect of 
the original of their works or of copies thereof the author has the right to authorise or prohibit any form of 
distribution to the public by sale or otherwise (art. 4(1) InfoSoc Directive).  More precisely, the distribution 
right covers any form of distribution entailing a transfer of ownership (Cassina).   
Without an exhaustion rule, the author would be able to exercise her exclusive right every time a material 
object incorporating her work changed owners.  The author would thus be able to control not only the first 
commercialization of her work but also the derived, second-hand market.  Moreover, the national exercise 
of the distribution right would have an effect on intra-Community movements of goods (imports/exports). 
In order to avoid this corollary of the territoriality principle, it is provided that “the distribution right shall not 
be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first 
sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the right holder or with his 
consent” (art. 4(2) Information Society Directive).  In other words, whenever an object incorporating the 
work has been put on the European market by the author or with her consent, she cannot objet to the 
subsequent exploitation of the object in the form of sales or other transfers of ownership. 
This principle is not applicable to immaterial exploitations protected under the right of communication to 
the public.  It is expressly stated that the rights of communication to the public and of making available to 
the public (art 3(1)-(2) InfoSoc Directive) are not exhausted by any act of communication to the public or 
making available to the public as set out in art. 3 InfoSoc Directive
120
. 
In other words, the authorised communication to the public of a work does not entail the exhaustion of the 
secondary exploitation of that work by means of a communication to the public.  Any act of immaterial 
exploitation, protected by the right of communication to the public, requires the author’s consent, even if it 
is preceded by an act of immaterial exploitation that has been authorised by the author.  For example, the 
authorisation given by the author to broadcast her work (primary communication) does not exempt the 
operator of a simulcasting service from obtaining her consent for including her work in this simulcasting 
service (secondary communication):  the right of communication to the public has not been exhausted by 
the consent to the primary broadcast of the work. 
However, since the CJEU’s decision in UsedSoft it is no longer inconceivable that the exhaustion rule be 
applied to copyright works (other than computer programs), downloaded with the right holder’s consent 
from a website.  In this case, the software company offered its computer programs for permanent 
download to end-users, whose rights were described in the user licence.  The Court decided that such 
download in conformity with the terms of the user licence resulted in a transfer of property and that this 
form of exploitation should be qualified as an act of distribution to the public, subject to exhaustion 
according to art. 4(2) CPD.  The Court was careful to distinguish computer programs, regulated in the 
Computer Programs Directive as a lex specialis, from other works, dealt with in the Information Society 
Directive.  At the same time, the Court and the Advocate-General rely on the WIPO Copyright Treaty for 
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this interpretation, which the Information Society Directive was meant to implement in the EU legal order 
(UsedSoft, par. 52).  The UsedSoft ruling, qualifying an offer for download as an act of distribution subject 
(under certain conditions) to exhaustion, is currently restricted to computer programs, but a decision of 
the Court on a similar form of exploitation of other types of works is now more than ever welcome.  
Traditionally it is understood that distribution right applies to tangible objects (save the UsedSoft ruling) 
and it is determined which material acts are restricted
121
.  By consequence, it is clear how the exhaustion 
rule restricts the distribution right, i.e. by reference to a tangible object
122
..  After a first act of distribution 
with the author’s consent, this object can circulate freely within the EU. 
Any effort to control the (extra) territorial effects of the making available right should similarly consist of 
both a definition of the restricted act under this right and a precise determination of the territorial effects 
which should be contained.   
d) Conclusions on the territoriality principle 
The principle that the national legislator is competent to regulate the events occurring on the national 
territory in copyright terms is not challenged, not even after several international and European initiatives 
to harmonise copyright protection.   
The absence of a EU definition of the making available right leaves the Member States a considerable 
margin to interpret this restricted act under national copyright law (until the CJEU has filled in this gap) 
and to identify the relevant elements taking place on their territories.   
CJEU decisions. The “national territoriality” principle stands in the decisions of the CJEU.  By principle 
the Member States are still competent to regulate on their territories and to control the events occurring 
on their territories.  In “Lagardère”, the conduct engaged on the national territory led to an obligation to 
pay an equitable remuneration, the rate of the equitable remuneration was calculated in function of the 
value of the (national) use and the remunerations due in distinct Member States cannot be compensated.  
In “Stichting De Thuiskopie”, the harm resulting from reproductions (private copies) on a national territory 
– located by the residence of the final user, created an obligation to pay a fair compensation to the 
authors, recovered in the form of a levy.  It seems however that the Court is inclined to seek a balance 
with the requirement of a high level of protection and an efficient enforcement of copyright.  
The satellite broadcasting right constitutes a deviation from this national territoriality principle.  Its wider 
territorial scope entails that the value of the use (according to which the amount of the licence fee is 
assessed) is not restricted to the national territory of the Member State of broadcast but to the audience 
present in the Member States of broadcast and reception (Satellite and Cable Directive, rec. 17). 
However, in “Stichting De Thuiskopie”, the effect of the territoriality principle was moderated and a 
Member State is allowed to interpret its own norms (in effect) as to regulate the behaviour of a person 
residing in another Member State in relation to acts occurring in another Member State, if this is 
necessary to ensure a high protection for the authors and the execution of that Member State’s obligation 
to ensure the effective compensation of the harm occurring on its territory as a consequence of an 
exception in that Member State’s copyright legislation.  The facts of this case being quite specific, it is 
uncertain how the teaching of this decision could be generalised.  
In Donner and Sportradar, the territoriality principle was (implicitly) applied to complex operations, with 
constitutive acts in several Member States.  In both cases the Court found relevant acts as parts of such 
distribution / communication process in the Member States of the referring courts.  In Donner, the 
                                                     
 
121 Cf. Cassina, Donner. 
122 This is less clear in the UsedSoft ruling, which extends the exhaustion of the distribution right to the functional or economic 
equivalent of the originally distributed copy, on condition that this first copy is made unusable by the time a copy is sold.  
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outcome determined whether the criminal law provisions could be applied in Germany.  In Sportradar, this 
allowed the UK courts to find jurisdiction to rule on the liability of one of the parties. 
Various criteria have been applied to trigger the “territoriality”.  In Lagardère, it was the material act of 
broadcasting that determined where the obligation to pay the single equitable remuneration was due.  
The rate of the fee by contrast should be determined based on the presence of a (potential or actual) 
public on a national territory or the exploitation of a work on a national territory.  The fact of the 
exploitation was not relevant to establish an obligation to pay a remuneration but it was taken into 
account to determine the amount of the remuneration.  Where a material act of broadcast takes place on 
the territory of a Member State but the broadcast is not actually exploited on that national territory, then in 
principle an obligation to pay the remuneration arises but its rate should be determined according to the 
value of the exploitation (i.e. result in a low rate).  In Stichting De Thuiskopie, it was the occurrence of 
harm on a territory, at the residence of the final user who causes the harm that located the conduct on the 
territory of a Member State.   
The Court applied a different criterion in Donner and Sportrada.  After its ruling in L’Oréal, it applied the 
criterion of “intended target” of the user of the protected subject matter.  In Donner it was established that 
the essential parts of the cross-border distribution process took place in the Member State of destination, 
where the public was targeted.  Elements that suggested such targeting behaviour were inter alia a 
website and advertisement in German and the existence of a delivery and payment system extending to 
the German territory.  In Sportradar it was decided that the act of sending was protected under the 
reutilisation right and that it could be localised in the Member State where the public was targeted.  The 
mere accessibility of the data in a Member State was not sufficient to establish localisation in that 
Member State. In this case however it was derived from the nature of the data, contracts with betting 
service operators, perhaps the basis of the remuneration scheme and the language of the service, which 
was different from the language of the Member State where Sportradar pursued its activities.  
Interestingly, in Sportradar, the service provider did not seem to perform any material act in the Member 
State of destination:  it had its servers in another Member State and it transmitted the data at the request 
of users, residing in the Member State of destination.  It must be emphasised however that the Court 
allows that several restricted acts can be found in several Member States. 
Uncertainty re making available right.  The absence of a definition of the making available right creates 
some legal uncertainty as to the territorial reach of the online accessibility of protected subject matter.  
Different elements of this complex act could be considered relevant to establish the application of the 
national right of making available to the public:  the availability on a server or the transmission to a 
Member State, even accessibility of the work may be considered a relevant element for the making 
available right.  By consequence, if all Member States are free to determine which element of the 
complex act is relevant to establish an act of making available, then each could subject this constitutive 
part to the prior authorisation of the author (and to the corresponding payment of a licence fee – cf. 
Premier League, par. 110).  The Member States could define the same or different criteria to apply their 
national making available right.  At least in theory, this would lead to the accumulation of, firstly, distinct 
acts of making available under the national copyright legislations concerned.  Secondly, there could be an 
accumulation of distinct acts of reproduction and (other) communication to the public.  Without a 
clarification of this restricted act, its relation to the other exclusive economic rights and the localisation 
criterion, the territorial application of national copyright laws remains speculative.   
In the following section it will be examined how this uncertainty in terms of definition and localisation of 
the making available right affects other legal issues, in particular the conflicts of laws principles, the 
authorship and ownership rules and the accumulation with the reproduction right. 
C. Legal issues/consequences 
In section A of this Study, it has been established that the making available right is not defined in the 
InfoSoc Directive and that acts protected under this right may be localised according to different criteria, 
found in the cases decided by the Court of Justice.  In this section it will be examined how this uncertain 
scope affects other copyright issues.  It will be examined how the making available right should be 
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applied together with the rules on conflict of laws, with the national rules on authorship and ownership 
and with the reproduction right.  The purpose of this exercise is to have a more precise idea of the actual 
effects of this uncertainty.  This will allow us to conclude on the bottlenecks the actual making available 
right presents to various stakeholders (in particular right holders, service providers, end-users).  
1. Conflict of laws 
Because of the territoriality of copyright, the exercise of the making available right may raise issues of 
private international law, hence it can generate situations with cross-border elements. Yet, when a legal 
dispute contains cross-border elements, different arguments may be relied upon to justify the competence 
of different national courts and/or the application of different national laws.   
Private international law issues have long been neglected in the field of copyright. It was thought that they 
could be avoided through the international copyright conventions and through the harmonisation of 
legislation
123
.  The development of essentially “international” technologies, i.e. satellite broadcasting and 
the Internet, has reminded of the importance of private international law with regards to copyright.  
Indeed, due to its worldwide scope, the use of the Internet reveals many cross-border situations: when 
the user uploads a protected work on Internet, it is potentially accessible all over the world and a 
protected act may occur in more than one country.  
We have established before that uncertainty exists regarding both the definition of the making available 
right and the criteria to localise protected acts within the EU.  In this chapter we will examine how this 
situation is affected by private international law rules.  We will successively examine the rules of 
jurisdiction (sub a)) and applicable laws (sub b)) with regard to the making available right.  
a) Jurisdiction 
Despite several attempts, there is no international instrument yet that harmonizes the rules on jurisdiction 
for the whole world. The Hague Conference on Private international law tried to fix international rules and 
proposed a draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters but 
the project failed in 2003 as no consensus could be reached. 
Except in Europe, the conflicts of jurisdictions are therefore ruled by each country’s private international 
law rules, so a whole set of national systems coexists. Different groups of scholars have tried to draw 
worldwide principles on conflict of laws in intellectual property. The American Law Institute adopted a set 
of rules in 2007 to settle the conflict of laws issues in intellectual property law (ALI Principles). In 2011, 
the European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property presented a list of principles 
covering international jurisdiction, the applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in the field of intellectual property (CLIP Principles)
124
. However, these principles lack 
authoritative force. They can however be used as guidelines by legislators and judges. 
In the European Union, the Member states have adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters
125
, commonly known as Brussels I Regulation
126
.   
                                                     
 
123 A. LUCAS, “Applicable law in copyright infringement cases in the digital environment”, 1.  
124 The text of the CLIP Principles is available at http://www.cl-ip.eu/files/pdf2/Final_Text_1_December_2011.pdf  
125 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16 January 2001, p. 1–23. 
126 In addition to Brussels I, two other instruments remain in force in Europe: the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels Convention”) which applies between the Member States of Brussels I and 
Denmark; the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters  
(“Lugano Convention”) which applies between the Members States of the European Union and the EFTA countries. 
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According to the article 1, Brussels I applies in all the Member States of the European Union in civil and 
commercial matters, with the exception of Denmark.  
Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation provides a general rule assigning jurisdiction to the Courts of the 
Member State in which a person is domiciled, whatever her nationality.  
Furthermore, the Brussels I Regulation provides additional rules for national judges to treat issues on 
jurisdiction with regard to provisional or protective measures (i) contractual matters (ii) and non-
contractual matters (iii). 
(i) Provisional or protective measures 
According to article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation, provisional or protective measures can be pursued in 
all the Member States, even if there is no link between the Member State selected and the infringing 
act
127
. That provision deals with the granting of provisional measures in contractual as well as in non-
contractual matters.  
Article 31 is designed to apply regardless of any jurisdiction as to the substance, so that it applies where 
a claim for provisional, including protective, measures is brought before a court other than the court which 
has jurisdiction as to the substance. Consequently, the courts of a Member State are authorised to rule 
on a claim for a provisional measure even if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to 
the substance of the matter under the Regulation Brussels I: In Solvay, it was admitted that a national 
court can grant a provisional cross-border injunction provided that the court does not issue a final 
decision on the validity of the patent and the validity of the patents is not seriously challenged
128
.  It is 
uncertain to which extent such cross border measures are available for copyright infringements.  
Furthermore, the mere fact that proceedings have been commenced on the substance of the case in 
another Member State does not deprive a court of a Member State of its jurisdiction under article 31
129
. 
That provision is intended to avoid causing loss to the parties as a result of the long delays inherent in 
international proceedings. As it lays down an exception to the general rule set up by article 2 of the 
Regulation, article 31 has to be interpreted strictly
130
. According to the Court of Justice, it applies to 
measures which are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the 
recognition of which is sought elsewhere
131132
. As a consequence, it is contested whether article 31 may 
justify the granting of measures such as orders of description resulting from infringements to IP rights in a 
Member State different from the Member State having jurisdiction to rule on the substance of the 
infringement: that provision would indeed only apply to measures intended to preserve the substantive 
claim in law, and not to the performance of procedural measures such as the taking of evidence
133134
.  
                                                     
 
127 Article 31 provides:  Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, 
measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member State have 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
128 CJEU 12 July 2012, Case C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV, Honeywell Belgium NV, Honeywell 
Europe NV. 
129 CJEU 17 November 1998, Case C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in 
Firma Deco-Line and Another (Van Uden). 
130 CJEU 28 April 2005, Case C-104/03, St. Paul Dairy Industries NV v Unibel Exser BVBA (St. Paul). 
131 CJEU 26 March 1992, Case C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner Bank AG. 
132 Recital 25 of the new Regulation Brussels Ibis mentions that the notion of provisional, including protecting, measures should not 
include measures which are not of a protective nature, such as measures ordering the hearing of a witness.  
133 Opinion delivered by the Advocate General KOKOTT delivered on 18 July 2007 in CaseC-175/06, Alessandro Tedesco v 
Tomasoni Fittings Srl and RWO Marine Equipment Ltd.  
134 Recital 25 of the new Regulation Brussels Ibis resolves that debate and states that the notion of provisional, including 
protective, measures should include protective orders aimed at obtaining information or preserving evidence as referred to in 
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The Court of Justice holds that the granting of provisional or protective measures is conditional on, inter 
alia, the existence of a real connecting link between the subject-matter of the measures sought and the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State of the court before which those measures are sought
135
. On 
that condition, provisional measures may be sought in a Member State to be executed in another Member 
State. However, such measures will be subject to an authorization for enforcement in the second Member 
State
136
, based on art. 39 of Brussels I. 
The new Regulation n° 1215/2012 (Brussels Ibis) – which will apply from 10 January 2015 – will facilitate 
the circulation of judgments, including provisional or protective measures, as it eliminates the requirement 
of authorization for enforcement in other Member States
137
. However, according to Brussels Ibis, where 
provisional measures will be ordered by a court of a Member State not having jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter, the effect of such measures will have to be confined to the territory of that 
Member State
138
. On the contrary, provisional and protective measures ordered in a country having 
jurisdiction as to the substance will have to be recognised and enforced in other Member States
139
.  
(ii) Contractual disputes 
It seems that there are few issues of private international law in disputes that relate to the enforcement of 
contracts in the field of copyright.  
Indeed, the contract generally contains a specific clause fixing jurisdiction and, according to the general 
provision contained in article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, any claim has to be brought before the 
courts mentioned in that clause of the contract
140
. A similar provision has been proposed at the WIPO 
forum on private international law and intellectual property
141
.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30 April 2004, p. 45–86. 
135 Van Uden. 
136 A. NUYTS, "Les mesures provisoires dans le Règlement Bruxelles Ibis", R.D.C.-T.B.H., 2013, 350. 
137 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,  OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32.  
138 Rec. 33. 
139 A. NUYTS, "Les mesures provisoires dans le Règlement Bruxelles Ibis", 351. 
140 Article 23 provides: 
1. If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are 
to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that 
court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Such an 
agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either: 
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing; or 
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves; or 
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been aware 
and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade or commerce concerned. 
2. Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to "writing". 
3. Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is domiciled in a Member State, the courts of other Member 
States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction. 
(…) 
141 Article 4.1 of the Draft Convention on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in intellectual property matters, proposed at the 
WIPO Forum in Geneva on 30 and 31 January 2001: 
1. If the parties have agreed that a court or courts of a Contracting State or an arbitral forum shall have jurisdiction to settle any 
dispute which has arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have 
jurisdiction, and that tribunal shall have jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 
Where an agreement having exclusive effect designates a court or courts of a non-Contracting State, or an arbitral forum, the courts 
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That principle is positive for the right holders, as well as for the users, as they have the guarantee that the 
courts they have chosen will have jurisdiction. However, sometimes the author or the user does not really 
have the opportunity to negotiate the contract. In that case, she is forced to accept the will of her 
contracting partner regarding jurisdiction.  
If the contracting partners did not regulate the jurisdiction in the contract, then Brussels I provides 
alternative principles. First of all, as we mentioned it above, article 2 gives jurisdiction to the courts of the 
defendant’s Member State in any circumstances
142
. 
Furthermore, according to article 5(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation, the action can also be brought in 
the Member State of the place of performance of the obligation
143
. Art. 5.1.b stipulates that the place of 
performance of the obligation is the place where the goods were delivered or should have been delivered 
in the case of the sale of goods and the place where the services were provided or should have been 
provided in the case of the provision of services. In a judgment dated 23
rd
 April 2009
144
, the Court of 
justice of the European Union held that a contract under which the owner of an intellectual property right 
grants its contractual partner the right to use the right in return for remuneration may not be interpreted as 
a contract for the provision of services in the meaning of article 5(1)(b), as the owner of the intellectual 
property right does not perform any active conduct in granting a right to use that property
145
. According to 
the Court, such contract nevertheless falls under the scope of article 5(1)(a). Consequently, jurisdiction 
has to be determined in accordance with the law governing the obligation which arises under the contract 
and the non-performance of which is relied upon in support of the action. The place where that obligation 
has or should be performed is to be determined with respect to the conflict rules of the court before which 
the proceedings have been brought
146
.  
These rules apply to contracts dealing with the making available right: 
 According to article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, any dispute relating to the enforcement of a 
contract according to which the right holder would have allowed the right to make its work available 
has to be brought before the courts elected in the contract. It can be a positive rule for the right 
holders provided that they really have the opportunity to negotiate that choice. 
 If the contract does not regulate the issue of jurisdiction, then the claimant has the choice to bring his 
claim in the country of the defendant (article 2) or in the country where the making available act 
should or has been performed (article 5.1.a). That location has to be determined according to the 
national law governing that obligation. We find that last criterion uncertain for both contracting 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
in Contracting States shall decline jurisdiction or suspend proceedings unless the court or courts chosen have themselves declined 
jurisdiction. 
142 Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation: 
Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that 
Member State. 
143 Article 5.1. of the Brussels I Regulation: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued: 
1. (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question; 
(b) for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be: 
- in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have 
been delivered, 
- in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the services were provided or 
should have been provided, 
(c) if subparagraph (b) does not apply then subparagraph (a) applies; 
144 CJEU, 23 April 2009, Case C-533/07, Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lindhorst, ECR, 2009, I, 
03327.  
145 Opinion of the Advocate general TRSTENJAK of 27 January 2009 in the case C-533/07, Falco Privatstiftung, par. 59. 
146 Cfr. CJEU, 6 October 1976, C-14/76, ECR 1976, I, 1497; CJEU, 6 October 1976, C-12/76, ECR 1976, I, 1473. 
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partners with regard to the making available right, as the protected act can hardly be located in one 
single place due to its uncertain definition. Taking into account the recent case-law of the Court of 
Justice, we can anticipate that the act of making available will be seen as performed in the country 
whose public is targeted by the contract.  
(iii) Non-contractual disputes 
The issues related to jurisdiction in the field of copyright mainly arise in non-contractual disputes.  
Articles 2 and 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation provide rules to settle such issues. We will not treat the 
rule contained in article 6.1 of the Brussels I Regulation
147
 in the present Study. That provision specifically 
applies to claims directed against several defendants who are located in different Member States
148
.  
Complementary to the rule provided under article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation, according to which the 
claimant may always sue the defendant before the Courts of the Member State where he has his 
domicile, article 5.3 contains an additional rule providing jurisdiction to the Courts of the Member State 
“where the harmful event occurred or may occur”. 
This is a factual localisation criterion that applies independently from the debate on the substance, even if 
both issues are related
149
: the localisation of the material act on the substance may influence the 
application of the rules of private international law, which nevertheless apply autonomously. 
According to the CJEU, the purpose of article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation is to take into account the 
existence of a particularly close connecting factor between a dispute and the court which may be called 
upon to hear it
150
.  
However, in case of complex infringement, i.e. situations where the infringing act is located in different 
countries, the use of the wording “place where the harmful event occurred” is unclear and causes a lack 
of legal certainty for the right holders as well as for the users/alleged infringers. Indeed, the event giving 
rise to an infringement of the making available right and the resulting damage may occur in different 
countries, so the legal provision does not answer the question which element has to be taken into 
account as connecting factor to determine jurisdiction.  
In Mines de Potasse, the Court of justice has interpreted the wording “place where the harmful event 
occurred” as an option for the plaintiff to start proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred 
or at the place of the event giving rise to it. When those places are located in different Member States, the 
plaintiff has an option for the introduction of his claim: 
“Taking into account the close connection between the component parts of every sort of liability, it 
does not appear appropriate to opt for one of the two connecting factors mentioned to the exclusion 
of the other, since each of them can, depending on the circumstances, be particularly helpful from the 
point of view of the evidence and of the conduct of the proceedings. 
                                                     
 
147 Article 6.1 provides: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 
1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings; 
148 For an example of the enforcement of that provision in the field of copyright, see CJEU, 1 December 2011, C-145/10, Painer.  
149 Opinion of the Advocate general JÄÄSKINEN in Pinckney par. 45; E. TREPPOZ, “Droit européen de la propriété intellectuelle”, 
R.T.D.E., 2011, 851. 
150 CJEU, 30 November 1976, Case C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace, ECR, 1976, 01735 
(SAMines de potasse). 
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To exclude one option appears all the more undesirable in that, by its comprehensive form of words, 
Article 5 (3) of the Convention covers a wide diversity of kinds of liability. 
Thus the meaning of the expression 'place where the harmful event occurred' in Article 5 (3) must be 
established in such a way as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to commence 
proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event giving rise to it.” 
The Court of justice confirmed that interpretation of article 5.3 in Shevill
151
. That case resulted from the 
distribution of a libellous newspaper article published in the United Kingdom, to different Member States, 
causing damage in each country where the paper was distributed. The Court first reminded that the victim 
has the option to bring her entire claim in the country of the event giving rise to the damage: 
“In the case of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States, the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage, within the meaning of those judgments, can only be the place where 
the publisher of the newspaper in question is established, since that is the place where the harmful 
event originated and from which the libel was issued and put into circulation. 
The court of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established must therefore 
have jurisdiction to hear the action for damages for all the harm caused by the unlawful act.” 
Then, the Court held that the damage occurs in the places where the publication is distributed, so the 
courts of each Member State in which the publication is distributed and in which the victim claims to have 
suffered injury to her reputation also have jurisdiction to rule on the injury caused in that State: 
“As the Court held in Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, the plaintiff must consequently have the option to 
bring proceedings also in the place where the damage occurred, since otherwise Article 5(3) of the 
Convention would be rendered meaningless. 
The place where the damage occurred is the place where the event giving rise to the damage, 
entailing tortious, delictual or quasi-delictual liability, produced its harmful effects upon the victim. 
In the case of an international libel through the press, the injury caused by a defamatory publication 
to the honour, reputation and good name of a natural or legal person occurs in the places where the 
publication is distributed, when the victim is known in those places.” 
In Shevill, the Court of justice brought an important limitation to the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
countries where the damage occurs, as it ruled that these courts are competent only for the damage 
caused in that country: 
“In accordance with the requirement of the sound administration of justice, the basis of the rule of 
special jurisdiction in Article 5(3), the courts of each Contracting State in which the defamatory 
publication was distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation are 
territorially the best placed to assess the libel committed in that State and to determine the extent of 
the corresponding damage.”  
The Court of justice has recently applied the principles resulting from the rulings Mines de Potasse and 
Shevill to infringing acts committed on Internet. The case eDate Advertising
152
 dealt with online 
publication of newspaper articles infringing two individuals’ privacy. These publications were causing 
damages to these persons in many countries, including the country where the respective publishers of the 
article were located, the country where the victims were domiciled, and other countries all over the world. 
                                                     
 
151 CJEU 7 March 1995, Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v 
Presse Alliance SA, ECR, 1995, I, 00405 (Shevill). 
152 CJEU 25 October 2011, Joined cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v MGN Limited (C-161/10) (eDate Advertising). 
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In its decision, the Court pointed out the specific issues of Internet and the difficulty to apply the existing 
case-law relating to article 5.3: 
“(…) the placing online of content on a website is to be distinguished from the regional distribution of 
media such as printed matter in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content. 
That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of internet users throughout the 
world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it in regard to its consultation 
beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s control.  
It thus appears that the internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion relating to distribution, in so 
far as the scope of the distribution of content placed online is in principle universal. Moreover, it is not 
always possible, on a technical level, to quantify that distribution with certainty and accuracy in 
relation to a particular Member State or, therefore, to assess the damage caused exclusively within 
that Member State” 
The Court stressed the necessity to adapt the existing criterion of the place where the damage occurs. 
For the first time, it has allowed a person to bring a complaint in respect to all the damage caused in the 
country where that person has her centre of interests, even if that country is not the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage, neither the place where the defendant is domiciled:    
“The connecting criteria referred to in paragraph 42 of the present judgment must therefore be 
adapted in such a way that a person who has suffered an infringement of a personality right by 
means of the internet may bring an action in one forum in respect of all of the damage caused, 
depending on the place in which the damage caused in the European Union by that infringement 
occurred. Given that the impact which material placed online is liable to have on an individual’s 
personality rights might best be assessed by the court of the place where the alleged victim has his 
centre of interests, the attribution of jurisdiction to that court corresponds to the objective of the sound 
administration of justice, referred to in paragraph 40 above.  
(…) 
The jurisdiction of the court of the place where the alleged victim has the centre of his interests is in 
accordance with the aim of predictability of the rules governing jurisdiction (see Case C-144/10 BVG 
[2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33) also with regard to the defendant, given that the publisher of 
harmful content is, at the time at which that content is placed online, in a position to know the centres 
of interests of the persons who are the subject of that content. The view must therefore be taken that 
the centre-of-interests criterion allows both the applicant easily to identify the court in which he may 
sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may be sued (see Case 
C-533/07 Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch [2009] ECR I-3327, paragraph 22 and the case-law 
cited).  
Moreover, instead of an action for liability in respect of all of the damage, the criterion of the place 
where the damage occurred, derived from Shevill and others, confers jurisdiction on courts in each 
Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been accessible. Those courts 
have jurisdiction only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the 
court seized.” 
The plaintiff still has the alternative to sue the person liable for the infringing act in the country of the 
event giving rise to that act, or in each country where the damage occurs.  With regard to the place where 
the damage occurs, the Court considered that this criterion provides jurisdiction to all the countries where 
the content is accessible: 
“Moreover, instead of an action for liability in respect of all of the damage, the criterion of the place 
where the damage occurred, derived from Shevill and Others, confers jurisdiction on courts in each 
Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been accessible. Those courts 
have jurisdiction only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the 
court seized”. 
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This means that all the Member States will have jurisdiction with regard to the damage caused on their 
territory, if the website is accessible all over Europe and if that accessibility may generate a damage
153
. 
According to E. TREPPOZ, the criterion of accessibility might even provide jurisdiction to Member states 
where no real prejudice is felt
154
. It should be observed that the Court seems to have nuanced this 
interpretation in more recent cases (infra).   
The judgment in e-Date Advertising gives the plaintiff the opportunity to opt for a complementary 
connecting factor and to sue the person liable for the infringing act in the plaintiff’s country with regard to 
the entire damage caused. According to the Court of justice, that connecting factor is based on the 
objective of the sound administration of justice and on the aim of predictability of the rules governing 
jurisdiction. These criteria can be found in the recitals 11 and 12 of the Brussels I Regulation
155
. 
If that new connecting factor was applied to acts infringing the making available right, it would allow the 
right holder to sue the counterfeiter in the country where the right holder has the center of his interests to 
claim compensation for the whole resulting prejudice
156
. It would be a regime very favourable to the 
interests of the right holders. The scope of the e-Date Advertising decision is however strictly limited to 
the protection of personality rights, so that its extension to the sphere of copyright is contested
157158
.  
Commentators have criticized the interpretation of article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation provided by the 
Court of justice in eDate Advertising, because of its lack of legal certainty for the users of internet: 
“La compétence universelle et systématique décrite dans les paragraphes précédents est-elle 
satisfaisante? Du point de vue des intérêts de l’auteur, la réponse est affirmative, car ce dernier 
disposera d’une grande variété de choix quant à la ou aux juridiction(s) à saisir (forum shopping). A 
contrario, du point de vue du défendeur, cette solution est très rude : il pourra être assigné n’importe 
où (en Europe notamment par le biais de l’article 5 (3), mais également dans le reste du monde, pour 
autant qu’une disposition nationale similaire existe). Le risque pour un défendeur de se faire attraire 
devant n’importe quelle juridiction « exotique », par le seul fait que son site internet soit consultable à 
partir du territoire sur lequel est établie cette juridiction, est réel."
159
  
The case Wintersteiger
160
 gave the Court the opportunity to apply article 5.3 to counterfeiting acts on 
internet and to delineate the scope of the doctrine e-Date Advertising. That case resulted from the 
unauthorized use of a trademark through a web search engine focused on a country different from the 
country where the trademark was registered. The Court reminded the option for the holder of a trade 
mark to sue the advertiser in the country of the event giving rise to the infringing act or in the country 
where the damage occurs.  
                                                     
 
153 J-P MOINY, "Droit international et droit européen – L’intention "géodéterminée" : un facteur de rattachement confirmé ?", 
R.D.T.I., 2012, n° 48-49, 217. 
154 E. TREPPOZ, op. cit., 853. 
155 Recitals 11 and 12 provide: 
(11)The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the 
defendant's domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the 
subject-matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different linking factor. The domicile of a legal person must 
be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. 
(12) In addition to the defendant's domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the 
court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice. 
156J-P MOINY, "Droit international et droit européen – L’intention "géodéterminée" : un facteur de rattachement confirmé ?", 219-
221.  
157 Opinion of Advocate general Jaaskinen in Pinckney, par. 69. 
158 J.C. GINSBURG, “Where does the act of “making available” occur?”, The Media Institute, 29 October 2012, 
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2012/102912.php. See however E. TREPPOZ, op. cit., 847-853. 
159 F. LEJEUNE, "Contrefaçon, internet et compétence internationale : le droit d’auteur échapperait-il à la théorie de la 
focalisation ?", AM 2011/4, 427. 
160 CJEU, 26 April 2012, Case C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. 
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As to the event giving rise to a damage caused through the use of internet, the Court denied the place of 
establishment of a server as the place where the event giving rise to the infringing act occurs. The Court 
stated that the infringement takes place where the activation of the technical process displaying the 
infringing content is decided, in this case the establishment of the advertiser: 
“In the case of an alleged infringement of a national trade mark registered in a Member State 
because of the display, on the search engine website, of an advertisement using a keyword identical 
to that trade mark, it is the activation by the advertiser of the technical process displaying, according 
to pre-defined parameters, the advertisement which it created for its own commercial 
communications which should be considered to be the event giving rise to an alleged infringement, 
and not the display of the advertisement itself. 
As the Court has already held in the context of interpretation of the directive to approximate the laws 
of the Member States relating to trade marks, it is the advertiser choosing a keyword identical to the 
trade mark, and not the provider of the referencing service, who uses it in the course of trade (Google 
France and Google, paragraphs 52 and 58). The event giving rise to a possible infringement of trade 
mark law therefore lies in the actions of the advertiser using the referencing service for its own 
commercial communications. 
It is true that the technical display process by the advertiser is activated, ultimately, on a server 
belonging to the operator of the search engine used by the advertiser. However, in view of the 
objective of foreseeability, which the rules on jurisdiction must pursue, the place of establishment of 
that server cannot, by reason of its uncertain location, be considered to be the place where the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred for the purpose of the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 
44/2001. 
By contrast, since it is a definite and identifiable place, both for the applicant and for the defendant, 
and is therefore likely to facilitate the taking of evidence and the conduct of the proceedings, it must 
be held that the place of establishment of the advertiser is the place where the activation of the 
display process is decided.” (emphasis added) 
The Court then decided, with regard to the criterion of the place where the damage occurs, that it gives 
jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State in which the right at issue is registered to determine all the 
damage allegedly caused to the proprietor of the protected right. This is based once again on the 
objective of foreseeability and that of sound administration of justice: 
“With regard to jurisdiction to hear a claim of infringement of a national mark in a situation such as 
that in the main proceedings, it must be considered that both the objective of foreseeability and that 
of sound administration of justice militate in favour of conferring jurisdiction, in respect of the damage 
occurred, on the courts of the Member State in which the right at issue is protected. 
It is the courts of the Member State in which the trade mark at issue is registered which are best able 
to assess, taking account of the interpretation of Directive 2008/95 in, inter alia, Cases C-236/08 to 
C-238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECR I-2417, and Case C-324/09 L’Oréal and Others 
[2011] ECR I-0000, whether a situation such as that in the main proceedings actually infringes the 
protected national mark. Those courts have the power to determine all the damage allegedly caused 
to the proprietor of the protected right because of an infringement of it and to hear an application 
seeking cessation of all infringements of that right.” (emphasis added) 
Nevertheless, we doubt that this principle could apply to the making available right: contrary to 
trademarks, copyright does not imply a registration process, so the criterion of the country where the IP 
right is registered cannot apply.  
The Court went further in the case Football Dataco, opposing an organisation managing a database 
containing a compilation of data’s on football matches in England and Wales and Sportradar, a German 
company which provides to betting companies results and other statistics relating to the English league 
matches live via the internet. Football Dataco brought proceedings against Sportradar in England 
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claiming that the German company was infringing to the sui generis right on its database. Sportradar 
challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts and alleged that the infringing act was committed in a 
Member State other than the United Kingdom, at the place where Sportradar’ servers are located.  
Even if the prejudicial issue did not treat the question of jurisdiction, the reasoning of the Court of Justice 
has to be taken into account. The Court indeed explained how to localise the protected act by analysing 
rules of substantive law and rules of private international law. Doing so, it rejected Sportradar’s 
arguments trying to assimilate the place where the harmful event occurs to the place where the server 
from which the data’s are sent is situated, and ruled in favour of the approach focused on the public of the 
Member State to which the user is directing his offer, considering that it is the place where the act of 
reutilisation of the data’s happens: 
“The localisation of an act of re-utilisation in the territory of the Member State to which the data in 
question is sent depends on there being evidence from which it may be concluded that the act 
discloses an intention on the part of its performer to target persons in that territory. 
(…) 
In the light of the above considerations, the answer to the question is that Article 7 of Directive 96/9 
must be interpreted as meaning that the sending by one person, by means of a web server located in 
Member State A, of data previously uploaded by that person from a database protected by the sui 
generis right under that directive to the computer of another person located in Member State B, at that 
person’s request, for the purpose of storage in that computer’s memory and display on its screen, 
constitutes an act of ‘re-utilisation’ of the data by the person sending it. That act takes place, at least, in 
Member State B, where there is evidence from which it may be concluded that the act discloses an 
intention on the part of the person performing the act to target members of the public in Member State 
B, which is for the national court to assess.” 
As to the place of the damage, the Court then diverged from the theory of accessibility it had raised in 
eDate Advertising and expressed that the accessibility of a website in a Member State is not a sufficient 
condition to localize the protected acts in that country: 
 
“The mere fact that the website containing the data in question is accessible in a particular national 
territory is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the operator of the website is performing an act of 
re-utilisation caught by the national law applicable in that territory concerning protection by the sui 
generis right. 
If the mere fact of being accessible were sufficient for it to be concluded that there was an act of re-
utilisation, websites and data which, although obviously targeted at persons outside the territory of the 
Member State concerned, were nevertheless technically accessible in that State would wrongly be 
subject to the application of the relevant law of that State.
” 
J. GINSBURG approves the reasoning of the Court as it makes sense on an economic point of view “and 
avoids the pitfalls of a point of attachment based solely on the place(s) of receipt of the 
communication”
161
.  
So far, the Court of justice has never had to treat issues regarding jurisdiction in disputes related to 
copyright infringement on internet. Meanwhile, it has received a prejudicial issue aiming at the 
interpretation of article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation because of the unauthorized reproduction and 
distribution on internet of songs protected by copyright
162
. According to the summary of the case made by 
Advocate general JÄÄSKINEN, the songs of Mr Pinckney, a singer-songwriter living in France, were 
                                                     
 
161 J. GINSBURG, " Where Does the Act of ‘Making Available’ Occur?”. 
162 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 11 April 2012, Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney 
v KDG Mediatech AG. 
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reproduced on CD’s in Austria, without his consent, by an Austrian company called Mediatech. The CD’s 
were commercialised on internet by British companies, whose websites are accessible in France. Mr 
Pinckney brought proceedings against the Austrian company in France. Mediatech challenged the 
competence of the French courts and the French Court of cassation referred the case to the Court of 
Justice to decide whether it had jurisdiction on the basis of art. 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
The Court of Justice has not answered the prejudicial issue yet and it might never provide a response to 
the French Court of cassation, as the admissibility of the issue is contested. 
In his non-binding opinion, the Advocate general has nevertheless provided interesting guidelines to 
interpret art. 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation and define the place where the damage occurs after an 
infringement to the making available right
163
. 
The Advocate general first reminded that the action can be brought in the Member State where the 
defendant has his domicile or in the Member State where the harmful event occurs. As to the place of the 
harmful event, the Advocate general reminded the existence of an option between the Member State 
where the event giving rise took place and the Member State(s) where the damage happened.  
According to the Advocate general the event giving rise to the harm has to be found at the place where 
the act of upload is decided, namely the place of establishment of the counterfeiter. That criterion is 
similar to the one applied in Wintersteiger: 
“En ce qui concerne le lieu de l’évènement causal, qui confère compétence à la juridiction saisie pour 
l’ensemble du dommage subi, je considère qu’il convient d’adopter en matière de droits d’auteur la 
même approche que celle retenue par la Cour dans l’arrêt Wintersteiger, précité, dans le domaine du 
droit des marques, consistant à attribuer compétence aux juridictions du lieu d’établissement des 
contrefacteurs présumés en tant que lieu où l’offre en ligne des CD – pour l’acte de distribution – ou 
bien la mise en ligne des chansons («upload») – pour l’acte de communication – a été décidée."       
As to the place of the damage, the Advocate general proposed to localize it in the Member States 
targeted by the infringing act: 
"En l’occurrence, s’agissant d’une atteinte alléguée à certains droits exclusifs d’auteur par 
l’intermédiaire d’Internet, il me semble que l’approche de la localisation développée par la Cour au plan 
substantiel dans les arrêts susmentionnés pourrait également être suivie pour déterminer le lieu de 
matérialisation du dommage aux fins d’application de l’article 5, point 3, du règlement n° 44/2001. 
Cette analyse me paraît en effet confortée par la nature propre du préjudice résultant d’une atteinte 
aux droits de distribution et de communication au sens de la directive 2001/29. Celui-ci s’analysant en 
un manque à gagner au titre de la diffusion non autorisée des œuvres, il me semblerait approprié de 
privilégier un for qui serait désigné à l’issue d’une analyse de la direction de l’activité vers un public 
donné par le site Internet en question, approche qualifiée par la doctrine de « théorie de la focalisation 
». Le for ainsi désigné ne disposerait que d’une compétence limitée aux dommages survenus sur le 
territoire intentionnellement ciblé par l’auteur présumé de la violation". 
The Advocate general thus rejected the criterion of accessibility used in e-Date Advertising to localize the 
place where the damage occurs. However, Mr. JÄÄSKINEN did not define the elements to be taken into 
account to find the public targeted by a website. It only referred to an existing judgment of the Court of 
Justice: 
"Pour la mise en œuvre d’un tel rattachement, la Cour pourrait s’inspirer des critères non limitatifs 
dégagés dans l’arrêt Pammer et Hotel Alpenhof, étant précisé que lesdits critères me semblent devoir 
être appliqués par les juridictions nationales avec une certaine souplesse, tenant compte, notamment, 
de la nature de l’activité en cause." 
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In the case Pammer, the Court proposed a non-exhaustive list of criteria capable of constituting evidence 
of an exploitation, such as the international nature of the activity, the use of a language or a currency 
other than the language or currency generally used in the Member State in which the exploitant is 
established, the mention of telephone numbers with an international code, the use of a top-level domain 
name other than that of the Member State in which the exploitant is established, and the mention of an 
international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member States (infra sub Part II, C, 
1)
164165
. 
The way the national courts apply the principles laid down by the Court of justice to cases deriving from 
copyright infringement on internet differ from one state to the other, and may even vary in the same 
country
166
.   
The main question the national courts have to solve is whether the mere accessibility of a website in the 
territory is a sufficient basis for finding jurisdiction on basis of article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(place where the damage occurs) or whether a closer connection than mere accessibility is required.  
In France, the Cour de cassation generally stresses the necessity of the existence of a close link between 
the harmful event and the French territory
167
:  
“(…) la seule accessibilité d’un site internet sur le territoire français n’est pas suffisante pour retenir la 
compétence des juridictions françaises, prises comme celles du lieu du dommage allégué et sans 
rechercher si les annonces litigieuses étaient destinées au public de France (…)" (emphasis added) 
However, analysing the question of the place where the damage occurs after the publication of protected 
works of a Chilean artist made available on a Chilean website, the Cour d’appel in Paris has rendered a 
controversial decision, considering that the accessibility of the website was sufficient to justify French 
jurisdiction
168
: 
“Considérant, s’agissant du grief de contrefaçon, que le site incriminé constitue, selon les propres 
écritures de la partie défenderesse, une source d’information sur les artistes chiliens depuis l’époque 
coloniale jusqu’à nos jours, qu’à ce titre, fut-il rédigé en langue espagnole et édité au Chili, il vise 
nécessairement tant le public des amateurs d’art ou des historiens d’art qui est, par essence, un 
public international, ouvert sur le monde et recherchant sa documentation au-delà des frontières, que 
quiconque étant intéressé soit par l’art pictural chilien en général soit par l’oeuvre de Hernan G. en 
particulier, sera amené peu important à cet égard sa nationalité ou son lieu de résidence, à consulter 
un site informatif hébergé au Chili ; 
Que par voie de conséquence et dès lors qu’il est constant que ce site est accessible depuis la 
France, force est de relever que le public français pertinent se trouve à même de réceptionner les 
contenus argués de contrefaçon, circonstance qui justifie de l’existence d’un lien de rattachement 
suffisant, substantiel ou significatif entre les faits illicites et le dommage allégué sur le territoire 
français et qui commande de retenir la compétence du tribunal de grande instance de Paris pour 
connaître de la contrefaçon ;"(emphasis added) 
                                                     
 
164 CJEU 7 December 2010, joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG 
(C-585/08) and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller (C-144/09) (Pammer/Alpenhof). 
165 For a recent analysis : J-P MOINY, "Droit international et droit européen – L’intention “géodéterminée”: un facteur de 
rattachement confirmé?”, R.D.T.I., 2012, 211-215. 
166 R. DI NOTO, "La compétence internationale des juridictions françaises et allemandes en matière de cyber-délits de 
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That decision has been criticized because for infringement occurring on Internet, the French courts – and 
especially the Cour d’appel in Paris
169
 – usually require a closer connection than the mere accessibility of 
the website on the French territory. 
 
Belgian case-law seems divided on the question whether the mere accessibility of a website is sufficient 
to provide jurisdiction to the Belgian courts and it is difficult to elaborate a global theory over the 
application of article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation by the Belgian courts. 
A few years ago, the Cour d’appel in Brussels considered that it was competent to hear a litigation 
resulting from the making available of a French film on a website because it was accessible in Belgium: 
"Attendu qu’en l’espèce, le film « La Veuve de Saint-Pierre » a été écrit, réalisé et produit en France ; 
qu’il n’est pas démontré par l’appelante que les copies de ce film destinées à la télévision, la vidéo 
ou les DVD sont réalisées en Belgique ; qu’il n’est pas démontré non plus que le site web est 
alimenté depuis le territoire belge ; 
Qu’il n’est toutefois pas contesté que le film a été distribué en Belgique et que le site web peut être 
consulté en Belgique ; que ce film pourra être vu par les téléspectateurs belges s’il est programmé 
sur une chaîne de télévision captée en Belgique et se retrouvera vraisemblablement dans les 
vidéothèques belges lorsqu’il sera mis en location ; 
Que les juridictions belges sont donc compétentes pour connaître des effets préjudiciables sur le 
territoire belge de la réalisation et de la production du film en France ainsi que pour connaître de tous 
les effets des communications de ce film au public qui ont lieu en Belgique."
170
  
A few years later, the Tribunal de première instance in Liège dealing with a litigation opposing the French 
Tennis Federation and online gambling websites adopted an intermediate position based on the mere 
accessibility of the website in Belgium and the existence of a few other connecting factors such as the 
use of the English language, the possibility to use the services provided on the website in Belgium, the 
fact that the Belgian football league, amongst others, was targeted by the website, …
171
.  
 
However, in a similar litigation between football clubs and gambling companies, the Cour d’appel in Liège 
denied the competence of the Belgian courts. According to the Cour d’appel, the accessibility of the 
websites in Belgium and the possibility to make online bets from Belgium does not justify the existence of 
a sufficient link between the litigation and the Belgian territory in order to provide jurisdiction to the 
Belgian courts: 
 
“La seule circonstance, déterminante à leurs yeux, que les sites web litigieux sont accessibles au 
public belge est impuissante à rendre compte de l'existence d'un lien de rattachement 
particulièrement étroit entre la  contestation et les juridictions belges de nature à justifier une 
attribution de compétence à ces dernières pour la simple et bonne raison que, s'agissant de 
sites web ‘.com’, ceux-ci sont, dès le placement du matériel en ligne, instantanément et 
automatiquement accessibles dans tous les États membres de l'Union européenne, pour ne parler 
que de ce qui intéresse celle-ci. 
Les internautes de chacun des autres États contractants peuvent, à l'instar des internautes belges, 
faire enregistrer leurs paris sur ces sites, en sorte qu'à suivre l'interprétation que les 
(demanderesses) veulent donner de l'article 5.3, les juridictions de tous les États membres se 
retrouveraient simultanément compétentes pour connaître des éventuels dommages causés sur 
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The territoriality of the making available right  77 
 
le territoire de leur État, à côté des juridictions naturelles appelées à connaître de l'entièreté du 
préjudice allégué que sont les tribunaux du domicile des (défenderesses). 
Le résultat aboutirait donc à consacrer une base de compétence paneuropéenne. Or, cette 
conséquence va clairement à l'encontre des objectifs poursuivis par le règlement et, avant lui, par la 
Convention de Bruxelles, dans la mesure où ces instruments cherchent impérativement à favoriser la 
reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions judiciaires en dehors de l'État dans lequel elles ont été 
rendues, ce qui implique qu'il est indispensable d'éviter la multiplication des juridictions compétentes 
sous peine d'accentuer au contraire les risques d'inconciliabilité de ces décisions." 
 
The Cour d’appel noted that the gambling companies had no establishment in Belgium, did not use 
servers hosted in Belgium and had no “.be” domain name. The websites were available in different 
languages but not necessarily in French and in Dutch, They offered betting services on multiple football 
leagues and not exclusively the Belgian competition. They did not seem to have a marketing strategy 
focused on the Belgian public. Finally, the number of Belgian gamblers using these websites was not 
significant. 
 
The case went to the Cour de cassation, which cancelled the judgment delivered by the Cour d’appel and 
settled the dispute in favour of the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts:  
 
"L’arrêt attaqué énonce que la seule circonstance « que les sites web litigieux sont accessibles au 
public belge est impuissante à rendre compte de l’existence d’un lien de rattachement 
particulièrement étroit entre la contestation et les juridictions belges de nature à justifier une 
attribution de compétence à ces dernières », qu’en réalité, « les données propres aux sites litigieux 
ne fondent pas l’existence d’un lien de rattachement particulièrement étroit entre la contestation et la 
Belgique. […] Les sites de paris sont accessibles aux internautes belges qui peuvent y faire 
enregistrer leurs paris dans la même mesure qu’ils sont accessibles aux internautes des autres États 
membres puisqu’il s’agit de sites ‘.com’ qui ont vocation à élargir leur marché à l’Europe entière. Le 
fait que ces sites n’ont pas exclu le territoire belge de leur portée ne témoigne d’aucune attention 
particulière au marché belge dès lors que tel est le cas pour la grande majorité des autres États. Par 
ailleurs, ils n’ont pas non plus créé d’extension ‘.be’ propre à la Belgique. Ils sont disponibles en 
plusieurs langues sans que s’y retrouvent systématiquement les deux langues les plus usitées en 
Belgique ». 
Il considère enfin qu’« il n’est pas discuté que le nombre de paris pris par le public belge est tout à 
fait marginal par rapport au nombre total de paris enregistrés par ces sites », que, si, dans l’affaire 
Shevill, seulement cinq exemplaires des 250.000 de la publication litigieuse avaient été diffusés dans 
la ville où siégeait le tribunal saisi, « il existait de toute façon [dans cette affaire] un lien de 
rattachement particulièrement étroit entre l’atteinte à la réputation dont se plaignait la requérante et 
les tribunaux saisis, quel que soit le nombre d’exemplaires diffusés dans le for, dès lors que la 
plaignante vivait à l’endroit et subissait donc principalement l’atteinte dénoncée là-bas » et que « les 
[défenderesses] sont fondées à conclure en effet que leurs relations commerciales avec la Belgique 
sont ‘de minimis’». 
Ni par ces énonciations et considérations ni par aucune autre, l’arrêt attaqué ne justifie légalement sa 
décision d’accueillir les déclinatoires de compétence internationale soulevés en application du 
règlement (CE) 44/2001". 
The ruling delivered by the Belgian Cour de cassation is based on the judgment eDate Advertising and 
considers the accessibility of the website as the condition to confer jurisdiction to the Belgian courts. That 
condition might nevertheless evolve as the Court of justice seems to have replaced the criterion of 
accessibility by an exploitation approach in Wintersteiger and Football Dataco, and might confirm it in 
Pinckney.       
In the Netherlands, the existence of a closer link than the mere accessibility of the website is required to 
sue a counterfeiter before the Dutch courts. The courts apply the principles fixed by the Hoge Raad in the 
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judgment Ladbrokes
172
 to determine whether counterfeiting elements published on a website have 
occurred in the Netherlands. In the case The Pirate Bay, the Tribunal of Amsterdam ruled that the offer 
coming from the website The Pirate Bay was specifically focused on the Dutch territory. The judges 
noticed inter alia that The Pirate Bay was used from the Netherlands or through a Dutch provider, that it 
was using Dutch as language, that there were advertisements focused on the Dutch public and that files 
contained contents in Dutch
173
. The Tribunal therefore considered it had jurisdiction to hear the case.  
In the United Kingdom, the High Court of Justice treated the question of jurisdiction in the case Football 
Dataco and Sportradar, before it was referred to the Court of justice. The Chancery Division of the High 
Court expressly analysed the location of the making available act coming from the re-utilization of the 
database by Sportradar on a conflict of laws point of view:  
“"Re-utilization" raises a question of law. Where does "making available to the public all or a 
substantial part of the contents of a database by … on-line … transmission" occur? Does it occur 
where the server is situated? Or where the public are? Or in both locations? 
(…) 
The debate in relation to both these provisions is similar to that which occurred in relation to 
"broadcasting". That debate has now been resolved, so far as the European Union and satellite 
broadcasts are concerned, by the Directive on Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Re-transmission, 
Directive 93/83 EC, and by amendments made to section 6 of the Act by the Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2967) for all wireless broadcasts. By those provisions the place 
where the act of broadcast occurs is where the signals are introduced under the control of the person 
making the broadcast into an uninterrupted chain of communication. This is known as the "emission 
theory". There is no corresponding definition for either of the restricted acts in issue here. 
Does the emission theory apply in the case of infringement of database right by making available to 
the public by online transmission? Mr Mellor submitted that it did not. He submitted firstly that the 
emission theory made sense in the context of satellite broadcasting, principally because of the 
approximate coincidence between the footprint of the satellite and the sphere of regulatory influence 
over the broadcasters, i.e. the European Union. With online transmission the server could be 
positioned anywhere – and in particular in states which are not party to any international obligations. 
He was, however, unable to point to any case or travaux préparatoires which indicated this as the 
basis for the emission theory as it applies to broadcasting. Moreover it is significant that the UK has 
adopted the emission theory for all wireless broadcasts, not solely satellite broadcasting: see section 
6(4) of the Act. 
(…) 
I have come to the conclusion that the better view is that the act of making available to the public by 
online transmission is committed and committed only where the transmission takes place. It is true 
that the placing of data on a server in one state can make the data available to the public of another 
state but that does not mean that the party who has made the data available has committed the act of 
making available by transmission in the State of reception. I consider that the better construction of 
the provisions is that the act only occurs in the state of transmission.”
174
 (emphasis added) 
The English judge considered that the making available act is committed where the transmission takes 
place and therefore provides jurisdiction to the courts in that country.  
                                                     
 
172 Hoge Raad (NL) 18 February 2005, NJ 2005, 404. 
173 Rechtbank Amsterdam (Voorz.) 22 October 2009, AMI 2010, 18. 
174 EWHC 2911 (Ch) (17 November 2010), retrieved via http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/2911.html  
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That case then went to the Court of Appeal that addressed a prejudicial issue to the Court of justice of the 
European Union
175
. After the ruling delivered by the Court of justice, the Court of Appeal did not come 
back on the issue of jurisdiction and found it was competent to settle the dispute. 
In Germany, the Landgericht München decided it was competent to hear a claim brought by a German 
right holder against an Austrian website unlawfully using maps protected by copyright. According to the 
Court, the website was accessible from Germany and it could potentially be used by its owner to enter 
into business relations with German customers, as it already was in the past
176
. Even if the argumentation 
used in that decision shows that the mere accessibility of the website is not sufficient to justify the 
jurisdiction of the German courts, no other decisive connecting factors were presented. 
 
Furthermore, the Landgericht Köln ruled in another case that the accessibility of a website in Germany 
was not a sufficient condition to admit the jurisdiction of the German courts as the website had no impact 
on the German public. The Court especially focused on the absence of any German translation of the 
website, while it was translated in 8 other languages
177
.    
 
According to the Italian expert we have consulted, in case of cross-border online infringement of 
copyright, Italian courts should apply the ordinary criteria of private international law and civil procedure 
law in order to find out where the copyright protected act takes place and where the supposed infringer 
can be sued (i.e., the place of domicile/residence of the defendant or the place where his or her servers 
are located, if the infringer does not have a domicile in Italy)
178
.  
 
By applying these rules, in terms of jurisdiction cases of online copyright infringement should be brought 
before the court of the place where the illegal conduct has taken place and, if this is not possible, at the 
place where communication to the public has been technically enabled (i.e., place of the servers of the 
infringer).  In this respect, the criterion of the place where the harmful event occurs can only play a 
subordinate role. As far as territorial competence of courts is concerned, moreover, it should be 
considered that the liability exemptions created to the benefit of providers of services of mere conduit, in 
their transposition into Italian law, should be understood as making it impossible for the court of the place 
where such provider is established to assert its competence, even though copyright has been infringed 
through its networks.  
 
Finally, a recent judgment in the United States of America should be mentioned. So far, the mere 
accessibility of a website in a forum was not deemed sufficient for a court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
defendant. However, the New York Court of Appeals decided in the case Penguin Group v. American 
Buddha that it had jurisdiction to treat a claim brought by a New York copyright holder against the owner 
                                                     
 
175 EWCA Civ 330 (29 March 2011), retrieved via http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/330.html  
176 Langericht München, Urteil vom 30.07.2009, Az. 7 O 13895/08, retrieved via http://www.damm-legal.de/lg-muenchen-i-
gerichtsstand-bei-rechtsverletzungen-im-internet-dort-wo-potentielle-kunden-sind  
177 Oberlandesgericht Köln, 30 October 2007, GRUR, 2008, 71  
178 The reasoning of the Italian expert is based on the observation that several decisions in the Italian case law have examined the 
issue of where an unlawful act of online communication should be deemed to have occurred, for purposes of applicable law, 
jurisdiction and territorial competence of courts. Italian courts have drawn on principles of tort law, civil procedure, private 
international law, and constitutional law in order to take such resolutions and to determine where a tort committed online (e.g., 
defamation) had occurred.  Outside the specific domain of copyright law, for instance, there is a relevant judgment of the United 
Chambers of the Italian Supreme Court (judgment n. 21661 of 13.10.2009) that held that the tort of defamation becomes punishable 
only when online transmission of unlawful content is complete and the conduct becomes perceivable by the offended party. In the 
same judgment the Supreme Court added that the fact that a tort occurs online should not unreasonably expand the opportunities 
for the claimant to file suit in any fora or courts because of the ubiquity of the Internet and of the perception of on-line offences and 
infringements in so many different places. The Italian Constitution (Art. 25), according to the Supreme Court, makes it mandatory for 
civil procedure law to render the territorial competence of courts foreseeable. This means that courts should localize torts avoiding 
the adoption of criteria (like the one localizing torts where its harmful consequences materialize) that would make infringements 
potentially ubiquitous and would end up giving the claimant the chance to sue the infringer whenever he or she wants.  
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of a website located in another State of the US, because the plaintiff’s business interests were harmed in 
New York
179
: 
“the role of the Internet in cases alleging the uploading of copyrighted books distinguishes them from 
traditional commercial tort cases where courts have generally linked the injury to the place where 
sales or customers are lost. The location of the infringement in online cases is of little import 
inasmuch as the primary aim of the infringer is to make the works available to anyone with access to 
an Internet connection, including computer users in New York. In addition, the injury to a New York 
copyright holder, while difficult to quantify, is not as remote as a purely indirect financial loss due to 
the broad spectrum of rights accorded by copyright law. (…) Thus, we conclude that the alleged 
injury in this case occurred in New York for purposes of CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii). 
Finally, contrary to American Buddha's assertion, our decision today does not open a Pandora's box 
allowing any nondomiciliary accused of digital copyright infringement to be haled into a New York 
court when the plaintiff is a New York copyright owner of a printed literary work. Rather, CPLR 302 
(a) (3) (ii) incorporates built-in safeguards against such exposure by requiring a plaintiff to show that 
the nondomiciliary both "expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the 
state" and, importantly, "derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." 
There must also be proof that the out-of-state defendant has the requisite "minimum contacts" with 
the forum state and that the prospect of defending a suit here comports with "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice," as required by the Federal Due Process Clause.” (emphasis added) 
The reasoning of the American Court of Appeal is interesting, but it is difficult to find relevant elements for 
the present studies, as it refers to specific American concepts of fair play and due process clause. 
Jurisdiction ultimately failed because the defendant did not derive substantial revenue from interstate or 
international commerce.  J. Ginsburg nevertheless notices that the European and American approaches 
are complementary rather than contradictory
180
. 
(iv) Intermediate conclusion 
Even if there are few judicial decisions relating to the making available right, we have found, in the 
absence of a clear definition, that its supposed cross-border character causes issues in terms of 
jurisdiction.  
These issues generally arise in non-contractual disputes.  
 
Currently the national courts of a European Member State have jurisdiction if alternatively the defendant 
is established in that Member State, or the event giving rise to the infringing act or the damage resulting 
from this event occur on their national territory: 
 The courts of the Member State where the defendant is established have jurisdiction with regard 
to the entire damage. 
 According to the decision Wintersteiger, the event giving rise to the infringement should be 
located at the place “where the activation of the display process is decided”, i.e. the place of 
establishment of the user. The courts in that Member State have jurisdiction to settle the entire 
damage suffered by the author. 
 According to the Court of justice, the courts of the Member States where the damage occurs 
have jurisdiction with regard to the damage caused in that Member State. However, the place 
where the damage occurs depends on the interpretation provided by the national judges. In the 
absence of a clear definition, the courts generally examine whether the accessibility of a website 
in their country is a sufficient link to provide jurisdiction. The national case law of the Member 
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180 J.C. GINSBURG, “Where does the act of “making available” occur?. 
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States is divided on that point. Certain courts consider that the mere accessibility of a website is 
sufficient to justify jurisdiction, while others require closer connecting factors between the 
infringing acts and their territory and require the infringing act to target a public on their territory 
to provide jurisdiction to the judges of that Member State. 
That approach is the one favoured by the Court of justice in Football Dataco with regard to the 
act of reutilisation of databases. It might be confirmed in Pinckney concerning the right of 
communication to the public. If this is so, the national courts will still have to define which 
elements they take into account to prove that the exploitation of the work targets their Member 
State. 
 A new localisation of the place where the damage occurs was proposed by the Court of justice in 
eDate Advertising and in Wintersteiger, providing jurisdiction to the courts of one Member State 
(respectively the Member State where the victim has the centre of her interests and the Member 
State where the trade mark has been registered) with regard to the whole damage suffered. The 
application of a similar principle to the making available right is uncertain, as the connecting 
factors selected by the Court of justice may not be applied to copyright. Advocate general 
JÄÄSKINEN has rejected such an outcome in his opinion over the case Pinckney. 
b) Applicable law 
In cross-border conflicts, once the issue of jurisdiction has been settled, then the judge often has to 
determine under which law the dispute has to be solved.  
With regard to the applicable law, a distinction has to be made between the law applicable to the 
copyright itself and the law applicable to the exploitation of the work (whether it is a contractual or non-
contractual exploitation). It may be difficult to delineate the limits between the scope of those two laws. 
(i) Authorship and ownership 
Article 5.2 of the Berne Convention refers to the application of the laws of the country for which a 
protection is claimed (lex loci protectionis) to the enjoyment and the exercise of the rights provided under 
the Convention. 
That provision is generally presented as a rule treating the conflicts of laws
181
. Authors are however 
divided on that question and some of them consider that this provision is a substantive rule establishing 
the scope of the Berne Convention
182
. 
                                                     
 
181 Article 5 provides: 
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than 
the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights 
specially granted by this Convention. 
 (2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be 
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this 
Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed. 
 (3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. However, when the author is not a national of the country of 
origin of the work for which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors. 
 (4) The country of origin shall be considered to be: 
 (a) in the case of works first published in a country of the Union, that country; in the case of works published simultaneously in 
several countries of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country whose legislation grants the shortest term of 
protection; 
 (b) in the case of works published simultaneously in a country outside the Union and in a country of the Union, the latter country; 
 (c) in the case of unpublished works or of works first published in a country outside the Union, without simultaneous publication in a 
country of the Union, the country of the Union of which the author is a national, provided that: 
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Furthermore, the extent of article 5.2 is uncertain
183
 and it is argued that the lex loci protectionis does not 
apply to issues related to the determination of authorship/initial ownership, which would remain governed 
by the law of the country in which the right is granted (lex loci originis).The lex loci originis refers to the 
law of the country of origin in the sense of the Berne Convention, i.e. the country of the first publication of 
the work or, in case of unpublished works, the country of which the author is a national (article 5.4)
184
.  
Even if the Court of Justice has now provided a uniform definition of the originality, that issue remains 
important because it is not limited to the European Union but affects all the contracting parties of the 
Berne Convention. Furthermore, that debate also applies to the determination of authorship, and that 
issue is not harmonised by the Court of Justice so far.   
A part of the legal scholarship defends the position that the law of the locus originis of the work should 
apply to the determination of the initial ownership. This would vest the authorship or initial ownership in 
one person (natural or legal), regardless of the subsequent fate of the work. Such solution provides 
simplicity and consistency
185
. 
Applying the lex loci protectionis by contrast would lead to different persons claiming copyright protection, 
depending on the place where that protection is sought.  This could even result in the exclusion of the 
person who is considered as the author or initial owner in the locus originis. This variability affects the 
legal certainty not only from the initial rights holder’s point of view, but also from the users’ point of view, 
as “it could mean, for example, with respect to joint works, that different persons would be adjudged 
authors of the same work in different countries, depending on each country’s standard for demonstrating 
authorship”
186
. For that reason, J. Ginsburg and S. Ricketson claim that “even if article 5(2) announces a 
choice of law rule, it does not purport to cover all issues of international copyright. Notably, questions of 
authorship, initial ownership, and transfers of ownership remain unaddressed”
187
. These authors consider 
that the Berne Convention sets forth neither substantive rules nor choice of law rules to determine 
copyright ownership and that each Member State is free to apply its choice of law rules to determine initial 
ownership: 
“It makes more sense to conceive of copyright as germinating in a work’s source country, 
subsequently to flower in all other countries in which the work is protected. The countries that 
later host the work tend to its growth, but the welcome they extend to the work does not uproot it 
from its source. The work’s source country (country of first publication, or residence, or domicile, 
or nationality of the author, or, where relevant, the country where the immovable work is located) 
thus should determine who is the initial titleholder. (…) 
That choice of law rule ensures that the work will not change initial owners by operation of law 
each time the work crosses an international boundary.(…) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 (i) when these are cinematographic works the maker of which has his headquarters or his habitual residence in a country of the 
Union, the country of origin shall be that country, and 
ii) when these are works of architecture erected in a country of the Union or other artistic works incorporated in a building or other 
structure located in a country of the Union, the country of origin shall be that country. 
182  Interpreting art. 5.2 as a material rule: M. VAN EECHOUDT, Choice of law in copyright and related rights: Alternatives to the 
lex loci protectionis, 2003, 95. 
In favour of the interpretation of art. 5.2 as a rule on conflicts of laws: N. BOUCHE, Le principe de territorialité de la propriété 
intellectuelle, Editions L'Harmattan, 2002, 508. 
183 On that question, A. LUCAS, Applicable law in copyright infringement cases in the digital environment, 2-4 ; A. 
CRUQUENAIRE, ” La loi applicable au droit d’auteur : état de la question et perspectives”, 8-10. 
184 The meaning of the “country of origin” rule in the sense of the Berne Convention differs from the “country of origin” principle 
applied at the European level in several directive, which we will analyse in the second part of the present Study.    
185 A. STROWEL and J.-P. TRIAILLE, Le droit d’auteur, du logiciel au multimedia, Kluwer, 1997, 378. 
186 S. RICKETSON and J. GINSBURG, International copyright and neighbouring rights, vol I, 376. 
187 S. RICKETSON and J. GINSBURG, International copyright and neighbouring rights, vol II, 1299.  
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Resort to the law of the source country reinforces the security of international contracts, and 
therefore would seem to promote the international exchange of copyrighted works.”
188
 
M. Van Eechoud rejects the application of the lex loci protectionis as the law governing the initial 
ownership and the transfers of rights as well and she prefers the lex loci originis: 
“Domestic laws do, however, tend to deal differently with the allocation of rights in case of works 
made for hire and works created by two or more co-contributors (e.g. film). If one were to let the 
lex protectionis govern issues of initial ownership, the result would be legal uncertainty as to who 
qualifies as initial right owner. (…) The tendency in case-law and among scholars to use some 
form of the lex originis for initial ownership, is mainly inspired by the wish to avoid this legal 
uncertainty. 
In my opinion, the move away from the lex protectionis towards a single governing law is a 
development to be welcomed, as it could increase legal certainty and thereby facilitate the cross-
border exploitation of works.”
189
 
However, she admits that the precise definition of a localisation criterion is difficult
190
.  
An important part of the legal doctrine defends the opposite view and considers that the lex loci 
protectionis should apply to all issues relating to copyright, including the determination of authorship
191
, or 
at least to the determination of the initial ownership on a work
192
, according to article 5.2 of the Berne 
Convention.  A. Lucas considers that the country of origin in the Berne Convention should only apply in 
exceptional cases and not as a matter of principle to determine the existence and/or the ownership of the 
right
193
.  According to him such extensive application would contradict article 5.2 BC and art. 14bis.2.a. 
BC, in relation to audiovisual works
194
.  Lucas does not consider it appropriate to dissociate “preliminary” 
copyright questions (such as authorship) from the “content” of the right
195
.  The lex loci protectionis 
should consequently govern all aspects of a copyright matter: 
“As long as the copyright laws continue to differ substantially, the application of one choice of law 
rule to all aspects of the right in question seems the best solution in order to get coherent results, 
as these aspects are interdependent in the respective copyright acts, and a cumulative 
application could lead to inconsistent results. (…) 
The Country of protection principle, applied to all aspects of copyright, having the advantage of 
being – according to the predominant position – consistent with Berne standards, seems to be the 
most convenient to establish. It also has the highest support among the EU Member States.”
196 
According to that principle, the author of a copyright does not own one single copyright with international 
validity, but a bundle of many national copyrights
197
.  
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Lucas nevertheless admits that the application of the lex loci protectionis has to be softened by the “droits 
acquis” theory
198
. This droits acquis theory implies that the rights acquired by a person under the aegis of 
one law subsequently have to be recognized in other countries
199
. Indeed, it is common for authors to 
entrust the exploitation of their works to a publisher, record label, film producer, collecting society,...  The 
user should then conclude a contract for the exploitation of the work with the person actually holding the 
rights. F. De Visscher and B. Michaux confirm that the questions of ownership after a contractual transfer 
of rights should be assessed by the general rules applicable to conflicts of laws in the sphere of 
contracts
200
. Consequently, if a contractual transfer of the rights on a work has occurred, the uploader or 
the service provider wanting to make that work available should acquire the rights in conformity with the 
contractual arrangements of the author or initial right owner.   
From a judicial point of view, it seems that the choice between the lex loci protectionis and the lex loci 
originis differs from one Member State to the other: Belgium relies at least partly on the lex loci originis
201
, 
while other countries, for instance Germany, apply the lex loci protectionis for the issues of initial 
ownership. In Denmark, the issue is unsettled in the literature and has not resulted in reported case law. 
The case of the Eastern Court of Appeal reported in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 1997.975 Ø presupposes 
that lex loci protectionis is applicable to rules on ownership (but the issue was not disputed in the case). 
In Poland, the law of the country where the right is exploited is used in respect of the creation, the content 
and the cessation of copyright, so that it covers the issues of initial ownership.  
The French Cour de cassation has recently settled the debate in favour of the application of the lex loci 
protectionis to the issues of authorship. The Cour de cassation had to deal with a litigation between a 
cameraman established in France and an American broadcasting company having him working under an 
employment contract during several years. After the cameraman was fired by the American broadcaster, 
he claimed that the company was infringing his rights on his works. The Cour d’appel in Paris considered 
that the lex loci originis – in this case American law – had to apply to settle the debate concerning the 
authorship on the works, so that the American broadcaster, as an employer, was the holder of the rights. 
The Cour de cassation rejected that reasoning and explained that art. 5.2. of the Berne Convention that 
refers to the lex loci protectionis applies to the issues of authorship
202
.  
These issues have never been examined in the context of litigation or scholarly discussions in Italy. Italian 
provisions on conflict of laws are embodied into an act (Law N. 218/1995) where issues such as 
authorship, initial ownership and transfers of rights are not taken into special consideration. The 
understanding of such issues from a cross-border perspective depends largely on the interpretation of 
general rules that Italian law creates for wider categories of norms, acts or fact. For instance, the fact that 
the moral rights of the author under Italian law are legally treated as personality rights could trigger the 
application of the provision indicating that the existence and subject matter of a personality right should 
be regulated by the national law of each person (see Art. 24 of Law 218/1995). As far as economic 
prerogatives of the author are concerned, Italian law provides that intellectual property rights are 
governed by the law of the state of utilization of the protected works, which is a consequence of the strict 
principle of territoriality of intellectual property law (in the same way as the principle according to which, in 
case of violation of an IP right, the applicable law should be that of the country where protection is 
sought). As regards the transfer of rights, Italian law “nationalized” the 1980 Rome convention on 
contractual obligations and, as a result, Italian authors transferring their rights are free (in theory) to opt 
for the application of a foreign law to such agreements. However, these agreements would not have the 
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power to validly impose clauses conflicting with public order provisions granting non-waivable rights to the 
author.    
(ii) Exploitation of the copyright  
After having defined which law applies to the issue of authorship/initial ownership, we will successively 
examine the principles and legal provisions determining the law applicable to copyright contracts and to 
non-contractual copyright infringements. 
- Law applicable to copyright contracts 
There is no worldwide instrument for determining the law applicable to disputes related to copyright 
contracts
203
. 
At the European level, the Member states of the European Union have adopted the Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I)
204
. That regulation applies in all the Member states, except in Denmark, 
“in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters”. It 
determines the law applicable to the interpretation of the contract, its performance, the consequences of a 
breach of contractual obligations, the ways of extinguishing obligations and prescription and limitations of 
actions, and the consequences of the nullity of a contract (art. 12). 
Copyright contracts fall under the scope of that Regulation, especially under articles 3, 4 and 6. We will 
also examine articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation. 
According to article 3, and subject to what will be explained below regarding consumers, the parties have 
the freedom to select the law applicable to their contract. The courts will have to respect that choice if it 
complies with the principles laid down in article 3. 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation then defines which law is applicable in the absence of a choice made 
by the parties. Paragraph 1 defines which law is applicable to different sorts of contracts (sale of goods, 
provision of services, distribution, …). However, copyright contracts do not really fit one of these 
categories. According to the decision in Falco, a contract under which the owner of an intellectual 
property right grants its contractual partner the right to use the right in return for remuneration may not be 
interpreted as a contract for the provision of services.  
According to paragraph 2 of the Article 4, where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1, it shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the 
contract has his habitual residence. 
Finally, paragraphs 3 and 4 especially stress on the criterion of proximity and require the application of 
the law of the country with which the contract is the most closely connected
205
.  
                                                     
 
203 F. DE VISSCHER and B. MICHAUX make a distinction between the content of the contract and the context of the contract. 
They consider that the lex loci protectionis (see below) does not apply to the issues related to the content of the contract (Précis du 
droit d’auteur et des droits voisins, 633, 641-651). A. LUCAS adds that “the operator still has to allow for the various domestic laws 
applicable to the right, in respect of all matters that are not governed by the law of the contract” (“Applicable law in copyright 
infringement cases in the digital environment”, 8).  
204 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177 , 4 July2008, 6–16. 
205 Article 4 provides: 
1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3 and without prejudice to 
Articles 5 to 8, the law governing the contract shall be determined as follows:  
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As a consequence, article 4 requires the identification of connecting factors between the contract and the 
law applicable. Prof. P. GOLDSTEIN and B. HUGENHOLTZ note that “in situations where a copyright 
transfer is an integral part of any of the contract types mentioned in article 4(1), the transfer will most 
likely be governed by the corresponding rule. In other cases, the analysis will require identification of “the 
party required to effect the characteristic performance”
206
. Prof. A. LUCAS adds that “the predominant 
doctrine holds that characteristic performance must be presumed to be effected by the assignee or 
licensee who undertakes a contractual obligation to perform and by the rightholder in the absence of such 
an obligation”
207
. 
This implies that the law applicable to a contract according to which the licensee would undertake to 
exploit protected works and make them available on internet would be the law of the country of the 
licensee.  
In the case of complex copyright contracts, the law of the country with which the contract is the most 
closely connected would apply, in accordance with article 4(3) and 4(4)
208
.  
Complementary to articles 3 and 4, article 6 of the Rome I Regulation contains a specific provision that 
applies to contracts concluded by consumers with professionals. These contracts are governed by the 
law of the country where the consumer has her habitual residence. The aim of such provision is to protect 
consumers from abusive clauses which would allow the application of the professional’s law system
209
. 
Such provision could for instance apply to contracts concluded by private users who download protected 
works made available on the internet.  
The Regulation Rome I contains a specific provision determining the law applicable to the individual 
employment contracts. According to article 8(1), these contracts are governed by the law chosen by the 
parties, provided that this choice may not deprive the employee of the protection afforded to him by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual residence; 
(b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his habitual 
residence; 
 (…) 
2. Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of 
points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the 
characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence. 
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other 
than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. 
4. Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country with which it is most closely connected. 
206 P. GOLDSTEIN and B. HUGENOLTZ, International Copyright, 144-145. 
207 A. LUCAS, “Applicable law in copyright infringement cases in the digital environment”, 7. 
208 P. GOLDSTEIN and B. HUGENOLTZ, International Copyright, 145. 
209 Article 6 provides: 
1. Without prejudice to Articles 5 and 7, a contract concluded by a natural person for a purpose which can be regarded as being 
outside his trade or profession (the consumer) with another person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the professional) 
shall be governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, provided that the professional: 
(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, or 
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries including that country, and the contract falls within the 
scope of such activities. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the parties may choose the law applicable to a contract which fulfils the requirements of paragraph 
1, in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, 
would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1. 
3. If the requirements in points (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 are not fulfilled, the law applicable to a contract between a consumer and a 
professional shall be determined pursuant to Articles 3 and 4. 
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provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, 
would have been applicable to the contract. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 provide additional rules to find the law applicable to the contracts when the parties 
have not specified it. 
Article 9 of the Regulation Rome I protects overriding mandatory provisions. In order to protect certain 
principles the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, 
article 9 foresees the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum, 
regardless the law applicable to the rest of the contract.  
Moreover, article 21 preserves the application of the rules of public policy of the forum. The judge may 
indeed refuse to apply a foreign law when his rules of public policy require him to substitute the parties’ 
private choice by his own copyright law. As a consequence, the copyright law of the forum supersedes 
private contract terms
210
. 
Such hypothesis may occur to guarantee the protection of moral rights for instance
211
. In the Huston
212
 
judgment, the French Cour de cassation decided to apply French law instead of American law to 
guarantee the protection of the moral rights of the right holders, despite the existence of a valid contract 
under American law and according to which the author had globally transferred his rights to an American 
producer.   
There is no decision of the Court of justice of the European Union yet with regard to the enforcement of 
those provisions to copyright contracts.  
- Law applicable to non-contractual copyright infringement 
The law applicable in non-contractual disputes in the field of copyright refers to the lex loci protectionis 
according to which the judge has to apply the law of the country for which a protection is claimed. As we 
mentioned above, that rule is fixed in article 5(2) of the Berne Convention.  
The Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) also refers to the application of the lex loci 
protectionis
213
. Like Brussels I, that Regulation applies in all the Member states of the European Union, 
except in Denmark. Article 4 of the Regulation Rome II first provides a rule that generally applies to the 
conflicts of laws, “unless otherwise provided for in the Regulation”. It clearly opts for the law of the country 
where the damage occurs, and rejects the law of the country of the event giving rise to the infringing act.  
Then, article 8 contains a specific rule for conflicts of laws in the field of IP rights that refers to the 
abovementioned lex loci protectionis
214
. Article 26 of the Regulation expressly entitles the judges to refuse 
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213 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-
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214 Article 8 provides: 
1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of 
the country for which protection is claimed. 
2. In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of a unitary Community intellectual property right, the law 
applicable shall, for any question that is not governed by the relevant Community instrument, be the law of the country in which the 
act of infringement was committed. 
3. The law applicable under this Article may not be derogated from by an agreement pursuant to Article 14. 
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the application of a specific provision that would be manifestly incompatible with their rules of public 
policy.  
According to article 15 of the Regulation Rome II, the lex loci protectionis governs the basis and the 
extent of liability, the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liability and any division of 
liability, the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed, and the 
measures which a court may take to prevent or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of 
compensation. In case of proceedings, a distinction has to be made between the law applicable to the 
procedural rules (which should be treated under the lex fori) and the law applicable on the substance (for 
which the lex loci protectionis will apply). Meanwhile, the limits of the scope of both laws may be 
uncertain, as it is sometimes very difficult (in the case of provisional measures for instance) to define 
where the issues of procedural law stop and where the debate related to the substance begin.  
Furthermore, there is a potential conflict between article 15 of the Regulation Rome II and article 31 of the 
Regulation Brussels I: Rome II extends the application of the lex loci protectionis to provisional or 
protective measures within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, while 
Brussels I states that application may be made to the courts of a Member State for provisional, including 
protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if the courts of another 
Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter
215
. 
Since plaintiffs often seek protection in the country where the harm is transpiring, localizing the place of 
the harm generally identifies both a forum, and the applicable law in that forum: 
“The court of the country whose market the person making a work available has allegedly targeted 
will determine whether the defendant has in fact sought customers from that jurisdiction.  If so, that 
country will be a place in which the making available occurs, and the forum will be competent not 
only to hear the case, but to apply its own law to the making available of the work to users within 
the jurisdiction.”
216
   
Nevertheless, as previously explained about jurisdiction, in case of complex infringements, it may be 
difficult to find the location of the infringing act (initiating in one country and culminating in another) and, 
consequently, to determine for which country the protection is sought. The lex loci protectionis may 
indeed refer to the application of multiple laws, as the act is generally interpreted as taking place in 
different countries, i.e. the country of the event giving rise to the infringement (Member State from which 
the work is made available – country of transmission) and the countries where the damage occur 
(Member States to which the work is made available – countries of reception)
217
. 
The law of the country of the event giving rise to the harm (country of transmission) should regulate the 
full territorial impact of the act of making available, while the law of a country where the damage occurs 
(country of reception) only has effect in that country exclusively and not in the other countries also 
targeted by the uploader: 
“Because the defendant’s targeting of Member State B’s market justifies B’s competence, it would 
follow that if the defendant is targeting multiple markets, then the act of making available occurs in 
each national market to which the defendant directed its communications, and that each national 
market is competent to hear and to regulate disputes arising out of the making available of works to 
its residents.  It would also follow that Member State B has no authority to adjudicate or regulate 
makings available that occur in Member States C, D, or E (etc.).  In order to adjudicate the full 
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territorial impact of the makings available, the right owner may need to sue in Member State A, 
where the defendant (and its server?) resides.“
218
  
Both the country of transmission and the country of reception present advantages, but also important 
disadvantages with regard to the applicable law: 
 The application of the law of the country of transmission would give the opportunity to counterfeiters 
to search and locate their activities in a country with a low protection of copyright. This could lead to a 
bad protection of the right holders: 
“It would be absurd in the field of authors’ rights to favour the application of the first option in 
cases of complex torts committed through the Internet because the result would too often be 
contrary (existence of digital havens) to the objective sought by the Berne Convention, which is 
precisely to promote effective international protection of literary and artistic works.”
219
 
“The issue actually at stake is the risk of delocalization to countries of transmission with a lower 
level of protection, a very real risk given the significant differences between national laws, 
particularly in regard to exceptions to the exclusive rights, and the great ease with which the 
uploading site can be manipulated in digital networks.”
220
 
“la thèse du (des) pays de réception nous semble plus appropriée que celle du pays d’émission, 
d’une part parce qu’il est difficilement contestable que la diffusion via Internet correspond à une 
exploitation dans chacun des pays de réception et, d’autre part, en raison des difficultés 
techniques de localisation du point d’émission d’une transmission numérique."
221
 
 The application of the law of the country of reception is a difficult option with the use of internet, as 
the damage may potentially be worldwide. It would indeed force the persons uploading protected 
works to take into consideration the potential consequences of their acts with regards to many 
different legal systems and lead, in case of infringement, to the application of the law of each country 
affected by the infringement:    
“When the content is made available over the internet, lex loci protectionis allows the right holder 
to pursue the infringement under the law of each country where the work has been uploaded or 
could be potentially accessed (in most cases, worldwide).  This enables right holders who have 
sufficient resources to identify and claim the most protective law in the case. Although formally 
the relief acquired under one country’s law should be limited to its territory, in practice it often has 
extraterritorial effects. Meanwhile the user (both an ISP and a private consumer) who makes the 
works available online faces a threat to be sued under any law where the work can be accessed 
and thus should accommodate its conduct to (almost) each law worldwide. This causes great 
legal uncertainty and hampers the development of legitimate online businesses.”
222
 
“Those who argue in favour of the law of the country of transmission highlight the legal security of 
the distributor, maintaining that the distributor may not be bound to respect practically all the laws 
in the world, which would be the case if the differing laws of the countries of reception were 
applied.”
223
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“'emission theory' cannot be considered reflective of online activity and its application potentially 
renders the rights of UK citizens, in an online context, completely meaningless.”
224
 
“Cette solution présente toutefois d’importants problèmes pratiques du point de vue des 
exploitants d’œuvres protégées parce qu’elle leur impose la prise en compte d’un nombre 
considérable de législations, ce qui peut indiscutablement constituer un frein à l’exploitation des 
œuvres sur Internet."
225
 
As the principles “country of transmission” and “country of reception” are contested, intermediate 
solutions are sometimes proposed, such as the application of the law of the place where the responsible 
for the use of the protected works is located, the law of the place where the servers are located or the law 
of the countries where the final users reside. Nevertheless, these intermediate solutions seem 
unsatisfactory to us mainly for two reasons. First of all, it is difficult to establish with certainty the location 
of persons or servers in relation to an Internet use. Secondly, the aim of these intermediate solutions is 
only to protect one group of persons (the users, the authors,…) and it does not take into account the 
interests of the other groups. 
A last option consists in combining both the principles “country of transmission” and “country of 
reception”: 
“General principles of private international law thus lead us to distinguish judicial and legislative 
competence.  While we can accept, and indeed propose, that the forum of plaintiff’s residence have 
jurisdiction over the full territorial extent of a violation of the making available right, the same result 
should not determine the applicable law.  Neither the law of the country of origin of the 
infringement, nor that of the impact of the harm (when the harm from multiple territories is 
centralized at the copyright owner’s residence) should govern the totality of multi-territorial 
infringements. Rather, the judge should apply the law of each country whose market is disrupted by 
the impact of the infringement.”
226
   
National courts also hesitate with regard to the different options proposed by the lex loci protectionis. It is 
important to note, once again, that few decisions have been delivered at that level: 
“As far as Internet infringements are concerned, the courts often do not discuss any private 
international law issues at all; they, at most, confine themselves to briefly referring to jurisdictional 
questions and simply apply forum law”
227
 
Recently, the Google cases raised conflict of laws issues in France and in Belgium, as Google tried to 
obtain the application of the American copyright law and its exception of fair use in Europe. 
In France, the judges have analysed the connecting factors in order to apply the law of the country which 
had the most significant relationship with the dispute.   
In the case Google/La Martinière, the Court of Grande Instance in Paris declared that French law was 
applicable, after having noted the existence of many connecting factors between the dispute and the 
French territory
228
: 
« Or attendu que la loi applicable à la responsabilité extra contractuelle en matière de délit 
complexe est celle de l’Etat du lieu où le fait dommageable s’est produit ; que ce lieu s’entend 
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aussi bien de celui du fait générateur du dommage que de celui du lieu de réalisation de ce 
dernier ; 
qu’en l’espèce, il n’est pas contesté que le litige concerne des œuvres d’auteurs français 
numérisées pour être accessibles par extraits aux internautes français sur le territoire national ; 
que par ailleurs il convient de relever, outre le fait que le tribunal saisi est le tribunal français, que 
les sociétés demanderesses sont établies en France pour la société Editions du Seuil ou filiales 
d’une société française pour les deux autres, que de même les intervenants volontaires habilitées 
à défendre les intérêts des auteurs et des éditeurs français sont de nationalité française, que la 
société Google France a son siège en France, que le nom de domaine permettant l’accès au site 
www.books.google.fr a une extension ”.fr” et que ce site est rédigé en langue française ; 
qu’il résulte de l’ensemble de ces éléments que la France est le pays qui entretient les liens les 
plus étroits avec le litige, ce qui justifie l’application de la loi française contrairement à ce que 
soutiennent les défenderesses ; » (emphasis added) 
The same reasoning can be found in the case Google/SAIF, in which it is important to notice that the 
Cour d’appel in Paris has decided to apply French law although the Tribunal de grande instance had first 
ruled in favour of Google and applied American law
229
:  
« Qu’il ne peut être retenu que le rattachement au territoire français serait insuffisant au seul motif 
que les faits reprochés trouvent pour l’essentiel leur origine hors de France, étant observé qu’il 
n’est pas réellement contesté que la loi du lieu du dommage est susceptible de s’appliquer en cas 
de proximité manifestement plus étroite avec le litige ;  
Qu’à cet égard si les services incriminés peuvent être consultés par un public francophone il n’en 
demeure pas moins que le litige qui porte sur le fonctionnement de Google images concerne des 
services en français accessibles au public français et est principalement destiné à ce public en ce 
qu’il est en particulier accessible par des adresses URL en “.fr” ( google.fr et images.google. fr) ; 
que le territoire français s’avère incontestablement délibérément visé comme le pays où les 
images peuvent être visualisées et choisi en toute connaissance de cause ; 
Que le lieu de connexion et de réception voulu par le titulaire du moteur de recherche constitue 
un critère de proximité substantiel alors que les services mis en place tendent à produire leurs 
effets en France et que leur objet tel que revendiqué par les intimées est de faciliter l’accès des 
Internautes à l’information et à la connaissance ;  
Qu’il est ainsi suffisamment établi que le pays de réception constitue un lien de proximité 
manifestement plus pertinent que celui de faits générateurs pour apprécier le présent litige ; que 
la décision critiquée sera en conséquence infirmée en ce qu’elle a fait application en la cause du 
Copyright Act de 1976 et non de la législation française ». (emphasis added) 
J. GINSBURG notices that, even if the Regulation Rome II did not apply to these cases, the assessment 
made by the courts in Paris is consistent with its provisions
230
. 
Furthermore, these decisions are in line with the case law of the French Cour de cassation, which applies 
alternatively the law of the country where the event giving rise to the infringing act took place
231
 and the 
law of the country where the damage occurred
232
.  
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Therefore, in France, making a work available on the internet without the author’s prior consent is an 
infringing act that will be treated either under French law, or under a foreign law, depending on the 
connecting factors that will be identified between the dispute and the country whose law will be applied. 
The French Cour de cassation seems to approve that reasoning. In a dispute between Google and a 
photographer whose photographs were made available on Google Images, it confirmed the application of 
French law based on the existence of a close link between the French territory and the exploitation of the 
photographs made by Google: 
“Attendu que les sociétés Google reprochent à l'arrêt de déclarer la loi française applicable au 
litige, alors, selon le moyen : 
1°/ qu'en application de l'article 5 § 2 de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des oeuvres 
littéraires et artistiques, la loi applicable aux agissements litigieux est celle du pays où la 
protection est réclamée qui n'est pas celle du lieu où le dommage est subi mais celle du pays sur 
le territoire duquel se sont produits les agissements ; qu'en l'espèce, statuant sur la contestation 
relative à la loi applicable au litige, la cour d'appel a dit la loi française applicable en retenant que 
le litige porte sur le fonctionnement des services Google Images, rédigés en français, destinés au 
public français et accessibles en France par les adresses URL en ". fr ", que l'internaute pourra 
ainsi visualiser en France la photographie de M. X... et au besoin la télécharger, que cette photo 
a été mise en ligne et stockée sur plusieurs sites français, que la société Aufeminin. com, dont la 
responsabilité est également recherchée, est une société dont le siège est à Paris, qu'il suit que 
le lieu de destination et de réception des services Google Images et de connexion à ceux-ci, 
caractérisent un lien de rattachement substantiel avec la France qui commande l'application de la 
loi française ; qu'en se prononçant ainsi, lorsque la loi applicable au litige devait être déterminée 
par application de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques 
du 9 septembre 1886, la cour d'appel a violé l'article 5 § 2 de ladite Convention ; 
2°/ qu'en application de l'article 5 § 2 de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres 
littéraires et artistiques, la loi applicable aux agissements litigieux est celle du pays où la 
protection est réclamée qui n'est pas celle du lieu où le dommage est subi mais celle du pays sur 
le territoire duquel se sont produits les agissements ; qu'en retenant, pour décider que la loi 
française était applicable, que le fonctionnement des services Google Images, rédigés en 
français, destinés au public français et accessibles en France par les adresses URL en ". fr ", que 
l'internaute pourra ainsi visualiser en France la photographie de M. X... et au besoin la 
télécharger, que le lieu de destination et de réception des services Google Images et de 
connexion à ceux-ci caractérisaient un lien de rattachement substantiel avec la France, la cour 
d'appel a violé l'article 3 du code civil ensemble l'article 5 § 2 de la Convention de Berne ; 
3°/ qu'en application de l'article 5 § 2 de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres 
littéraires et artistiques, la loi applicable aux agissements litigieux est celle du pays où la 
protection est réclamée ; qu'en retenant, pour justifier l'application de la loi française, que la 
société Aufeminin. com, dont la responsabilité est également recherchée, est une société dont le 
siège est à Paris quand le lieu du siège social du codéfendeur n'a aucune incidence sur la loi 
applicable aux actes litigieux, la cour d'appel a statué par des motifs inopérants et violé les 
articles 3 du code civil et 5 § 2 de la Convention de Berne ; 
Mais attendu que l'arrêt retient que le litige porte sur le fonctionnement des services Google 
Images, en des textes rédigés en français, destinés au public français et accessibles sur le 
territoire national par les adresses URL en ". fr " et que le lieu de destination et de réception des 
services Google Images et de connexion à ceux-ci caractérisent un lien de rattachement 
substantiel avec la France ; qu'il en déduit exactement, conformément à l'article 5. 2 de la 
Convention de Berne qui postule l'application de la loi de l'Etat où la protection est réclamée, que 
l'action introduite par M. X..., qui réclamait, en tant qu'auteur de la photographie, la protection de 
ses droits en France à la suite de la constatation en France de la diffusion en France, par un 
hébergeur français, la société Aufeminin. com, d'une photographie contrefaisante, mise en ligne 
pour le public français sur le site de Google Images par le service des sociétés Google Inc. et 
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Google France, relevait de la loi française ; que le moyen n'est fondé en aucune de ses 
branches;"
233
 
In Belgium, the Court of Appeal in Brussels also decided to apply Belgian law to copyright infringements 
by Google
234
. That decision based on a close analysis of articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the Berne Convention 
deals with the rights of reproduction and communication to the public. It does not consider the making 
available right itself
235
:  
“Aux termes de l'article 5 (4) (a) de la Convention, le pays d'origine des œuvres en cause est la 
Belgique puisque les articles de presse ont été publiés pour la première fois en Belgique. 
La Convention n'entend pas s'appliquer dans le pays d'origine de l'œuvre sauf au cas où l'auteur 
n'est pas ressortissant de ce pays, un élément d'extranéité apparaissant alors, faute duquel les 
auteurs de la convention ne voulaient pas intervenir dans le pays d'origine (F. DE VISSCHER et 
B. MICHAUX, Précis du droit d'auteur, Bruylant, 2000, p. 609). 
Il s'en déduit que, conformément à l'article 5 (3) de la Convention, la protection en Belgique est 
régie par la loi belge. » 
The Belgian judges have thus rejected the conflict of laws rule contained in article 5.2 and they have 
applied article 5.3 of the Berne Convention as they considered that the dispute was raised in the country 
of origin of the works.  
Interpreting the Rome II Regulation, the judges have subsidiarily answered the question of the location of 
an online publication on Internet: 
“Enfin, à supposer que la Convention de Berne ne contiendrait pas de références suffisamment 
claires pour résoudre le conflit de loi dans le cadre d'une situation complexe où le lieu de la faute 
et du dommage seraient situés dans deux pays différents, il s'imposerait à la cour d'appliquer sa 
loi nationale. 
Dans ce cas, il faut se référer à la règle générale contenue à l'article 4.1 du Règlement (CE) n° 
864/2007 du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 11 juillet 2007 sur la loi applicable aux 
obligations non contractuelles ("Rome II") (…) 
Il ne convient en effet pas d'avoir égard à l'article 8 traitant des atteintes aux droits de propriété 
intellectuelle ni à l'article 93 du Code de droit international privé puisque ces dispositions 
reprennent les mêmes termes que ceux de la Convention de Berne, à savoir « la législation du 
pays où [interprété par « pour lequel »] la protection est réclamée ». 
A supposer que les actes préparatoires à la contrefaçon, à savoir l'injection des données dans 
les serveurs de Google, doivent entrer en ligne de compte pour la détermination du lieu du fait 
dommageable, il conviendrait alors de constater que le délit est formé par un ensemble de faits 
complexes situés dans des pays différents (les Etats-Unis pour l'injection et la Belgique pour la 
diffusion) et qu'il y a lieu de se référer à la loi du pays avec lesquels le fait dommageable 
présente des liens manifestement plus étroits (cf. article 4 (3) du Règlement 864/2007). Ainsi que 
cela a été dit plus haut, il s'agit de la Belgique, pays vers lequel les œuvres protégées sont 
diffusées sur le site Google.be. 
                                                     
 
233 Cass (fr.),12 July 2012, n° M 11-15.188 and n° M 11-15.165, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/  
234 Brussels, 5 May 2011, retrievable via www.juridat.be.  
235 The relation between the Berne Convention and the making available right is presented above (n° 32). 
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Privilégier la loi de l'injection peut conduire à décerner un brevet d'impunité au contrefacteur 
puisqu'il lui suffirait de localiser ses serveurs dans des pays à faible protection en matière de 
droits d'auteur, ce qui est manifestement contraire au but recherché par la Convention de Berne. 
Certes, une page diffusée sur un site ayant un nom de domaine se terminant par «.be » peut être 
lue dans le monde entier. Elle n'est cependant susceptible que d'intéresser des belges résidant à 
l'étranger ou des étrangers souhaitant être informés de ce qui se passe en Belgique. Leur 
nombre est dérisoire par rapport à tous les internautes résidant en Belgique. Cette seule 
circonstance ne suffit pas pour soutenir, comme le fait Google, que « les points de contact avec 
la Belgique sont manifestement insuffisants »." 
The Court’s decision could be criticized on that point as it applies the general rule for conflict of laws 
provided by article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, instead of the specific rule for IP rights issues contained 
in article 8. The explanation provided for that choice, namely the fact that the rule mentioned in article 8 is 
the same than the one in article 5 of the Berne Convention (the “lex loci protectionis”), is difficult to 
understand. Indeed, even if it is the same rule, there is no reason why it should not apply to a dispute in 
the field of copyright. In any case, similarly to the French courts, the judges in Brussels finally relied on 
the “connecting factors” criterion to solve the conflict of laws issue. 
As regards the applicable law, Italian private international law
236
 provides that the law of the country 
where the protected intangible work has been used should regulate the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. This rule should be made compatible with Art 8 of Regulation EC 864/07. 
 
The infringing act has to happen in Germany for the German law to be applicable. If the exploitation 
completely happens abroad, the German law cannot apply
237
. 
 
In Poland, private international law and IP law issues have been recently referred to in the Act on 
International Private Law of 4 February 2011
238
. Art. 33 refers to Regulation Rome II. Moreover, according 
to art. 5 of the Polish Copyright Act, Polish law applies to works whose author or co-author is a Polish 
citizen, or a citizen of one of the countries of the European Union or EFTA, or to works first published in 
Poland or simultaneously in Poland and abroad, first published in Polish and works protected on the basis 
of international agreements. 
 
In Canada, the Supreme Court referred to the “connecting factor” criterion. It has defined a number of 
elements that can be decisive in function of the circumstances to determine which law applies:  
“The applicability of our Copyright Act to communications that have international participants will 
depend on whether there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication 
in question for Canada to apply its law consistent with the “principles of order and fairness . . . 
that ensure security of [cross-border] transactions with justice”; see Morguard Investments, supra, 
at p. 1097;  see also Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2003] 2 
S.C.R. 63, 2003 SCC 40, at para. 56; Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (4th 
ed. 2002), at pp. 601-2. 
 (…)  
 So also, in my view, a telecommunication from a foreign state to Canada, or a 
telecommunication from Canada to a foreign state, “is both here and there”.  Receipt may be no 
less “significant” a connecting factor than the point of origin (not to mention the physical location 
of the host server, which may be in a third country).   
                                                     
 
236 See Italian act of 31 May 1995, N. 218, Art. 54. 
237 Cf the case that led to the Le Corbusier ECJ decision, BGH 8 December 2010 GRUR 2011 227. 
238 Dz. U. Nr 80, poz. 432 
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(…) 
A real and substantial connection to Canada is sufficient to support the application of 
our Copyright Act to international Internet transmissions in a way that will accord with 
international comity and be consistent with the objectives of order and fairness. 
In terms of the Internet, relevant connecting factors would include the situs of the content 
provider, the host server, the intermediaries and the end user.  The weight to be given to any 
particular factor will vary with the circumstances and the nature of the dispute. 
(…) 
Generally speaking, this Court has recognized, as a sufficient “connection” for taking jurisdiction, 
situations where Canada is the country of transmission (Libman, supra) or the country of 
reception (Liberty Net, supra).  This jurisdictional posture is consistent with international copyright 
practice.” 
The Supreme Court of Canada expressly relied on the making available right and declared that this right 
was generally exercised at the point of transmission:  
“Canada is a signatory but not yet a party to the WIPO Copyright Treaty. This treaty responded to 
the development of the Internet and other on-demand telecommunications technology. Article 8 
provides that: 
. . . authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making 
available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these 
works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
The “making available” right is generally exercised at the point of transmission. This does not 
deny the interest of the country of reception but avoids, as a matter of policy, a “layering” of 
royalty obligations in different countries that are parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty.”
239
  
That part of the decision seems contradictory to the principles applied by the European Courts, which 
seem to consider that the country of reception is the decisive place to resolve the conflict of laws.  
(iii) Intermediate conclusion 
As for jurisdiction, the unclear extent of the making available right causes applicable law issues.  
First of all, a distinction has to be made between the law applicable to the copyright and the law 
applicable to the exploitation of copyright. The borders between these two subjects may be difficult to 
find. 
 As to the law applicable to the copyright itself, there is a controversy between the application of 
the lex loci protectionis and the application of the lex loci originis. The way the courts answer 
that controversy differs from one country to the other. 
 Regarding the law applicable to the exploitation of copyright, we have observed that the 
absence of definition of the protected act makes it impossible to determine its location and 
leaves the door open for various interpretations of the lex loci protectionis (country of 
transmission and countries of reception). The law applicable to the making available right 
actually depends on the way national judges interpret that act and on the connecting factors 
they find between the protected act and the country for which the protection is sought. If they 
opt for the law of the country of transmission, one legislation will be applicable for the same pan-
                                                     
 
239 Canadian Supreme Court, Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet 
Providers , 2004 SCC 45 ; [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (June 30, 2004), retrievable via http://scc.lexum.org.   
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European infringement. On the contrary, if they opt for the law of the country of reception, 
multiple laws should be applied to repair a pan-European damage resulting from one single 
infringement.  
The French case Google v SAIF clearly demonstrates that the present situation is a source of 
legal uncertainty for right holders and for users of the works, to whom it is difficult to predict 
which law will govern the act of making works available on Internet. 
In the absence of a harmonized definition of the making available right, the Principles on Conflict of Laws 
in Intellectual Property prepared by the European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual 
Property could provide objective elements to help the national courts ruling on conflict of laws issues
240
. 
According to article 3:603, the courts may apply the law of the country that has the closest connection 
with the infringement. That article then indicates the relevant factors that the judge has to take into 
account to find that connection
241
.  
c) General conclusion regarding private international law issues 
Because of its worldwide scope, the use of Internet generally reveals various questions of private 
international law. In the field of copyright, the national courts propose different interpretations of the 
existing rules. This causes legal uncertainty for the right holders as well as for the users of protected 
works, especially in case of infringements: 
 As to the jurisdiction, the courts of different Member States are cumulatively competent, 
namely: 
o The courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled (for the whole 
damage); 
o The courts of the Member State where the event giving rise to the infringement took 
place (for the whole damage); 
o The courts of the Member States where the damage occurred (for the part of the 
damage that occurred in each Member State respectively), taking into account the 
fact that there is a debate whether a damage occurs at the place where a website is 
accessible, even if the website does not target a public at that place; 
The Court of justice has recently proposed to provide jurisdiction to the courts of the Member 
State where the victim has the centre of her interests (for personality rights) or where the 
                                                     
 
240 Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property prepared by the European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in 
Intellectual Property, retrieved via http://www.cl-ip.eu/files/pdf2/FinalText-1December2011.pdf.  
241 Article 3:603 provides: 
(1) In disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court may apply the law 
of the State having the closest connection with the infringement if the infringement arguably takes place in every State in which the 
signals can be received. This rule also applies to existence, duration, limitations and scope to the extent that these questions arise 
as incidental questions in infringement proceedings. 
(2) In determining which State has the closest connection with the infringement, the court shall take all the relevant factors into 
account, in particular the following: 
(a) the infringer’s habitual residence; 
(b) the infringer’s principal place of business; 
(c) the place where substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out; 
(d) the place where the harm caused by the infringement is substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety. 
(3) Notwithstanding the law applicable pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, any party may prove that the rules applying in a State or 
States covered by the dispute differ from the law applicable to the dispute in aspects which are essential for the decision. The court 
shall apply the different national laws unless this leads to inconsistent results, in which case the differences shall be taken into 
account in fashioning the remedy. 
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trade mark has been registered (for trade marks). Even if these are places where the damage 
occurs, the courts in these Member States have jurisdiction with regard to the reparation of 
the whole damage. Following the opinion expressed by the Advocate general Jääskinen in 
Pinckney, we do not think that a new interpretation of article 5.3 of the Regulation Brussels I 
might apply in the field of copyright.   
 As to the applicable law, the courts will have to make a choice based on different elements: 
o If the dispute relates to the determination of authorship/initial ownership, then the 
choice has to be made between the application of the law of the country of origin of 
the work (lex loci originis) or the law of the country for which the protection is sought 
(lex loci protectionis). 
If they opt for the lex loci protectionis, they might have to choose between the law of 
the country of the event giving rise to the infringement (country of transmission) and 
the laws of the countries where the damage occurs (countries of reception). 
o If the dispute relates to the exploitation of the copyright, then the law applicable is: 
 The law of the contract in case of a contractual exploitation; 
 The law of the country for which the protection of copyright is sought (lex loci 
protectionis) in case of a non-contractual exploitation: because the use of 
internet implies cross-border exploitations, the lex loci protectionis may refer 
to the law of the country of transmission or to the laws of the countries of 
reception.  
o The national courts usually apply the law of the country with which the dispute is the 
most closely connected.  
The criteria used to define which Member States have jurisdiction and which law is applicable are factual 
criteria, independent from the analysis of the case on the substance. Nevertheless, the way the copyright 
acts are defined on the substance and localised may have an impact on the way the judge will solve the 
questions of private international law. 
While centralizing the litigation in a single Member State promotes efficient adjudication of Internet 
infringement claims, it does not always follow that a single law should apply to a multi-territorial 
infringement
242
. 
We have concluded above that three definitions were available to describe the protected act: 
- According to the first one, the act of making available covers the initial act of making the work 
accessible to the users/members of the public, the actual transmission of the work (if any) 
and the reception of the work.   
- According to the second definition, the act of making available covers the initial act of making 
the work accessible to the users/members of the public, but not the actual transmission or 
reception of the work. 
- According to the third proposal, only the material act of making a work available online is 
restricted under the making available right.  The accessibility is considered only to determine 
whether a “public” has access (a work that can only be consulted by an individual user or by 
a group of users that do not constitute a “public” is then not made available to the public).  
The transmission and the reception are not protected under the making available right.   
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The choice of the third definition would have a direct impact on the private international law issues, as it 
would render easier the determination of the place where the protected act takes place. Various countries 
would still have jurisdiction to hear a claim related to the making available right, as the damage resulting 
from an infringement might be suffered all over the world. However, we assume that the law applicable to 
the dispute would be easier to determine, because the place where the obligation has to be performed 
(contractual matters) as well as the place where protection is claimed (non-contractual matters) would be 
easier to determine: it would correspond to the country of transmission. 
The two other proposed definitions would not settle the private international law issues, as it would define 
the making available act as a complex one with cross-borders elements. The choice of a connecting rule 
would therefore be required in order to treat the problems of private international law. Such a choice is a 
complex one, as it could have an influence on the issue of a dispute between authors and users of the 
works. Recently, the CLIP Principles proposed to apply the law of the country that has the closest 
connection with the infringing act and provided criteria to find that connection. However, that rule leaves 
space for interpretation by the national judges.  
2. Authorship, ownership and transfer of rights 
According to the Information Society Directive, the making available right is an exclusive right (art. 
3(1)(2)), which entitles its owner to authorise or prohibit the restricted acts under this right.  Broadly 
speaking, this entails, on the one hand the right holder’s consent should be cleared before making the 
work available and, on the other hand, that she has the right to enforce it in case of infringement.   
Since the making available right may contain several constitutive elements that may take place on the 
territories of several Member States, divergent national rules on authorship and ownership may raise 
complications, in particular for the clearing of rights and for their enforcement.   
In this section it will be examined for the Member States under consideration how the national copyright 
legislation regulates issues of authorship and ownership.  Questions of conflict of laws are not dealt with 
in this section but sub 1.  
Authorship, initial ownership and the transfer of rights are regulated at the national level.  Little has been 
harmonised at the international
243
 and European levels
244
.  This leads to considerable disparities.   
The conditions applicable to contracts relating to intellectual property in the European Union have been 
described in a report of 2002 by the University of Amsterdam, commissioned by the European 
Commission
245
.  The report first assessed the legislative provisions dealing with the initial allocation of 
ownership of rights in the European Union, before examining the issues of transfer of rights. The current 
Study will take the results of the 2002 IViR study as its starting point. 
The rules on authorship and the ones determining the ownership after a transfer of the rights will be 
examined together. These topics are indeed closely related since the author (creator) of a work may be 
the initial owner of copyright in some Member States, while other Member States may indicate another 
natural or legal person as the initial owner of copyright of the same work by virtue a legal rule operating a 
transfer of rights. The holder of the rights on a work may thus differ from one Member State to the other.  
                                                     
 
243 The Berne Convention also leaves the determination of authorship, ownership and transfer of rights to national legislations. 
244 The issue of who benefits from copyright and the one of the transfer of rights are among the least harmonised at the European 
level. 
245 L. GUIBAULT and B. HUGENHOLTZ, Study on the conditions applicable to contracts relating to intellectual property in the 
European Union, 2002, retrieved via http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2000b53001e69_en.pdf, 
hereafter the 2002 IViR report.  
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a) National authorship rules 
The notion of authorship is not globally harmonised at the European level. In some directives, the 
authorship for certain types of works is determined: for audiovisual works
246
, for computer programs
247
 
and for databases
248
. In relation to other kinds of works, the Member States remain free to determine who 
the author is. 
The Berne Convention does not contain an explicit authorship rule but it is assumed that the author is the 
person to whom the intellectual and creative effort can be attributed
249
. Such principle is known as the 
“creator doctrine”. Accordingly, the authorship of a work is vested in the natural person who has created 
the work, rather than in the person or company that has invested in its production.  
The creator doctrine complies with the definition of originality provided by the Court of Justice, where it 
states that a work is original if it reflects the “author’s own intellectual creation”
250
. The Court adds that “an 
intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects the author’s personality. That is the case if the author 
was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative 
choices”
251
. 
(i) Application of the creator doctrine 
Assessing the rules applicable to the determination of authorship, the 2002 IViR report found two major 
tendencies in the European countries:  “On the one hand are the Anglo-Saxon countries, like Great 
Britain and Ireland, where copyright protection is said to follow utilitarian objectives. There, the initial 
ownership of rights may be conferred, depending on the circumstances, either on the natural person who 
created the work or on the legal person who invested in its production, like an employer or a film 
producer. On the other hand are most countries of continental Europe, where copyright protection is 
                                                     
 
246 Art. 2.2 of Directive 2006/115/EC of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property: “The principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as 
its author or one of its authors. Member States may provide for others to be considered as its co-authors”. 
Article 2.1 of Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights: “The 
principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors. Member States 
shall be free to designate other co-authors”. 
Article 1.5 of Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission:  “For the purposes of this Directive, the principal 
director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors. Member States may 
provide for others to be considered as its co-authors”. 
247 Art. 2.1 of Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs:  “1. The author of a computer 
program shall be the natural person or group of natural persons who has created the program or, where the legislation of the 
Member State permits, the legal person designated as the rightholder by that legislation.  
Where collective works are recognised by the legislation of a Member State, the person considered by the legislation of the Member 
State to have created the work shall be deemed to be its author. 
2. In respect of a computer program created by a group of natural persons jointly, the exclusive rights shall be owned jointly. 
3. Where a computer program is created by an employee in the execution of his duties or following the instructions given by his 
employer, the employer exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the program so created, unless otherwise 
provided by contract.” 
248 Article 4.1. of Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases:  “1. The author of a database shall be 
the natural person or group of natural persons who created the base or, where the legislation of the Member States so permits, the 
legal person designated as the rightholder by that legislation. 
2. Where collective works are recognized by the legislation of a Member State, the economic rights shall be owned by the person 
holding the copyright. 
3. In respect of a database created by a group of natural persons jointly, the exclusive rights shall be owned jointly.” 
249 M. VAN EECKHOUD e.a., Harmonizing European copyright law, Kluwer, 2009, 48. 
250 Infopaq I, par. 37. 
251 CJEU 1 December 2011, Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, par. 88-89. 
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based on natural rights principles. In these countries, only the natural person who created the work can 
be considered the author, on whom the initial ownership of the copyright is generally conferred following a 
principle known as the ‘creator doctrine.”
252
 (our emphasis).  
All the European copyright acts refer to the creator doctrine for the determination of the authorship of a 
work. However, the way the Member States apply the creator doctrine differs from one country to the 
other.  
In Germany
253
, in Denmark
254
, in Hungary
255
 and in Belgium
256
, the copyright act expressly refers to the 
creator doctrine. It is stated that the author is the creator of the work.  In those countries, a transfer of the 
rights by contract is needed for a legal person to become the owner of the rights on a work.  
France applies the creator doctrine as well and, except as explained hereafter, a legal person cannot be 
the author of a work. This is expressly stated in the French copyright act with regard to the works of joint 
authorship, the audiovisual works and the radio works
257
 and the scholarly literature interpret the wording 
“author” especially art. L. 111-1 CPI and art. L. 113-1 CPI as referring only to natural person (annex)
258
. 
However, in France, like in Spain
259
, in Italy
260
 or in Poland
261
, the copyright legislation explicitly allows a 
natural or a legal person other than the natural person who created the work to be the initial owner of the 
rights in specific circumstances strictly defined by law. 
In the Netherlands, the copyright act does not specifically define the notion of authorship. The creator 
doctrine is the general rule. However an exception to the creator doctrine can be found in art. 8, 
according to which a public entity which communicates a work to the public as its own, without naming 
any natural person as the author thereof, shall be regarded as the author of that work. Furthermore, it is 
stated that the person who has designed and is supervising the creation of a work is deemed the author 
of that work (art. 6 Dutch Copyright Act), although this provision seems to have a narrow application in 
practice.  Its scope is limited to works that are intellectually conceived, planned, created, and arranged by 
one person and executed – more or less technically – by one or more assistants
262
. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom
263
, the copyright acts provide as a general rule that the person – whether a 
legal or a natural person – who has assumed the risks involved in the creation of the work is the initial 
owner of the rights.  
The creator doctrine is thus applied in all the Member States – at least partially – to determine the 
authorship of a work. A few Member States apply that principle strictly and rarely allow other persons than 
the natural person who has intellectually created the work to be the initial owner of copyright. In those 
countries, a contract is needed to transfer the rights from the author to other persons who will exploit the 
work. Other legal systems contain provisions that limit the scope of the creator doctrine and provide that 
                                                     
 
252 Painer, 24. 
253 Art. 7-8 German copyright act (Urheberrechtsgesetz).  
254 Art. 1 Danish copyright act.  
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the initial owner of copyright may be the person who has taken the initiative of the work and therefore 
deserves to have full control over its exploitation.  
Furthermore, the creator doctrine itself may lead to different outcomes, since its concrete application is a 
matter of practice and may vary according to subjective elements.  . 
(ii) Special case:  collective works 
Collective works are works created by several authors at the initiative of a natural or legal person. The 
legislations of several Member States contain specific provisions governing the ownership of rights on 
collective works. 
In France for instance, one of the rare exceptions to the creator doctrine comes from the provisions 
regulating collective works.  For these works, various criteria may apply to find the initial right holder, it 
can be the legal person who has taken the initiative of the collective work
264
, or his coordination or 
harmonization role, the disclosure by that person….. In Spain, the creator doctrine does not apply to 
collective works:  the person – possibly a legal person – who discloses the collective work under her 
name is the initial owner of copyright
265
. In Italy, it is stated that the author of a collective work is the 
person who organizes and directs the creation
266
. In Hungary, the copyright act allows a legal person to 
be the initial right holder of copyright in the case of collective works
267
. GYERTYÁNFY, however, notes 
that there is no court decision on this issue yet, and he argues for the elimination of art. 6 from the 
statute
268
.  In Poland, it is provided that the producer of a collective work enjoys the economic rights
269
. 
Other Member States, such as Belgium, do not have specific rules applying to collective works. In these 
Member States, the exploitation of the collective works is done through the application of the general 
rules applying to joint authorship and the transfer of rights. In Denmark for example, it is specified that if a 
work has two or more authors, without the individual contributions being separable as independent works, 
the copyright in the work shall be held jointly. 
In short, in the countries that have a specific regime for collective works, the initial owner of the economic 
rights on that work is the person who has taken the initiative of the collective work. That specific regime 
does not apply in all the countries of the European Union and, in some countries, a contract operating a 
transfer of rights is needed to allow the person who takes the initiative of the collective work to exploit it.  
b) National rules on transfer of rights / ownership  
When the author is the initial owner of the rights on a work, any person who wants to use or exploit it (e.g. 
a producer) must acquire the rights and operate a transfer of rights. It happens either through allocation 
by law (a) or by way of contract (b).  
(i) Allocation by law and initial ownership 
In the present chapter, we will analyze two examples of disparities related to the legal provisions 
operating the transfer of the rights. We have focused our analysis on the issues of the transfer of the 
rights on works created under employment (i) and on audiovisual works (ii).   
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- Works created under the duties of an employment contract 
The initial ownership on works created under the duties of an employment contract is not harmonised at 
the European level, except for computer programs
270
 and databases
271
. Most of the Member States have 
a specific regime that applies to works created by employees under the duties of their employment 
contract. The purpose of such provisions is to facilitate the transfer of rights from the employee to the 
employer, who remunerates the author and bears the economic risk.  
In some countries, the employer is the initial owner of copyright on works created by her employees:  
 The British copyright act expressly stipulates that the employer is the first owner of the rights on 
the works created by her employees
272
.  
 Moreover, the Dutch copyright act provides that the employer has to be deemed the “maker” of 
the works created by her employees, unless otherwise decided by the parties
273
.  
 In Poland, the employer will in principle be the initial owner of the rights on a work created by an 
employee under her duties resulting from the employment contract
274
. 
 In Hungary, unless otherwise agreed, the employer acquires the economic rights on the works 
delivered by her employees, if the works were created in execution of the employee’s duties
275
. 
 
In other countries, the employee remains the initial owner of the rights, but specific provisions of the 
copyright law facilitate the transfer of these rights to the employer: 
 In Belgium, there may be a transfer of rights from the employees to the employer, if the 
assignment of rights is explicitly laid down in a written contract and if the creation falls within the 
scope of the employee’s contract
276
.  Some of the rigorous rules on author contracts are not 
applicable to these agreements. 
 In Spain, the existence of an employment contract does not operate per se a transfer of rights on 
works created by the employees. There must be a written clause operating the transfer of rights. 
In the absence of a written contract, the employer is nevertheless presumed to be the owner of 
the rights needed for the exercise of his usual activities
277
. 
 The Italian copyright act does not provide any general rule that applies to the works created by 
employees. Art. 12ter organizes a transfer of the economic rights in favour of the employer for 
works of industrial design, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, if the works are 
created in the execution of the employee’s duties and following the instructions given by the 
employer
278
. 
 
The French copyright act expressly excludes that existence or the conclusion of a contract for hire or of 
service by the author of the work have a consequence on the initial ownership of the rights
279
. As a 
consequence, in France, the conclusion of an employment contract does not imply that the employer 
automatically is the holder of the rights to the works created by his employees, neither can the employer 
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refer to an automatic assignment of the authors’ rights, save the cases in which exception to that principle 
is provided. 
 
Finally, Denmark and Germany do not have specific provisions that apply to the works created by the 
employees: 
 In Denmark a rule on assignment has been developed in case law. In respect of a permanent 
employee who has creation of works as a part of her job description, the copyright passes to the 
employer but only to the extent necessary for the normal business activities of the employer
280
. 
 In Germany, the general rules of the section dedicated to the exploitation of rights apply to 
authors in employment. There is no specific rule that simplifies the use of works by the 
employer
281
. 
 
The disparities between the Member States of the European Union in the legal treatment of the works 
created by employees are significant. They may lead to different outcomes in the determination of the 
initial owner of the rights on a work created by employees under the duties of their employment contract.  
- Cinematographic and audiovisual works 
As mentioned above, the Term of protection Directive (2006/116/EC), the Rental and Lending Rights 
Directive (2006/115/EC) and the Satellite and Cable Directive (93/83/EEC) have partially harmonised the 
notion of authorship in the field of cinematographic or audiovisual works. According to these directives the 
principal director of a film has to be considered as the author or one of the co-authors of the film. The 
Member States are free to designate other individuals, such as the author of the screenplay, the author of 
the dialogue or the composer of music, as co-authors. 
The Court of Justice confirmed the status of the principal director of the film in the case Luksan: 
“The principal director of a cinematographic work must be regarded as having lawfully acquired, 
under European Union law, the right to own the intellectual property in that work. 
In those circumstances, the fact that national legislation denies him the exploitation rights at issue 
would be tantamount to depriving him of his lawfully acquired intellectual property right.”
282
 
Even if there are some disparities, all the Member States grant the authorship on an audiovisual work to 
more or less the same participants: 
 The Belgian copyright act considers that the main director, the author of screenplay, the author of 
the adaptation, the author of the words, the graphical author and the author of the musical 
compositions are the joint authors of an audiovisual work
283
. 
 In France, several contributors to the film are presumed to be the joint authors, namely the 
director, the author of the script, the author of the adaptation, the author of the dialogue and the 
author of the musical compositions specially composed for the work
284
. This is not an exhaustive 
list, others creators may also prove their creator quality. 
 In Spain, the authors of the audiovisual work are the director, the author of the script and the 
adaptation, the author of the staging, the author of the dialogue, and the authors of the musical 
compositions created specifically for the work
285
. 
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 In Germany, the joint authors are the principal film director, the author of the screenplay, the 
author of the dialogues and the composer of music specifically composed for use in the 
cinematographic work in question
286
. 
 In Hungary, the authors of the literary and musical works prepared for a film, the director of the 
film and all the other persons having made creative contributions to the production of the film are 
joint authors of the audiovisual work
287
. The director of the film represents the other authors in the 
exercise of their rights. 
 In Poland, the persons who have made a creative contribution to the establishment of the 
audiovisual work are the joint authors of that work. It includes the director, the director of 
photography, the author of the adaptation of a literary work, the author of musical or textual and 
musical works created for the audiovisual work and the author of the screenplay
288
. 
 In Italy, the author of the story, the author of the screenplay, the composer of the music and the 
artistic director are joint-authors of a cinematographic work
289
. 
 In Denmark, the authors are the principal director, the author of the script, the author of the 
dialogue and the composer of music specifically created for use in the cinematographic work
290
. 
 In the Netherlands, the joint authors are the natural persons who have made a contribution of a 
creative nature to the making of the cinematographic work. It is unclear when a contribution is 
substantial enough to result in authorship for the contributor. Copyright in a cinematographic work 
expires 70 years after 1 January of the year following the year of death of the last of the following 
persons to survive: the principal director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the dialogue 
and the composer of the music created for use in the work
291
. 
 
Different laws thus recognise different contributors as authors of the audiovisual or cinematographic work.  
The existing disparities in the legislation of the Member States with regard to the determination of 
authorship on cinematographic or audiovisual works are mitigated by the existence, in all the European 
countries, of a legal presumption operating the transfer of the rights from the co-authors to the producer. 
Article 3 of the Directive 2006/115/EC expressly harmonises that legal presumption for the rental rights
292
. 
In the case Luksan, the Court of Justice came to the conclusion that such a presumption was not an 
irrebuttable one. The Court also reminded that the existence of that presumption might not deprive the 
authors of their rights: 
“European Union law must be interpreted as allowing the Member States the option of laying 
down a presumption of transfer, in favour of the producer of a cinematographic work, of rights to 
exploit the cinematographic work such as those at issue in the main proceedings (satellite 
broadcasting right, reproduction right and any other right of communication to the public through 
the making available to the public), provided that such a presumption is not an irrebuttable one 
precluding the principal director of that work from agreeing otherwise.”
293
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292 Art. 3.4. and 3.5. of the Directive 2006/115/EC: “4. Without prejudice to paragraph 6, when a contract concerning film production 
is concluded, individually or collectively, by performers with a film producer, the performer covered by this contract shall be 
presumed, subject to contractual clauses to the contrary, to have transferred his rental right, subject to Article 5. 
5. Member States may provide for a similar presumption as set out in paragraph 4 with respect to authors.” 
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Consequently, even if it can benefit from a legal transfer of rights, the producer will never be the initial 
owner of the rights on a cinematographic or audiovisual work.  
(ii) Transfer of rights by way of contract 
When the copyright legislation does not by itself operate a transfer of the rights in favour of the person 
wanting to exploit a work, then a contract (assignment or licence) has to be concluded between that 
person and the owner of the rights. 
E. DERCLAYE reminds that “many aspects of copyright contract law are predicated, at least in part, upon 
cultural considerations, such as the desire to protect independent authorship against increasingly 
dominant media and entertainment conglomerates. At present, apart from a few areas of special 
European concern, such as consumer law, commercial agency and electronic commerce, contract law 
remains firmly a matter for the national legislatures”
294
. 
All Member States may impose obligations on copyright contracts of some sort (e.g. requirements of 
forms, scope of the transfer, determination of remuneration)
295
, but these conditions surely vary from one 
Member State to another.  There are indeed many disparities regarding the rules applicable to copyright 
contracts between the legislations of the Member States.  
According to the 2002 IViR study, in several countries the copyright legislation contains extensive 
measures of protection, which lay down specific rules of form and content. In other countries, the 
measures of protection are limited to a number of general principles of interpretation of copyright 
contracts. In yet other Member States, the copyright acts contain only scarce measures apart from the 
few provisions flowing from the implementation of European Directives or from the general principles of 
law
296
.  We refer to the 2002 IViR study for a complete presentation of the rules applicable to copyright 
contracts in most of the Member States of the European Union. 
c) Impact of the existing disparities  
In order to assess the impact of the existing disparities regarding authorship, ownership and transfer of 
rights, we will first summarise the current situation. We will then try to evaluate the consequences of such 
disparities. 
(i) Disparities on authorship, ownership and transfers of rights 
The disparities in the different copyright legislation observed in the report made by the IVIR in 2002 are 
still reflected in the legal systems of the Member States selected in the scope of the present Study. 
Indeed, at the European level, only a few provisions partially regulate the determination of authorship or 
the allocation of initial ownership of certain types of works.  
Concerning the other kinds of works, the Member States remain free to determine the authorship / 
ownership of copyright, and, doing so, to deviate from the creator doctrine. Furthermore, in the absence 
of any harmonisation of that topic, the Member States are also free in the way they apply the creator 
doctrine.  As a result, some countries admit that a person other than the actual creator of the work 
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(including legal persons) who was particularly involved in the creation of the work be the initial owner of 
the rights, while other countries stick to a strict application of the creator doctrine.  
The same kind of disparities affect the authorship on works created in the course of an employment 
contract. In France or in Belgium, an employee is the owner of the copyright on his work. However, in 
Belgium, the copyright act contains specific rules that facilitate the transfer of the employee’s rights to the 
employer. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, the employer is the initial owner of the copyright on the 
works created by his employees in the execution of their employment contract. 
The concept of collective works is another example of a particular regime determining the ownership on 
a work, which exists in some Member States but not in others.  
Even if the rules determining the authorship on audiovisual or cinematographic works have been 
partially harmonised, it does not prevent the existence of remaining disparities between the Member 
States. However the impact of the existing disparities with regard to audiovisual and cinematographic 
works is mitigated by the existence of a legal presumption of transfer of the rights in favour of the 
producer, which is laid down in the copyright legislation of the Member States. 
Finally, the legislation of the Member States on copyright contracts also reflects various tendencies that 
ensure a bigger or lower protection to the authors.   
In theory the disparity of rules on authorship and ownership complicates the exercise of the making 
available right.  The making available right protects a complex act, consisting of certain material acts that 
may take place in several Member States (Sportradar, par. 34).  It is assumed that each of such 
constitutive elements requires the consent in the Member State where it is deemed to take place, where 
the remuneration should also be paid (cf. Premier League, par. 111). 
Considering that the constitutive elements of the complex act of making available to the public may be 
localised in several Member States, different persons may be entitled to exercise this right by virtue of the 
national copyright rules
297
.  It is not merely a matter of applicable law.  Instead, a cross-border act, 
consisting of constitutive elements, may justify finding distinct infringements that may be localised in 
various Member States.  In that case, any act of exploitation should be authorised by all persons who 
hold rights in the Member States where a constitutive element of the making available may be localised. 
This means that a service provider is expected to acquire the consent of the person holding the rights in 
each Member State where a constitutive element of complex act of making available can be found.  Given 
the circumstance that this may not be the same person in each relevant Member State, the candidate-
licensee should verify who owns which rights for the territory where such relevant act is performed.  The 
uncertainty with regard to the definition of the making available right and the localisation criteria may thus 
affect the position of this candidate-licensee.  Inversely, a right holder should verify whether she holds the 
relevant rights in each territory where an infringement may be found. 
The consequences of the disparities mentioned above will become clearer in the following example.  The 
operator of a news website wants to publish an article written by a journalist who is an employee of the 
publisher of the newspaper where the article was first published. 
- In France, the journalist (as the creator of the work) will be the author of the article. The French 
copyright act organises a legal transfer of the rights from the journalist to the editor, unless 
otherwise provided (Art. L. 132-36 French Copyright Act). Yet the exploitation of the news article 
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outside the newspapers of the editor’s group requires the author’s consent as well (art. L. 132-40 
French Copyright Act)
298
. As a consequence, the news website will have to acquire the 
journalist’s and the editor’s authorisations to make the article available on its platform. 
- According to Belgian law, the journalist (as the creator of the work) will be the owner of the rights. 
However, the newspaper publisher has an employment contract with the journalist.  If this 
contract expressly specifies a transfer of rights from the journalist to the employer, then the 
newspaper publisher alone holds the economic rights.  The news site operator should seek the 
publisher’s consent.  Although the conditions for a valid transfer are attenuated in this case, the 
transfer of right should still be stipulated in the contract.  Without such provision, the journalist 
remains the sole holder of her rights.   
- According to British law, the newspaper publisher may be the initial owner of the rights if it has 
specifically taken the initiative of the work. 
Depending on the applicable national law, the journalist has a more or less solid bargaining position and, 
inversely, the publisher enjoys a more or less comfortable position regarding the acquisition of copyrights.  
Consequently the operator of the news site wanting to use the article should turn to either the journalist, 
the publisher or both.  It is therefore important to determine which legislation will apply in case of 
international situations. 
For example, a news aggregator with its servers in England offers a news service that is 
accessible everywhere in Europe.  It offers the possibility to select the news reports per Member 
State, e.g. Belgium.  Some news articles published in the French press are also displayed for the 
Belgian public.   
Depending on the constitutive elements of the making available right (hosting, transmission, targeting), 
relevant acts may be found in England (servers), Belgium (targeted public) or the rest of Europe 
(accessibility).  The service provider (wanting to avoid any risk of infringing the rights to the French article) 
should therefore clear the rights in each of Member States where a relevant act takes place.  The hosting 
of the article is the first act and it takes place in the UK.  Regardless of a contractual transfer of 
ownership, the employer of the journalist should authorise this use (the French publisher of the news 
article).  The news aggregator offers Belgian news hence, somewhat simplifying, it could be derived that it 
targets the Belgian public.  In that case a relevant act takes place in Belgium, where the author/journalist 
is considered the initial holder of the making available right.  But the news aggregation service is 
accessible anywhere in Europe and the news article may be transmitted to any Member State.  In that 
case relevant acts may take place in any Member State, where the rights of making available should be 
cleared as well.  
- Consequences of the current situation 
We have presented the rules on applicable law above.  We explained that there was a controversy with 
regard to the law applicable to the initial ownership (lex loci originis vs lex loci protectionis). That 
controversy was the reason of the litigation that led to the decision of the French Cour de cassation on 10 
April 2013 in the dispute between the American broadcasting company and its former photographer
299
. 
Under the lex loci protectionis applied to treat the issues of initial ownership, the following scenario could 
occur.  A person defined as the initial owner of copyright in the country of first publication (country A) 
could lose his rights in favour of another person in the country of exploitation (country B) at least for that 
exploitation, if country B (as the locus protectionis) has different rules on authorship.  
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Returning to our example, this would mean that a journalist working under a Belgian employment contract 
who has not expressly assigned her rights to her employer would have to be considered as the initial right 
holder on the articles that are first published in Belgium. However, if an English operator of the news site 
wants to exploit the works in England, the English copyright act would be applied (as the lex loci 
protectionis) to determine the initial holder of the rights, i.e. the publisher of the newspaper (as the 
journalist’s employer).  Such outcome would affect the rights acquired by the right holders.  
On the contrary, the application of the lex loci originis would provide more legal certainty, as the initial 
owner of copyright would always remain the same person.  
It should follow from the existing disparities between the national rules on authorship and ownership that 
the exercise of the making available right inevitably lead to a deadlock, at least to numerous 
complications each time a work is made available online.  The making available right indeed protects a 
complex act, which may consist of relevant material acts that may take place in several Member States.  
Depending on the constitutive elements protected under this right and the localisation criteria applied, the 
rights of making available to the public should then be cleared for each relevant act in the Member State 
where it takes place, from the person who holds the right according to the national rules on this point. 
In practice, we have found no such conflicts in the cases reported in the Member States under 
consideration.  This suggests that the disparity of national rules on authorship and ownership is not 
insurmountable.  On the other hand it may entail a transaction cost in contractual practice, which is not 
reflected in litigation before the courts.  
Despite the existence of the disparities listed above and despite the complexity of the rules of private 
international law, IViR concluded that there was no actual need to harmonise the rules on authorship at 
the European level: 
“Intuitively, we would tend to believe that the disparities we found may not be so important as to 
affect the efficient functioning of the Internal Market. A first indication that the impact on the 
Internal Market may be somewhat limited is that, to our knowledge, neither the European Court of 
Justice nor the national courts have had to decide a case where the application of the rules on 
copyright contracts of one Member States raised problems in another Member State. A second 
indication comes from the fact that there appears to be a general consensus among Member 
States on a number of important issues. (…) 
In light of our findings and for the various reasons mentioned in subsections 6.2 and 6.3 above, a 
Community initiative on the harmonisation of the rules on copyright contracts may be, at the 
present stage, wholly premature.”
300
  
E. DERCLAYE recently recalled the existence of these disparities with regard to copyright contracts and 
stressed on the absence of an actual impact on the functioning of the Internal Market: 
“In view of the fact that there seems to be no real indication that the functioning of the common 
market urgently requires the approximation of the laws of the Member States in this area, it is 
therefore questionable whether an action from the European legislator towards the harmonization 
of the rules on copyright contracts would be consistent with article 5 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community.”
301
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The stakeholders who responded to the consultation on the online distribution of audiovisual works in the 
European Union seemed to be divided on the question whether a harmonisation of the notion of 
authorship in the field of audiovisual works is needed
302
.  
In a recent paper, M. VAN EECHOUD wrote that the Court of Justice might be questioned in the future in 
order to define the notion of authorship if no directive intervenes to regulate that concept: 
“Inevitably, I would think, once national courts are taken further down the road to an all-inclusive 
Community-wide notion of what constitutes a work, there will be no escape from a Community-
wide notion of authorship (and initial ownership).(…) 
The numbers of copyright cases brought before the Court of Justice are rising, and the Court 
shows itself rather activist and willing to construct pan-European notions of copyright that are not 
clearly in (or even squarely out of) the directives.”
303
 
In the current context, the actual need to harmonise the concept of authorship at the European level is 
difficult to evaluate. The stakeholders adopt different, and even opposite, positions on that issue. 
Furthermore, we are not aware of the existence of any case-law resulting from that problematic. However, 
the theoretical hypothesis we have presented shows that the current situation may hamper the conclusion 
of pan-European licences. An economic market study would be needed to evaluate the real impact of the 
existing disparities.  
Moreover, it should be taken into account that the harmonisation of the rules of authorship and (initial) 
ownership are not the only causes for fragmented ownership of copyright works.  The rights are 
commonly transferred by contract or licensed by territory.  To the extent that an act of making available 
covers various constitutive elements that may take place in different Member States, the issue remains 
that several persons’ consent should be obtained – the difference being that these persons are indicated 
by contract rather than by national law. 
3. Reproduction right 
The making available right is considered, in the InfoSoc Directive, as a species of the right of 
communication to the public.  The Directive does not regulate the relation between the rights of 
reproduction, communication to the public and distribution.  Yet these rights may apply, even 
simultaneously, to the same technical process.  A typical instance of on demand availability may be 
represented by the following schema: 
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A work may be uploaded from a user device to a server, where it is stored and members of the public 
have the possibility to access the work from their own devices.    
The level of control that the user can exert depends on the technology chosen by the uploader
304
 and on 
the (commercial) customs.   
- Download (e.g. music, films, newspapers).  The end user will receive the most complete 
control and independence of the uploader who has made the work initially available:  the user 
stores her own copy of the work and can see, hear or read it whenever she likes. 
- Streaming (mostly audio or audiovisual content).  A work that is streamed to the end user will 
remain in the latter’s possession only for the purpose of seeing or hearing it. No permanent 
copy is saved at the user’s end. For a later use, the final user depends on the availability of 
the work at the uploader’s end. 
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- Other forms of access (e.g. news sites or blogs).  The user loads copies of web pages while 
“browsing” in order to access the content of the page.  These copies may subsist as long as 
the user remains on the page or even until the browsing programme is closed.   
It appears from this simplified scheme that the act of making available involves a number of copies, at 
distinct stages of the technical process.  It should thus be verified for each of these copies whether these 
are reproductions (art. 2 InfoSoc Dir) and whether these may be exempted under the exception for 
temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir). 
The key question is how the rights of making available and reproduction relate in case a work is offered to 
the public on its demand.  We will hereafter proceed to a brief analysis of the reproduction right (art. 2 
InfoSoc Dir) and the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  Based on the 
findings of this examination, we will proceed to the identification of the (protected) reproductions in 
different use cases of on demand exploitation.  
a) Scope of the reproduction right in the InfoSoc Directive 
The scope of protection of the reproduction right is determined by a combined reading of the reproduction 
right (art. 2 InfoSoc Dir) and the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  Both 
will be discussed here, as this particular exception plays the role of correcting the excessive protection 
under the broad reproduction right.  Remarkably, the reproduction right requires less explanation than the 
exception (cf. relevant decisions of the CJEU).  The conditions of this exception are indeed complex to 
interpret and to apply.  Although this exception is not exclusively connected to the making available right, 
its uncertain scope of application has important consequences for the harmonising effect of the making 
available right.  We have therefore considered it important to undertake an analysis of this exception and 
its interpretation by the CJEU,  
(i) The reproduction right  
The reproduction right is the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or 
permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part (art. 2 InfoSoc Dir).   
The relation between the making available right and the reproduction right has not been regulated in the 
InfoSoc Directive.  The rights of reproduction and communication to the public are autonomous rights, 
which can apply cumulatively. 
The reproduction right is understood in a broad way (rec. 21 InfoSoc Dir)
305
.  From the Information 
Society Directive, its preparatory works and the cases decided by the CJEU, it can be stated, generally, 
that the reproduction right protects the material act of copying, including transient copies in cache 
memories, satellite decoders or television screens
306
.  The CJEU stated indeed that this right extends to 
transient copies, which may have an “ephemeral existence because they are immediately effaced in the 
course of a technical process”
307
.  The result is that it suffices to find a reproduction in the material sense 
(a “copy”) in order to find a reproduction in the sense of the InfoSoc Directive, regardless of the function 
or the economic value of the copy (technical approach). 
The principle of territoriality governs the reproduction right (similarly to the making available right).  This 
means that the Member State where reproduction is performed is competent to regulate the behaviour.  It 
may not be so straightforward to localise the reproduction.  At first glance, the restricted act takes place 
where the copy is made.  But, in the current technological framework, the person who makes the 
reproduction may be in a different Member State than where the copy is stored (server – cf. third party 
                                                     
 
305 Infopaq I, par. 43. 
306 Premier League. 
307 Premier League, par. 157. 
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hosting or cloud services).  The localisation criterion for the reproduction right has not been harmonised, 
hence national legislations may differ in this respect. 
The copyright law of this Member State determines the transfer of rights or which (facultative) exceptions 
apply. 
The reproduction right as such is harmonised under the InfoSoc Directive.  Another question is who 
should be regarded as the person who reproduces the work.  The answer will determine who has the 
obligation to obtain the author’s consent for the reproduction or who can benefit from an exemption in the 
national copyright legislation.  It seems that the Member States answer this question in different ways.    
In simple cases where only one actor is involved, the answer is straightforward:  the person who makes 
the reproduction should acquire the author’s consent.  For example, the person who copies the music 
from a CD to the hard drive of her computer is the person who reproduces the work.  The answer is less 
obvious when several actors play different roles, in particular when a technical intermediary is involved 
(such as a copy centre or an Internet service provider).  Member States focus on different elements to 
decide who is responsible for a reproduction.  A few examples will illustrate the differences.  
In France it is generally held that the person who makes the material copy of a work – or even who 
intervenes in the reproduction by providing the technical means to do so – is responsible for the 
reproduction, even if she has acted upon the request of a final user (e.g. the user of a virtual personal 
video recording system)
308
.  It seems that the same solution is adopted under Spanish law
309
. 
In Germany, it was held at several instances that the user of a “virtual personal video recorder” may make 
the reproductions of protected television programmes, not the company offering the online video 
recording service
310
. If the user indeed “produces” the recording then it may be covered under the 
exception for private use (even if one copy served for the recordings of several clients).  In respect of 
Rapidshare, it was held that not the service provider but the user of the service made the reproduction of 
the works
311
.  According to the Belgian Supreme Court, the person who materially makes the reproduction 
or who orders it should acquire the author’s consent or qualify for an exception, even if the reproduction is 
made in a copy centre
312
.   
In the Meltwater cases, the question was whether the customer of a press monitoring company made 
protected reproductions when she receives the press overviews per e-mail or when she views these 
overviews on the website of the company.  The copies made while browsing gave rise to a debate on the 
application of the exception for transient copies (infra sub (ii)).  On the email copy, it was considered 
                                                     
 
308 Cour d’appel de Paris Pôle 5 (chambre 1), 14 December 2011, Wizzgo c Metropole Television et autres (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=3297. See T. VERBIEST, M. DE BELLEFROID, A. 
SOKOLOWSKA, « Le régime de l’exception de la copie privée en droit français », Droit & Technologies, 10 September 2007, 
http://www.droit-technologie.org/actuality-1070/le-regime-de-l-exception-de-la-copie-privee-en-droit-francais.html (consulted 3 
December 2012);  J. MARTIN, Réponse du groupe français au questionnaire relatif au congrès de l'association littéraire artistique 
international Kyoto octobre 2012, http://www.alai.jp/ALAI2012/program/national_report/France.pdf (consulted 3 December 2012). 
309 R. CASAS e.a., ALAI-Study Days 2012 – KYOTO.  Questionnaire Spain, 2012, 
http://www.alai.jp/ALAI2012/program/national_report/Spain.pdf (consulted 3 December 2012), p. 11.  Some reservations are 
expressed for the copies kept by means of cloud services. 
310 Bundesgerichtshof 22 April 2009, I ZR 175/07, "Save.tv". See A. GIEDKE, ALAI Congress 2012 – Kyoto Questionnaire – 
Germany, 2012, http://www.alai.jp/ALAI2012/program/national_report/Germany.pdf (consulted 3 December 2012), p. 23. 
311 OLG Düsseldorf 27 April 2010, case I-20 U 166/09 in the German section’s contribution to the ALAI’s Kyoto congress 2012 on 
cloud computing, p. 25, accessible via http://www.alai.jp/ALAI2012/program/national_report/Germany.pdf. 
312 Cass.bel.  27 May 2005, dock nr. C.03.0610.N, SABAM, I.F.P.I. v  Goossens, A&M 2005, 414. 
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common ground that Metlwater’s customers need a licence for this reproduction, which is not a temporary 
one
313
. 
These few illustrations suffice to observe that diametrically opposed principles may be followed in 
different Member States.  Member States may see either the ultimate beneficiary of the copy (final user) 
or technical copier (the service provider) as the person who reproduces the work.  That person either has 
to obtain the authorisation or qualify for an exception.  It follows that it has to be verified, for each 
reproduction, which national principles apply (taking into consideration the conflict of law rules) and to 
which effect.  One possible outcome is that the reproduction requires the author’s consent, to be acquired 
either by the service provider or by the final user (who ordered the reproduction and/or benefits from it).  
Another possible outcome is that the national copyright act contains an exemption in favour of the final 
user that is not ruled out because of the intervention of the service provider
314
. 
(ii) The exception for temporary acts of reproduction 
The scope of protection of the reproduction right is further determined by the (mandatory) exception for 
temporary acts of reproduction, which are transient or incidental [and] an integral and essential part of 
a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable: (a) a transmission in a network between 
third parties by an intermediary, or (b) a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and 
which have no independent economic significance (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive).   
This exception will, generally speaking, exempt transient copies with a merely technical function and 
without any independent economic significance.  Recurring examples were the technical copies that 
enable “browsing” and “caching” (see also cons. 33 of the directive).   
We will examine this exception to the reproduction right because the scope of application of the exception 
has an impact on the exercise of the making available right.  The exception for temporary acts of 
reproduction is not exclusively linked to the making available right, but inversely the making available right 
(in a digital environment) will in many cases entail reproductions and the exception for temporary acts of 
reproduction.  Any uncertainty regarding the scope of the exception will weigh on the application of the 
making available right.   
It is often presumed that works made available for download result in a reproduction, at the downloader’s 
end, that requires a prior consent, while works that are streamed at the user’s demand lead to 
reproductions that are exempted under art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir.  This hypothesis should be verified in the 
light of the recent decisions of the CJEU.  Any indication that not all temporary copies that enable the 
“consumptive” use of a work are exempted entails that the restrictions or exemptions are applies at the 
discretion of the Member States and that the global application of the making available right is less 
harmonised than presumed (cf. the controversial decisions in the Meltwater case in the UK - infra).   
We will first examine the CJEU’s decisions in relation with art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive, then we will 
highlight the uncertainties in relation to temporary copies following a transmission at the demand of the 
user. 
                                                     
 
313 UK Supreme Court 17 April 2013, Public Relations Consultants Association Limited v The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limted 
and others, [2013] UKSC 18, accessible via http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2011_0202_Judgment.pdf, 
(UKSC Meltwater), par. 4. 
314 Other solutions have been developed at the national level.  In Germany, inconsistencies in the licensing of the making available 
right and associated reproductions have been tackled via the conditions for valid licences (centred on the exploitation of a work, not 
the economic rights as such).  See LG München 25 June 2009 and OLG München 24 April 2010.  An appeal before the 
Bundesgerichtshof is pending.  In Canada, the Supreme Court has approached this issue differently, by giving guidelines on the 
qualification of resp. on demand downloads and streaming as either reproductions or communications to the public via 
telecommunication.  
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- Infopaq I & II and Premier League 
The CJEU has interpreted several of these cumulative conditions of this exception in the cases “Infopaq” I 
and II and “Premier League”, in relation to other technologies than Internet-related technologies.  The 
combined reading of these cases does not make the application of the exception for temporary acts of 
reproduction any less complicated.  Generally, the Court stated that the conditions are cumulative 
(Infopaq I, par. 55) and that the exception should be interpreted restrictively (Infopaq I, par. 56; FAPL, 
par. 162).  The strict interpretation should however not prevent the exception from being effective and 
achieving the exception’s purpose (i.e. “the development and operation of new technologies and 
safeguard a fair balance between the rights and interests of right holders, on the one hand, and of users 
of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those new technologies, on the other” – Premier 
League, par. 163-164)  
Firstly, the Court interpreted the condition that the reproductions should be transient.  In the first Infopaq 
decision, the Court was asked to rule on the reproductions that were part of a “data capture process”.  
Infopaq is a Danish media monitoring service, which supplies its customers with inter alia summaries of 
press articles.  Part of its work was automated by this “data capture process”, designed by Infopaq.  The 
first question was whether the reproductions, made in this context, were exempted under the exception 
for temporary acts of reproduction.  The Court stated that the an act can be held to be ‘transient’ “only if 
its duration is limited to what is necessary for the proper completion of the technological process in 
question, it being understood that that process must be automated so that it deletes that act 
automatically, without human intervention, once its function of enabling the completion of such a process 
has come to an end” (Infopaq I, par. 64).  This means that the transient character of the reproduction 
should be assessed by reference to the “proper completion” of the technological process (a relative rather 
than an absolute assessment).  A paper print is a reproduction outside the computer sphere and its 
deletion is not decided by the automated process:  the reproduction disappears only when the material 
support is destroyed and when the user decides to do so (Infopaq I, par. 67).  Such reproduction is not 
transient and cannot be exempted under this exception. 
In the second Infopaq case, the Court ruled on the condition that the reproduction should be an integral 
and essential part of a technological process.   
This condition means, on the one hand, that the temporary acts of reproduction are carried out “entirely in 
the context of the implementation of the technological process and, therefore, not to be carried out, fully 
or partially, outside of such a process”. On the other hand, the Court stated that “this concept also 
assumes that the completion of the temporary act of reproduction is necessary, in that the technological 
process concerned could not function correctly and efficiently without that act” (Infopaq II, par. 30).  Again 
the reference is the technological process (in particular the necessity of the reproduction for its correct 
and efficient functioning).  The Court described the technological process as consisting of “carrying out 
electronic and automatic research in newspaper articles and identifying and extracting predefined key 
words from those articles, in order to render the drafting of summaries of newspaper articles more 
efficient” (Infopaq II, par. 33) and its aim was to “identify predefined key words in newspaper articles and 
extracting them on a digital medium” (Infopaq II, par. 37).  Summarising the newspaper articles by 
contrast was an act outside the process; the fact that it is possible to summarise articles without these 
reproductions was not pertinent (i.e. the reproductions are not necessary to make such summaries).  All 
digital reproductions were therefore necessary for the correct and efficient functioning of the “data 
capture” process.  It mattered not that the reproductions were initiated by a human intervention or that 
they intervened at the beginning or at the end of the process.  
The next legal condition requires that the sole purpose of the process is either to enable a transmission 
in a network between third parties by an intermediary or a lawful use.   
Firstly, the technical copies may be exempted under this exception if the purpose is to does the 
transmission in a network by an intermediary.  It is explained that these copies should “enable 
transmission systems to function efficiently, provided that the intermediary does not modify the 
information and does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used by 
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industry, to obtain data on the use of the information” (rec. 33 InfoSoc Dir).  This element does not seem 
to raise too many difficulties.   
Secondly, the technical copies should enable a lawful purpose.  It is clarified that “a use should be 
considered lawful where it is authorised by the rightholder or not restricted by law” (rec. 33 InfoSoc Dir).  
This possibility has been interpreted by the Court of Justice in Infopaq II and Premier League. 
A use is considered lawful “where it is authorised by the rightholder or not restricted by law” (rec. 33 
InfoSoc Dir).  This condition was applied in the Court’s ruling in Premier League and in Infopaq II, to two 
very different sets of facts.  In Premier, it was decided that the technical copies made in the satellite 
decoder and the television screen could indeed constitute reproductions (provided that these were 
“partial” reproductions).  Answering the question whether they served a lawful purpose, the Court firstly 
identified the intended use.  The Court found that these ephemeral reproductions enabled the satellite 
decoder and the television screen to function correctly and that, from the television viewers’ standpoint, 
they enable the broadcasts containing protected works to be received (Premier League, par. 170).  It 
went on to evaluate whether the intended use was lawful.  The reproductions were not authorised so the 
Court had to assess whether the use of works was “not restricted by the applicable legislation” (Premier 
League, par. 169).  In this sense, it stated that “mere reception as such of those broadcasts – that is to 
say, the picking up of the broadcasts and their visual display – in private circles does not reveal an act 
restricted by European Union legislation or by that of the United Kingdom (...) and that act is therefore 
lawful” (Premier League, par. 171).  It should be noted that the Court did not consider that fact that in this 
case the broadcasts were not received in private circles but, on the contrary, to be shown in a public 
space (i.e. a pub).   In Infopaq II, the Court proceeded in a similar way (par. 43-44).  Firstly, it identified 
the intended purpose (a more efficient drafting of summaries of newspaper articles, i.e. a use of those 
articles) and it remarked that this was its sole purpose (there being no indications that the reproductions 
were used for any other use).  Then it verified whether the intended use (the facilitated drafting of 
summaries) was restricted under European
315
 or Danish law, which was not the case.  It should be noted 
that the Court did not require that the intended use be integral part of the technological process (the 
drafting of summaries being a technically independent act), it suffices that there were no indications that 
the technical process was used for another purpose.  Another noteworthy element is that the Court did 
not seek to verify whether the intended use was covered under one of the exceptions.  It results that a 
lawful use may consist of an intended use that is authorised, exempted under a legal exception or one 
that is not restricted by the applicable legislation.  
Finally, the temporary act of reproduction should not have an independent economic significance.  
Reproductions that make access to a work possible have an economic significance (Premier League, par. 
174):  since the works have an economic significance, access to the works has an economic significance 
and therefore the reproductions that enable this access have an economic significance.  This fact by itself 
does not preclude the application of the exception, as long as the reproduction does not have an 
independent economic significance.  The Court found that the reproductions are not capable of 
generating an additional economic advantage, beyond the advantage derived for the intended use (i.e. 
the mere reception of the broadcast) and that they do not have a separate economic significance.  The 
Court derives this from the fact that these copies are an “inseparable and non-autonomous part of the 
process of reception” (Premier League, par. 176).  Similarly, in Infopaq II, it was ruled that reproductions 
that facilitate a use or make it more efficient (efficiency gains, reduced costs, increased profits) have an 
economic significance.  No economic advantages distinct or separable from the economic advantages 
derived from the use of the works were found, provided that “the implementation of those acts does not 
enable the generation of an additional profit, going beyond that derived from lawful use of the protected 
work and, secondly, that the acts of temporary reproduction do not lead to a modification of that work” 
(Infopaq II, par. 54). 
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As far as the compliance with the three-step test is concerned, the Court sufficed to observe that the 
reproductions that meet the conditions of art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive do not conflict with the three-step test 
in art. 5(5) InfoSoc Dir. 
- Uncertainties 
These decisions raise important uncertainties, both in relation to internet technologies and other 
technologies. 
One of the main uncertainties resulting from these decisions is how to understand the “technological 
process” and its relation to the “sole” purpose it should be enabling. 
In Premier League the Court identified the “mere” reception of the television broadcasts via the satellite 
decoder and the television screen as the intended purpose.  It did not take into consideration that, in this 
case, the television screen was placed in a public space and that the broadcast football matches were 
displayed to a public – an act that the Court subsequently qualified as an act of communication to the 
public (Premier League, par. 207).  Instead, the intended use seemed to coincide with the proper 
technological process of each device (reflecting the ephemeral character of television broadcasts).   
By contrast in Infopaq II, the intended purpose of the data capture process was to make summaries of the 
Danish press articles (not a restricted act under Danish law).  The intended purpose in this case was 
(technically) outside of that technological process (Infopaq II, par. 38).  The “data capture” process thus 
covered 3 digital reproductions (ending with a reproduction in the form of a digital file comprising the 
relevant 11-word fragments of the articles).  It seems that an inherent technical connection between the 
technological process (i.e. the data capture process) and the intended purpose (the press summaries) is 
not required.  The Court could have identified the last reproduction (of the relevant fragments in one 
digital file) as the intended purpose (as defined by the technological process itself) and assessed its 
lawful character independently of the subsequent use.  However, the Court was satisfied with the 
observation that there were no indications that the result of the data capture process was used for any 
other purpose than the summaries of the press articles.  It could be observed that this finding contrasts 
sharply with the legal security the Court required when it demanded that all reproductions be part of an 
automated process and that their subsistence not depend on the sole volition of the user of the work. 
It is difficult to derive general guidelines from these fact-specific cases.  The different approaches make it 
difficult to assess other technologies and the reproductions they generate in the light of the exception for 
temporary acts of reproduction.  This is especially true for the act of “browsing”, the example given in 
recital 33 of the InfoSoc Directive.   
A closely related issue was addressed in the British decisions in the “Meltwater” case
316
.  The facts of this 
case were the following.  A dispute arose between, on the one hand, The Newspaper Licensing Agency 
(NLA) and six newspaper publishers (acting as claimants) and, on the other hand, Meltwater (Holding and 
UK) and Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA) (acting as defendants).  Meltwater is a 
company that provides commercial media monitoring services (online only).  PRCA was a customer of 
Meltwater, which received the media monitoring service.  In order to offer its service, Meltwater “spidered” 
and indexed news websites.  By means of search terms, defined by its customers, it established a 
monitoring report (consisting of a hyperlink with the headline of the article, the opening text, an extract in 
the form of a fragment surrounding each search term).  Finally, Meltwater sent an e-mail containing the 
monitoring report to its customer or granted her access to the Meltwater website.  For its own activities, 
Meltwater concluded a “Web Database Licence” with NLA.  This Web Database Licence was however 
conditional upon the acquisition of a Web End-User Licence (WEUL) by Meltwater’s customers. 
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The question was whether the copyright protecting newspaper articles is infringed, when an end-user 
receives an e-mail containing a press reports or accesses this report via her computer screen.  It was 
admitted that both the reception of an e-mail and the viewing of the report involve reproductions, the legal 
issue resided in the application of the exception for temporary acts of reproduction.   
The High Court decided in 2010 that the end-users’ acts were not exempted under the exception for 
temporary acts of reproduction.  The Court of appeal confirmed this ruling in 2011 and dismissed the 
appeal (without adding much to the analysis of the legal issues).  It was thus decided that the end-user 
infringes copyright (prima facie) since she makes a copy of the work when receiving an email or when 
accessing it on a website via a computer.  In relation to the exception for temporary acts of reproduction, 
the High Court found that it was not applicable.  The exception only applies to “incidental and 
intermediate copying so that any copy which is consumption of the work, whether temporary or not, 
requires the permission of the copyright holder”. The copy is made by the end-user, “by his own volition”, 
it is not part of the technological process:  it is the end of the process and “storage of the copy and the 
duration of that storage are matters within the End User’s control”.  The end user must therefore 
demonstrate that the copy was lawful.  Finally that copy does have an independent economic 
significance, since the end user is paying Meltwater for it. 
The UK Supreme Court came to a different conclusion.  Summarising the decisions of the CJEU in 
Infopaq I & II and in Premier League
317
, the Supreme Court found firstly that art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir applies 
to temporary copies generated by an end-user’s use of the internet that enable her to view copyright 
material on the internet, by reference to rec. 33 of the directive, the text of the directive (in art. 5(1)(b)) 
and the CJEU’s decisions in Premier League and Infopaq II (UKSC Meltwater, par. 27).  Having 
established this, the Court held that “the various conditions laid down by that article must be construed so 
far as possible in a manner consistent with that purpose. It must, if the exception is to be coherent, apply 
to the ordinary technical processes associated with internet browsing” (UKSC Meltwater, par. 28).  The 
Supreme Court accepted that these temporary copies met the conditions that they be an integral and 
essential part of a technological process, that the use was lawful and that the temporary copies had no 
independent economic significance (UKSC Meltwater, par. 29).  The Supreme Court also found the 
copies transient and temporary, since they met the two conditions (1) that the storage and deletion of the 
material be automatic, as opposed to being dependent on the discretionary human intervention and (2) 
that the duration of the copy be limited to what is “necessary for the completion of the technological 
process in question” (UKSC Meltwater, par. 31).  These copies in the cache or on screen were 
considered the “automatic result of browsing the internet. It requires no other human intervention than the 
decision to access the relevant web-page.  Its deletion is the equally automatic result of the lapse of time 
coupled with the continuing use of the browser”; Web browsing is enabled by some technological 
processes, including the retention of material in cache for a duration that does not exceed the ordinary 
processes associated with (normal) internet use.  The Court then reminded that the purpose of the 
exception was to distinguish between the use of equipment to view copyright works and its use to record 
it:  downloads or other permanent copies that remain in existence until the user chooses to delete or 
destroy them are not exempted under this exception (UKSC Meltwater, par. 31).  The Supreme Court 
repeated twice that the act of reading or viewing has never been a copyright infringement (UKSC 
Meltwater, par. 1; 36) and this should not be altered because of the high level of protection under the 
directive.  The opposite interpretation would make internet users vulnerable to civil liability when they 
merely browse the Web and end up on a page containing copyright works.   Although the Supreme Court 
had come to the decision that the temporary copies in the cache memories and on the screens during the 
browsing process were exempted under art. 5(1), it expressed the intention of referring the matter to the 
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CJEU for a preliminary question given the transnational dimension and the implications for many millions 
of people across the EU using the internet (UKSC Meltwater, par. 38)
318
. 
The uncertainty on status of such browsing copies then has an impact on the issues under consideration 
in this Study.  If the “access” to the protected works by the final user should be understood entirely and 
only in the framework of the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (possibly by some “twist” on the 
sole purpose of a “lawful use”), then such use can be considered fully harmonised under the InfoSoc 
Directive and declared “lawful” in all Member States.   
If the UK High Court and the Court of appeal have come to a correct judgment of the issue in Meltwater, 
then each reproduction that enables the end-user to access a work should be considered a restricted act 
and therefore be authorised by the right holder or exempted by a national exception (e.g. for private use).  
In this event, the issue of the reproduction at the final user’s end arises not only in case a work is offered 
to the public for download, but also when it is offered for “mere access”, including the often cited case of 
browsing or streaming.  In practice, it should then be verified, at the user’s end, whether the right holder 
has given her consent or, alternatively, the national legislation contains an exception covering such use 
(considering the non-compulsory list of exceptions in art. 5(2) and 5(3) InfoSoc Dir
319
).  As will be 
demonstrated in the following sections, such an interpretation of the reproduction right may undermine 
the understanding (and localisation) of the making available right. 
b) Application of the reproduction right to “making available” processes 
The rights of reproduction and communication to the public (including the making available right) are 
autonomous rights.  By consequence these rights can be exercised independently, whenever a material 
act meets the conditions for protection
320
. 
Both rights may apply cumulatively to the same act:  an act of upload (resulting in the accessibility of a 
work to a “public”) may be qualified as an act of making available to the public and may result, in addition, 
in acts of reproduction. Also, the circumstance that a work is made available with the author’s consent 
does not entail that the copies directly transferred at the individual demand of the final user are covered 
by this consent or are otherwise exempted. Different exceptions apply to the reproduction right and the 
right of communication to the public, including the making available right
321
. 
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(ii) copies of that web - page are automatically made on screen and in the internet "cache" on the end-user's hard disk; 
(iii) the creation of those copies is indispensable to the technical processes involved in correct and efficient internet browsing; 
(iv) the screen copy remains on screen until the end - user moves away from the relevant web - page, when it is automatically 
deleted by the normal operation of the computer; 
(v) the cached copy remains in the cache until it is overwritten by other material as the end - user views further web - pages, when it 
is automatically deleted by the normal operation of the computer; and 
(vi) the copies are retained for no longer than the ordinary processes associated with internet use referred to at (iv) and (v) above 
continue; 
Are such copies (i) temporary, (ii) transient or incidental and (iii) an integral and essential part of the technological process within the 
meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC? 
319 The role of the exception for private use is likely to increase, even if it is subject to strict conditions and requires a fair 
compensation to be paid. 
320 This appears inter alia from Premier League, in which the display of television broadcasts was assessed as a reproduction and 
as a communication to the public.  It is confirmed more explicitly in the Advocate General’s opinion in Pinckney (par. 30). 
321 This appears from the structure of art. 5:  art. 5(2) lists the exceptions to the reproduction right, art. 5(3) contains the exceptions 
to all harmonised economic rights. 
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The fragmentation of the economic rights may complicate this picture.  The rights of reproduction and 
making available to the public may be held by different people and, moreover, the same rights may be 
exercised by different people in different territories.  This complicates both the licensing process and the 
enforcement of rights.  
The reproduction right intervenes in several respects, when a work is made available to the public.  
Based on the preceding description of the scope of the reproduction right, it seems that a reproduction 
can be found whenever a copy in the material sense is made.  These reproductions may then be 
exempted under the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art.5 (1) InfoSoc Dir). 
A distinction can be made between the “upstream” and the “downstream” reproductions. 
The “upstream” reproduction is the copy kept on the hosting server from which the work is available for 
transmission at the individual demand of the users.  This reproduction is most likely a permanent or a 
temporary reproduction, which is not exempted under the exception of art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive. It 
should be kept in mind that different national rules may apply to localise this reproduction and to identify 
the person who makes the reproduction.  Such copies are also relevant in case of cloud services.  
The “downstream” reproductions are the copies at the final user’s end, at whose individual request the 
work is transferred.  Some downstream reproductions are intended to be kept for an indefinite period and 
in that sense permanent (e.g. downloaded music tracks for repeated and indefinite listening, a copyright 
work in an email). These reproductions require the author’s authorisation, unless these are covered under 
a national exception. 
The status of the temporary reproductions that enable access to a work may be more uncertain, 
especially if the user has some degree of control over the copy (in which case it is not certain that the 
copy’s sole purpose is the “mere access” to the work).  Given the outcome of the Meltwater case before 
the UK courts and the lack of clear guidance in the CJEU’s decisions (Infopaq and Premier League) until 
the CJEU’s ruling in Meltwater, this uncertainty affects the copyright status of certain uses, which de facto 
serve only to access the work and may be perceived as “consumptive” and therefore not restricted.   
Leaving aside national exceptions, it should be taken into account that downstream reproductions are 
made in any case. Some are permanent reproductions, others are transient and still others are temporary 
(but not transient). 
It should be remembered that the rules to determine who makes this reproduction and is responsible for 
the infringement are not harmonised.  The person who copies the work may be the final user in some 
Member States or the service provider in other Member States.  By consequence the burden of acquiring 
the author’s consent or meeting the (national) exceptions may be on different actors. 
Another take on the cumulative application can be found with RICOLFI
322
.  In his opinion, the right of 
communication to the public and making content available should not cover the preliminary acts of 
reproduction that are technically necessary for the content to be transmitted online from one point to the 
other. Preliminary acts like (i) reproductions of works in ‘packets’ made by telecommunication operators 
through their networks and (ii) reproductions made by content providers to the end-user (if not exempted 
as transient reproductions
323
) should be only be protected under the reproduction right.  However, these 
acts of reproductions are lawful in so far as the online transmission of the digitally reproduced content is 
also (i.e., separately) authorized by the copyright owner through the exercise of the right of 
communication to the public.  
                                                     
 
322 M. RICOLFI, ‘Comunicazione al pubblico e distribuzione’, Annali Italiani Diritto Autore (AIDA), 2002, 53. 
323 Art. 68-bis of the Italian Copyright Act, which transposed into Italian law Art. 5(1) of the 2001 Information Society Directive. 
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c) Conclusions on the accumulation of the making available to the public right 
and the reproduction right 
In this Study we have been asked to examine the making available right.  We have established that there 
is no certainty with regard to the constitutive elements of the making available right.  A work could thus be 
hosted (“available”) on a server in one Member State, directed at the public of another Member State (or 
even several Member States) and transmitted to any other Member State. 
In addition to this plurality of acts and locations of any act of making available to the public, the 
reproduction right should be complied with.  The reproduction right is currently understood in a technical 
way, which means in practice that a reproduction in the technical sense, a “copy”, is equated to a 
reproduction in the legal sense.  The scope of protection of this economic right is limited by the 
mandatory exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  The Court of Justice has 
issued several decisions on the reproduction right and this exception, both harmonised in the Information 
Society Directive.  The overall scope of protection of the reproduction right is still uncertain, especially in 
the light of non-permanent copies at the end-user’s end (e.g. streaming or browsing).  The CJEU will 
probably clarify this issue when it rules in the Meltwater case. 
Reproductions have been identified “upstream” and “downstream” in the average online on-demand use, 
i.e. on the server where the work is hosted for transmission and at the user’s end, after transmission on 
demand (leaving aside copies in the course of the transmission via a network).   
The reproduction right being applied cumulatively to the same processes as the making available right, an 
additional burden may be imposed upon the person who wants to clear the relevant rights to offer a 
service (the reproduction right and the making available right as a species of the right of communication 
to the public are not necessarily held by the same persons).  Also, it may increase the number of 
interested parties in case of an infringement.  
Moreover, the reproductions may take place in yet more Member States.  The criteria for localising the 
reproduction have not been harmonised.  This leads, at least in theory, to an unpredictable status for 
online available works.  The location of the upstream reproduction may or may not coincide with the 
Member State where the work is made available.  The downstream reproductions may take place in the 
Member State where the relevant acts of making available are found.  However, it is also likely that 
reproductions are made outside these Member States.  If the making available right is understood in a 
more narrow way than the accessibility of the work, then still an act of reproduction will be found when the 
user actually receives and accesses the work.  Some temporary copies for viewing a work will be 
exempted but more permanent reproductions will require the author’s consent, wherever the act of 
reproduction is performed and even outside the territorial scope of the making available right. 
It depends then on the national legislation of the Member States whether such reproduction is restricted 
or exempted (under a national exception) and who has the burden of this reproduction (acquisition of 
licences resp. meeting the conditions of the exceptions under national law). 
D. Bottlenecks 
In this section the bottlenecks resulting from the application of the making available right will be identified. 
The principle that the national legislator is competent to regulate the events occurring on the national 
territory in copyright terms is not challenged, but several international and European initiatives have been 
taken to harmonise copyright protection.  The absence of a EU definition of the making available right 
leaves the Member States a considerable margin to interpret this restricted act under national copyright 
law (until the CJEU fills in this gap) and to identify the relevant elements taking place on their territories.   
The CJEU’s decisions confirm the territoriality principle in copyright.  The Court has not ruled on the 
making available right or how this protected act should be localised.  It has applied several criteria were 
applied to localise copyright protected acts on the territories of the Member States.  In Lagardère, the 
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location of the (terrestrial) broadcasts was established according to the location of the broadcasting 
stations, while in Premier League the satellite broadcast was found to take place in the Member State 
where the broadcast originated.  In both cases the remuneration had to be calculated in function of the 
actual and potential audience, which in Lagardère could be found in the same Member State as the 
terrestrial broadcast and in Premier League in any Member State where the satellite broadcast could be 
received.  In Donner the act of distribution to the public was held to take place in the Member State where 
the trader specifically targeted the public of the state of destination.  In Sportradar, the Court found that 
the act of reutilisation of a database (via the Internet) took place – at least – in the Member State where 
the public was targeted.   
The absence of a definition of the making available right creates legal uncertainties as to the territorial 
reach of the online accessibility of a protected subject matter
324
.  Different elements of this complex act 
could be considered relevant to establish an act relevant under the making available right:  the availability 
on a server, the targeting of a public or the transmission to a Member State, even accessibility of the work 
has not explicitly be ruled out as a relevant element for the making available right.  By consequence, if all 
Member States are free to determine which element of the complex act is relevant to establish an act of 
making available, then each could subject this constitutive part to the prior authorisation of the author 
(and to the corresponding payment of a licence fee – cf. Premier League, par. 110).  The Member States 
could define the same or different criteria to apply their national making available right.  At least in theory, 
this would lead to a multitude of acts in a multitude of Member States.  
Without a clarification of this restricted act, its relation to the other exclusive economic rights and the 
localisation criterion, the impact of the territorial application of national copyright laws remains 
speculative.   
Licences and transfer of the making available right by contract.   
Conflict of laws.  If a cross-border on demand offer is analysed as consisting of constitutive elements of 
a complex process, each taking place in different Member States, then the rights for each relevant act 
must be cleared by the service provider or the user.  Whenever the situation presents a “foreign” element, 
it should be determined which law applies to the contract according to the principles defined in the 
Regulation Rome I.  
Authorship and initial ownership.  The lack of harmonisation and divergence of national rules may 
lead, in theory, to conflicts between different persons (individuals or legal entities) who are considered 
authors or initial owners of the copyright under different national laws.  If there is a multitude of acts in 
several Member States at the same time for each material act of upload leading to public accessibility, 
this means that on the one hand the consent of several persons in different Member States is required 
and on the other hand that several people have a title to enforce their right of making available in case of 
infringement.  That situation is the one the French Cour de cassation treated in its ruling delivered on 10 
April 2013, deciding to refer to the lex loci protectionis.  
Fragmented ownership.  The exclusive rights under copyright can be transferred or licensed on a 
territorial basis.  Different people then hold the rights of making available to a particular work for a certain 
territory.  This is mainly an issue for music works and related performances, where the management of 
the public performance rights (which may include the making available right) has been entrusted to 
collecting societies.  The challenges of new technologies and multi-territorial exploitations have been 
                                                     
 
324 See also L. BENTLY & B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University Press, 2009, 151.  These authors describe 
the difficulty of localising an act of making available and consider that this could done 1) where an individual uploads a work to on to 
web site; 2) where the server that permits access is located;  3) where the work is accessed or can be accessed or 4) where the 
public at which the work is targeted is located.  Without taking a position, these authors feel that this difficult issue will need to be 
resolved. 
The territoriality of the making available right  122 
 
taken on in different ways
325
.  Broadly speaking, collecting societies have been working together to offer 
licences for online use, according to different parameters.   
One option is to organise licensing in function of the establishment of the licensee:  the collecting 
society operating in the territory where the licensee has her establishment grants a multi-territorial 
licences for the repertoire of all collecting societies (not just its own repertoire).   
Another option is take the use of the work as the focal point:  a collecting society can grant a 
licence for the use on the territory where it operates for the repertoire of its members and those of 
other collecting societies, regardless of where the licensee is established.   In this latter case, 
where the location of the use determines which collecting society should grant a licence, the 
uncertainty as to the material and territorial reach of the making available right may complicate 
matters.  Whenever a relevant act takes place on the territory of another Member State, it may be 
necessary to involve another collecting society, exercising the rights for that territory.   
The challenges of multi-territorial licensing of online rights in musical rights by collecting societies are 
however dealt with in the proposal for a directive on collective rights management and multi-territorial 
licensing of rights in musical works for online uses
326
.  In any case, the territorial definition of the licensed 
rights poses less of a challenge when the making available right is held by one party and licensed directly 
by her, without the intermediary of a collecting society (or competing collecting societies). 
Reproduction right.  The cumulative application of the making available right and the reproduction right 
may complicate the licensing of works for online use.  Each act of making available entails (in the current 
state of technology and law) several reproductions.  The rights should be cleared both “upstream” 
(hosting server) and downstream (e.g. at the end-user’s side) of the online availability.  These 
reproductions may take place in yet other Member States than the relevant acts pertaining to the making 
available of the work.  Since the reproduction right is autonomous and independent from the right of 
making the work available to the public, it may be held by a different person.  The licensing may present 
an additional challenge in that case
327
.  Furthermore the burden for clearing the rights may be distributed 
differently in the Member States (end-user v service providers). 
This has consequences for different actors involved.  The owner of the reproduction right may be another 
person than the person holding the making available right:  both parties may exercise their rights 
independently from each other (i.e. granting or refusing a licence, determining the licence fee or other 
conditions).  The service provider must clear the rights for the making available of a work and the 
reproductions that occur during the same technical process.  Moreover, it should be determined who has 
the responsibility, under the applicable national law, to clear the reproduction rights for the copies of the 
work at the end-user’s end.  Even if the end-user has acquired access to a work via a “legitimate” 
platform, she may face insecurity as to whether the platform has cleared the rights for the reproductions 
the end-user makes of the work. 
Infringement. 
Conflict of laws.  The issues of private international law, and especially the questions of jurisdiction, are 
solved on the basis of factual elements. Moreover, we assume that the principles laid down by the Court 
of justice in the interpretation of article 5.3 of the Regulation Brussel I can be applied to the making 
                                                     
 
325 See Commission decision of 16 July 2008, C(2008) 3435 final and General Court 12 April 2013, case T-422/08, CISAC v 
European Commission. 
326 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights 
and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market, COM(2012) 372 final, 2012/0180 
(COD), 11 July 2012, accessible via http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/com-2012-3722_en.pdf.  The 
effect of this proposal has not been examined, as this was out of the scope of this study. 
327 The licensing of the reproduction right in relation to an online use of a musical work may be dealt with under the proposed 
directive.  This aspect is not examined in this study. 
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available rights. This might be clarified soon if the Court answers the prejudicial issues referred by the 
French Cour de cassation in Pinckney.  
The right holder can choose where to bring her legal action, depending on her objectives.  Provisional 
measures can be obtained in all Member States, regardless of which court is competent on the merits, 
provided that there is some connection to the territory of that State.  It is uncertain whether the CJEU’s 
ruling in Solvay v Honeywell (a patent case) can be extended to the making available right and courts can 
issue cross-border provisional measures.  On the merits the right holder can claim reparation of her entire 
damage in the Member State where the defendant has her domicile or where the event giving rise to the 
harm occurred.  This court will have to apply the lex loci protectionis to the infringement the making 
available right, which means that it may be led to apply the laws of different Member States (the lex loci 
protectionis being the law of the countries for which damages are claimed).  The right holder can also act 
in other Member States where she has suffered prejudice, but the courts of those Member States will be 
competent only to rule on the damage occurring on the territory of their own Member States, in 
accordance with their own national law (the lex loci protectionis being the law of the Member State for 
which damages are claimed) or with the law of the country (the lex loci protectionis being the law of the 
Member State where the event giving rise to the harm occurred).   
Cessation measures on the merits can be claimed before the courts that have jurisdiction, i.e. where the 
defendant has her establishment, where the harmful event occurs or where the damage is felt.  Where an 
action is initiated against the infringer (rather than an intermediary), competent courts are found in the 
Member State where the defendant has her domicile or where the harmful event (act of upload) has taken 
place.  Where an intermediary is asked to put an end to the infringement, the case can be brought before 
the courts of the Member State where it has its establishment or where the measure is meant to have 
effect. In case of the Pirate Bay, the operators of The Pirate Bay in Sweden have been criminally 
convicted; rarely have the users of the platform been addressed (inefficient);  instead, the internet access 
providers have been addressed to block access to the Pirate Bay
328
.  It seems that this circumstance is 
not so much related to the territoriality of copyright and the national character of the making available right 
but rather the nature of the infringement; where the decision against the service operator cannot be 
enforced and the individual users cannot be pursued for efficiency reasons or for the public image of the 
right holders, then the right holder turn to the ISPs, which are organised at the national level. 
The applicable law is the lex loci protectionis.  Except in the Google cases (where fair use is at stake), the 
applicable law between European countries does not seem to have been a discussion. In the Google 
cases, the judges determined the law applicable in function of the connecting factors between the dispute 
and the legislation they decided to apply. A clarification about the definition and localisation of the making 
available right might nevertheless facilitate the identification of the connecting factors.  Although the 
enforcement of intellectual right has been harmonised, it cannot be excluded that differences remain (e.g. 
level of damages). 
Authorship/ownership.  As the rules on authorship differ at the European level from one Member State 
to the other, one material act of making available may infringe the rights of different parties, depending on 
the territory for which the protection is claimed. Consequently, the claimants might differ from one 
Member State to the other.       
Reproduction right.  An infringement of the making available right often goes together with an 
infringement of the reproduction right.  Given the autonomy of both rights, it should however be verified 
for each case whether an act of reproduction is performed, whether this act required the right holder’s 
consent or if an exception applies to the act of reproduction.  Furthermore it should be verified where the 
act of reproduction takes place and who can be held responsible for the infringement under national law.  
Depending on the (territorial and material) fragmentation of rights, the persons who can claim 
infringement of the making available right and the reproduction right may not be the same.  An 
                                                     
 
328 Belgium :  Antwerpen 26 september 2011 AM 2012, afl. 2-3, 216; ICIP 2011, afl. 5-6, 731; RABG 2011, afl. 18, 1269, note P. 
VAN EECKE, A. FIERENS. 
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infringement of each right must be established (in accordance with national law), damages may be 
awarded or other enforcement may be taken. 
For the right holders, the independence of the making available and the reproduction rights means that 
they have an additional legal ground to demonstrate an infringement in case of unauthorised use.  Where 
the rights are held by different persons, it should be verified whether the unauthorised use under 
consideration entails both acts of making available and reproduction and if the right claimant is involved in 
the litigation.  The (alleged) infringer may thus have to face several right holders, claiming infringements 
and demanding measures (including cessation and cumulative damages).   
II. Localisation of the act of making available to the public: alternatives 
In the first part we have examined the current notion (“status quo”) of the making available right, as a part 
of the right of communication to the public, as harmonised in the Information Society Directive of 2001.  
We have found that the making available right is not clearly defined and that the criteria to localise the 
protected acts have not been explicitly stated.  The online exploitation of a work could be qualified as a 
multitude of restricted acts in a multitude of Member States.  We have concluded that these uncertainties 
could affect the licensing process and the enforcement of the making available right.   
In the second part of the Study, we will examine whether acts of making available can be localised within 
the European Union according to alternative criteria.  This examination starts by a reflection on the notion 
of the making available right (sub A).  Then, the alternative criteria for localisation will be developed and 
their consequences will be examined (sub B and C).  Two possible approaches to the making available 
right are suggested.  Under the first approach, the making available to the public is defined in such a way 
that it can be localised in one Member State (even though its effects are felt in other Member States).  
This comes down to what could be called a “country of origin” approach, comparable to the system in the 
SatCab Directive.  Under the second approach, the making available right will be defined as an act of 
exploitation under a certain form and it will be localised in the Member States where the exploitation of 
the work is taking place. 
On a preliminary note, two observations should be made in relation to any legal initiative on the definition 
of the exclusive right and its localisation within the European Union.  
Firstly the objectives of any legislative intervention should be clearly stated.  Failing a detailed 
description of the expectations of such intervention it is impossible to assess whether it is desirable to 
adopt either proposed definition and its localisation criterion.  Furthermore, this is necessary to achieve a 
balance between the interests at stake (authors, right holders, commercial users, end-users, the general 
public).  Since no policy objectives nor a statement of practical problems were communicated to the 
authors of this Study, we have not formulated any recommendations nor expressed a preference for any 
hypothesis (including keeping the status quo). 
Secondly, any legal initiative should take into account that the making available right is considered a 
species of the right of communication to the public.  It should be avoided that the making available 
right is given features that are in contradiction with the characteristics of the right of communication to the 
public.  Furthermore, the making available right should be compatible with the reproduction right, as it is 
now known.  
Our reflection on alternative interpretations of the making available right will start with the definition of the 
making available right.  We have found four definitions, two of which will be examined in depth and tied to 
a localisation criterion that allows an integrated approach.   
A. Reflection on the notion of “making available to the public” per se 
The making available right protects a complex act, consisting of different constitutive acts.  Since such 
acts are not bound by any territorial restrictions, the act of making available could be localised in several 
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Member States, which leads to complications in the licensing process and the enforcement of this 
exclusive right.  If clarity on the territorial scope of the restricted act is the objective, then the first step 
should be to delineate the restricted act itself:  determine which constitutive acts are or are not part of the 
act of making available to the public.  
We will start with some preliminary observations before listing the potential approaches to the making 
available right. 
1. Preliminary observations 
In order to focus the reflection on the definition of the making available right, we will start from two 
observations.  Firstly, the making available right is supposed to cover the use of a copyright work (or 
other protected subject matter) based on a certain technical scheme.  We will draw this technical scheme 
sub a).  Secondly, the making available right supposes a “public”.  We have described this notion in part I 
and this description is sufficient for the purposes of this Study. 
 
a) Technical scheme 
The technical scheme can be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
In this general scheme, a user uploads a work to a server. This could be a professional, commercial user 
(e.g. the owner of an online music store) or a private user (e.g. a hobby blogger or the user of a peer-to-
peer file sharing service).  The work is then stored on a “server”.  The work is accessible “on demand”, 
User 
Server Client 
Client 
Client 
Client 
Upload 
Reception 
Request/ 
transmission 
Accessibility 
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through the (technical) requests of the “client” which are responded by the transmission of the work by the 
“server” to the “client”.  The definitions we will discuss in this Study will refer to the material acts of 
“upload”, “accessibility” and “reception”. 
This technical scheme will serve as the factual basis for the further reflection on the definition of the 
making available right and its localisation.  It could however be applied to different technical and 
commercial environments:  protected works can be made available “on demand” e.g. via the Web or via 
digital television networks.  The business models may be different but the technical scheme remains the 
same.  
b) Presence of a “public” 
Only if a “public” has access to the work, the act of making it available is protected under copyright.  We 
have examined this notion in part I of this Study. 
With the increased use of “cloud” services, this condition should be emphasised:  these services can 
indeed be used by individuals for their personal use, to share a work with some people or with a large (or 
even unlimited) group of people.  The user can adjust the technical parameters to her purposes, so the 
technology by itself should not be decisive to assess whether the making available right has been 
infringed. 
Where the work is accessible only to the user who has uploaded the work to the server, no act of making 
available to the public is performed, since the work is not available to a “public” (such service enables the 
user e.g. to continue working on one document, accessible from home, the office or any other location 
without locally stored copies of the document)
329
.  Similarly, a work that will only be transmitted to the 
members of a group of people who cannot be qualified as a “public”, no restricted act of making the work 
available to a public is performed.  The person or group of people authorised to access (i.e. request 
access and transmission of the work upon request) the works stored “in the cloud” determines whether 
the work is available to the “public”.  As long as the group of people having access is not qualified as a 
“public”, no restricted act of making the work available to the public has taken place.  It depends therefore 
on the concrete use of “cloud” services whether or not any protected works are made available to the 
“public”.   
Although the notion of “public” justifies an in-depth analysis, such research goes beyond the scope of this 
Study.  Suffice to emphasise, for the further reflection on the making available right, that a “public” should 
be present, interpreted in conformity with the decisions of the CJEU so far.  
2. Alternative definitions 
It has been found that this making available right has not been defined and that its scope is not entirely 
clear.  Making a work available on demand is a complex act, consisting of distinct constitutive material 
acts but at the same time forming a whole (due to the logic of the technical architecture they are part of).  
More practically:  it is uncertain which material acts are restricted under the making available right and 
how the legal act of making a work available relates to the exploitation of the work.  Here we will examine 
the relation between the legal notion of making available to the public, the material acts covered, the 
technology and the exploitation of the work. 
                                                     
 
329 A. SCHNEIDER, “OLG Hamburg:  Die Rapidshare-Entscheidung, ein Meilenstein?”, Telemedicus, 29 March 2012, retrieved via 
http://tlmd.in/a/2229.  Press communication “Urheberrechtswidrige Downloads: Oberlandesgericht Hamburg entscheidet über Prüf- 
und Handlungspflichten des Online-Speicher-Dienstes „RapidShare“, 15 March 2012, 
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decision of 14 March 2012, Az. 5 U 87/09.  See on the online personal video recorders:  BGH 22 April 2009, I ZE 175/07, "Save.tv"; 
BGH, 22 April 2009, I ZR 216/06, “Shift.tv”, via www.juris.bundesgerichtshof.de. See also S. VON LEWINSKI, “Recent 
developments of German Authors’ Rights Law”, 164-165.  
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In this section we will try to come to a better understanding of the making available right by considering 
different descriptions, each emphasising different elements of the act.  A legal definition of the making 
available right could be formulated along the lines of 4 scenarios.  In these four scenarios, three material 
acts related to the on demand use of works are presented in different combinations (cf. also the technical 
scheme): 
- Upload:  the material act of storing a work on a server to which a “public” has access. 
- Accessibility:  the fact that a member of the public has the possibility to request transmission, 
upon which the work is transmitted to the client computer of this person.   
- Transmission:  after the member of the public has requested access to a work, it is transmitted to 
her device. 
- Reception:  the material act of receiving a work on the client computer (e.g. in the RAM of the 
computer).  After the reception of a work, other restricted acts may be performed, which may be 
qualified as a reproduction or a communication to the public. 
A definition will clarify which material acts require a (distinct) authorisation of the right holder.  The 
material scope of protection depends on whether the constitutive elements are cumulative or alternative.  
For each of the four scenarios identified, we will discuss how the making available right (legal notion) 
relates to the material/technical acts, the accessibility and the exploitation of the work.  We will also 
discuss the consequences for licensing practices and infringements. Where helpful we will illustrate the 
different scenarios with examples and where useful we will describe situations involving different 
countries. 
a) Scenario 1:  material act of upload 
In the first scenario the legal notion of making a work available corresponds to the straightforward act of 
uploading a work to a server that is accessible to a “public”.  The material acts of upload and accessibility 
are cumulatively (not alternatively) required in order to find an act of making the work available to the 
public.  It is not required that the work be actually accessed or transmitted to a user’s device. 
This interpretation responds to the understanding that whenever a work is distributed via the Internet, it 
will – by default – be accessible wherever in the world.  Unless the uploader implements geographical 
restrictions, the work can be requested and transmitted to any user (downloader) with an internet 
connection.  In this respect this interpretation corresponds to the technical reality, since one act of 
making available will cover all the technical acts that are connected through one technical logic or 
architecture, regardless of all geographical borders.  This uploader could be a blogger, a user of peer-to-
peer file sharing software, a member of a social networking site or a commercial provider of an online 
music store:  the works are made available through one material act of upload.   
This definition does not necessarily correspond to the exploitation of the work:  the uploader (whether a 
commercial entity or not) may perform one act of exploitation – or more.  For example, the user of a peer-
to-peer platform makes the works available via the same platform (same language, same terms of use), 
regardless of where the downloaders are located.   
The act of making a work available focuses on the material act of upload (assuming that a “public” has 
access to the work), rather than the public.  It does not suffice that a work is accessible to find a separate 
infringement:  the work may be accessed from anywhere in the world, an act of making available is found 
only if a distinct act of upload is established.  It is not self-evident in which country the upload would take 
place:  it could be located in the country where the uploader is established, where the server to which the 
works are uploaded is situated (if this is known at all) or even another country.  How to determine the 
country where the work is made available to the public could however be clarified in an explicit rule. 
Consequences.  A material act of upload that makes the work accessible to a public leads to one act of 
making available to the public.  It matters not how this “public” is constituted, how it is composed (general 
public, one target group or several target groups).  By default, the work is thus available to an EU-wide 
public. 
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Authorisation.  The act of upload with resulting public accessibility corresponds to one act of making 
available to the public.  The uploader should then acquire the consent of the author for this one act of 
making available to the public.  By default the “public” is an EU-wide one, regardless of where it is located 
or how it is targeted.  If the right holder or the uploader intends to restrict the public, this should be 
specified by contract.   
This does not mean that the author cannot negotiate a remuneration taking into account the entire public, 
wherever it is located
330
.  A remuneration can indeed be calculated in function of the value and therefore 
the public targeted or reached.    
Infringement.  When the work is uploaded without the author’s consent, the infringement of the making 
available right is established (leaving aside other defences).  No additional infringements are found in the 
Member States where the work is merely accessible, nor where the public is targeted.  Such 
determination has consequences in terms of private international law, i.e. to establish international 
jurisdiction and the applicable law.  This in turn will have consequences in terms of damages and 
available injunctive measures.    
Under this interpretation one complex technical act, is protected as one restricted act of making available, 
with extra-territorial effects.   
b) Scenario 2:  accessibility 
In this scenario the making available right protects each of the technical facts related to online availability 
as distinct acts of making available to the public.  The upload and the fact that the work is accessible are 
constitutive elements of the making available right, each one sufficing to find an infringement.   
The mere accessibility of a work is sufficient to find an act of making available, even considered in 
isolation from the material act of rendering the work accessible or the exploitation of the work.  This 
means that the author’s consent is required wherever the work is accessible, even if the public was not 
targeted. 
From a legal point of view the technical process of making the work on demand available is no longer 
considered as a complex whole, but it is severed according to its technical phases of upload (to a public) 
and accessibility – each of which can be considered distinct acts of making available to the public.  It 
matters not whether a public is targeted or if the accessibility is “spillover”.  The reception of the work, by 
contrast, is left out of the scope of the restricted act.  In other words, one technically complex act results 
in several legal acts of making available to the public, since each of constitutive parts of the complex 
technical acts can be qualified as distinct acts of making available to the public
331
.  Similarly, one act of 
exploitation can result in several distinct acts of making available to the public.  
Consequences.  A material act of upload that makes the work accessible to a public may result in 
several acts of making available to the public.  The upload of the work (to the extent a “public” indeed has 
access to it) is a restricted act.  The fact of the accessibility is sufficient to find an infringement, regardless 
of the upload or the targeted public. 
Authorisation.  The uploader needs to clear the rights for the act of uploading the work so the public can 
access it.  She will however also need to define the targeted public and take into consideration the public 
that is not targeted but nevertheless has access to the work.  Even so-called “spill-over” access could 
lead to an infringement if it is not covered by the author’s consent.  Consequently, a fee may be due for 
                                                     
 
330 See by analogy SatCab Directive, rec. 17; Premier League, par. 112. 
331 The Advocate-general in Sportradar seems to interpret the reutilization of online databases in this sense. 
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the mere accessibility of the work – although the remuneration will arguably be lower if there is little 
interest of an actual or potential public reached
332
.   
The uploader should make sure that the boundaries of the licence are reflected in the technical 
accessibility.  Especially where a certain public is targeted, the uploader should technically restrict access 
to the work to exclude all risk of liability for infringement for the spill over.   
Infringement.  In case one of the constitutive elements is not covered by a licence of the right holder, an 
infringement of the making available right can be found.    The single material act of uploading may then 
result in a wide range of acts of making available.  The constitutive elements also determine the territorial 
scope of the making available right, so separate infringements can be found in different Member States if 
these elements take place in different Member States. 
This has consequences in terms of enforcement of the making available right in different Member States, 
but also in terms of conflicts of laws.  In a transnational situation, infringements may be found in several 
Member States, each of which will have to apply its conflict of law rules to determine its competence and 
the law applicable to the establish the existence of the infringement, to award damages or other 
measures.  
This scenario was assumed to be the status quo of the making available right in the terms of reference of 
this Study.   
c) Scenario 3:  exploitation 
A third way of understanding the making available right is by focusing on the exploitation of the work.  
Under this interpretation, the uploader’s efforts to bring the work to the attention of the public will be 
decisive.  This act is a complex act, in the sense that the act of making available starts at the upload of 
the work and ends with the defining of the public to whom the work is available.  The fact that a work is 
accessible is by itself not sufficient for finding an act of making available to the public (spill-over):  a more 
far-reaching intervention is required, in particular the presentation of the works in order to reach a certain 
public. This definition is centred on the public:  the exploitation is realised by addressing a public.  The 
material act of upload is per se not relevant for the making available right:  it is a technical prerequisite but 
has no legal significance as such. 
This understanding of the making available right is close to some notions of recent decisions of the CJEU, 
in which it has discarded the mere accessibility of a work or a service and focused on the “targeted 
public” instead (cf. supra in Donner, Sportradar).  It takes into account that the uploader can develop and 
design her service to reach a certain public and derive an income from this public, e.g. by advertisement 
or by imposing a fee for access.   
Support for this interpretation can also be found in the CJEU rulings in Rafael Hoteles and in Airfield.  In 
these cases, the Court found an act of communication to the public when a “new public” was addressed 
in comparison to a preceding communication, i.e. if it expands the circle of persons having access to that 
communication
333
.  In Airfield, the Court found that an operator performs a distinct act of satellite 
broadcasting when it encodes the signals, provides its subscribers with the means to decode the signals 
and provides an autonomous service addressed to its own subscribers, offering programmes of several 
broadcasting organisations in bundles as to constitute a new audiovisual product (the provider deciding 
upon the package)
334
.  These criteria, taken together, suggest that the restricted act should be delineated 
per exploitation of the work.  In TVCatchup, the provider of an internet streaming site targeted a public 
that was composed identically to the public of the initially broadcast that was streamed.  The Court found 
                                                     
 
332 See by analogy Lagardère, par 54. 
333 Airfield, par. 77. 
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that the right holders had authorised the transmission via broadcasting, i.e. a specific technology that is 
distinct from streaming technology.  In this case it was no longer necessary to find a “new” public, it 
sufficed to find specific means of transmission each addressing a public (TVCatchup, par. 39). The 
finding of a new act of communication to the public was supported by the profit-making nature of the 
streaming service.  
The Court also repeatedly mentioned that the profit-making nature of the communication is not an 
essential condition but it is “not irrelevant” (Rafael Hoteles, 44; FAPL, par. 204; TVCatchup, par. 42).   
It could be summarised that a work is made available to the public if it is uploaded and presented to a 
public in a way that makes it possible for the uploader to derive an economic benefit from the public 
accessing it.  This does not mean that the uploader should actually pursue such benefit:  it suffices that 
this form of communication makes it possible to “monetise” the public.  Essentially this capacity is found in 
the targeting of a defined public.  The uploader could target a specific public (in geographic terms or by 
other criteria) or address a general, unspecified public.  In case a public is targeted, the fact that the work 
is accessible to other people than the targeted public will not result in a distinct act of making available to 
the public.  Either way, the “public” addressed is a central element of the making available right.  The act 
of exploitation and the act or acts of making available will be delineated in concreto, depending on the 
circumstances of the case (e.g. type of content, graphic interfaces, presentation of the content, payment 
systems, targeted publicity,...). 
For example, a publisher of a newspaper makes the news available online as well.  The publisher 
has two websites.  One website presents the news that would be interesting to the public of one 
Member State (news content such as politics or events of national importance), in a language that 
is spoken by this public.  One other website addresses a wider public and contains a selection of 
the articles that could be of interest to an “international” public and that are translated in a more 
generally understood language (i.e. English).  Two acts of making available could be found (e.g. 
of illustrating photos or the (translated) articles):  the publication on the “national” website and the 
publication on the “international” website.  It matters not that the technical infrastructure is the 
same or that only one material act of upload has taken place, e.g. the photos are hosted on only 
one server.  Inversely, it matters not that the “national” website can be accessed by “nationals” 
residing abroad:  this accessibility alone will not result in a distinct act of making available to the 
public. 
Consequences.  An act of making available exists when an act of exploitation can be found.  The 
technical reality does not matter (e.g. several uploads to multiple servers).  The efforts in concreto of the 
uploader to address the public are relevant to delineate an act of exploitation.  Accessibility or “spill over” 
is not taken into account.    
Authorisation.  The author’s authorisation is required whenever the uploader takes initiatives to target a 
public and makes the works available to this public.  The authorisation should cover the acts from the 
upload (availability) to the public to which access is granted.   The uploader’s intention and efforts to 
address a general public or a specific public are taken into account to describe the exploitation of the 
work and to determine whether one or several acts of making available are performed.  Whenever an 
uploader willingly addresses a public, she should acquire the author’s consent.  When she distinguishes 
several publics, e.g. by addressing visitors with a certain profile, she must acquire the consent for each 
form of exploitation.  Logically these circumstances will also have an influence on the modalities of the 
licence, in particular the licence fee. A more specific audience could lead to a lower fee (if a smaller public 
generates a smaller revenue) or a higher fee (e.g. for scarce niche content). 
Infringement.  An infringement can be found when the right holders have not authorised the making 
available of the work (and this use is not exempted by an exception) or if the consent does not cover all 
aspects of the making available, including the whole of the targeted public.  By contrast if the uploader 
has cleared the making available rights for the intended public but the work is accessible to individuals, 
who are not part of the targeted public, then no distinct infringement can be found (spill-over).  A work 
distributed via a peer-to-peer platform will find a general public, without any restrictions and without 
distinction in the presentation or selection of the offered works.  It can be assumed that the uploader 
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willingly addresses the largest possible public.  The material availability on a server and the accessibility 
to a general public are considered infringements.  This delineation of the infringement and the absence of 
a specific public will affect the determination of the competent courts and the applicable law.   These rules 
will determine which court can impose which measures. 
By contrast, another outcome will appear if the uploader offers works on demand via more streamlined 
channels, reaching a selected public or a number of selected publics.  The fact of targeting a public 
entails that the other people who may have access are not part of the intended public.  If a distinction is 
made between different publics and the presentation of the works is adapted to reach a certain public 
(e.g. front-end in different languages, local advertisement, selection of the catalogue or the content and 
presentation in function of popularity or recent events), the right holder will be able to demonstrate distinct 
acts of making available to the public.  This will affect the right holders’ possibilities of acting before the 
national courts (competence) and applying national copyright laws.  It will also affect the available 
measures, in particular the calculation of damages.  
d) Scenario 4:  upload or accessibility or reception 
In the third scenario the right of making available to the public covers the upload to a server, the 
accessibility of the work by a public and the reception of the work after transmission
335
.  It suffices to find 
one of the three constitutive acts of the process to find an act of making the work available to the public:  
the constitutive acts are not cumulative but alternative conditions of the making available right.  In this 
hypothesis, it suffices to find that the work is accessible to find an infringement. Moreover, the mere fact 
of the reception suffices to conclude that the making available right is infringed.   
Traditionally the reception – in private circles – is however not protected under the right of communication 
to the public.  This view is confirmed in the CJEU’s ruling in the “Premier League” case
336
.  By contrast, 
the reception (even in private circles) could entail (temporary) reproductions, which should be assessed 
by the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  
After discussion with the Commission, this scenario will not be examined further. 
e) Conclusion on the alternative definitions 
Before examining criteria to localise acts of making available within the European Union, it was found 
necessary to consider a definition of the exclusive right.  The definition of the restricted act determines the 
material reach of the right, which material acts are protected and which are not.  The definition of the 
making available to the public has consequences for its territorial reach.  In practice a work made 
available on a global network will cover several, if not all, countries.  In order to come to more precise 
localisation of the restricted act, it needs to be ascertained which material acts are protected and which 
are not.  Once the protected acts are identified, they can be tied to a particular territory. 
Four definitions of the making available right have been proposed.   
The first definition emphasises the material act of uploading a work, which will then be accessible to a 
public.  How the public is composed has little importance, the exploitation or the accessibility of the work 
play no role in this interpretation.  One unique act of making available is found in the material upload of a 
work that is then accessible to a public.  This scenario will be examined in further detail in section B.   
Under the second scenario, the right of making available covers all stages of the process of on demand 
availability, from the material act of upload to the accessibility of a work.  Only the reception (in private 
                                                     
 
335 A. PEUKERT, “Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law”. p. 17.  In this sense also J. REINBOTHE & S. 
VON LEWINSKI, The WIPO Treaties 1996, 108. 
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circles) of the work is not protected under this right.  This scenario was taken as the status quo of the 
making available right and will not be examined further in this Study. 
The third scenario understands the making available right as covering the exploitation of works in the 
form of on demand availability of the works.  This scenario emphasises the concrete efforts of the 
uploader to present a work to certain public, a general, undefined public or a specific, delineated public.  It 
is understood that by “targeting” a certain public, the uploader has the possibility to generate a 
commercial benefit of the on demand availability of the work, even if she has no commercial intent.  The 
material act of upload is a necessary precondition of this exploitation, but it is the fact of reaching a public 
makes it possible to realise a commercial benefit.  By contrast the mere accessibility by individuals 
outside the targeted public will not be considered a constitutive element of the making available right.  . 
A fourth scenario extends the making available right from the upload to the reception of the work.  The 
mere reception (in private circle) is then considered a constitutive part of the making available of the work, 
which requires the author’s consent.  This scenario will not be examined further in this Study. 
In the next part of the Study we will examine which criteria can be applied to localise the act of making 
available within the European Union.   
Firstly, a localisation criterion will be examined that will place the restricted act in one unique Member 
State.  This will be referred to as a “country of origin” criterion, similar to the localisation criterion in the 
Satellite and Cable Directive.  In order to achieve this purpose, ideally the making available right should 
be defined as a unique act that can be localised in one Member State (as has been done in the SatCab 
Directive).  In order to situate the act of making available in one Member State, it will be understood as a 
material act of upload, leading to the work being available to the public at the demand of individual 
member of the public (supra sub scenario 1). 
Secondly, a localisation criterion based on the exploitation of the work will be examined.  This criterion 
may place the act of making available in one Member State (if the exploitation takes place in one Member 
State only) or in several – or even all – Member States.  The making available right then protects the 
exploitation of the work in a certain form (i.e. on demand availability) as described under scenario 3. 
After having described the localisation criterion and tied it to a certain definition of the making available 
right, the legal consequences will be considered in terms of conflict of laws, authorship and ownership 
and accumulation with the reproduction right. 
A.  “Country of origin” 
In this section, we will analyse how the making available right would be applied in combination with a 
“country of origin” principle.  The starting point is to match a definition of the making available right to a 
criterion that localises the restricted act in one single Member State (sub 1).  Several practical criteria 
could be considered to localise an act of making available in one single Member State:  where the servers 
are located, where the uploader has her centre of interests or where the material act of upload was 
performed.  Then the effects of such country of origin principle will be considered in terms of authorship 
and ownership of a work, the cumulative application with the reproduction right and enforcement (sub 2-
4).  A summary of the findings will be described in the intermediate conclusion (sub 5). 
1. Principle 
One of the central questions in this Study was to examine the implications of a “country of origin” 
principle
337
.  The objective of implementing such principle is to localise the act of making available in one 
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single Member State.  This objective can be achieved by defining the act of making available to the public 
unambiguously as a simple material act that can be localised in one Member State and by selecting a 
localisation criterion that situates this act in one Member State.   
The material act of upload (provided that it results in the work being available to a public on its demand) 
can be seen as the starting point of making a work available on demand.  Such act can be situated in one 
Member State, even if it may have ramifications in other Member States.  The upload of a work to a 
server is a simple act, which is confined in time and place.  Its effects, by contrast, may spread out in time 
and space:  the work may be accessible in several countries and for a longer period.  This extended 
availability would then be considered a corollary of the act of upload, which would be the only relevant 
act. 
A similar construction has been set up in the SatCab Directive.  This Directive contains a “country of 
origin” principle (cf. cons. 18 SatCab Dir) by which satellite broadcasts are located in one single Member 
State, i.e. the country of “origin”.  In order to achieve this localisation in one Member State, the Directive 
contains a definition of the right of communication to the public by satellite and a localisation criterion.  
The “communication to the public by satellite” is defined as “the act of introducing, under the control and 
responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals intended for reception by 
the public into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards the 
earth” (art. 1(2)(a) SatCab Dir).  This restricted act is then localised on the territory of a Member State by 
the criterion in art. 1(2)(b) SatCab Dir, which states that “[the] act of communication to the public by 
satellite occurs solely in the Member State where, under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting 
organization, the programme-carrying signals are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of 
communication leading to the satellite and down towards the earth”. 
The European Commission has observed that this rule designates the application of the law of one 
Member State instead of several legislations
338
: 
Several observations may be made with respect to this construction.  Firstly, it was deemed necessary to 
provide a definition of the restricted act.  Such definition allows delineating a process and considering it 
as one protected act, which is then localised in one Member State.  Inversely, it reduces the risk that 
interested parties put forward one material element to claim a distinct infringement and localise it in 
another Member State, more convenient to their purpose.  Secondly, the definition in the SatCab 
Directive refers to a material act (“the act of introducing the signals into an uninterrupted chain of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Output 2: Examine the implications of the application of the "country of origin" principle (applicable/substantive law) to: 
(a) Enforcement measures: identification of specific issues relating to the enforcement of copyright and related rights in the country 
of destination (damages and injunctive relief; examination of relationship with Regulation 44/2001). 
(b) Determinations of authorship: what would be the (legal and economic) consequences of maintaining the status quo (limited 
harmonisation of this matter, i.e. harmonisation of authorship limited to Article 2(2) of the rental directive) while implementing this 
principle? Is the harmonisation of authorship necessary or desirable in order to give effect to the country of origin principle? Are 
there other issues of substantive law that would need to be harmonised (or further harmonised) e.g. exceptions. 
(c) Transfer of rights/ownership:  what would be the effect of maintaining the status quo (transfer of rights are not harmonised in the 
Community acquis) while implementing the country of origin principle? (Relationship with Regulation 593/2008)  
(d) The reproduction right:  there will be a need also to examine the link between the application of the "country of origin" and the 
reproduction right associated with certain acts of making available e.g. downloads. 
338 Report from the European Commission on the application of the Council Directive 93/83 EEC on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, COM(2002) 
430 final, 3.1.1:  “The object of the Directive, with the definition of the notion of communication to the public by satellite at 
Community level, was to put an end to the legal uncertainty regarding the rights to be acquired, by specifying the place where the 
act of communication occurs and the copyright legislation applicable to contractual relations regarding the transfer of rights. The 
applicable law is that of the Member State in which the programme-carrying signals are transmitted; its application extends beyond 
national borders into the Member States in which the signals are received (although, in technological terms, the footprint covers 
many areas other than those of the Member States, the term "footprint" in this Report refers only to the territory of the Member 
States). This principle avoids the cumulative application of several national legislations of the various Member States covered by the 
footprint (recitals 14 and 15)”. 
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communication”), which marks the starting point of a complex process that may cover several technical 
acts and therefore take place in different Member States.   
It seems that a “country of origin” criterion may well be applied with the right of making available 
understood as a material act of upload.  It is less straightforward to combine a localisation criterion 
leading to one single Member State with other definitions, especially those emphasising the exploitation 
or the accessibility of the work.   
The act of making available to the public could be understood for example as protecting the 
corresponding form of exploitation of the work.  Such restricted act would be established inter alia by 
proving efforts to target a specific public (by adapting its interface, language, content, events, ads,...).  
One service could target several (national) publics separately per country, or collectively, for example 
neighbouring countries that share a language or interest in certain events (such as festivals).  In those 
cases, several acts of exploitation would be established in different Member States, hence as many acts 
of making available could be established.  These distinct acts would however be localised in one Member 
State (e.g. establishment of the service provider).   
Such definition is not completely irreconcilable with a unique localisation criterion but it is not the most 
intuitive or coherent combination to apply the exploitation definition with a “country of origin” criterion.  It is 
overly complex to establish an act of making available via the exploitation of a work in possibly several 
Member States, only to localise the restricted act in another Member State.  Moreover, in some cases, 
restricted acts may be found in several Member States – despite the application of “country of origin” 
principle.  It could be imagined that several partners contribute by various means to the exploitation of a 
work and thus share the responsibility for the exploitation.  If the localisation criterion refers for example to 
the Member State where the person responsible for the making available has its establishment and the 
partners have their establishments in different Member States, then it restricted acts take place in several 
Member States and the objective of the “country of origin” criterion would not be met. 
For this part of the reflection the making available right will be understood as a simple material act, the act 
of upload that results in the work being available for a certain period of time, on demand for members of 
the public who may reside in various Member States.  Using this definition, the making available of a work 
may be localised in one single Member State according to criteria that will be examined in the next 
section. 
a) Possible localisation criteria 
Various criteria could be applied to localise this act of making available in one single Member State.  It 
must be borne in mind that only the localisation within the European Union will be examined here, without 
considering the localisation of acts in an international situation where certain acts take place in third 
countries.  
The act of making a work available to the public could be situated in the Member State (i) where the 
servers are located on which the works are hosted;(ii) where the uploader has her centre of interests or 
(iii) where the material act of upload has taken place.  These criteria will be developed here.  It should be 
noted that all these criteria are considered indicating a “country of origin” of the making available, in the 
sense that they localise the restricted act in one Member State, even if this restricted act has effects 
beyond this Member State (access to and exploitation of the work in other Member States). 
(i) Location of the servers on which the works are hosted 
One possible localisation criterion is the location of the server on which the work is hosted.  The act of 
making available takes place in the Member State where the servers are situated.   
There are few reasons to choose this criterion and many reasons not to.  In simple cases, it will be clear 
where the works are hosted and where the servers can be found, hence in which Member State the act of 
making available takes place.  However, the location of the hosting servers may not be particularly 
The territoriality of the making available right  135 
 
significant for the use of the work (cf. “cloud computing” services).  It may be difficult to determine in 
which country the servers are located on which a particular work is hosted
339
.  Also the works may be 
spread over different servers in different countries, meaning that one act of making available would be 
situated in several countries (no single location).  Practically, the uploader may not be aware in which 
country the works are hosted and by which laws she should abide.  Inversely, the uploader may choose 
the location of the hosting servers exactly in a Member State with relatively weak protection in terms of 
e.g. tariffs or judicial remedies.  This criterion may lead to location-shopping to the detriment of the author 
and the right holders.  Moreover, it is common to use servers located outside the EU:  in this case this 
criterion may have an impact on the effectiveness of the harmonised protection
340
.   
As agreed with the Commission, the localisation criterion according to the location of the hosting servers 
will not be further examined. 
(ii) Centre of activities of the uploader:  establishment, domicile or habitual residence 
In this scenario, the act of making available is localised at the uploader’s centre of activities.  A legal 
entity has its centre of activities at its establishment; a natural person has hers at her domicile or habitual 
residence.  All acts of making available performed by either a natural person or a legal entity are 
connected to the place where this person has her/its centre of activities and take place in that Member 
State.  A blogger who posts a picture to her blog invariably performs an act of making available in the 
Member State where she has her habitual residence.  The provider of a pan-European online music 
service makes the work available to the public only in the Member State where it has its establishment. 
It matters not, under this approach, where the uploader actually was situated when the material act of 
making available was initiated: the legal act of making available will be situated in the Member State 
where it/she has its/her establishment or domicile/habitual residence.  The blogger makes her photos 
available in her Member State of domicile, even if she posts them while travelling abroad.  The music 
service provider makes all works available in the Member State of establishment, regardless of the fact 
that the service is offered throughout Europe and regardless of where the technical operations of upload 
are performed.  The act of making available may thus take place in one Member State, while it may have 
effect in other Member States in the sense that the works may be accessible or commercialised in other 
Member States. 
The localisation of the restricted act in the Member State where the uploader has her centre of activities 
has the advantage that this location is relatively easy to determine.  Also, it localises the restricted act in 
one single Member State (possibly after a “cascade” of localisation criteria).  This provides legal certainty, 
especially when the exploitation covers the territory of several Member States without targeting one 
national public in particular or when several national exploitations are set up of the same catalogue of 
works under the same (branded) service.  It can be expected that the parties will consider the total value 
of exploitation in their negotiations to determine the licence fee, taking into account the entire public in the 
Member States where the service gives access to the works.  Such parameter could be provided by law 
(cf. rec. 17 SatCab Directive). 
It is self-evident for the uploader to abide by the law of the country where she is established, especially 
for legal entities with complex (transnational) structures (legal certainty for the uploader and for rights 
holder).  The establishment criterion was also applied in the Satellite and Cable Directive, as an 
                                                     
 
339 Sportradar, par. 45. 
340 L’Oréal, par. 63.  The Court held that the effectiveness of (national and Community) trademark protection would be undermined 
if it did not apply to “the use, in an internet offer for sale  or advertisement targeted at consumers within the EU, of a sign identical 
with or similar to a trade mark registered in the EU merely because the third party behind that offer or advertisement is established 
in a third State, because the server of the internet site used by the third party is located in such a State or because the product that 
is the subject of the offer or the advertisement is located in a third State”.  See also Sportradar, par. 45. 
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alternative localisation criterion in case the act of communication by satellite does not occur within the 
territory of the EU (art. 1(2)(d)(ii) SatCab Dir
341
).   
Usually the economic activities of the service provider are located on a continuous basis in the Member 
State of establishment (cf. case law of the CJEU).  This means that the service provider will probably 
organise the exploitation of the work at its establishment and feel economic return of the service there 
(profits, benefits). 
The localisation of the act of making available in the Member State where the uploader has its/her centre 
of activities presents some disadvantages. 
In this section we examine the making available right, defined as the material act of upload.  In some 
cases, the localisation criterion of the centre of activities of the uploader goes well together with this 
definition, in particular when the material act of upload is performed at the centre of activities of the 
uploader, for example an individual who distributes a work via a peer-to-peer network from her home.   
Material act of upload v establishment.  In case the material act of upload takes place in a different 
Member State than where the uploader has its/her centre of activities, the material act is subject to the 
copyright law of another Member State.  A service provider may have a complex, international structure 
and have its establishment in one Member State (localisation criterion), while the acts of upload 
(definition) are technically performed in another Member State.  An individual may perform acts of upload 
(definition) while residing in another Member State than where she has her domicile (localisation 
criterion), e.g. for holidays or during a business trip.  The localisation criterion (centre of activities, i.e. 
establishment or domicile/habitual residence of the service provider/uploader) then has no link with the 
material acts that defined the act of making available.  
For example, an online music service provider has its establishment in country A but has its 
technical operations performed in country D.  The material acts performed in country D would 
then be subject to the copyright law of country A, thus depriving country D of its power to regulate 
material acts on its territory.  
This could lead to a different treatment to people performing the same act, with the same effect, in the 
Member State where they do have their centre of activities.  A music service offered to the same 
European public by a service provider established in Member State E would be subject to a different 
copyright regime than the music service provider established in Member State A, although the service 
could be virtually the same (catalogue, target audience, business model). 
Exploitation v establishment.  It may lead to a strange effect of localising the making available in a 
Member State where no effects of the making available are felt.  This is the case when a work is made 
accessible in one Member State only (a purely “national” exploitation), while the uploader has its centre of 
activities in another Member State. For example, a service provider established in one Member State 
could offer a service that is only accessible in another Member State and that is protected by geo-
blocking measures.  The making available of works would be regulated as an act taking place in the 
Member State where the service provider or uploader is established.  In that case, there are no significant 
links with between the Member State of establishment and the Member State where the work is 
                                                     
 
341 Art. 1(2)(d) “Where an act of communication to the public by satellite occurs in a non-Community State which does not provide 
the level of protection provided for under Chapter II,  
(i) if the programme-carrying signals are transmitted to the satellite from an uplink situation situated in a Member State, that act of 
communication to the public by satellite shall be deemed to have occurred in that Member State and the rights provided for under 
Chapter II shall be exercisable against the person operating the uplink station; or 
(ii) if there is no use of an uplink station situated in a Member State but a broadcasting organization established in a Member State 
has commissioned the act of communication to the public by satellite, that act shall be deemed to have occurred in the Member 
State in which the broadcasting organization has its principal establishment in the Community and the rights provided for under 
Chapter II shall be exercisable against the broadcasting organization”. 
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accessible (national exploitation)
342
.  Additional measures could mitigate these effects (furthering the 
redistribution of the revenue among the right holders in different Member States). 
For example, a provider of an online music service has its establishment in country A but offers services 
that are only accessible in countries B or C.  In order to offer a legitimate service, the service provider will 
acquire the consent in its Member State of establishment A, in order to make the music works available in 
countries B and C.  If different people hold exploitation rights in Member States A, B and C (territorial 
fragmentation), then the right holders in the country of exploitation (B and C) could see their economic 
rights hollowed out by a legitimate service, authorised by the right holder for the country of establishment 
(A).  
Consequently, if the exclusive rights to a work are territorially fragmented, the exploitation value of rights 
held by one right holder could be undermined by licences granted by another right holder.  A service 
provider should obtain a licence in the Member State where it has its establishment, even if it intends to 
offer a service in another Member State (national exploitation).  The right holder in the Member State of 
establishment can thus grant a licence with effect on the territory of other Member States, i.e. where the 
public will have access to the service.  The rights holders in the country of exploitation could see their 
economic rights hollowed out by a legitimate service located in the country of establishment of the service 
provider/uploader.   
Location shopping.  Moreover, the uploader could choose to establish its centre of activities in a 
Member State with relatively weak copyright protection in terms of tariffs or judicial remedies
343
 
(establishment-shopping)
344
.  This criterion would also confer extensive extra-territorial effects in terms of 
rights acquisition (e.g. extended licences) and limitations to the rights to the extent that authors were not 
able to determine the territorial scope of the authorisation.  Or the service provider may have chosen the 
country of establishment for reasons not related to copyright (e.g. tax purposes or liberal advertisement 
rules).   
(iii) Geographical location of the material act of upload 
According to this criterion, the act of making available takes place where the material act of upload of the 
works is initiated.  This is the place where the user/uploader is present when she operates the 
transmission of the protected works to a server, knowing that it will lead to the work being available to a 
public. A blogger performs an act of upload when she clicks “publish” to upload her latest post to her blog.  
The act of making available then takes place in the country (Member State) where she is at that time.   
The material act of upload is not necessarily performed at the location of residence or establishment of 
the uploader.  When a natural person uploads a work, while residing “abroad”, the restricted act takes 
place “abroad”, not in the country of domicile or habitual residence.  A legal entity with an establishment 
in one Member State and an operational branch in another Member State performs the acts of making 
available in the Member State where the actual act of upload is performed. The place of upload is not 
necessarily the same as the place where the servers are located: a work can be initially uploaded by a 
user situated in country A and then stored on servers located in country B. 
                                                     
 
342 Cf. CJEU 5 June 1997, Case C-56/96, VT4 Ltd v Vlaamse Gemeenschap. 
343 It has not been harmonised how damages should be awarded.  Some Member States may provide statutory damages (e.g. 
Bulgaria – see P. SAMUELSON, P. HILL, T. WHEATLAND “Statutory Damages:  A Rarity in Copyright Laws Internationally, But For 
How Long?”,  60 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. (forthcoming September 2013), already accessible via 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/IP/Samuelson_SDs_2013.pdf).  Other Member State take initiatives to restrict damages 
imposed upon individuals (see “First-time copyright offenders will get off with a $200 warning” The Hollywood Reporter, 1 July 2013, 
via http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/germany-caps-piracy-fines-577989 and via http://the1709blog.blogspot.be/2013/07/the-
copykat-tenenbaum-teutonic-trolls.html).  
344 An exhaustive comparison of overall levels of copyright protection (taking into account the definition of the protected subject 
matter, the harmonised exclusive rights, the moral rights, applicable exceptions and limitations, contractual protection and 
enforcement measures has not been performed, this was beyond the scope of this study. 
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According to this criterion, the act of making a work available to the public will take place in one Member 
State, even if the work is accessible in several Member States and even if the exploitation of the work is 
directed to several Member States.   
This criterion is consistent with the principle of territoriality, according to which a state can regulate the 
behaviour of people while they stay on its territory, even if they have their habitual residence or domicile 
in another Member State.   
It is consistent with the approach in the SatCab Directive (definition of the act of satellite broadcasting and 
localisation according to introduction of the signals in an uninterrupted chain of communication).   
This criterion approaches the making available right from the perspective of the uploader, who should 
abide only by the law of the country where she is present, both professional service providers and natural 
persons. 
This criterion also presents a number of drawbacks.   
Practical application.  The country where the act took place may be difficult to establish (supposing 
already that the upload takes place within the EU
345
).  This may cause an important (administrative) 
burden for a service provider that uses large volumes of works, e.g. trans-European music service 
providers or video online services.  Such service providers may perform acts of uploads at different 
locations in different Member States, depending on its organisation (e.g. by distinct operational or 
technical entities).  Its operations will then be governed by several laws, which the service provider should 
integrate in its organisation.  Such criterion would be complex to apply in case of “user platforms”:  the 
platform provider may have concluded an agreement with the right holders for content uploaded by its 
users – but the same content may be uploaded by users in different Member States so it would be difficult 
to indicate one location for the upload,  This criterion may confront the right holder to difficulties in case of 
infringement, where the place where the upload took place is not easily established.   
Significance.  The location of upload may not be particularly significant for the use of the work or even to 
the uploader.  Especially in the case of complex organisations, the place where the material act of upload 
is performed may be determined by technical, organisational or even random criteria.   
Exploitation v upload.  In case of territorial fragmentation of rights, the making available of a work in one 
Member State may undermine the exploitation of the work in another Member State.  If the act of making 
available is localised in the Member State of upload, then an exploitation licence should be acquired for 
that Member State.  This entails that a service provider should obtain permission to make the work 
available in the Member State where it performs the act of upload, even if it intends to offer a service to a 
public in another Member State (national exploitation).  If the rights of making available are territorially 
fragmented, the right holder for the Member State of upload can grant licences with effect in the Member 
State of exploitation, without any possibility for the right holder in this Member State of exploitation to 
oppose such licence or to obtain a compensation for such exploitation. 
For example, a provider of an online music service performs acts of upload in country A but offers 
services that are only accessible in countries B or C.  In order to offer a legitimate service, the 
service provider will acquire the consent in the Member State of upload A, in order to make the 
music works available in countries B and C.  If different people hold exploitation rights in Member 
States A, B and C (territorial fragmentation), then the right holders in the country of exploitation (B 
and C) could see their economic rights hollowed out by a legitimate service, authorised by the 
right holder for the country of establishment (A).  
                                                     
 
345 A proper construction should be found for uploads taking place outside the EU.  Without such solution, it is likely that many 
content providers would perform acts of making available outside the EU (in particular the US). However, in this study, only the 
localisation within the EU is examined. 
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Location shopping.  Worse, this criterion entails a vulnerability to location-shopping:  the uploaders 
(especially commercial service providers) may structure their organisation in function of the weakest 
copyright protection
346
. 
Legal fiction for practical applicability.  Some of these disadvantages may be solved, in particular the 
practical difficulty of applying the criterion of Member State of upload.  The localisation of the act of 
making available to the public in the Member State where the material act of upload takes place may 
indeed prove cumbersome to legal entities, with an organisation covering several Member States.   
The inconveniences of this criterion may be mitigated by combining it with a legal presumption or a legal 
fiction.  It could be provided that the making available to the public takes place at the location where the 
material act of upload takes place (i.e. where the person is located when she executes the material act of 
making available) and that, in the case of legal entities, the act of upload is deemed to take place in the 
Member State where the legal entity has its establishment.  This combination of criteria ensures a flexible 
solution in that the criterion of the geographical location of the act of upload can be applied both to natural 
persons and to legal entities. 
Such presumption does not diminish the risks inherent to localising a transnational operation in one 
Member State, in particular “location-shopping” and the potential undermining effect on right holders in 
case of territorial fragmentation (e.g. territorial exclusivity in function of exploitation windows).  The effects 
on other right holders could be mitigated by requiring a licence fee in function of the total exploitation 
value and possibly by making the redistribution among right holders mandatory (e.g. via collecting 
societies).  Apart from remuneration issues, the localisation, the right holders in other Member States 
than the Member State of upload could be affected by an overall lower level of protection (exceptions or 
licensing mechanisms would find application beyond the nation borders, fewer measures may be 
available in case of infringement).  Given the potential impact of such changes and the complex 
measures required to mitigate the effects, the policy objectives of adopting a localisation criterion leading 
to one single Member State must be clearly stated. 
b) Criteria in other directives and the notion of “establishment” 
Other directives have defined localisation criteria for the behaviour they are regulating.  First we will give 
a brief overview of the various localisation criteria thus operated, then we will examine one of these 
criteria more in depth, i.e. the notion of establishment.  
(i) Various criteria 
Several directives regulate online activities that show some similarities to the making available of works to 
the public.  In order to do so, they put forward certain criteria to localise the activity in one Member State, 
the idea being that the activities or services performed in that Member State are governed by the law of 
that Member State and controlled by it.  The purpose is to create a single area without internal borders. 
However, the criteria used to localise this “country of origin” vary from one directive to the other.  Certain 
directives use economic criteria (place of establishment) while other directives apply technical criteria 
(place of the uplink). 
Before the further analysis of the notion “establishment”, the localisation criteria can be summarised as 
follows 
- The Directive on e-commerce (2000/31/EC) relies to the notion of establishment used in the 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and refers to the case law of the Court of justice 
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matter, the harmonised exclusive rights, the moral rights, applicable exceptions and limitations, contractual protection and 
enforcement measures has not been performed, this was beyond the scope of this study. 
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for the interpretation of that criterion. As a consequence, the country of origin of the service 
provider is the place where the service provider operates the actual pursuit of a genuine 
economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period.  
- The AVMS Directive (2010/13/EU) uses a list of alternative criteria to localize the country of 
origin of a service provider. The first criterion is the establishment of the service provider. The 
directive provides an autonomous meaning to that concept and regulates the hypothesis where a 
service provider is established in several Member States. It also uses alternative criteria, such as 
the use of a satellite and the notion of establishment in the meaning of the Treaty and it provides 
a provision preventing circumvention of the establishment criteria. 
- The Directive on the protection of personal data (95/46/EC) first clarifies technical terms. 
Then, it localizes the protected act in the country of establishment of the “controller”, defined as 
the country where the controller operates effective and real exercise of activity through stable 
arrangements. 
- The Cable and Satellite Directive (93/83/EEC) also starts with the clarification of various 
technical terms, including the complex act of “communication to the public by satellite”. Then it 
localises the protected act in the country where the program-carrying signals are introduced into 
an uninterrupted chain of communication under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting 
organization.  This directive operates a technical criterion, linked to the responsible broadcasting 
organisation.   
- The Services Directive (2006/123/EC) develops the freedom to provide services, starting from 
the Member State where a service provider has its establishment.  This is the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity by the provider for an indefinite period and through a stable infrastructure from 
where the business of providing services is actually carried out. 
It may be worth reminding that the country of origin principle only applies to acts or services occurring in 
or having a sufficient link with the European Union.  Some directives put forward criteria to link an activity 
to a Member State, even if the normal criterion would point to a location in a third country.  For example, 
the Directive on the protection of personal data provides that the national law of a Member State of the 
European Union shall apply to the processing of personal data carried out by a controller located in a third 
country if he makes use of equipment situated on the territory of said Member State (art. 4 Data 
Protection Directive). Moreover, the Cable and Satellite Directive stipulates that the communication to the 
public by satellite occurring from a third country takes place in the Member state where the uplink station 
from where the signals are transmitted is located or, if there is no use of an uplink station, in the Member 
State where the broadcasting organization that has commissioned the communication to the public by 
satellite has its principal establishment (art. 2 SatCab Dir).  Still, the “country of origin” principle cannot 
govern all the acts involving third countries. In specific circumstances, the common rules of private 
international law will still apply and each Member State might apply its national law to the acts having no 
link with the European Union.  
Finally, we find important to remind that several directives have linked the country of origin principle to a 
derogation clause in order to tackle problems coming from a lack of harmonization of the material rules. 
Such clause allows the Members States to derogate from the country of origin principle and apply their 
national law in order to protect specific interests (e.g. consumer protection). The derogation mechanism 
could also be applied to the “country of origin principle” with regard to the making available right to avoid 
difficulties coming from a lack of harmonisation.  
The principles discussed can be summarised in this scheme:  
  
The territoriality of the making available right  141 
 
 
 
Directive 
 
Localisation 
 
Interpretation  Enforcement towards service 
providers located in non-EU 
countries 
Directive  on 
electronic 
commerce 
(2000/31/EC) 
 
Member State of 
establishment of the 
service provider 
Place of the actual pursuit of 
an economic activity through a 
fixed establishment in that 
State for an indefinite period 
Does not apply towards service 
providers located in third countries 
Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive 
(2010/13/EU) 
Member State having 
jurisdiction to regulate 
the provider 
1. Member State of 
establishment of the 
provider in the sense of art. 
2, §3 of the Directive 
2. Location of the satellite up-
link or the satellite facilities 
3. Member State of 
establishment in the sense 
of the Treaty 
 
Does not apply to audiovisual 
media services intended exclusively 
for reception in third countries and 
which are not received with 
standard consumer equipment 
directly or indirectly by the public in 
the European Union 
 
Directive on the 
protection of 
personal data 
(Directive 
95/46/EC) 
Member State of 
establishment of the 
controller 
Place of an effective and real 
exercise of activity through 
stable arrangements  
Member state where the controller 
makes use of equipment, 
automated or otherwise, unless 
such equipment is used only for 
purposes of transit through the 
territory of the Community 
Directive Cable 
and Satellite 
(93/83/EEC) 
Member State where 
the program-carrying 
signals are 
introduced into an 
uninterrupted chain of 
communication  
In practice this will often be 
where the broadcasting 
organisation has its 
establishment. 
1. Member State where the uplink 
station from where the signals 
are transmitted is located 
2. Member State where the 
broadcasting organization that 
has commissioned the 
communication to the public by 
satellite has its principal 
establishment 
 
Services Directive 
(2006/123/EC) 
 
 
Freedom to provide 
services in other 
Member States than 
where the service 
provider is 
established. 
Place of “actual pursuit of an 
economic activity by the 
provider for an indefinite period 
and through a stable 
infrastructure from where the 
business of providing services 
is actually carried out” (art. 4) 
/  
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(ii) The notion of “establishment” and its location 
The country of establishment is used as the “country of origin” in four directives (this is the case in the E-
Commerce, AVMS, Data Protection and Services Directives
347
). However, the notion of country of 
“establishment” finds it specific application for each directive. We will examine how these four instruments 
define the place of establishment of the “service provider”.  It should be noted at the outset that the 
criterion of “establishment” applies to legal entities, rather than to individuals. 
- E-Commerce Directive 
The E-Commerce Directive takes the “establishment” of the service provider as the criterion to localise 
the service and thus determine which laws should be observed (“country of origin” – art. 3 E-Commerce 
Directive).   
It provides that the “place at which a service provider is established should be determined in conformity 
with the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which the concept of establishment involves the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period” or a “given 
period” (rec. 19 E-Commerce Dir).  This “presupposes actual establishment of the company concerned in 
the host Member State and the pursuit of genuine economic activity there”
 348
.  If a service provider has 
several places of establishment, one should be designated as the place of establishment from which the 
service concerned is provided, which should be “the place where the provider has the centre of his 
activities relating to this particular service” (rec. 19 E-Commerce Dir). 
The place of establishment should not be “the place at which the technology supporting its website is 
located or the place at which its website is accessible” (in case of a provider of services via an Internet 
website) but the place where it pursues its economic activity instead. 
This definition of the pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period 
resp. the relevant centre of activities could apply to the “establishment” criterion for the online making 
available of works – at least in a number of cases. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the E-commerce Directive was explicitly adopted with the purpose 
of contributing to the “proper functioning of the internal market by ensuring the free movement of 
information society services between the Member States” (art. 1(1) E-Commerce Dir).  Furthermore, it is 
applicable only to “information society services”, defined as “any service normally provided for 
remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services” 
(ar. 1(2) Directive 98/48
349
 amending art. 1(2) Directive 98/34
350
).   
This criterion is consequently suitable to regulate the provision of a service, which could consist of 
providing works (e.g. music streaming or film downloading).  It is less straightforward to apply it to the 
activities of natural persons who do not provide a “service”
351
 or do not pursue an economic objective. 
                                                     
 
347 The Cable and Satellite Directive localises the protected act primarily according to a technical criterion, i.e. Member State of 
uplink.  
348 CJEU 12 September 2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue; See also CJEU 25 July 1991, Case C-221/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd and others; CJEU 4 October 1991, Case C-246/89, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
349 Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations O.J. L 217 , 5 August 1998, p. 18-26. 
350 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of 
information in the field of technical standards and regulations, O.J. L 204 , 21 July 1998, p. 37-48. 
351 The e-commerce Directive (as amended by Dir. 1998/48) provides the following definition of a “service”:   
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- AVMS Directive 
The AVMS Directive indirectly uses the criterion of “establishment” to regulate services:  it grants 
jurisdiction to the Member States to regulate “audiovisual media services transmitted by media service 
providers under its jurisdiction”.  The establishment of an AVM service provider is the primary criterion to 
determine jurisdiction (art. 2 AVMS Dir).  Despite the potential overlap with the E-commerce Directive, the 
“establishment” of the AVMS Directive has an autonomous meaning (art. 2(3) AVMS Dir).   
The Directive provides a set of alternative criteria to determine the establishment in a Member State (our 
emphasis):  
(a) the media service provider has its head office in that Member State and the editorial decisions 
about the audiovisual media service are taken in that Member State; 
(b) if a media service provider has its head office in one Member State but editorial decisions on 
the audiovisual media service are taken in another Member State, it shall be deemed to be 
established in the Member State where a significant part of the workforce involved in the pursuit 
of the audiovisual media service activity operates. If a significant part of the workforce involved in 
the pursuit of the audiovisual media service activity operates in each of those Member States, the 
media service provider shall be deemed to be established in the Member State where it has its 
head office. If a significant part of the workforce involved in the pursuit of the audiovisual media 
service activity operates in neither of those Member States, the media service provider shall be 
deemed to be established in the Member State where it first began its activity in accordance with 
the law of that Member State, provided that it maintains a stable and effective link with the 
economy of that Member State; 
(c) if a media service provider has its head office in a Member State but decisions on the 
audiovisual media service are taken in a third country, or vice versa, it shall be deemed to be 
established in the Member State concerned, provided that a significant part of the workforce 
involved in the pursuit of the audiovisual media service activity operates in that Member State. 
This criterion could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the right of making available to the public and to 
companies that offer works to the public via (commercial) online services.  The “cascade” of criteria to 
determine the Member State where the service provider is established offers possibilities to regulate the 
making available of works by online service providers with several establishments in the EU.   
However, the AVMS (like the Television without Borders Directive before it) pursues a different objective 
than copyright, which is to accomplish an internal market for audiovisual media services in the EU (cons. 
10-11 AVMS Directive).  Furthermore, its objective is to regulate the provisions of audiovisual media 
services, which are defined as “a service as defined by Articles 56 and 57 of the Treaty on the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
“any Information Society service, that is to say, any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means 
and at the individual request of a recipient of services. 
For the purposes of this definition: 
"at a distance" means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously present, 
"by electronic means" means that the service is sent initially and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the 
processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by 
optical means or by other electromagnetic means, 
"at the individual request of a recipient of services" means that the service is provided through the transmission of data on individual 
request. 
An indicative list of services not covered by this definition is set out in Annex V. 
This Directive shall not apply to: 
radio broadcasting services 
television broadcasting services covered by point (a) of Article 1 of Directive 89/552/EEC”. 
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Functioning of the European Union which is under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider 
and the principal purpose of which is the provision of programmes, in order to inform, entertain or 
educate, to the general public by electronic communications networks within the meaning of point (a) of 
Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC. Such an audiovisual media service is either a television broadcast as 
defined in point (e) of this paragraph or an on-demand audiovisual media service as defined in point (g) of 
this paragraph”.  These services are normally provided for remuneration and may have an industrial or 
commercial nature or relate to activities of craftsmen or the professions (art. 57 TFEU).   
- Data Protection Directive 
According to the Data Protection Directive, a Member State is competent to regulate the processing of 
personal data “carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the 
territory of the Member State” (art. 4 DPD).  The establishment on the territory of a Member State implies 
“the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements; whereas the legal form of such an 
establishment, whether simply branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining 
factor in this respect” (rec. 19 DPD).  When the controller has establishments on the territory of several 
Member States (particularly by means of subsidiaries), each of the establishments must fulfil the national 
obligations. 
The controller subject to these obligations is defined as “the natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data” (art. 2(d) DPD).  The processing of data is “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means” (art. 2(b) DPD). 
The definition of the scope of regulation in the Data Protection Directive is an interesting example for the 
protection of the making available right. The Data Protection Directive provides a definition of the 
restricted acts (data processing) and the responsible person (data controller) and a localisation of the 
protected act in the Member State where the controller has its establishment or establishments.  It is also 
provided that if the controller is not established on Community territory and makes use of equipment, 
automated or otherwise, that is situated on the territory of a Member State, for purposes of processing 
personal data, this Member State applies its national provisions – unless such equipment is used only for 
purposes of transit through the territory of the Community (art. 4(1)(c) DPD). 
The data protection provisions are not only binding upon service providers which pursue an economic 
activity, but upon anyone who processes data in the context of an “activity”. A similar construction could 
be thought of to regulate the making available right. However, it must be observed that the Data 
Protection Directive adopts an “internal market approach” to the protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms, in particular the right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data (art. 1 DPD):  
the free flow of data between Member States should not be restricted nor prohibited for this reason.  The 
free flow of data and the accomplishment of the internal market are of primary importance (since uneven 
levels of protection constitute an obstacle to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital – 
see rec. 3-7 DPD).  The Directive regulates the behaviour of a person by reference to an activity with a 
certain continuity and the data protection provisions should not hamper the cross-border extension of 
these activities.   
- Services Directive 
The Services Directive further develops the freedom to provide services
352
.  It is repeated that “Member 
States [should] respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other than that in 
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which they are established. The Member State in which the service is provided shall ensure free access 
to and free exercise of a service activity within its territory” (…) (art. 16(1) Services Directive). 
The establishment of the service provider is defined as the “actual pursuit of an economic activity, as 
referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty, by the provider for an indefinite period and through a stable 
infrastructure from where the business of providing services is actually carried out” (art. 4(5) Services 
Directive).  The place where a provider is established should be determined “in accordance with the case 
law of the Court of Justice according to which the concept of establishment involves the actual pursuit of 
an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period” (rec. 37).  Where it is difficult 
to determine from which of several places of establishment a given service is provided, the location of the 
provider’s centre of activities relating to this particular service should be that place of establishment (rec. 
37 in fine). 
This criterion could be applied in relation to the making available right (as described supra).  It should 
however be borne in mind that the Services Directive pursues an internal market objective and should 
regulate economic activities.  As already pointed out, the making available right is not only relevant for 
economic entities (for which an “establishment” may be found) but also to private individuals (e.g. users of 
social media, bloggers or users of sharing platforms).  Should the establishment criterion be applied as 
the localisation factor for the making available right, a complementary criterion should be provided for 
private individuals. 
- Some conclusions on the notion of “establishment” 
The E-commerce Directive, the AVMS Directive and Services Directive have as their specific objects the 
regulation of services, i.e. a distinct economic activity.  The Directives on E-commerce, AVMS, Data 
Protection and Services all pursue the accomplishment of the internal market and refer to the 
establishment of the responsible person (service provider resp. data controller) as the starting point of the 
regulation.   
As far as the making available right is concerned, the criterion of “establishment” may be used to regulate 
the behaviour of service providers in the sense of the TFEU or, more generally, persons acting in the 
context of a continuous, stable or organised activity.  It is not so easily applicable to natural persons 
acting without direct economic objectives or organised activity but who are of course also capable of 
performing acts of making available to the public.  Moreover, it should be taken into account that 
copyright has its own objectives, its proper logic and system of protection, which are not entirely similar to 
other directives. It appears from the acquis and the decisions of the CJEU that such copyright objective is 
the payment of a remuneration corresponding to the exploitation value of the work, which cannot be 
dissociated from the territory where the exploitation takes place.  The localisation of acts of making 
available according to the establishment of the service provider would thus change the logic of the system 
by emphasising the service provider’s point of view, rather than taking the exploitation as the starting 
point.  Such change requires an explicit policy choice, which should take into consideration all 
consequences for the making available right and other parts of the copyright system.   
c) Conclusions on the localisation criteria leading to a single Member State 
In this part of the Study, we have examined how an act of making available (with cross-border effects) 
could be localised in one single Member State.  With this objective in mind, the most straightforward 
construction is to define the making available right as a material act of upload and to localise this act by a 
criterion that leads to a single Member State (“country of origin”).   
Some localisation criteria are more likely to tie the acts of making available to the public to one single 
Member State than others.   
The localisation of the act of making available where the servers are located may or may not lead to one 
Member State.  In the most straightforward cases, the works are stored on one server and it is evident in 
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which Member State the servers are situated.  In the most complex cases, the works are stored on 
servers in several countries (Member States of the EU and/or third countries) and the right holders and 
the uploader have to keep track of the places where any particular work is stored (this is especially the 
case for “cloud” services, distributed computing).  Moreover, such a technical criterion might soon be 
outdated, because of unpredictable, future technological developments.  
The centre of activities, i.e. the establishment of a legal entity or the domicile/habitual residence of a 
natural person, and the act of upload are two sets of criteria most likely to connect the act of making 
available to one Member State.  In the event that a legal entity has several establishments or that acts of 
upload are performed in different Member States, sufficient factual criteria should be provided to identify 
the single Member State where the protected act takes place (possibly as a cascade).   
If the objective is to identify one single Member State for the acts of making available and from an 
“internal market” perspective, the “centre of activities” criterion seems the most obvious one. It has the 
advantage that the centre of activities of a legal person or a private person can be determined with 
relative ease.  By contrast, this criterion may challenge the Member States’ competence to regulate 
behaviour taking place on their territories, in particular in case a natural person performs an act of making 
available in a Member State other than the Member State where she has her domicile.  Applying the 
“centre of activities” criterion would lead to the result that, legally speaking, the act of making available is 
performed in the Member State of domicile A, even though the material act of making available takes 
place in another Member State B.  Member State B would thus lose control over material acts performed 
on its territory and Member State A would see its copyright legislation apply to material acts performed on 
the territory of Member State B.   Another challenge exists when, in case of territorial fragmentation of 
rights, an act of making available is localised in one Member State but has effects in other Member 
States, thus undermining the position of the persons holding rights for those other Member States 
(Member States of exploitation).  Finally, there is a risk of location shopping in the sense that the 
uploader/service provider may establish her/its centre of activities in a Member State where the right 
holder enjoy a relatively weak level of copyright protection.  
As far as the criterion of establishment is concerned, we have demonstrated that it occurs in other 
directives with an “internal market” objective and approach, which challenge some of copyright’s 
objectives (such as protection of the exploitation at a national level).  
Another construction could be to localise the act of making available at the location where the material 
act of upload was performed.  This makes sense for a natural person (who is more mobile than a 
service provider and thus remains subject to the law of the country where she happens to be and this in 
accordance with the territoriality principle) and for legal persons in simple constructions.  For more 
complex (international) organisations it is less straightforward to identify the act of upload and to localise it 
(e.g. an international web search operator).  A possible solution could be a fiction (or a presumption) that 
the act of making available to the public by legal entities takes place at the establishment of the legal 
entity.  Inversely, the act of upload could be used to define the place of establishment of the service 
provider/user. Similarly to the Directive on the protection of personal data, technical elements could be 
used to define the place of establishment, rather than or combined with economic criteria. The protected 
act would be localised in the Member State where the service provider/user has its centre of activities, 
taking into account various criteria including the place where the act of upload happens.  Such criterion 
would thus allow localising the restricted act in one single Member State.  Unlike the criterion focusing on 
the “centre of activities”, the Member States would keep the power to regulate behaviour taking place on 
their territories (material act “upload”).  Similarly to the former criterion, however, the localisation of the 
restricted act in one single Member State (of upload) may undermine the position of right holders for other 
Member States (territorial fragmentation), since the making available of works occurs in one Member 
State but may have effects in other Member States (access, exploitation). 
Both the criteria of “centre of activities” and “act of upload” allow localising the act of making available in 
one single Member State (albeit with some additional criteria to facilitate the application of either criterion 
for legal entities or individuals as the case may be).  It can be expected that this approach will facilitate 
the licensing process:  since the restricted act takes place in one Member State, the rights have to be 
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cleared in that Member State.  This availability work will nevertheless have effects in other Member 
States, which can be taken into account e.g. in the remuneration. 
Both criteria allow the uploader/service provider to determine the location of the making available of 
works:  the uploader/service provider may choose to establish her centre of activities in one Member 
State rather than in another Member State or to organise its activities in order to perform the acts of 
upload in one Member State rather than in another one.  This creates a risk of location shopping, 
where the uploader/service providers chooses a Member State with a relatively weak copyright 
protection.  Even if copyright protection is admittedly harmonised to a large extent at the European level, 
this risk should not altogether be excluded since important parts of the copyright systems are still left to 
the Member States, such as copyright contracts (the assessment of the actual risk is beyond the scope of 
this Study).  Another risk exists in case of fragmentation of rights, in particular territorial fragmentation.  
Both criteria localise the act of making available in a “country of origin”, while this act has effects beyond 
this country (access, exploitation in other Member States).  Right holders with (exclusive) rights for those 
Member States could see the exploitation in those territories undermined by a legitimate offer, coming 
from another Member State.   
In the following sections we will examine the consequences of applying a “country of origin” principle to 
the making available right.  The criteria of “act of upload” and “centre of activities” will be treated together 
since both criteria (or a combination of both) are developed in order to localise the restricted act in one 
Member State hence mutatis mutandis the same conclusions are valid for both criteria.  We will analyse 
the effects of these localisation criteria in relation to the enforcement of the making available right in the 
EU (sub 2), to the (unharmonised) national rules of authorship and transfer of rights (sub 3), and to the 
harmonised reproduction right (sub 4).  The current state of these legal topics has been described in part 
I.C of this Study.  We will repeat a brief summary of the findings with respect of each legal issue and then 
apply it to the case of the making available right, localised in a single Member State according to a 
“country of origin” principle. 
2. Conflict of laws 
In this section we have considered the making available right from a “country of origin” approach.  We 
have proposed a construction that allows localising the act of making available in one single Member 
State, i.e. the “country of origin”. In order to achieve this objective, the making available to the public was 
defined as the material act of upload (leading to the work being available to the public on its demand) and 
it was localised according to two selected criteria, either where the act of upload takes place or where the 
uploader has her centre of activities (or a combination of both criteria). 
In this subsection we will verify how this construction affects the enforcement of the making available right 
in situations where a conflict of laws may occur.  Even if the act of making available is localised in one 
Member State, it may have effects beyond that Member State since the work may be accessible in other 
Member States or the exploitation may be directed to particular Member States.  These circumstances 
may give rise to a conflict of laws. 
In this subsection, it will be examined how the issue of international jurisdiction would be solved and how 
the applicable law would be determined, in case the making available legally takes place in one Member 
State.   
a) Jurisdiction 
In this scenario the act of making the work available to the public is legally localised in the Member State 
where the work was uploaded and/or where the uploader has her centre of activities, even if the effects 
can be felt beyond that country.  Applying the principles of jurisdiction explained above, it seems that an 
alleged infringer may be sued in the courts of the Member State where she is domiciled or in the courts of 
the Member States where the harmful event occurred, located either at the place of the event giving rise 
to the infringement or at the place where the damage occurred.   
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In our opinion, the application of a country of origin principle would not have an impact on the application 
of these principles, as the rules used to determine jurisdiction are based on an assessment of the factual 
elements of the dispute, independent from the analysis on the substance.  This means that some courts 
are competent to decide on the entire damage, i.e. the courts of the Member State where the defendant 
has her domicile/establishment or where the work was uploaded, as the place of the event giving rise to 
the harmful event.  These factual criteria point to the “country of origin”.  It so happens that the factual 
criteria to find competence refer to the legal criterion of localisation of the making available right.  In 
addition, the courts of the place where the damage occurs remain competent.  This could be the Member 
States where the exploitation of the work takes place (targeting of the public in one Member State). By 
contrast, the place where the work is merely accessible seems to be rejected by the Court of justice in the 
decisions Wintersteiger and Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof if there is no damage suffered in that Member State. 
The rule of the place of the centre of interests of the right holder, which was applied in the case of an 
infringement of a personality right, is not directly transposable to the case of the infringement of an 
economic right under copyright.  
The country of origin principle does not alter the application of the rules on jurisdiction.  It seems however 
that these rules point to the courts of the Member States of origin for a ruling on the entire damage (by 
contrast to a decision on the damage suffered on the territory of one Member State only). 
In our example, a journalist writes articles for a French newspaper.  Her articles are made available to the 
public by a news aggregator with establishment in Ireland.  Arguably the act of upload takes place in 
Ireland, at the aggregator’s establishment, hence the event giving rise to the damage occurs in Ireland.  
The search engine operator may by consequence be sued in the Irish courts, for all the harm done.   
The news aggregation website is however directed at the Belgian public (at least partially, in so far as it 
offers a “national” news page).  The Belgian courts will therefore also be competent to hear the case on 
the merits, restricted to the damage that occurred in Belgium.  In this case most or all of the damage will 
arguably occur in this one country.  If the website is also accessed by a certain public outside Belgium 
(e.g. by Belgian expats), then it could be argued that the courts of these countries of “overspill” have 
jurisdiction as well (albeit for a smaller part of the damage). 
It can be concluded that the outcome is the same as the current situation, when the rules on jurisdiction 
are applied to an act of making available that is localised in one single Member State (country of origin). 
b) Applicable law 
The country of origin principle in the SatCab Directive is a rule that designates the application of the law 
of one Member State, instead of several legislations. Several authors analyse it as a provision implicitly 
ruling the conflicts of laws, which would have a hybrid character (between substantial law and private 
international law)
353
.  
In the scenario where an act of making available is localised in the country where the act of upload has 
taken place or where the uploader has her establishment, the restricted act takes place in its entirety in 
one single Member State.  The effects of the restricted act, by contrast, are possibly felt in several 
Member States (e.g. where the exploitation takes place or where the work is accessed).  Since the 
restricted act takes place in one country, which serves as a country of origin, the purpose is to avoid an 
actual conflict of laws and the act of making available is entirely governed by the law of the place where it 
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was performed. The cumulative application of several national laws is thus avoided (see rec. 14-15 
Satellite and Cable Directive)
354
. 
This means that the “uploader’s law” is applicable to the merits of the case
355
. On the merits, an 
infringement in any of those targeted territories will be judged by the law of the Member State where the 
service provider has uploaded the works or has its establishment.  By consequence, the damages will be 
assessed and a cessation measure (as a corrective measure) will be admitted according to this law.  This 
is even the case if the exploitation is not actually turned to the country of origin:  a service provider may 
have its establishment in one Member State and offer, from this geographical basis, services that target 
several, distinct national publics.  Right holders will have access to harmonised enforcement measures 
throughout the EU (insofar as the harmonisation is effective). The damages are evaluated according to 
the law of the country where the infringement has taken place.  The possible adverse effects could be 
mitigated by the principle that the compensation should reflect the value of exploitation in the territories 
concerned (cf. Lagardère, Stichting De Thuiskopie
356
). 
The localisation in the Member State of upload or establishment leaves the right holders vulnerable to 
acts of making available originating from outside the EU. In order to offer protection against acts from 
beyond the reach of the European harmonisation a safeguarding clause may be considered (see mutatis 
mutandis the provision in the Satellite and Cable Directive). 
The country of origin principle may however be expressed as a substantial rule that does not interfere 
directly on the issues of applicable law. The rule “country of origin” then localizes the protected act in one 
country but it does not expressly rule the applicable law, which will be determined according to the 
general principles of conflicts of laws.  
In that hypothesis, the law applicable will be determined according to the rule lex loci protectionis. The 
judge thus has to apply the law of the country for which a protection is claimed, which can refer either to 
the law of the country of transmission or to the law of the country of reception. That issue is traditionally 
solved by the national courts depending on the connecting factors between the dispute and either of 
these countries. The country of transmission will correspond to the country of origin (place of upload or 
place of establishment of the uploader).  Still, a court may apply the law of the country of reception, which 
might differ from the country of origin and refer to the Member States to which the work made available is 
exploited. In the European Union, the laws of the countries of reception should nevertheless localise the 
act of making available according to the country of origin principle as, consequently, apply the law of the 
country of origin as to the substance. 
3. Authorship, ownership and transfer of rights 
The authorship of copyright protected works is only partially harmonised at the European level.  The 
Member States are competent to determine authorship of works that are not subject to a European 
directive (such as computer programs, databases or audiovisual works).  All Member States under 
consideration adopt the “creator doctrine” to some extent.  There are however important differences, in 
particular with regard to collective works, works created by an employee in the context of her employment 
and even audiovisual works (although the effects are mitigated by the presumed transfer of rights in 
favour of the producer).  Moreover, the issue of copyright contracts has not been harmonised at all, which 
results in important disparities between the national copyright laws.  Some Member States barely regulate 
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the contracts on the exploitation of copyright works, other Member States impose more or less detailed 
conditions for the validity, interpretation or enforcement of copyright contracts. 
These disparities are likely to have an impact on the position of the right holders when applied to a 
making available right that is localised in one single Member State. 
The making available right is understood in this section as a material act of upload, localised in one 
Member State (according to a criterion such as the location of the material act of upload or the centre of 
activities of the uploader).  Such localisation criterion is considered a “country of origin” criterion, 
comparable to the “country of origin” principle applied in the SatCab Directive (93/83/CE).  Yet it has to be 
verified which law is applicable:  even if the restricted act is localised in one Member State, it has effects 
in other Member States, which may raise a conflict of laws.  
For the time being, it is proposed that this “country of origin” principle applied to the making available right 
be considered as a rule of substantive law determining the territorial reach of the substantive national 
legislation. Such rule would localise the relevant copyright act in one single Member State and 
accordingly lead to the application of the law of that Member State rather than several legislations.     
The act of making available can be localised in one Member State, i.e. where the work was uploaded 
and/or the uploader has her centre of activities (country of origin).  The locus protectionis is the only 
country where the act of making available is localised, even if this act has effects in other Member States.  
The copyright law of the “country of origin” would be the only applicable law to the act of making 
available
357
.  
a) Authorship and initial ownership 
Authorship and initial ownership.  This entails that the authorship or initial ownership is determined in 
accordance with the laws of the Member State where the act of making available takes place (i.e. 
Member State of upload or where the uploader has her centre of activities).  Depending on the country 
where that act takes place, the author/owner of the rights might be a different person. By consequence, it 
affects the acquisition of licences and right to take legal action in case of infringement. 
If a work is made available to the public by an uploader in Member State A  (“country of origin”, i.e. upload 
or centre of activities), then all copyright questions relating to this making available are treated in Member 
State A.  It will be determined in accordance with the copyright rules of Member State A who should be 
considered the author of the work (i.e. creator, initiator of a collective work or employer).  The outcome 
could be different in case the same work was made available from Member State B, in which case the 
authorship would be determined in accordance with the laws of Member State B (i.e. creator, initiator of a 
collective work or employer).  Regardless of whether the work was made available in Member State A or 
B, the effects may be the same and the work may be accessible to the public in all the Member States of 
the European Union. 
So it matters where the uploader/service provider chooses to make the work available to the public 
(country of origin):  depending on the rules of authorship of the Member State, she will have to clear the 
making available right from the creator or, as the case may be, the person taking the initiative to create a 
collective work or the employer of the maker of a work under an employment contract.  Inversely, in case 
of infringement, the person who can claim infringement of her copyright is determined in accordance with 
the copyright law of the Member State where the act of making available was performed by the (alleged) 
infringer.  In theory, such a situation may affect the legal certainty and encourage acts of forum 
shopping
358
.  Arguably this is not an insurmountable problem in practice, given the circumstance that in 
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many sector the exploitation rights are explicitly dealt with in contracts.  This should however be 
empirically verified. 
An example may clarify this scenario.  A news aggregator making news articles, published online, 
available to the public needs to clear the right of making available to the public.  Leaving aside the 
contractual assignment for now, this aggregator needs to obtain the authorisation of the journalist 
(creator) or the publisher (employer or initiator of a collective work).  This depends on where the act of 
making available was performed. 
- The country of origin regarding the act of making available is France (the news aggregator has its 
establishment in France or performs the material acts of upload in France).  The news aggregator 
should acquire the making available right for the news articles from the publisher and the 
journalist (art. L132-36 and L-132-40).  The country of origin regarding the act of making available 
is Belgium (the news aggregator has its establishment in Belgium or performs the material acts of 
upload in Belgium).  According to Belgian law, the journalist remains the initial owner of copyright.  
The publisher holds rights only by virtue of a contractual transfer of rights.  
- The country of origin regarding the act of making available is the UK (the news aggregator has its 
establishment in the UK or performs the material acts of upload in the UK).    Applying the UK law 
to the transfer of rights, the employer holds the economic rights to the newspaper article.  The 
news aggregator should acquire the making available right from the newspaper publisher without 
regard for the journalist. 
Inversely, in case of infringement, it is either the journalist or the publisher or both who can take legal 
action and claim cessation or damages from the news aggregator.  Again, who can initiate the legal 
action depends on where the work was made available (i.e. where the material act of upload was 
performed or where the news aggregator has its establishment): 
- If the country of origin of the act of making available is France, then the journalist and the 
publisher are entitled to sue the website.  
- If the country of origin of the act of making available is Belgium, then the journalist is entitled to 
sue the website (leaving aside contractual transfers). 
- If the country of origin of the act of making available article is the UK, then the employer is the 
holder of the economic rights and is therefore entitled to sue the website and claim for economic 
compensation. 
Combined with the application of the lex loci protectionis, the country of origin principle would thus have 
an impact on the determination of authorship and initial ownership.  Moreover, the location of the making 
available and thus the applicable copyright law are determined by the person who makes the work 
available.  The uploader can consequently control (intentionally or not) which regime is applicable and 
she can even organise her activities in function of the most favourable regime.  It should be remembered 
that the accessibility to the work is not relevant here.   
The practical effects of that conclusion would need to be examined by an economic market study, on the 
basis of a systematic presentation of different levels of protection.  
Lex loci originis.  By contrast, if the lex loci originis principle is applied to determine the authorship of a 
work, then the initial right holder is invariable, regardless of where the act of making available is localised.  
According to the principle of lex loci originis, the initial owner of copyright is determined in accordance 
with the law of the country of origin of the work (not the origin of the making available), i.e. the country of 
the first publication of the work or, in case of unpublished works, the country of which the author is a 
national (art. 5(4) BC).  In that case, the same person holds the making available right, regardless of 
where the act of making available to the public is performed. 
The application of a new localisation criterion to the act of making available would not affect the 
determination of authorship. Indeed, that localisation criterion would only apply to the act of exploitation of 
the work, without prejudice to the rules determining the existence of a copyright protection or establishing 
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the initial owner of that protection.  The uploader/service provider should determine for each work she 
intends to make available to the public who the initial right holder is, in accordance with the lex loci 
originis.  It matters not where the act of making available is localised:  this has no effect on the person 
holding the making available right.  Once this person identified, the licence contract between the right 
holder and the uploader/service provider would be governed by the law of the contract.   Inversely, the 
author identified according to the copyright law in the country of first publication of the work has the right 
to claim infringement of her right, if her work is made available without her consent (unless she has 
transferred her rights to a third party).   
In case the lex loci originis is applied, the need to harmonise at the European level the rules on the 
determination of authorship appears to be limited.   Still it would be a cumbersome task to clear the rights, 
especially for service providers offering a wide range of works (such as automated aggregators or music 
providers).  Practically, the need to harmonise the rules on authorship and initial ownership should be 
assessed taking into consideration the contractual practices in the different sectors.  If it appears that (in 
some sectors) the rights are transferred by contract to one person or a limited number of people, then the 
need to harmonise the (preceding stage) of authorship or initial ownership would be discarded.  This 
assessment is however beyond the scope of this Study. 
b) Transfer of rights 
Transfer of rights.  As far as the transfer of rights is concerned, a distinction has to be made between 
contracts operating a transfer of rights concluded prior to the making available of the work, and contracts 
expressly concluded to give an authorisation for the making available of the work (“contracts with the 
purpose of the making available of the work”). 
Preceding transfer of rights – derived ownership.  We have described how the uploader/service 
provider should proceed to determine the author or initial right owner of a work she intends to make 
available to the public.  If a contractual transfer of the rights on a work has occurred, the uploader or the 
service provider wanting to make that work available should acquire the rights in conformity with the 
contractual arrangements of the author or initial right owner.  Where the making available by the 
candidate uploader does not matter in this respect, since the existing contracts determine which party 
holds the relevant making available right.  By contrast, it may matter where the making available takes 
place in case the making available rights have been granted to different parties per national territory 
(territorial fragmentation).  It should then be determined in which Member State the intended act of 
making the work available to the public will be situated, in order to determine which party holds the 
(exclusive) rights to this territory and who can grant a licence to the candidate uploader. 
Similarly, if the work is made available by a user or a service provider without prior consent of the rights 
holder, the person having acquired the rights in execution of that copyright contract will be entitled to 
claim compensation.  
Contract operating transfer of making available right.  The country of origin principle as it is applied in 
the Cab/Sat Directive is traditionally analysed as a rule determining the law applicable to contracts 
operating the transfer of rights for the purpose of the act of retransmission
359
.  Similarly, the application of 
a criterion of localisation to the making available right could have a consequence in the determination of 
the law applicable to the contracts operating the transfer of rights on works with the purpose to make 
them available on internet. The law applicable to these contracts would necessarily be the law applicable 
in the country where the act is deemed to occur. 
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When the act of making available is localised in a single Member State of “origin” (upload or centre of 
activities of the uploader°,  then the contracts clearing the rights for this making available are subject to 
the law of the Member State of origin (i.e. where the upload took place or where the uploader has her 
centre of activities).  As described supra, the national copyright laws provide different rules on copyright 
contracts and impose different conditions of validity, interpretation and enforcement of copyright 
contracts, some being more protective than others.  Since the uploader’s acts determine where the 
making available is localised, she will be able to determine (directly or indirectly) which legal regime 
applies to the copyright contracts on the making available of works.  In theory, the uploader could favour 
a copyright regime that less strict and less protective of the authors and right holders. 
c) Impact of Premier League on the country of origin principle 
Relevance for the making available right.  If it is an option to define the restricted act and the 
localisation criterion in such a way that the making available of a work to the public takes place in one 
Member State to the model of the “country of origin” principle in the SatCab Directive, then the analogy 
should be pushed further and other consequences should be anticipated.   Should a “country of origin” 
principle apply to the making available right, the restricted act is localised in one Member State regardless 
of the extra-territorial effects of this restricted act.  The restricted act would be defined as the material act 
of upload, but leads to the work being accessible for an extended period of time and to a public that is not 
necessarily territorially confined.  This is also the case for satellite broadcasts:  the protected act of 
communication to the public by satellite refers to a precise (technical) act of introducing the signals into a 
communication chain that makes it possible for people in the international “footprint” of the broadcast to 
receive the signal (and therefore the protected work). 
In a recent case, the CJEU examined certain contractual practices of a right holder and satellite 
broadcasters restricting the territorial reach of the satellite broadcast of football matches of the UK 
competition.  Given the analogy between the “country of origin” principle in the SatCab Direcitve and the 
one under consideration here, we will examine the consequences of the CJEU ruling in Premier League 
for the making available right.  First we will summarise the decision in Premier League, then we will 
examine how this ruling may affect the contractual practices with regard to the making available of works 
localised in one Member State but with a reach beyond that Member State. The aim of the present 
section is not to propose a complete analysis of the whole Premier League decision.  
Facts.  In Premier League, the broadcasting rights (live transmission) on the first class football 
competition in England were exploited via territorial licences granted for a 3 year terms. Licences were 
awarded by the Football Association Premier League (FAPL) based on an open tender procedure with 
the purpose of maximising the value of the rights. In order to reach that goal, each broadcaster getting a 
licence was allowed to retransmit the Premier League matches on a national territory exclusively. 
Furthermore, only one broadcaster was licensed per territorial area and each broadcaster had to encrypt 
its signal in order to prevent the reception of its broadcasts by viewers situated outside the area for which 
it hold the licence. The broadcasters also had to ensure that no decoding devices were authorised so as 
to permit any viewer to receive their transmissions outside the territory licensed.  
Despite these restrictions, certain bars in the United Kingdom decided to use Greek decoding devices to 
access the Premier League matches retransmitted by the Greek broadcaster NetMed Hellas, instead of 
the version retransmitted by the broadcaster BskyB, the holder of the exclusive licence for the United 
Kingdom. The subscription to the Greek broadcaster was indeed less expensive than the one to BskyB. 
FAPL and BskyB brought proceedings against the suppliers of the foreign decoding devices and owners 
of public houses who used them and allegedly infringed their copyrights. One of the issues raised 
concerned the lawfulness of the legal regime preventing the broadcasters from the retransmission of the 
subject-matter outside the territory covered by the exclusive licence granted by FAPL. The Court had to 
evaluate whether such provision constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide service protected by 
art. 56 TFEU. 
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CJEU Ruling.  In the United Kingdom, the national legislation confers a legal protection to contractual 
clauses that prohibit the access to satellite transmission services from another Member State. The 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act prohibits the dishonest reception of a programme included in a 
broadcasting service provided from a place in the United Kingdom with intent to avoid payment of any 
charge applicable to the reception of the programme
360
. That prohibition also benefits to persons who 
make charges for the reception of programmes included in a broadcasting service provided from a place 
in the United Kingdom or in any other Member State and to persons who send encrypted transmissions 
from a place in the United Kingdom or in any other Member State. They are entitled to prohibit the 
importation, the sale, the installation and other forms of distribution of any apparatus used to enable 
persons to access the programmes and/or to circumvent conditional access technology
361
,  
The Court found that such legislation combined with the contractual practices implemented by the 
Premier League constitutes a restriction to the freedom to provide services, unless it can be objectively 
justified (FAPL, par. 89). 
According to the Court, the protection of intellectual property rights may justify a restriction on 
fundamental freedoms (par. 94), provided that the specific subject-matter of the intellectual property is to 
ensure for the right holders a protection of the right to exploit commercially the marketing or the making 
available of the protected subject-matter (par. 107). However, it does not guarantee the right holders the 
opportunity to demand the highest possible remuneration; only an appropriate remuneration for each use 
of the protected subject-matter is ensured (par. 108). Defining the concept of an appropriate 
remuneration, the Court declared that such remuneration must be reasonable in relation to the actual or 
potential number of persons who enjoy or wish to enjoy the service (par. 109). 
In the Premier League decision, the Court of Justice found that the premium paid by the broadcasters in 
order to be granted absolute territorial exclusivity went beyond what was necessary to ensure appropriate 
remuneration for the right holders and consequently constituted a restriction to the freedom to provide 
services, because it resulted in artificial price differences between the partitioned national markets (par. 
115).   
Analogy with the making available right.  The Premier League decision may affect the transfer of rights 
on online exploitation forms covered by the making available right, in the hypothesis where the country of 
origin principle is applied as localisation criterion.   
There are indeed similarities between the acts of communication to the public by satellite and the making 
available of works on the internet.  As described supra, the making available of works has cross-border 
effects (unless technical measures are applied to restrict access) but it would be defined and localised in 
one single Member State (“country of origin”).The application of the country of origin principle to the 
making available right could thus lead to a context similar on a technical and a legal point of view to the 
facts that have led to the Premier League decision.  
Similarly to what happened in Premier League; it is conceivable that a right holder (such as a film 
distributor or a record label) grants an (exclusive) licence to a service provider (e.g. an online film platform 
or an online music service) to make available a film or music, valid for the territory of one Member State 
and on condition that access to this work be restricted to this one Member State.  The right holder may 
have sound economic reasons for such request, e.g. the ambition to maximise the exploitation value of 
the work by organising the territorial segmentation of advertising.  Such contract would require the service 
provider to implement access restrictions, preventing users residing outside this national territory from 
consulting the work. Moreover, these technical restrictions could legally be protected as technological 
measures (art. 6 InfoSoc Dir). The territorial exclusivity per national territory may be beneficial to either 
party as the case may be:  the right holder may negotiate a higher fee (or a “premium”) or a service 
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provider may demand exclusivity as the price of distributing the content.   This exclusivity may be 
temporary. 
Projected consequences for the making available right.  The Premier League ruling does not prohibit 
the grant of exclusive licences on the territory of one Member State, considering that such exclusivity by 
itself would not affect the freedom to provide services.  The CJEU is nevertheless critical towards a 
combination of an exclusive licence to broadcast a work in a Member State (via an encrypted signal), the 
contractual obligation having the effect of restricting the reception of the broadcast to the territory of the 
same Member State (by regulating the distribution of decoders) and the statutory (UK) protection of such 
technical restrictions (via decoders).  A similar combination could be thought of with regard to the online 
exploitation of works.  The exploitation would be protected by the making available right, so the right 
holder could grant an (exclusive) licence allowing the making available of a work in one Member State.  
The same contract could contain the obligation to restrict access to the programmes to the territory of the 
Member State covered by the licence through geo-blocking measures, which are in turn legally protected 
as technological measures (cf. art. 6 of the Directive 2001/29).  This combination of legal, technical and 
contractual measures would make it impossible for the work to be accessed from other Member States 
than the one covered by the licence and could be considered an infringement of the freedom to provide 
services.  
A restriction of the freedom to provide services may however be justified, e.g. for the protection of the 
specific subject matter of copyright.  It could for example be argued that the purpose of the territorial 
exclusivity and the geo-blocking measures is to protect the exploitation of the work and for the right holder 
to receive an “appropriate remuneration”.  
In Premier League, the Court gave some indications on the factors that could be considered to determine 
whether a remuneration is “appropriate”: the remuneration should be reasonable in relation to the 
economic value of the service, in particular the actual or potential number of persons who enjoy or wish to 
enjoy the service (par. 109), the language of the broadcast (par. 110), but possibly also territorial 
exclusivity (par. 114) though not “absolute” territorial exclusivity that leads to artificial prices between 
partitioned (national) markets (par. 115).  
According to these criteria, there could be situations in which a justification for such restrictions to making 
a work available online within the boundaries of a single Member State could be put forward: 
 Exploitation windows.  Exclusivity.  In some sectors the exploitation of the work is organised in 
national windows. This is for example the case for some audiovisual (cinematographic) works 
(cinema release, DVD, on demand availability online and/or via digital TV, free TV broadcast). 
These windows are often determined at the national level.  
This national exploitation scheme could be affected if the audiovisual work were available on 
demand via the Internet. For example, a French provider of online services acquires an exclusive 
licence to make a film available online for a certain time. This period of exclusivity is determined 
on the basis of the French exploitation scheme. A different exploitation scheme of the same film 
applies however in Belgium and the service provider that has acquired the exclusive ”on demand” 
rights in Belgium is entitled to make the film available before the French service provider. Offering 
services in French and actively targeting (partially) the same French speaking public, the Belgian 
service provider may undermine the exploitation by the French service provider (or even more 
generally the French exploitation scheme).  
In such a case the contractual territorial restrictions could be justified to protect the exploitation of 
the work and ensure the appropriate remuneration of the right holder but this will depend on the 
all circumstances of the case, in particular the economic context (e.g. commercial practices per 
sector, temporary exclusivity for one service provider;  significant difference between the national 
exploitation windows,...). 
 Exploitation windows.  National competitors.   Another possibility for the right holder is to 
grant simple licences to several service providers and impose a contractual obligation to restrict 
access to these works to the territory of one Member State. Such a restriction to the freedom to 
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provide services could be justified in the case of national exploitation windows, where a work (a 
film, a book or an album) is released in different countries at different times, but where several 
providers within one country are entitled to simultaneously offer the work to the public.  
In general, other than during the initial release phase, it will be difficult to justify such restriction from the 
point of view of the right holder. Moreover, territorial restrictions are not imposed in all sectors,  e.g. most 
(old and new) music is offered at the same time via several services. Even without territorial exclusivity, it 
is possible for the right holder to negotiate and receive an appropriate remuneration from the service 
provider in function of the actual or potential audience (including those residing in other Member States).  
Inversely, territorial restrictions could be imposed not so much at the request of the right holder but of the 
service provider.  Such restrictions could be justifiable in certain circumstances, e.g. of the service 
provider’s interest to control the copyright remunerations.  If the remuneration is supposed to reflect the 
actual or potential public in all Member States, a small company may want to restrict the public having 
access to the works, thereby limiting the amount of the licence fee to be paid to right holders. 
Conclusion.  The outcome of the Premier League decision might thus affect the behaviour of the rights 
holders in the way they transfer their rights if the country of origin was applied to the making available 
right. We expect that copyright holders may be able to justify territorial access restrictions in certain cases 
(e.g. with regard to a temporary exclusive licence for new releases in a certain exploitation chronology) 
but not so much in other cases (e.g. with regard to the online exploitation of (older) works). 
4. Reproduction right 
Summary.  It has been found that the right of making a work available to the public and the reproduction 
right apply cumulatively to the use of a work.  The reproduction right is currently understood in a technical 
way, which means in practice that a reproduction in the technical sense, a “copy”, is equated to a 
reproduction in the legal sense.  The scope of protection of this economic right is limited by the 
mandatory exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  Despite several decisions 
of the CJEU, the overall scope of protection of the reproduction right is uncertain, especially in the light of 
non-permanent copies at the end-user’s end (e.g. streaming or browsing).   
Reproductions have been identified “upstream” and “downstream” in the average online on-demand use, 
i.e. on the server where the work is hosted for transmission and at the user’s end, after transmission on 
demand (leaving aside copies in the course of the transmission via a network).   
The reproduction right being applied cumulatively to the same processes as the making available right, an 
additional burden may be imposed upon the person who wants to clear the relevant rights to offer a 
service (the reproduction right and the making available right as a species of the right of communication 
to the public are not necessarily held by the same persons).  Also, it may increase the number of 
interested parties in case of an infringement.  
Having defined the making available to the public as a material act of upload that is localised in one 
Member State (where the uploader has her centre of interest or has performed the act of upload), it 
should be verified whether the location of the upstream reproduction coincides with the Member State 
where the work is made available.  The same should be done for the downstream reproductions, 
including for the copies made when an end-user actually accesses or receives a work.  Some temporary 
copies for viewing a work will be exempted but more permanent reproductions will require the author’s 
consent, wherever the act of reproduction is performed and even outside the territorial scope of the 
making available right. 
In the hypothesis under consideration, the making available right is constructed as to be localised in one 
single Member State (“country of origin” principle).  It is defined as the material act of upload (regardless 
of the wide accessibility that follows from this upload) and it is situated on the territory of one Member 
State.   
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One possibility is to localise the act of making available in the Member State where the material act of 
upload takes place. This would correspond to the Member State where the person uploading the work  
is present while she is uploading the work.  For legal entities, it is less straightforward to apply this 
criterion (especially if technical operations are performed in several Member States).  A more suitable 
criterion would be the Member State where the legal entity (service provider) has its establishment. 
The reproductions, inherent to the making available to the public, do not coincide with the act of making 
the work available to the public and may take place in other Member States than the act of making 
available localised in one “Member State of origin”. 
 The “upstream” reproduction (on the server where the publicly available work is hosted) takes 
place in the Member State where the reproduction is made.  
This may coincide with the Member State where the act of making available is localised, i.e. 
where act of upload is performed
362
.  Arguably, the material act of upload cannot be distinguished 
from the material act of reproduction on the hosting server.  However, it must be reminded that 
the Member States are free to determine who they consider as the person making a reproduction 
and that different solutions may exist (technical intervention v instructions or beneficiaries). 
If the act of making available is localised in the Member State of establishment, the act of 
reproduction may be situated in the same or in another Member State, i.e. where the material act 
of reproduction takes place.   
A reproduction could also be regarded as a continuous act, since it is kept for a longer period of 
time and be localised instead in the country where the servers are located on which the work is 
hosted.  This is not necessarily the same Member State as where the material act of upload is 
performed or where the uploader has her centre of activities.   
The localisation of the reproduction is not harmonised and does not automatically follow the 
localisation of the act of making available.  The reproduction and the making available rights 
being autonomous rights, relevant acts could be found in several Member States.  In theory, this 
could lead to a situation where one material act of uploading a work to a distant server is qualified 
as an act of making available in one Member State and a reproduction in another Member State.  
The technical approach to the reproduction right would bring about a result that a “country of 
origin” principle applied to the making available is meant to avoid, i.e. the difficulty of determining 
where the act of upload takes place. 
 The “downstream” reproductions (i.e. downloads and those access copies that are not covered by 
the exception for temporary acts of reproduction) are made at the end-user’s end.  
The downstream reproduction made in the Member State where the work was made available 
(i.e. where the act of upload takes place or at the centre of activities) will be localised in this 
Member State.  If the work is accessible in other Member States than where it was made 
available to the public, then the reproductions that follow directly from this availability will take 
place in other Member States.  The mere accessibility may not require a licence based on 
the making available right but by virtue of the reproduction right.  While the making 
available right is defined as to exclude the “mere accessibility” from its scope, the simple 
consultation (reading, viewing) of a work may entail copies that are considered reproductions 
                                                     
 
362 In Pinckney, the Advocate-General considered the case of pressing CDs and qualified this as an act of reproduction. By 
principle, infractions of the reproduction right are strictly territorial (“les atteintes au droit de reproduction revêtent en principe une 
dimension strictement territoriale”).  The Advocate-General found that the territory of the reproduction was Austria, without however 
specifying why this was so (location where the reproduction was made, establishment of the distributor).  Any extraterritorial effects 
were due to subsequent acts of distribution or communication to the public (Advocate-General in Pinckney, par. 25).  To determine 
which court is competent to hear the case with regard to the reproduction, article 5(3) Regulation 44/2001 grants jurisdiction to the 
court where the harmful event occurred, which may be understood as either the location of the event giving rise to the damage or 
where the damage is felt.  In case of a reproduction, the location of the event giving rise and the damage are identical, according to 
the Advocate-general (par. 53): “le préjudice résultant de l’atteinte à un droit de reproduction est entièrement réalisé du seul fait de 
l’accomplissement de l’acte de reproduction et survient doc dans le même lieu que ce dernier”. 
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wherever they are performed.  This is not only the case for downloads of permanent copies but 
also for access copies, that are not covered by any exception.   
It is remembered that the burden of acquiring a licence for this reproduction may be attributed 
according to different national rules.  The service provider should therefore take into account the 
eventuality that the work will be reproduced in any Member State where the work is accessible. 
In addition to a single act of making available to the public localised in one Member State, several 
reproductions may be found in the same or in different Member States, possibly “upstream”, certainly 
“downstream”.  If the work is accessible in other Member States than the “country of origin”, then it is 
likely that a reproduction will be made in another Member State.   
With a lack of harmonisation of the localisation criteria and the exceptions, it should be verified in which 
Member State the reproductions are made, who is responsible for the reproduction and whether the 
author’s consent is required. 
5. Intermediate conclusion 
In this section we have examined a construction that allows localising the act of making a work available 
to the public in one single Member State.  The restricted act was defined as the material act of upload 
(leading to the work being available to the public).  The localisation criterion could be either the centre of 
activities of the uploader (establishment, domicile or habitual residence) or the material act of upload.  
Both criteria could be combined, in order to solve some practical objections. The localisation criterion “act 
of upload” may be difficult to apply to legal entities with complex, international organisation structures so 
this criterion could be complemented by a fiction for legal entities that all acts of upload take place at the 
establishment of the legal entity.   
The localisation in one Member State has some legal consequences.   
Firstly, when the making available of a work entails pertinent facts in several countries, some conflicts of 
laws may arise, in particular with regard to the competent jurisdictions and the applicable law. 
Several courts may have competence to rule in a dispute with cross-border elements.  For provisional 
(protective) measures, the courts of any Member State may be seized provided that the intended 
measure has an effect on the territory of that Member State.  On the merits, the competence of the courts 
depends on the measure claimed.  A ruling on the entire damage can be expected from the courts of the 
Member State where the defendant has her domicile/establishment as well as from the courts of the 
Member State where the event giving rise to the infringement happened, i.e. where the act of upload has 
taken place or where the uploader has her centre of interest.  These locations correspond to the “country 
of origin”.  In addition, the courts of the countries where the damage occurs are competent to state on the 
part of the damage that is felt in that Member State.  This corresponds to the Member States where an 
exploitation of the work can be found (where the public is targeted).  Given the rulings of the Court in 
Wintersteiger and Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof, it is not sufficient that a work is accessible to find jurisdiction 
in that Member State.   
While the courts generally try to apply the lex fori, the applicable law to the making available right should 
by principle be determined by reference to the principle lex loci protectionis.  The Member State for which 
protection is claimed could be taken to refer to the country of transmission or reception, depending on the 
connecting factors.  However, a provision that would legally localise an act of making available in the 
Member State of origin could entail that this is also the country for which protection is claimed, if that 
provision is interpreted as a rule of applicable law. 
The localisation of the making available right in one Member State results in the following situation for the 
stakeholders. 
The author or right holder, whose rights are infringed, has different options.  For provisional measures, 
a legal action can be brought before the court of any Member State, even if these courts are not 
The territoriality of the making available right  159 
 
competent to decide on the merits of the case.  The entire damage can be claimed before the courts of 
the defendant’s domicile or where the act of upload has taken place.  This court will apply the law of the 
Member State for which protection is claimed, i.e. the law of the country of origin or the laws of the 
countries of exploitation..  The author or right holder can also seize the courts of the Member State where 
the damage is felt, which will then have to decide the case by applying the law of the Member State for 
which protection is claimed, i.e. the law of the country of origin or the law of the country of exploitation (lex 
fori).  It is unlikely that an action for the entire damage can be brought before the courts of the Member 
State where the author/right holder has the centre of her interests, as was the case in the CJEU’s ruling in 
eDate Advertising.  This case dealt with personality rights, which are distinct from the making available 
right that is seen as an economic right granted under copyright.   
The author/right holder may thus have to act outside the Member State where she has her centre of 
interests and the applicable law is country of origin, which de facto depends on the behaviour of the 
alleged infringer.   
The alleged infringer may be brought before the courts of her domicile/establishment or where she has 
performed the act of upload and will be judged by the law of the Member State of origin - which also 
depends on where she performs the act of making available - or by the law of the countries of 
exploitation.  However, she can also be called to defend herself before the courts of other Member States 
for provisional measures, cessation measures on the merits or partial reparation of the damage, which will 
be assessed by the laws of the country of origin or by the laws applicable in these countries of 
exploitation. 
The localisation in one country of origin has an impact on who is identified as the author or initial owner 
of copyrights.  The national rules on authorship and initial ownership are quite divergent:  all Member 
States see the creator of a work as its author to a certain extent but some have specific rules for 
collective work, works made by an employee in the context of her employment contract or provide 
presumed transfers of rights in favour of other persons than the author/creator.  Different persons may 
thus be indicated as the author or initial right holder, depending on the Member State where the work is 
made available to the public.  If the lex loci protectionis principle is applied or if the “country of origin” 
principle is read as a principle containing a conflict of laws rule, then different persons may be regarded 
as the authors or initial right holders in function of the applicable law (creator, person taking the initiative 
for a collective work, employer, film producer).  Moreover the outcome depends on a factor that is 
determined by the uploader/service provider, i.e. on where the act of making available is performed (i.e. 
where the material act of upload is performed or where the uploader has her centre of activities).  An 
alternative is to apply another principle to determine the applicable law, i.e. the lex loci originis which 
ensures that the applicable law is invariably the law of the country of origin of the work (rather than the 
country of origin of the making available). 
In principle the uploader or service provider who intends to make the work available to the public must 
clear this right before using the work (e.g. for a blog, an online music store or a film platform).  The 
definition and localisation in one Member State favours the uploader/service provider in the sense that the 
making available right should be cleared in one Member State only (rather than in several Member States 
where the work is accessible).  Since the rules on authorship and initial ownership are not harmonised, 
she must pay attention to the national rules and identify her contracting party accordingly (especially if the 
work is a collective work, if it is created in the framework of an employment contract or if other 
presumptions of transfers apply).  This disparity could be solved by harmonising the rules on authorship 
and initial ownership, although there are few indications that such need exists in practice.   
It is common for the author or the initial right owner to entrust the exploitation of the work to another party, 
such as a publisher, a record label or a film producer.  Contractual transfers by the initial right owner or 
subsequent contractual operations could lead to a fragmentation of rights:  the rights can be divided 
between different persons and on a territorial basis (even granting territorial exclusivity to one partner).  
Where the making available is localised, determines whose rights are at stake.  
The localisation of the making available right in one Member State results in the following situation for the 
stakeholders. 
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The right holder can grant a licence for making the work available from one Member State, in return for a 
licence fee based on the exploitation value of the work (actual or potential public).   
- Divergences on the national rules on authorship and initial ownership may (in theory) lead to 
different entitlements.  An initial right owner in one Member State may see herself deprived of any 
right if another person is considered the initial right owner in another Member State.   
- Territorial fragmentation.  Different persons may hold making available rights for different 
territories.  The making available right is localised on the territory of one Member State but has 
effects in other Member States.   
The licence granted by the person who owns rights in one Member State may affect, even undermine the 
rights of persons in other Member States.  The exploitation of the work by making it available on demand 
may be directed at one Member State; while the underlying act of making available to the public is 
localised in another Member State (upload, centre of activities of the uploader) and requires the consent 
of the right holder in that Member State, which means that the right holder in the Member State of 
exploitation is considered irrelevant in this process.  There is no necessary link between making available 
of the work and its exploitation. 
Right holders may use contractual constructions to restrict the exploitation of the work to national 
territories, thus requiring uploaders/service providers to make a work available in one Member State and 
to restrict access to the work to users being present on the territory of that Member State (i.e. excluding 
access from outside the Member State).  The effect of localising the act of making available in one 
Member State is thus undermined by contractual practice.  Such practices may constitute an infringement 
on the freedom to provide services within the EU or competition law.  Such restrictions may however be 
justified by demonstrating that these are necessary to protect the essential subject matter of copyright 
protection. 
Inversely, the person making the work available, i.e. the uploader, who may be a private person or a 
(commercial) service provider, should obtain the right holder’s consent prior to making the work available 
to the public.  Her act of making available will be localised in one Member State, where she should clear 
this making available right.  This means that the uploader should identify author, initial or derived right 
holder(s) in the MS where the making available takes place.   
- Author or initial right owner. Since there is no harmonisation in this field, the copyright laws of 
the Member States consider different people the author or initial owner of the making available 
right.  The uploader’s task may be complicated since she should verify which regime applies in 
the Member State where the work is made available. 
- Derived ownership.  The making available right may be transferred by contract to a third party.  
The uploader has the burden of identifying who holds the rights for the relevant territory. 
Once the uploader has identified the person holding the rights for the relevant territory, she can acquire 
licence for making the work available in one Member State, with effect in other Member States.  The 
remuneration due to the right holder can be calculated in function of the exploitation value, taking into 
account inter alia the actual or potential public across the Member States where the work can be 
accessed. 
For the end-user/public the variables on the making available right have no direct legal consequences.  
Under this construction the acts performed at the user’s end are not restricted under the making available 
right (although the reproduction right continues to apply).  Commercially, the end-user’s position may be 
affected by the larger offer of online services or, inversely, the national offer due to contractual 
restrictions. 
Conclusion.  The uncertainty with regard to the author/initial ownership of the work may be solved by 
harmonising the rules at the European level.  There are however few indications that this is a major 
problem in practice.  Furthermore, the harmonisation of the national rules on authorship and initial 
ownership will not prevent an ulterior fragmentation of rights so there are different derived right owners 
with making available rights. 
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The reproduction right is autonomous of the right of making available in the sense that the use of a work 
may cumulatively involve acts of making available to the public and reproduction.  In the scenario where 
the act of making available to the public is localised in a Member State of origin, the reproduction right 
may be exercised: 
- Upstream:  the work is reproduced on the server where the work is hosted for it to be accessible 
to the public. 
- Downstream:  the work being available to the public, reproductions may follow directly from this 
availability and occur at the end user’s end.  Some reproductions may be ephemeral and thus be 
exempted under the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir). 
Examples are the temporary copies made while consulting the work in order to view (television, 
computer, mobile device). Other reproductions are (more) permanent and cannot be exempted 
under this exception.  
Both the upstream and the downstream copies may be protected reproductions that require the right 
holder’s consent.  These protected acts may occur outside the Member States where the making 
available is localised.  Moreover, the person who holds the reproduction right is not necessarily the same 
person as the one holding the making available right (fragmentation of rights).  The rights for the 
reproductions, made upstream and downstream, should therefore be cleared.  Although the reproduction 
has been harmonised in the InfoSoc Directive, there remain national divergences with regard to the 
reproduction right, for example who bears the responsibility for clearing the reproduction right. 
The right holders’ consent is thus required for all uses that involve acts of making available and 
reproduction.  These rights could be in the hands of distinct persons.  It is not sufficient to acquire 
authorisation for making the work available in the Member State of origin, the consent is also required for 
acts of reproduction occurring outside the territory of making available. 
This means that the uploader, who intends to make a work available to the public, should not only clear 
the making available right in the Member State where this act takes place, but also the reproduction right 
for the upstream copies and possibly also for the downstream copies, depending on the national law in 
this regard.  This complicates the licensing process.  In case the uploader has not acquired any 
authorisation, she could be found responsible for infringements of the making available right and the 
reproduction right. 
The end-user who consults a work is likely to perform an act of reproduction.  In most streaming cases 
the copy will be exempted under the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  
The scope of this exception is still uncertain, further clarity being expected in future decisions of the 
CJEU.  Where a permanent copy is made, the author’s consent is required and this burden may fall upon 
the end-user.  The end-user may thus be at risk for example when a service provider makes works 
available to the public, the end-user receives the work directly from this service provider but the 
reproduction rights are not cleared for this end-user’s reproduction.  The end-user may rely on an 
exception to the reproduction right under national law.  National divergences subsist concerning the 
application of national exceptions (most exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive being optional except for the 
one covering temporary acts of reproduction).   
Conclusion.  The reproduction right is not inseparably connected to the making available right.  While the 
making available of a work to the public may be localised in one Member State, acts of reproduction may 
occur in the same Member State and outside this Member State, depending on where the copies are 
made and the work is reproduced.  Where no exception applies, this reproduction should be authorised 
by the holder of the reproduction right (who may be another than the holder of the making available right) 
either on the account of the uploader (the reproduction following directly from the availability of the work 
to the public) or the end-user.  
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B. Exploitation of the work 
In this section, it will be analysed how the making available right would be applied when the exploitation 
of the work is emphasised.  First it will be examined how the making available right can be localised in the 
Member State or Member States where the exploitation is taking place.  The efforts of the uploader to 
target a public is considered a distinctive criterion, for which practical indications will be summed up 
based on the decisions of the CJEU (sub 1).  Then the effects of such localisation criterion will be 
considered in terms of authorship and ownership of a work, the cumulative application with the 
reproduction right and enforcement (sub 2-4).  A summary of the findings will be described in the 
intermediate conclusion (sub 5). 
1. Principle 
The making available of a work to the public can be localised in the Member State or Member States 
where the work is exploited.  This localisation criterion results from the definition of the making available 
right as an act of exploitation.  A work is made available to the public if it is uploaded and made 
accessible to a public in a way that makes it possible for the uploader to derive an economic benefit from 
the public accessing it.  This does not mean that the uploader should actually pursue such benefit:  it 
suffices that this form of communication makes it possible to “monetise” the public.  The consequence is 
that the mere fact that a work is accessible does not automatically lead to finding an act of making 
available:  there should be concrete indications that the uploader meant to organise the exploitation of the 
work.   
It follows that the act of making available to the public can be localised in the Member States where such 
concrete indications are found of the uploader’s intentions to exploit the work on the territory of a given 
Member State.  It is not sufficient that work is technically accessible from the territory of a Member 
State
363
, it must be established that the exploitation was directed to this Member State, the uploader had 
the intention of addressing the public in that Member State.  Various and variable criteria could be applied 
to determine whether the exploitation takes place in a particular Member State:  the content made 
available could be of mainly national interest, the language in which the service is offered, references to 
local events, the currency, payment methods, marketing and promotional techniques,...  This does not 
mean that a work made available on a non-commercial basis should be assessed by different standards.  
Even if the uploader has no direct commercial purpose, her act of making available will be localised 
according to the location of exploitation, in particular the targeted public. 
In some cases it will be clear that the public of one particular Member State is targeted, e.g. because it is 
stated explicitly or it is implied in the branding of a service (e.g. in the trade name of the service).  In other 
cases, it will be more difficult to pinpoint one single Member State as the target of an uploader:  she may 
address the public in several Member States (e.g. language groups) or not distinguish at all.  In those 
cases the exploitation of the work will take place in several Member States, therefore acts of making 
available can be found in several Member States. 
A similar drift can be found in the relevant decisions of the Court of Justice.  In several cases the Court 
has sought evidence of the intention to target the public of a given Member State.  Moreover, the Court 
has distilled several concrete elements that indicate that a work is targeted at a public in the territory of a 
certain Member State. 
Sportradar.  In Sportradar, the question was asked where the act of re-utilisation of a database, covered 
by the sui generis protection of Directive 96/9, took place:  in the Member State where the web server is 
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located or in the Member State where the user is located to whose computer the data are sent.  The 
Court first defined the restricted act as “extending to any act, not authorised by the maker of the database 
protected by the sui generis right, of distribution to the public of the whole or part of the contents of the 
database” and covering an act “in which a person sends, by means of his web server, to another person’s 
computer, at that person’s request, data previously extracted from the content of a database protected by 
the sui generis right.  By such a sending, that data is made available to a member of the public”
364
.  This 
act of sending is localised – at least – in the Member State “where there is evidence from which it may be 
concluded that the act discloses an intention on the part of the person performing the act to target 
members of the public in [that Member State]”
365
.   
Relevant circumstances in this case were that the data in the database related to English football league 
matches
366
, contracts concluded with companies knowing that they offer betting services to the UK public, 
possibly a remuneration taking into account the activities of the betting companies in the UK market and 
the prospects of its website subsequently being consulted by internet users in the UK.  Supporting 
evidence could be found in the circumstance that the services (in which the data are used) are offered in 
the language of the customers, which is not the language commonly used in the Member States from 
which Sportradar pursues its activities. 
The Court in Sportradar referred often to its rulings in other cases that were more or less comparable. 
Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof.  In the joined case Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof, the Court was asked to find 
whether a trader (operating via the Internet) “directed its activity to the Member State of a consumer’s 
domicile” in order to establish jurisdiction
367
.  The Court found that an intention to target one or more 
Member States was implicit in certain forms of advertising, such as traditional forms (press, radio, 
television, cinema, catalogues or offers in person), but not in others, such as the Internet advertisement.  
The mere fact that such Internet ads are accessible outside the Member State where the trader has its 
establishment does not entail that it is directed to other Member States.  It had to be verified whether the 
trader has manifested its intention to establish commercial relations with consumers from one or more 
other Member States, including that of the consumer’s domicile
368
.   
The Court listed non-exhaustively which factors could indicate that the trader’s activity was directed to the 
Member State of the consumer’s domicile:  the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries 
from other Member States for going to the place where the trader is established, use of a language or a 
currency other than the language or currency generally used in the Member State in which the trader is 
established with the possibility of making and confirming the reservation in that other language, mention 
of telephone numbers with an international code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service 
in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other 
Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the trader 
is established, and mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various 
Member States
369
.  By contrast, the mere accessibility of the trader’s or the intermediary’s website in the 
Member State in which the consumer is domiciled is insufficient, as is the mention of an email address 
and of other contact details, or of use of a language or a currency which are the language and/or currency 
generally used in the Member State in which the trader is established
370
. 
eBay.  In eBay, the Court decided a case on the offer of goods via the online market place eBay.  Some 
goods were counterfeits, the offer for sale of others entailed the use of a sign that could be an 
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infringement of exclusive trademark rights.  The issue was whether the Community and/or national trade 
mark protection applied to the online offer for sale, since the goods were located in a third state or the 
person behind the offer was established in a third state.  It was decided that (Community or national) 
trade mark protection applies “as soon as it is clear that the offer for sale of a trade-marked product 
located in a third State is targeted at consumers in the territory covered by the trade mark”
371
.  The 
effectiveness of the trade mark protection would indeed be undermined if it did not apply to such use of a 
sign, directed at consumers in the EU, merely because the establishment of the person behind the offer 
or the advertisement, the hosting server for the website or the offered product offered for sale were 
located in a third State.  It is however not sufficient that the website is merely accessible from the territory 
covered by the trade mark, to conclude that the offer for sale is targeted at the consumers in that territory.  
It is for the national court to assess “on a case-by-case basis whether relevant factors exist, on the basis 
of which it may be concluded that an offer for sale or an advertisement displayed on an online 
marketplace accessible from the territory covered by the trade mark is targeted at consumers in that 
territory”
372
.  Any details of “the geographic areas to which the seller is willing to dispatch the product” on 
the website where the offer to sell is displayed are particularly important to assess whether the public in 
the territory (in this case the EU) are targeted.   
Donner.  In Donner, the issue was the localisation of the act of distribution to the public by sale.  An 
Italian company sold replica furniture inter alia to the German public, this furniture at that time not being 
effectively protected under Italian copyright.  The furniture was brought to customers in Germany via an 
Italian freight forwarding firm.  The issue was whether the German person heading the freight forwarding 
firm could be criminally pursued in Germany for infringement of the distribution right.  The Court of Justice 
answered the question by a description of the right of distribution to the public and by localising this 
(complex) act.  The notion of distribution to the public (art. 4(1) InfoSoc Dir) was understood as “making 
available to the public through sale” (art. 6(1) WCT) and it was characterised by a series of acts, going 
from the conclusion of the sale contract to the delivery to a member of the public
373
.  In case of a cross-
border sale, consisting of several acts which may take place in different Member States, the distribution 
right may be infringed in a number of Member States.  The Court found that, in complex operations 
involving different actors, a trader is responsible for acts carried out “by him or on his behalf”, but also for 
acts by a third party “where [the trader] specifically targeted the public of the State of destination and 
must have been aware of the actions of that third party”
374
.   
Relevant factors were the existence of a website in German, the content and the distribution channels of 
the advertising materials, a cooperation with a freight forwarding company making deliveries in Germany 
and these could be taken as proving such targeted activity.  It was stated, generally, that “a trader who 
directs his advertising at member of the public residing in a given Member State and creates or makes 
available to them a specific delivery system and payment method, or allows a third party to do so, thereby 
enabling those members of the public to receive delivery of copies of works protected by copyright in that 
same Member States, makes, in the Member State where the delivery takes place, a distribution to the 
public”
375
. 
A caveat must be expressed, since these decisions each deal with a particular set of facts and are 
perhaps not to be generalised.  At least in Donner and in Sportradar it was fairly straightforward which 
(national) public was targeted.  In Donner, the specific advertisement system, the delivery and the 
payment methods were clearly directed to the German public.  In Sportradar, the database was offered to 
betting companies directed to the UK market (the bets relating in particular to the football competitions of 
England and Scotland).  The Advocate-General in Pinckney considers however that these principles may 
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apply in a case of (alleged) infringement of the rights of distribution and communication to the public via 
Internet
376
. 
Summary.  Yet an attempt can be made to distil some general guidelines from these cases.  The Court 
generally applies a “targeting” criterion, meaning that it localises the restricted act in the Member State or 
Member States if the person performing the act has the intention of targeting the public in that Member 
State.  It is not sufficient that a work is accessible in a Member State, to find that the public in that 
Member State is targeted. 
The following criteria have been taken as indications of a targeting activity:  content of the service of 
particular interest to the public in one Member State (national football competition), the terms of the 
contract (remuneration in function of the public), the willingness to dispatch goods in particular 
geographical areas, the presence of a specific delivery system, advertisement materials, a specific 
payment method. 
Other criteria have circumstantial value, such as the language in which the service is offered or the 
currency in which it can be paid.  The fact that the service is offered in a certain language is by itself not 
conclusive to a targeting activity.  The circumstance that the service is presented in the language of the 
customers and that is different from the language commonly spoken in the Member State from where the 
service provider pursues its activities may indicate that the public of another Member State is targeted. 
The Court’s approach in these cases is helpful for the approach developed under the “exploitation 
scenario”, where the act of making available is defined as an act of exploitation and is localised in the 
Member States where the exploitation takes place.  In both cases the “public” is central:  the 
uploader/service provider has the intention of reaching a public, which creates a possibility to monetise 
the works (directly or indirectly, actually or potentially). 
This approach has advantages and disadvantages, depending on the point of view.  
It corresponds to the exploitation approach to the making available right.  If the making available right is 
understood as protecting a particular form of exploitation, then the territorial scope should correspond to 
this definition
377
.   
It allows taking into account the geographic location of the public (territoriality principle) and the right 
holders have exclusive control over the exploitation of their works per Member State.  This criterion 
reduces the risk of location shopping and the authors are less vulnerable to circumvention (pressure 
towards the country of lower protection).  In case of fragmentation of rights, the act of making available 
requires the consent of person holding a right for one given territory, where the exploitation will take place 
and the effects of the making available will be felt.  Inversely, this person will have the possibility to take 
legal action in case of infringement. 
At the same time, this criterion relieves the uploader/service provider from the burden of acquiring the 
authors’ consent in all Member States where the work is merely accessible
378
 (as far as the making 
available right is concerned).  No restricted act takes place where the work is accessible, as long as the 
exploitation is covered by a licence (which takes due account of the public that actually has access).   
The location of the exploitation (in contrast to mere accessibility) of the work may be established by 
variable and various criteria, which will appear and be weighed on a case-by-case basis.  This has also 
been the method of the CJEU in the cases discussed above.  This approach allows a certain flexibility to 
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each particular case (taking into account the choices made by the uploader/service provider and her/its 
efforts to “target” specific audiences).   
The difficulty with this localisation criterion is its formulation in an abstract and generally applicable rule 
that offers enough clarity to be applied in practice.   
Firstly, an all-encompassing definition of an “exploitation” of a work is difficult to fix.   The objective criteria 
to define the concept of exploitation and the target of that exploitation have to be defined through a case-
by-case approach.  There is little or no legal certainty concerning the particular criteria to find a national 
exploitation.  It appears from the cases decided by the CJEU that the criteria to find targeting activities are 
intrinsically connected to the facts of the case.  A body of case law will be construed over time but before 
that time there is some legal uncertainty as to the Member States where acts of making available are 
performed.  
The online exploitation of a work in several countries will lead to acts of making available in several 
Member States.  Especially in case of a multi-territorial exploitation directed indiscriminately to a public 
spread over the territories of several or all Member States, there is no unique or decisive localisation 
factor.  This is more the case when parts of the European public are addressed based on other criteria 
than purely national ones, e.g. an international news website offered in English or in several European 
languages.  In that case the works are made available in several Member States, i.e. in each Member 
State where the exploitation is realised.  
In cases where it would be impossible to localise the exploitation in one or several identified countries, 
then there is a risk that the act of making available would be considered to occur in all the countries 
where the work is accessible. 
If there is a will for localisation of the protected act in one single country, then de lege ferenda a criterion 
should be found to choose one Member State of exploitation among the different Member States where 
an exploitation could be found.   It seems however not practically feasible to select one Member State of 
exploitation if the exploitation is equally spread over several Member States without seeming arbitrary.   
2. Conflict of laws 
The impact of the exploitation scenario on the principles of private international law is limited. We will 
successively examine its effects on the issues of jurisdiction (sub a) and applicable law (sub b). 
a) Jurisdiction 
In the exploitation scenario, the act of making available is localised in the Member States where the work 
is exploited, i.e. where the national public is targeted.  In case of a purely national exploitation, the act of 
making available will be localised in that Member State.  When the work is addressed to several national 
publics, to a Europe-wide public or to no national public in particular (e.g. the Pirate Bay), the exploitation 
takes place in several Member States and the act of making available is localised in several Member 
States.   
The courts of any Member State can be seized for provisional measures, even if this is not the court that 
has jurisdiction on the merits.  It is uncertain if the CJEU ruling Solvay v Honeywell (a patent case) 
applies for provisional cross border injunction in copyright.   
On the merits, the courts of the place where the defendant is domiciled are competent.  Moreover, the 
courts of the Member State where the harmful event occurred are also competent. It means that the 
courts of the place where the event giving rise to the damage – i.e. the courts of the Member State where 
the activation process was decided (where the user/uploader is established) – have jurisdiction with 
regard to the entire damage, Finally, the courts of the Member State where the damage occurs - namely 
the courts where the public targeted by the exploitation of the work– are also competent. Their jurisdiction 
is however limited to the damage occurring in their country. Even if the decision delivered in the case 
Sportradar – according to which “the mere fact that the website containing the data is accessible in a 
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particular national territory is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the operator of the website is 
performing an act of re-utilisation (…) in that territory”
379
 – could be applied to the making available right, it 
could be argued that the Courts of the Member States where the work is accessed also have jurisdiction, 
if a damage is suffered in that country, even if the exploitation of the work does not specifically target that 
country.In case of a transnational exploitation, it may be difficult for the seized court to rule on the entire 
damage:  if the work is also exploited in other Member States, then the courts of those Member States 
are also competent to rule on the entire harm.   
The connecting factor of the place of the centre of interests of the right holder, which was applied in the 
case of an infringement of a personality right, is not directly transposable to the case of the infringement 
of an economic right under copyright. Cessation measures on the merits can be claimed before the courts 
of the Member State where the defendant has her domicile/establishment (including intermediaries such 
as ISPs), where the harmful event has occurred (with cross-border effect) and where the damage is felt 
(national effect). 
b) Applicable law 
In case of a purely national exploitation (possibly de facto enforced by technological measures), the act of 
making available is performed in one Member State
380
.  An exploitation that addresses a wider public may 
by contrast be localised in several Member States, hence several laws may apply to one material act with 
effects in different Member States according to the lex loci protectionis (interpreted in favour of the laws of 
the countries of reception). However, it will not suffice that the work is accessible in a Member State to 
find that the act of making available takes place in that Member State (the so-called spill-over).  This 
principle is in conformity with the Sportradar decision of the CJEU. 
It could thus be imagined that a work is made available on a website turned to the German-speaking 
public.  Depending on the circumstances of the case, acts of making available could be found in Germany 
and in Austria (e.g. a music website with national charts for both countries, references to regional music 
events, local artists, ...).  The mere fact that the website is accessible to German-speakers in e.g. Belgium 
does not entail that the works are made available in Belgium.  If two acts are localised in resp. Germany 
and Austria (where the targeted publics are present), the national copyright acts of Germany and Austria 
will apply to the infringement and to the measures available to enforce the national copyright acts.  It can 
thus be imagined that one court is seized (in conformity with the principles of jurisdiction) which will then 
apply different national copyright laws to find the infringement, evaluate the damage or impose other 
measures (depending on the localisation of the restricted acts). This criterion suits well in those cases 
where a targeted national public can be identified – or a restricted number of publics.  It is not so 
straightforward to identify the applicable law in case of pan-European or even global service (e.g. global 
news websites in several languages):  where no clearly targeted public can be identified, it could seem 
arbitrary to localise the service in one Member State or in some selected Member States.   
3. Authorship, ownership and transfer of rights 
The authorship of copyright protected works is only partially harmonised at the European level.  The 
Member States are competent to determine authorship of works that are not subject to a European 
directive (such as computer programs, databases or audiovisual works).  All Member States under 
consideration adopt the “creator doctrine” to some extent.  There are however important differences, in 
particular with regard to collective works, works created by an employee in the context of her employment 
and even audiovisual works (although the effects are mitigated by the presumed transfer of rights in 
favour of the producer).  Moreover, the issue of copyright contracts has not been harmonised at all, which 
results in important disparities between the national copyright laws.  Some Member States barely regulate 
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the contracts on the exploitation of copyright works, other Member States impose more or less detailed 
conditions for the validity, interpretation or enforcement of copyright contracts. 
These disparities are likely to have an impact on the position of the right holders when applied to a 
making available right that is localised in one single Member State. 
The making available right is understood in this section as an act of exploitation, localised in the Member 
State or Member States where the exploitation takes place, i.e. where the public is targeted.  One or 
several acts of making available can thus be identified and localised in one or several Member States. 
This may have repercussions on the determination of authorship, ownership and the transfer of rights 
rules.   
a) Authorship and initial ownership 
Authorship and initial ownership.  This entails that the authorship or initial ownership is determined in 
accordance with the laws of the Member State where the act of making available takes place.  By 
consequence, it affects the acquisition of licences and right to take legal action in case of infringement. 
If a work is made available to the public in one Member State because it appears clearly from all 
circumstances that the public of one Member State is targeted, the exploitation takes place in that 
Member State.  Depending on the choice of the law applicable to determine the authorship/initial 
ownership (lex loci originis or lex loci protectionis), the author or initial right owner might be determined in 
accordance with the rules in the Member State of exploitation.  If the exploitation takes place in several 
Member States, distinct acts of making available are performed in those Member States where the public 
is addressed.  The case could be that a service is directed at all members of the public of the EU (e.g. 
content that could be of interest to everyone, accessible in a language commonly understood in all 
Member States) or that a service is directed at the public in a smaller number of Member States (e.g. 
where the public shares a certain cultural interest or – often related – language). The application of the 
principles lex loci protectionis and lex loci originis are successively analysed hereunder in order to show 
the different outcomes they would provide.  
Lex loci protectionis.  The lex loci protectionis may refer to the law of the country of transmission or to 
the laws of the countries of reception (Member States of exploitation).   
In the second hypothesis, the uploader/service provider who intends to make a work available on the 
internet will have to comply with the law applicable in each country she/it targets. Doing so, they will have 
to determine the owner(s) of the rights according to the law of each country targeted.  In some situations, 
different persons will have to grant their authorisation (cumulatively) for the overall exploitation of a work 
on internet.  
For example, a news aggregator that makes news articles (already published online) available to the 
public needs to clear the right of making available to the public.  Leaving aside the contractual 
assignment for now, this aggregator needs to obtain the authorisation of the journalist (creator) or the 
publisher (employer or initiator of a collective work).  This depends on where the act of making available 
was performed.  If the news aggregator targets the publics of several Member States, then the consent 
for each Member State must be acquired (since distinct acts of exploitation and therefore making 
available are established).  If these Member States consider the same person as the author/initial right 
owner, then one contract can cover the entire exploitation.  If different persons are identified as the 
author/initial right holder of the work, then separate contracts will have to be concluded per territory (e.g. 
the journalist/author or the publisher/employer/initiator of a collective work
381
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Inversely, in case of infringement, it is either the journalist or the publisher who can take legal action and 
claim cessation or damages from the news aggregator.  Again, who can initiate the legal action depends 
on where the work was made available. The uploader/service provider does not have to clear the making 
available rights for all the territories where the work is accessible.  In principle the potential number of 
national laws governing the act of making available is reduced:  only the law of the countries targeted by 
the act of exploitation would apply instead of the law of each country where the work is accessible.  
In that context, the harmonization of the rules on the determination of authorship would of course simplify 
the users or service providers’ activities. In the absence of harmonisation, the situation would be 
significantly similar to the one that currently rules the Internal Market.   
Lex loci originis.  By contrast, if the lex loci originis principle is applied to determine the authorship of a 
work, then the initial right holder is invariable (supra sub C.2), regardless of where the act of making 
available is localised.  According to the principle of lex loci originis, the initial owner of copyright is 
determined in accordance with the law of the country of origin of the work (not the origin of the making 
available), i.e. the country of the first publication of the work or, in case of unpublished works, the country 
of which the author is a national (art. 5(4) BC).  In that case, the same person holds the making available 
right, regardless of where the act of making available to the public is performed. 
Under the lex loci originis, the initial right holder is invariable, regardless of the interpretation of the 
making available right and regardless of where an act of making available is localised. The initial owner of 
copyright would thus remain the same person wherever the country where the work is then exploited. 
Once this person identified, the licence contract between the right holder and the uploader/service 
provider would be governed by the law of the contract (infra).   Inversely, the author identified according 
to the copyright law in the country of first publication of the work has the right to claim infringement of her 
right, if her work is made available without her consent (unless she has transferred her rights to a third 
party).   
In case the lex loci originis is applied, the need to harmonise at the European level the rules on the 
determination of authorship appears to be limited.   Still it would be a cumbersome task to clear the rights, 
especially for service providers offering a wide range of works (such as automated aggregators or music 
providers).  Practically, the need to harmonise the rules on authorship and initial ownership should be 
assessed taking into consideration the contractual practices in the different sectors.  If it appears that (in 
some sectors) the rights are transferred by contract to one person or a limited number of people, then the 
need to harmonise the (preceding stage) of authorship or initial ownership is not so pressing.  This 
assessment is however beyond the scope of this Study. 
b) Transfer of rights 
Transfer of rights.  As far as the transfer of rights is concerned, a distinction has to be made between 
contracts operating a transfer of rights concluded prior to the making available of the work, and contracts 
expressly concluded to give an authorisation for the making available of the work (“contracts with the 
purpose of the making available of the work”). 
Preceding transfer of rights – derived ownership.  We have described how the uploader/service 
provider should proceed to determine the author or initial right owner of a work she intends to make 
available to the public.  However, in many cases the uploader/service provider will be confronted with a 
derived right holder, rather than the author/creator.  It is common for authors to entrust the exploitation of 
their works to a publisher, record label, film producer, collecting society,...  The uploader/service provider 
should then conclude a contract for the exploitation of the work with the person actually holding the right 
of making available to the public.  She has no option but to respect the existing contracts between the 
author/initial right owner and the derived right holder.  It matters not where the intended act of making 
available will take place:  the location of the restricted act does not have an influence on who has 
acquired those rights from the author/initial right owner. 
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Consequently, if a contractual transfer of the rights in a work has occurred, the uploader or the service 
provider who intends to make that work available should acquire the rights in conformity with the 
contractual arrangements of the author or initial right owner.  The location of the intended act of making 
available as such will not lead to variable right holders by virtue of the national copyright rules, since the 
existing contracts determine which party holds the relevant making available right.  By contrast, it may 
matter where the making available takes place in case the making available rights have been granted to 
different parties per national territory (territorial fragmentation).  It should then be determined in which 
Member State the intended act of making the work available to the public will be situated, in order to 
determine which party holds the (exclusive) rights to this territory and who can grant a licence to the 
candidate uploader. 
Similarly, if the work is made available by a user or a service provider without prior consent of the rights 
holder, the person having acquired the rights in execution of that copyright contract will be entitled to 
claim compensation.  
Contract operating transfer of making available right.  If the act of making available is localised in the 
Member State(s) where the exploitation takes place, then the rights should be cleared for all those 
Member States (restricted act).  It should then be determined which law is applicable to the contract in 
which the licence for the making available (per Member State) is granted.  This means that one act of 
exploitation, directed at several Member States, could entail an act of making available in these Member 
States and that the person holding the rights for each of those Member States should authorise this 
exploitation (per Member State).  This is not so much of a practical problem for the uploader/service 
provider if all rights are held by one person (possibly a derived right holder).  By contrast, if the rights of 
making available are (territorially) fragmented and held by different persons, then the uploader/service 
provider should acquire the consent from the person who holds the rights for the Member State where an 
exploitation of the works can be found. 
The application of a criterion of localisation to the making available right could have a consequence in the 
determination of the law applicable to the contracts operating the transfer of rights on works with the 
purpose to make them available on internet. In the absence of a choice made by the contracting parties, 
the law applicable to these contracts would necessarily be the law applicable in the country where the act 
is deemed to occur.   
Concerning the transfers of rights, the localisation of the protected act at the place of exploitation of the 
work leaves the question open for the determination of the law applicable to contracts operating the 
transfer of the rights on works exploited in several countries (contracts concluded “with the purpose” of 
the making available of the work), provided that the contract does not specify the applicable law.  It may 
however matter that a restricted act is found in each country where a national public is targeted:  this may 
influence the determination of the state to which the contract is most closely connected or of where the 
characteristic obligation should be performed. 
4. Reproduction right 
Summary.  It has been found that the right of making a work available to the public and the reproduction 
right apply cumulatively to the use of a work.  The reproduction right is currently understood in a technical 
way, which means in practice that a reproduction in the technical sense, a “copy”, is equated to a 
reproduction in the legal sense.  The scope of protection of this economic right is limited by the 
mandatory exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  Despite several decisions 
of the CJEU, the overall scope of protection of the reproduction right is uncertain, especially in the light of 
non-permanent copies at the end-user’s end (e.g. streaming or browsing).   
Reproductions have been identified “upstream” and “downstream” in the average online on-demand use, 
i.e. on the server where the work is hosted for transmission and at the user’s end, after transmission on 
demand (leaving aside copies in the course of the transmission via a network).   
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The reproduction right being applied cumulatively to the same processes as the making available right, an 
additional burden may be imposed upon the person who wants to clear the relevant rights to offer a 
service (the reproduction right and the making available right as a species of the right of communication 
to the public are not necessarily held by the same persons).  Also, it may increase the number of 
interested parties in case of an infringement.  
Having defined the making available to the public as a material act of upload that is localised in one 
Member State (where the uploader has her centre of interest or has performed the act of upload), it 
should be verified whether the location of the upstream reproduction coincides with the Member State 
where the work is made available.  The same should be done for the downstream reproductions, 
including for the copies made when an end-user actually accesses or receives a work.  Some temporary 
copies for viewing a work will be exempted but more permanent reproductions will require the author’s 
consent, wherever the act of reproduction is performed and even outside the territorial scope of the 
making available right. 
In this section, the making available right has been approached in a more economical way, centred on the 
exploitation of the work. The restricted act of making available is localised where the exploitation takes 
place, in particular where the public is targeted.  An exploitation may cover several Member States, 
but the mere accessibility of a work in a Member State does not suffice to find a restricted act in that 
Member State. 
The reproductions do not necessarily take place in the same Member States as the making available of 
the work. In many instances reproductions of the work will occur in the Member State where the work is 
being exploited (and where the making available takes place) but this is not necessarily the case. 
 The “upstream” reproduction (on the server where the publicly available work is hosted) takes 
place in the Member State where the reproduction is made.  
This may well be in the Member State where the work is made available (exploitation), but this is 
not necessarily the case.  The reproduction right is indeed determined according to technical 
criteria, which are not pertinent to the making available right (understood as an act of 
exploitation).  It is more than plausible that the upstream reproduction takes place in one Member 
State (where the hosting server is located or where the material act of upload has taken place) 
but the exploitation by making available is oriented to other Member States (where the public is 
targeted).  It should be remembered that the Member States are free to determine the criteria to 
localise a reproduction and who made it. 
 The “downstream” reproductions (i.e. downloads and those access copies that are not covered by 
the exception for temporary acts of reproduction) are made at the end-user’s end.  
The download or access by a member of the targeted public, as a direct consequence of the work 
being made available to the public, will give rise to a reproduction.   
When a member of the targeted public makes the reproduction, then the reproduction takes place 
in the same Member State as the act of making the work available to the public (of that Member 
State).  When the work is reproduced in a Member State where the public has access but is not 
specifically targeted by the uploader/service provider, an act of reproduction may occur outside 
the Member State where the act of making available takes place. 
A number of factors may complicate the picture.  Firstly, the reproduction right and the right of 
making available are in different hands.  Secondly, Member States may have different rules for 
determining who has the burden of clearing the reproduction rights (the uploader/service provider 
and/or the person making the reproduction at the end-user’s end).  It should also be reminded 
that the Member States are free to determine the localisation criteria for the reproduction right.  
This may play a role in times of cloud computing, where the final user does not store her copies in 
her proximity (but under her virtual control) and where the role of technical intermediaries is more 
important. 
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In the simplest scenario, the rights of reproduction and making available are held by one and the 
same person and the rights for the reproductions at the end-user’s end can be cleared by the 
uploader/service provider.  It is more complicated when the making available right and the 
reproduction rights are (territorially) fragmented, so the making available right should be cleared 
for all the Member States where the uploader/service provider intends to exploit the work by a 
contract with the persons holding the rights to those territories.  In addition, the uploader/service 
provider should acquire the reproduction right for all those territories where a reproduction is 
expected from the holders of the reproduction right per territory.  In addition to these rights, 
reproductions may occur in the Member States where the work is accessible, but the public of 
that Member State was not targeted as such (no act of making available).  The uploader/service 
provider and/or the end-user accessing the work are at risk of copyright infringement.  This could 
be the case, e.g. when a member of the targeted public accesses a work when she is “abroad” 
(e.g. “expat” communities or business trip).  This is the result of the technical interpretation that is 
currently given to the reproduction right.  
In addition to the acts of making available in the Member States of exploitation, several reproductions 
may take place, “upstream” and “downstream”.  If the work is accessible in other Member States than 
where the public is explicitly targeted, then it is likely that a reproduction will be made in those Member 
States.  With a lack of harmonisation of the localisation criteria and the exceptions, it should be verified in 
which Member State the reproductions are made, who is responsible for the reproduction and whether 
the author’s consent is required. 
We have found here that the reproduction right is approached in a merely technical way and that the 
scope of the reproduction right (in combination with the exception for temporary acts of reproduction) is 
uncertain.  The rights of reproduction and making available being autonomous rights that can be applied 
cumulatively to the same use of a work, the net copyright protection may be reinforced.  Since 
reproductions can be found both upstream and downstream of the act of making available, the 
reproduction right may undermine any definition and localisation of the making available right.  A 
consistent approach to the reproduction right and the making available right could be sought to solve this 
issue (either by reviewing the reproduction right or by defining the relation between both exploitation 
rights).   
5. Intermediate conclusion 
In this section we have examined the approach of the making available right, understood as an act of 
exploitation and localised in the Member State or Member States where an exploitation of the work takes 
place.  The mere circumstance that a work is accessible is not sufficient to find an act of making available.  
The localisation criterion in practice can be understood as the targeting or the intention to target a public 
of a Member State.  Indications of such targeting efforts can be found in the existing body of decisions of 
the CJEU:  content of the service of particular interest to the public in one Member State (national football 
competition), the terms of the contract (remuneration in function of the public), the willingness to dispatch 
goods in particular geographical areas, the presence of a specific delivery system, advertisement 
materials, a specific payment method.  Indications with circumstantial proof are the language in which the 
service is offered and the accepted currency.   
This entails that when a work is exploited in several Member States (i.e. it is accessible on demand of the 
user and the user is part of the public the uploader intends to address), several acts of making available 
can be found in those Member States (where the public is targeted). 
These principles pose few difficulties in a purely national situation, when a work is made available on 
demand to the end-user by an uploader/service provider in the same Member State and interested 
members of the public outside this Member State have no access to the work.  This may be the case for 
“video on demand” offered by digital television service providers with national distribution networks.  By 
contrast, if the work is accessible on demand to a larger public, the act of making available should be 
identified (the exploitation of the work being turned towards a general or a more circumscribed public) and 
localised (possibly in several Member States), while being distinguished from the mere accessibility that 
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does not result in a distinct act of making available to the public.  This means that where a work is offered 
on demand of the public of two Member States (e.g. an e-book platform mirroring the distribution 
channels of the hard copy, including promotion in certain Member States with a common language), one 
act of exploitation is directed at two national publics and an act of making available can be found in each 
Member State. 
Conflict of laws. The impact of the exploitation scenario on the issues of private international law is 
limited. It does not affect the application of the rules on jurisdictions: the courts of the Member State 
where the defendant is domiciled and, in case of infringement, the courts of the Member State where the 
event giving rise to the infringement took place and the courts of the Member State where the damage 
occurs remain competent. 
As to the applicable law, the lex loci protectionis could lead to the cumulative application of the law(s) of 
the Member State(s) where the work is exploited (provided that the lex loci protectionis is interpreted in 
favour of the countries of reception). This could clarify the issues on applicable law and eventually limit 
the number of copyright legislation to take into account.  
The author/right holder has several possibilities to litigate in case of infringement.  She can claim 
provisional measures before the courts of all Member States of the EU, even if those courts are not 
competent on the merits.  It could be argued that a provisional cross-border injunction is available as long 
as the court does not issue a final ruling on the copyright protection and the protection is not seriously 
challenged.  She can seize the courts of the Member State of domicile/establishment of the defendant or 
where the event giving rise to the infringement occurred, for the reparation of the entire damage.  The 
amount of this damage will be calculated by reference to the laws applicable in the Member States of 
exploitation.  Cessation measures on the merits can be granted by this court, which will apply the law of 
the Member State for which protection is claimed, i.e. where the effect is sought.  The author/right holder 
can also bring legal actions before the courts where the damage is felt.  These courts are competent to 
state on the damage on that territory, applying its own law as the lex loci protectionis, interpreted as the 
law of the Member State of exploitation,   
The uploader/alleged infringer can be brought before the courts of the Member State where she has 
her domicile/establishment or where she has performed the act of upload, in addition to all other Member 
States where provisional measures can be claimed.  Furthermore, she can be expected to defend her 
case before the courts where the work is exploited, i.e. where the public is targeted.  The 
uploader/alleged infringer can thus de facto influence which courts are competent to hear the case.   
Author/initial right owner.  The rules on authorship/initial ownership are not entirely harmonised at the 
European level.  These may have an impact on who is entitled to grant authorisation or who has the 
quality to take legal action in case of infringement.  All Member States see the creator of a work as its 
author to a certain extent but some have specific rules for collective work, works made by an employee in 
the context of her employment contract or provide presumed transfers of rights in favour of other persons 
than the author/creator.  Different persons may thus be indicated as the author or initial right holder, 
depending on the Member State where the work is made available to the public. 
Lex loci protectionis.  Where the on demand exploitation of the work is oriented to the public in different 
Member States, distinct acts of making available are performed in distinct Member States.  The national 
rules on authorship and initial ownership may diverge and may apply cumulatively, so several “initial right 
holders” may intervene for overall exploitation (e.g. via the Internet).  Similarly, different persons may 
have the quality to bring legal action in one Member State where they are considered authors/initial 
owners.   
Lex loci originis.  If the authorship/initial ownership is determined according to this principle, the same 
person is invariably considered the author/initial owner of the making available right.  Without subsequent 
contractual assignments, this single person can grant licences for the overall exploitation of the work, 
even if this results in acts of making available in several Member States.  
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Transfer of rights.  The preceding transfer of rights by the author/initial owner to a derived right holder is 
not affected by the localisation in the Member States of exploitation.  If the preceding assignments have 
resulted in a (territorial) fragmentation of rights, then the person holding the rights for the relevant territory 
of exploitation should be identified (either for licensing or enforcement purposes).  An on demand 
exploitation that is directed to the public of several Member States can thus result in acts of making 
available in distinct Member States and require the consent of different right holders in different Member 
States. 
The localisation in the Member State of exploitation (targeted Member State) leads to the following 
situation for the following stakeholders. 
The right holder can grant a licence for the Member State where the exploitation takes place.  Her rights 
in any given territory will not be undermined by right holders in other Member States:  if the public in the 
Member State for which she holds the making available right is targeted, then her prior authorisation is 
required.  It matters not where the uploader performed the material act of upload or where its centre of 
activities is situated, the value of the making available right is not affected by manoeuvres of the 
uploader. 
Right holders may use contractual constructions to restrict the exploitation of the work to national 
territories, thus requiring uploaders/service providers to make a work available in one Member State and 
to restrict access to the work to users being present on the territory of that Member State (i.e. excluding 
access from outside the Member State).  Such practices may constitute an infringement on the freedom 
to provide services within the EU or competition law.  Such restrictions may however be justified by 
demonstrating that these are necessary to protect the essential subject matter of copyright protection (the 
equitable remuneration being payable per Member State where the exploitation takes place). 
Inversely, the person making the work available, i.e. the uploader, who may be a private person or a 
(commercial) service provider, should obtain the right holder’s consent prior to making the work available 
to the public.  Her act of making available may be in several Member States, where she should clear this 
making available right.  This means that the uploader should identify author, initial or derived right 
holder(s) in the MS where the making available takes place.   
- Author or initial right owner. Since there is no harmonisation in this field, the copyright laws of 
the Member States consider different people the author or initial owner of the making available 
right.  The uploader’s task may be complicated since the consent of these different people may 
be cumulatively required to cover the overall exploitation taking place in several Member States. 
- Derived ownership.  The making available right may be transferred by contract to a third party.  
The uploader has the burden of identifying who holds the rights for the relevant territory.  In case 
of territorial fragmentation the making available right should be cleared from different people 
(cumulatively) to cover the overall exploitation taking place in several Member States.   
The rights have to be cleared per Member State where the exploitation takes place, i.e. where the public 
of that Member State is targeted.  The remuneration owed to the right holder can be calculated in function 
of the exploitation value per Member State. 
For the end-user/public the variables on the making available right have no direct legal consequences.  
Under this construction the acts performed at the user’s end are not restricted under the making available 
right (although the reproduction right continues to apply).  Commercially, the end-user’s position may be 
affected by the larger offer of online services or, inversely, the national offer due to contractual 
restrictions. 
Conclusion.  The uncertainty with regard to the author/initial ownership of the work may be solved by 
harmonising the rules at the European level.  If the same person is designated as the author/initial right 
holder (even in case of collective works or employment), it should be less complicated to conclude a 
licensing agreement.  In case of exploitations covering several Member States, the same person could 
authorise making her work available in those Member States.  There are however few indications that this 
divergence of authorship/ownership rules is a major problem in practice.  Furthermore, the harmonisation 
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of the national rules on authorship and initial ownership will not prevent an ulterior fragmentation of rights 
as a result of contractual practices to this effect. 
The reproduction right is an autonomous right, independent from the right of making available:  the use 
of a work may cumulatively involve acts of making available to the public and reproduction.  The 
reproduction right and the exception for temporary acts of reproduction are harmonised, yet the 
localisation criteria and the liability rules are not.  The reproduction right may apply in addition to the 
making available right: 
- Upstream:  the work is reproduced on the server where the work is hosted for it to be accessible 
to the public. 
- Downstream:  the work being available to the public, reproductions may follow directly from this 
availability and occur at the end user’s end.  Some reproductions may be ephemeral and thus be 
exempted under the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir). 
Examples are the temporary copies made while consulting the work in order to view (television, 
computer, mobile device). Other reproductions are (more) permanent and cannot be exempted 
under this exception.  
Both the upstream and the downstream copies may be protected reproductions that require the right 
holder’s consent.  These protected acts may occur outside the Member States where the making 
available is localised.  Moreover, the person who holds the reproduction right is not necessarily the same 
person as the one holding the making available right (fragmentation of rights).  The rights for the 
reproductions, made upstream and downstream, should therefore be cleared.  
This means that the uploader should clear the making available right in the targeted Member State and 
the reproduction right for the foreseeable reproductions (upstream and downstream).  It can be expected 
that reproductions will be made at the end-user’s end in the Member State where the public is targeted.  If 
the rights of reproduction and making available are held by different persons, then the consent of both 
should be obtained.  The uploader may be at risk when the work is reproduced in a Member State where 
the public is not targeted in terms of the on demand availability.  This is less foreseeable for the uploader, 
yet she may incur responsibility for the end-user’s reproduction if the national law holds intermediaries 
responsible for such reproductions. 
The right holders’ consent is required for all uses that involve acts of making available and reproduction.  
These rights could be in the hands of distinct persons.  By principle the reproduction right can be 
exercised when a reproduction is made in a Member State where the work is merely accessible (without 
exploitation directed to the public in that Member State). Depending on the national law, the end-user 
making the reproduction or the intermediary enabling this reproduction can be held liable. 
The end-user who consults a work is likely to perform an act of reproduction.  In most streaming cases 
the copy will be exempted under the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) InfoSoc Dir).  
The scope of this exception is still uncertain, further clarity being expected in future decisions of the 
CJEU.  Where a permanent copy is made, the author’s consent is required and this burden may fall upon 
the end-user.  The end-user may thus be at risk for example when a service provider makes works 
available to the public, the end-user receives the work directly from this service provider but the 
reproduction rights are not cleared for this end-user’s reproduction.  The end-user may rely on an 
exception to the reproduction right under national law.  National divergences subsist concerning the 
application of national exceptions (most exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive being optional except for the 
one covering temporary acts of reproduction).   
Conclusion.  The reproduction right is not inseparably connected to the making available right.  While the 
making available of a work to the public may be localised in one Member State (or several Member) 
States, acts of reproduction may occur in the same Member State(s) and outside this Member State(s), 
depending on where the copies are made and the work is reproduced.  Where no exception applies, this 
reproduction should be authorised by the holder of the reproduction right (who may be another than the 
holder of the making available right) either on the account of the uploader (the reproduction following 
directly from the availability of the work to the public) or the end-user.  
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III. Conclusions  
A. Status quo 
In the first part of the Study, we have examined the right of making available in its current state and the 
territoriality principle (application and criteria).  This has led to the identification of some bottlenecks. 
The making available of a work to the public was described as a complex act, without precise definition, 
neither in the Information Society Directive nor in the 1996 WIPO Treaties in which the Directive has its 
origin:  it is not entirely clear which material acts are protected as constitutive elements of the legal act of 
making available to the public. 
In order to clarify its contours, the making available right was examined as a species of the genus right of 
communication to the public and contrasted to the distribution right in the InfoSoc Directive.  The court 
decisions issued in 11 Member States have been examined to verify how the making available right has 
been applied to various online services.   
The making available right requires (i) the availability of the work (ii) to the public (ii) on demand of 
members of the public.  The starting point of the making available right is the availability (preceding the 
transmission on demand of the member of the public).  It should however immediately be verified whether 
the public has access to the work. It is not sufficient to demonstrate that a work is stored on a server, 
without verifying that additional initiatives have been taken to grant access to the members of the public 
(e.g. by publishing a hyperlink leading to the location where the work is stored).  The work may be 
available for download or streaming.  So far the endpoint of the making available right, has, by contrast, 
not been addressed in national decisions (transmission resulting from a demand of a member of the 
public or reception by the member of the public).  Members of the “public” should have access to the 
work on their demand.  Insofar as the “public” is a notion common to all species of the genus right of 
communication to the public, the interpretations of the “public” by the CJEU can be extended to the 
making available right, which then requires an “indeterminate number of viewers”, by contrast to a “private 
group”, who are to some extent targeted by the “communicator” and receptive to the communication, 
rather than being merely caught by chance.  Few cases have considered the “on demand” aspect of the 
making available right, although this distinguishes the making available right from other forms of 
communication, in particular the broadcasting right. 
Next, the territoriality principle was examined.  The principle that the national legislator is competent to 
regulate events occurring on the national territory in copyright terms has not been challenged, even after 
several international and European initiatives to harmonise copyright protection.  This principle is 
confirmed in several CJEU decisions (Lagardère, Stichting de Thuiskopie, Donner, Sportradar).  
However, various criteria have been applied to trigger the “territoriality”.  The Court paid attention to 
different factors, from a technical act (the presence of a ground station) in Lagardère, to the occurrence of 
harm on a territory, at the residence of the final user who causes the harm that located the conduct on the 
territory of a Member State in Stichting De Thuiskopie and the criterion of “intended target” of the 
distributor of the protected subject matter in Donner and Sportradar.   
Uncertainty re making available right.  The absence of a definition of the making available right creates 
some legal uncertainty as to the territorial reach of the online accessibility of protected subject matter.  
Different elements of this complex act could be considered relevant to establish the application of the 
national right of making available to the public:  the availability on a server or the transmission to a 
Member State, even accessibility of the work has not explicitly been ruled out as a relevant element for 
the making available right.  Consequently if all Member States are free to determine which element of the 
complex act is relevant to establish an act of making available, then each could subject this constitutive 
part to the prior authorisation of the author (and to the corresponding payment of a licence fee).  The 
Member States could define the same or different criteria to apply their national making available right.  At 
least in theory, this would lead to the accumulation of distinct acts of making available under the national 
copyright legislations concerned that do not necessarily correspond to the same technical and/or 
economic criteria.  Without a clarification of this restricted act, its relation to the other exclusive economic 
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rights and the localisation criterion, it remains speculative which facts will trigger an infringement and in 
which Member State.   
Finally, at the request of the European Commission, three legal issues have been examined in the 
Member States under consideration.  It was described which conflict of laws rules apply to determine the 
competent courts and the applicable law.  It was found that considerable divergences exist with regard to 
the national rules on authorship and initial ownership (in case of collective works, works made in the 
context of an employment relation or audiovisual works).  Independently of these national rules, the 
making available rights may be fragmented as a consequence of contractual practices.  Finally the 
making available right can be exercised in addition to the reproduction right, which is harmonised at the 
European level. 
Bottlenecks.  The current situation presents different bottlenecks, depending on whether the acquisition 
of a licence or an infringement of the making available right is concerned.   
 Licences and transfer of the making available right by contract.   
Authorship and initial ownership.  Before concluding a contract on the online exploitation of a work, the 
right holder should be identified.  There is controversy on whether the author/right holder should be 
determined by reference to the lex loci protectionis or the lex loci originis of the work.  If the French Cour 
de cassation is followed and the author or initial owner is determined according to the lex loci protectionis, 
then the lack of harmonisation and divergence of national rules may lead, in theory, to conflicts between 
different persons (individuals or legal entities) who are considered authors or initial owners of the 
copyright under different national laws.  If there is a multitude of acts in several Member States at the 
same time for each material act of upload leading to public accessibility, this means that the consent of 
several persons in different Member States is required. 
Fragmented ownership.  The exclusive rights under copyright can be transferred or licensed on a 
territorial basis.  Different people then hold the rights of making available to a particular work for a certain 
territory.  An act of making available with constitutive elements in different Member States should then be 
authorised by the persons holding rights for these distinct Member States, which may be a burdensome 
task for the uploader/service provider.  Alternative mechanisms have been developed to facilitate the 
licensing process (e.g. multi-territorial licences, granted by one collecting society for its own repertoire 
and the repertoire of other collecting societies). 
Conflict of laws.  If a cross-border on demand offer is analysed as an act of making available with 
constitutive elements in different Member States, then the rights for each relevant act must be cleared by 
the service provider or the uploader.  Once the right holder for the relevant territories are identified, it 
should be determined which law applies to the contract according to the principles defined in the 
Regulation Rome I.  It is common for the contracting parties to explicitly stipulate the applicable law.  In 
absence of such choice, the applicable law will depend on the qualification of the contract as a sale of 
goods, the provision of services, distribution contract or any other type of contract and the connecting 
factors.  This law will govern issues related to the contract (validity, formalities, scope, interpretation, 
performance). 
Reproduction right.  The cumulative application of the making available right and the reproduction right 
may complicate the licensing of works for online use.  Each act of making available entails (in the current 
state of technology and law) several reproductions.  The rights should be cleared both “upstream” 
(hosting server) and downstream (e.g. at the end-user’s side) of the online availability.  These 
reproductions may take place in yet other Member States than the relevant acts pertaining to the making 
available of the work.  Since the reproduction right is autonomous and independent from the right of 
making the work available to the public, it may be held by a different person.    Furthermore the burden for 
clearing the rights may be distributed differently in the Member States (end-user v service providers).  The 
licensing process may be complicated by the circumstances that the rights of making available and  
reproduction may have to be cleared in different Member States and may be held by different persons.  
Moreover, it should be determined who has the responsibility, under the applicable national law, to clear 
the reproduction rights for the copies of the work at the end-user’s end.   
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 Enforcement in case of infringement.   
Conflict of laws.  The issues of private international law, and especially the questions of jurisdiction, are 
solved on the basis of factual elements.   
The right holder can choose where to bring her legal action, depending on her objectives.  Provisional 
measures can be obtained in all Member States, regardless of which court is competent on the merits, 
provided that there is some connection to the territory of that State.  It is uncertain whether the CJEU’s 
ruling in Solvay v Honeywell (a patent case) can be extended to the making available right and courts can 
issue cross-border provisional measures.  On the merits the right holder can claim reparation of her entire 
damage in the Member State where the defendant has her domicile or where the harmful event occurred.  
This court will have to apply the lex loci protectionis, which means that it may be led to apply the laws of 
different Member States.  The right holder can also act in other Member States where she has suffered 
prejudice, but the courts of those Member States will be competent only to rule on the damage occurring 
on the territory of their own Member States, in accordance with their own national law (the lex loci 
protectionis being the law of the Member State for which damages are claimed).  Cessation measures on 
the merits can be claimed before the courts that have jurisdiction, i.e. where the defendant has her 
establishment, where the harmful event occurs or where the damage is felt.  In some cases these criteria 
point to the same Member Staten, e.g. when an Internet access provider is asked to block access to 
platforms that are commonly used to make works available to the public on a massive scale without the 
right holders’ consent. 
Authorship/ownership.  The rules on authorship and initial ownership differ from one Member State to 
the other, which means that different persons may hold the making available right in different Member 
States.  Moreover, the making available right may be fragmented by contract.   The holder of the making 
available right should be identified per territory where an infringement of this right may be found.   
Reproduction right.  An infringement of the making available right often goes together with an 
infringement of the reproduction right.  Given the autonomy of both rights, it should however be verified 
for each case whether an act of reproduction is performed, whether this act required the right holder’s 
consent or if an exception applies to the act of reproduction.  Furthermore it should be verified where the 
act of reproduction takes place and who can be held responsible for the infringement under national law.  
Depending on the (territorial and material) fragmentation of rights, the persons who can claim 
infringement of the making available right and the reproduction right may not be the same.  An 
infringement of each right must be established (in accordance with national law), damages may be 
awarded or other enforcement measures may be taken. 
For the right holders, the independence of the making available and the reproductions rights means that 
they have an additional legal ground to demonstrate an infringement in case of unauthorised use.  Where 
the rights are held by different persons, it should be verified whether the unauthorised use under 
consideration entails both acts of making available and reproduction and if the right claimant is involved in 
the litigation.  The (alleged) infringer may thus have to face several right holders, claiming infringements 
and demanding measures (including cessation and cumulative damages).   
B. Alternative approaches 
In the second part of this Study, two alternative approaches to the making available right have been 
studied.  Two caveats have been expressed in this respect.  Firstly, a modification of the application of 
the making available right should be decided in function of clear policy objectives.  Only if the policy 
objectives are unambiguously stated can the efficiency of an alternative approach be assessed.  
Secondly, any such modification should take into account that the making available right is currently 
considered a species of the right of communication to the public hence any characteristics that are 
contradictory to this genus right should be avoided. 
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 “Country of origin” 
The first alternative that was examined was a construction that allows localising the act of making a work 
available to the public in one single Member State (“country of origin” principle).  The restricted act 
was defined as the material act of upload that leads to the work being available to the public.  The 
localisation criterion could be either the centre of activities of the uploader (establishment, domicile or 
habitual residence) or the material act of upload.  Both criteria could be combined, in order to solve some 
practical objections. The localisation criterion “act of upload” may be difficult to apply to legal entities with 
complex, international organisation structures so this criterion could be complemented by a fiction for 
legal entities that all acts of upload take place at the establishment of the legal entity.   
A “country of origin” approach does not alter the conflict of law rules (unless it is actually intended as a 
rule to determine the applicable law).  Several courts may have competence to rule in a dispute with 
cross-border elements.  For provisional (protective) measures, the courts of any Member State may be 
seized provided that the intended measure has an effect on the territory of that Member State.  On the 
merits, the competence of the courts depends on the measure claimed.  A ruling on the entire damage 
can be expected from the courts of the Member State of the harmful event (e.g. where the uploader has 
its establishment or where the act of upload has taken place) or where the defendant has her 
domicile/establishment.  These locations correspond to the “country of origin”.  In addition, the courts of 
the countries where damage occurs are competent to state on the part of the damage that is felt in that 
Member State.  This corresponds to the Member States where an exploitation of the work can be found 
(where the public is targeted).  Given the rulings of the Court in Wintersteiger and Pammer/Hotel 
Alpenhof, it is not sufficient that a work is accessible to find jurisdiction in that Member State.   
While the courts generally try to apply the lex fori, the applicable law should by principle be determined by 
reference to the principle lex loci protectionis.  The Member State for which protection is claimed could be 
taken to refer to the country of transmission or reception, depending on the connecting factors. Logically it 
could be expected that the law of the Member State where the act of making available takes place 
applies, but this is not always the case (e.g. partial damages). 
The localisation of the making available right does not solve the bottlenecks found in the current state of 
law in case of infringement.  The author or right holder has several options depending on the measures 
pursued.  She can still be expected to act in several Member State (provisional measures, cessation 
measures on the merits or partial damages).  The applicable law will most likely be determined by the 
“country of origin”, which means that the behaviour of the defendant is decisive and that the right holder 
may be at a disadvantage.  The alleged infringer may be brought before the courts of her 
domicile/establishment or where she has performed the act of upload and will be judged by the law of the 
Member State of origin, which also depends on where she performs the act of making available.  
However, she can also be called to defend her position before the courts of other Member States for 
provisional measures, cessation measures on the merits or partial reparation of the damage, which will be 
assessed by the laws of the country of origin.  The alleged infringer, by her factual behaviour, has a 
possibility to weigh on the way of the infringement will be assessed.  In theory, this may lead her to 
localise the act of making available in a Member State with a lower overall level of protection in case of 
infringement (despite the harmonisation of the enforcement of IP rights in Directive 2008/48). 
The localisation in one country of origin of the upload might have an impact on who is identified as the 
author or initial owner of copyrights.  The divergence of national rules on authorship or initial 
ownership will have less effect on one cross-border transaction.  If the lex loci protectionis principle is 
applied or if the “country of origin” principle is read as a principle containing a conflict of laws rule, then 
one person is regarded as the author or initial owner per act of making available (despite its cross-border 
effects).  The national divergences are felt where different acts of making available take place in Member 
States with different authorship rules.  Complications could be overcome by harmonising the rule on 
authorship and initial ownership at the European level.  Such harmonisation would however not prevent 
the contractual fragmentation of rights per national territory.  In these scenarios, one person is regarded 
as the holder of the making available right per act of making available:  she has the prerogative of 
granting a licence for the acts of making localised in that Member State and to take legal action against 
infringements of this right. 
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This construction addresses the bottlenecks found with regard to cross-border licences.  It is less 
complicated to clear the making available rights for cross-border on demand exploitations, since only the 
consent of the person holding the making available right in the Member State of origin is required and not 
for the Member States where the work is exploited or where it is accessible.  It also creates new 
bottlenecks.  Firstly, the localisation (and therefore the entitlement of the different right holders) depends 
on the acts of the uploader, who may choose a location in her own favour (generally with a lower overall 
copyright protection) or by criteria that are not relevant from a copyright perspective (e.g. an 
establishment for fiscal reasons).  Secondly, licences granted by the person who owns rights in one 
Member State may affect, even undermine the rights of persons in other Member States (in case of 
territorial fragmentation).  The exploitation of the work by making it available on demand may be directed 
at one Member State; while the underlying act of making available to the public is localised in another 
Member State (upload, centre of activities of the uploader) and requires the consent of the right holder in 
that Member State, which means that the right holder in the Member State of exploitation is considered 
irrelevant in this process.  There is no necessary link between making available of the work and its effects 
or the exploitation of the work. 
Right holders may use contractual constructions to restrict the exploitation of the work to national 
territories, thus requiring uploaders/service providers to make a work available in one Member State and 
to restrict access to the work to users being present on the territory of that Member State (i.e. excluding 
access from outside the Member State).  The effect of localising the act of making available in one 
Member State is thus undermined by contractual practice.  Such practices may constitute an infringement 
on the freedom to provide services within the EU or competition law.  Such restrictions may however be 
justified by demonstrating that these are necessary to protect the essential subject matter of copyright 
protection. 
The reproduction right may be exercised, by reference to the act of making available, upstream (server) 
or downstream (end-user’s end).  These reproductions may take place in the Member State where the act 
of making available takes place or in another Member State.  The rights of making available and 
reproduction may be held by the same person or different people. Depending on where the reproduction 
takes place and who holds the relevant rights, the licensing process is more or less complicated.  Where 
the localisation of the making available right in one Member State is expected to simplify the licensing 
process (leaving other corollaries aside), this effect is evened out by the obligation to clear the 
reproduction rights both upstream and downstream outside the Member State of making available.  By 
contrast, this obligation does not redress the situation of the holders of making available right in the 
Member States of exploitation, to the extent that the reproduction right may be held by yet other persons. 
The holders of the rights of making available and reproduction can bring separate actions in case of 
infringement.  Where the end-user’s reproductions are not exempted under the exception for temporary 
acts of reproduction and have not been authorised (possibly via the service provider who has cleared the 
making available right in the country of origin); the end-user may thus be at risk of being held liable for an 
infringement of the reproduction right.  
 Exploitation/targeted public 
The second approach examined was to define the making available right as an act of exploitation (in 
function of the technology and the exploitation on that basis) and localised in the Member State(s) where 
the exploitation of the work is found.  While the current situation leaves room for doubt, it is clear under 
this approach that the mere circumstance that a work is accessible is not sufficient to find an act of 
making available.  The localisation criterion in practice can be understood as the targeting or the intention 
to target a public of a Member State.  Elements that indicate such targeting will have to be found in the 
circumstances of each case and examples can be found in the decisions of the CJEU (Pammer/Alpenhof, 
eBay, Donner, Sportradar).  When a work is exploited in several Member States (i.e. it is accessible on 
demand of the user and the user is part of the public the uploader intends to address), several acts of 
making available can be found in those Member States (where the public is targeted). 
Conflict of laws. The impact of the exploitation scenario on the issues of private international law is 
limited by comparison to the current situation. It does not affect the application of the rules on 
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jurisdictions: a case can be brought before the courts of the Member State where the defendant is 
domiciled, where the event giving rise to the infringement took place or where the damage occurs, 
depending on the claimed measures. 
As to the applicable law, the lex loci protectionis could refer to the application of the law of the country of 
transmission or to the application of the laws of the countries of reception. Logically it could be expected 
that the laws of the Members States where the act of making available takes place apply, which should 
lead to the cumulative application of the law(s) of the Member State(s) where the work is exploited. This 
could clarify the issues on applicable law and eventually limit the number of copyright legislation to take 
into account (excluding the laws of the Member States where the work is merely accessible).   
Author/initial right owner.  The national divergences on the rules of authorship and initial ownership 
continue to be felt in the exploitation approach (unless the lex loci originis of the work is applied to identify 
the original right holder).  Similarly, the making available rights may be contractually fragmented per 
territory.  The right holder can grant a licence or take legal action against an infringement for the Member 
State where the exploitation takes place.  Her rights in any given territory will not be undermined by right 
holders in other Member States:  if the public in the Member State for which she holds the making 
available right is targeted, then her prior authorisation is required.  It matters not where the uploader 
performed the material act of upload or where its centre of activities is situated, the value of the making 
available right is not affected by manoeuvres of the uploader.  By contrast, no infringement occurs when 
the work is accessible (outside the targeted territories) without the consent of the person holding the right 
for that territory.  
The exploitation approach does not solve the bottlenecks found in the current state of the law with regard 
to the licensing process for cross-border transactions.  The uploader should obtain the right holders’ 
consent prior to making the work available to the public for all the Member States where the exploitation 
is intended.  This means that the uploader should identify author, initial or derived right holder(s) in the 
Member States where the making available takes place.  This approach clarifies the current situation to 
the extent that the mere accessibility outside the member States of exploitation (“spill over”) does not 
necessitate the author’s consent, nor technical measures to exclude access by persons outside the 
territory of exploitation.  
In addition to the making available right, acts of reproduction can be found upstream and downstream 
from this availability.  Depending on who holds these rights and where the restricted acts take place, the 
uploader and/or end-user are required to clear the reproduction rights for all acts that are not exempted.  
The uploader should clear the making available right in the targeted Member State and the reproduction 
right for the foreseeable reproductions (upstream and downstream).  It can be expected that 
reproductions will be made at the end-user’s end in the Member State where the public is targeted.  If the 
rights of reproduction and making available are held by different persons, then the consent of both should 
be obtained.  The uploader may be at risk when the work is reproduced in a Member State where the 
public is not targeted in terms of the on demand availability.  This is less foreseeable for the uploader, yet 
she may incur responsibility for the end-user’s reproduction if the national law holds intermediaries 
responsible for such reproductions.  This burden may fall upon the end-user as well.  The exploitation 
approach does not solve the bottlenecks found under the current state of law with regard to the 
reproduction right.  
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Summarising table 
  
Country of origin (act of upload, 
country of establishment or 
combination of both) 
 
Exploitation scenario 
 
Authorship / Initial 
ownership 
a) Application of the lex loci 
protectionis 
Authorship and initial ownership are 
ruled according to the law applicable 
in the country of origin. The identity of 
the rights holder may vary in function 
of the localization of the protected 
act. 
 The consequence of the existing 
disparities related to authorship/initial 
ownership is a potential risk of forum 
shopping to find the most favorable 
regime. 
 
b) Application of the lex loci originis 
Authorship and initial ownership are 
determined according to the law 
applicable in the country of first 
publication of the work/the country of 
nationality of the author. The rights 
holder is invariable, wherever the 
protected act is located. 
 The country of origin principle 
does not change the situation 
resulting from the existing disparities 
on authorship/initial ownership. 
a) Application of the lex loci 
protectionis 
Authorship and initial ownership are 
ruled according to the law applicable 
in the country(ies) of exploitation. The 
identity of the rights holder may vary 
in function of the countries targeted 
by the protected act. 
 The exploitation scenario does not 
cause a new effect on the existing 
disparities on authorship/initial 
ownership. 
 
 
b) Application of the lex loci originis 
Authorship and initial ownership are 
determined according to the law 
applicable in the country of first 
publication of the work/the country of 
nationality of the author. The rights 
holder is invariable, wherever the 
protected act is located. 
 The exploitation scenario does not 
change the situation resulting from 
the existing disparities on 
authorship/initial ownership. 
Contractual transfer of 
rights 
a) Transfer of rights with the purpose 
of an act of making available  
The law applicable to the contract is 
the law of the country of origin. 
 The consequence of the existing 
disparities related to transfer of rights 
is a potential risk of forum shopping 
to locate the act of making available 
at the place with the most favorable 
regime. 
a) Transfer of rights with the purpose 
of an act of making available  
The law applicable to the contract is 
the law of the country (ies) where the 
work is exploited. 
 The exploitation scenario does not 
have a new effect on the existing 
disparities related to the transfers of 
rights. 
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b) Transfer of rights prior to the 
making available right 
The law applicable to the contract is 
the lex contractus, as it was 
determined either by the contracting 
parties or by the other rules of the 
Regulation Rome I. 
 The application of the country of 
origin principle does not have a new 
impact on the disparities related to 
the transfers of rights.  
 
b) Transfer of rights prior to the 
making available right 
The law applicable to the contract is 
the lex contractus, as it was 
determined either by the contracting 
parties or by the other rules of the 
Regulation Rome I. 
 The exploitation scenario does not 
have a new impact on the disparities 
on transfer of rights.  
Conflicts of laws a) Jurisdiction 
The courts of the country of origin (all 
damage) and the courts of the 
country where the work is accessed 
(for the damage in that country) will 
be competent. 
 The country of origin principle 
does not have an impact on the 
issues of jurisdiction. 
 
b) Applicable law 
According to the lex loci protectionis, 
the law applicable is either the law of 
the country of transmission (which 
would be the country of origin) or the 
law of the country of reception. 
 If the law of the country of 
transmission prevails (which would 
be conform to the country of origin 
principle) there is a risk of forum 
shopping. The country of origin 
principle might thus have an impact 
on the issues of applicable law. 
a) Jurisdiction 
The courts of the country of upload 
(all damage) and the courts of the 
country where the work is accessed 
(for the damage in that country) will 
be competent. 
 The exploitation scenario does not 
have an impact on the issues of 
jurisdiction. 
 
b) Applicable law 
According to the lex loci protectionis, 
the law applicable is either the law of 
the country of transmission or the law 
of the country of reception (which 
would be the countries of 
exploitation).  
 If the law of the country of 
reception prevails (which would be 
conform to the targeting approach), 
then the protected act is located in 
the country(ies) targeted by the 
exploitation of the work, thus 
potentially in several Member States. 
The exploitation scenario should not 
have an impact on the issues of 
applicable law. 
Reproduction right In addition to a single act of making 
available to the public, several 
reproductions (upstream and 
downstream) should be taken into 
consideration. If these acts happen in 
other Member States than the 
country of origin, then it is likely that 
In addition to the acts of making 
available in the Member States of 
exploitation, several reproductions 
(upstream and downstream) should 
be taken into consideration.  If the 
work is accessible in other Member 
States than where the public is 
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the reproduction(s) will be subject to 
the law of those Member States 
The country of origin principle does 
not solve the problem of the relation 
between the making available right 
and the reproduction right.  
explicitly targeted, then it is likely that 
a reproduction will be to the law of 
those Member States. 
 The exploitation scenario does not 
solve the problem of the relation 
between the making available right 
and the reproduction right. 
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I. Terms of Reference 
The Terms of reference for this part of the Study are the following: 
 
The territoriality of online rights in the Single Market 
 
The protection of copyright and related rights in the EU is "territorial" in the sense that the recognition 
and enforcement of rights occurs on a country by country basis (nevertheless, the management of rights 
does not need to be territorial and right-holders are often in a position to grant multi-territorial licences). 
The balance between territoriality and the functioning of the internal market has been achieved, as far as 
the distribution of physical copies is concerned, by the principle of exhaustion developed by the CJEU 
and, as far as the act of communication to the public by satellite is concerned, by the definition of where 
the act takes place (one single Member State, often referred to as "country of origin" or uplink) in the 
Satellite and Cable Directive. 
 
The main right applicable to on-line transmissions – the so-called "making available" right provided under 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive – remains territorial in the sense that the act of making available is in all 
likelihood an act relevant in each of the Member States where the content is accessed (plus, probably, 
the country in which the content is uploaded). The question has arisen as to whether this is sustainable 
for the functioning of the internal market, and whether alternative approaches would not be more 
appropriate - in particular whether the "making available" should not be re-considered as a relevant 
copyright act only in the Member State in which the relevant online service originates/the service 
provider is established. This approach is similar to that applied in the copyright 'acquis', to the act of 
communication to the public by satellite. The reproduction right is equally relevant, certainly in the case 
of downloads where clearly an act relevant for copyright purposes would happen (independently of 
where the act of "making available" is defined as taking place) in each of the countries where end users 
download digital files. This is an aspect that did not arise in the context of satellite broadcasting. 
Re-transmission of copyright-protected content in digital networks 
 
A specific regime for cable retransmission is established in Chapter III of the Satellite and Cable 
Directive (compulsory collective management with an extended effect). New digital platforms have 
enabled programmes to be retransmitted simultaneously across different networks. Operators of DSL, 
IPTV, mobile networks and other digital platforms also operate broadcast retransmission services. Some 
operators now propose a wireless distribution of the programmes after their transmission or 
retransmission by cable. The act of retransmission by Internet of a broadcast is normally referred to as 
"simulcasting". The question arises as to whether the technology-specific provisions of Chapter III of the 
Satellite and Cable Directive need to be reviewed to develop a framework for retransmission of content 
that is technology neutral with regard to the delivery platform. In that context, stakeholders have pointed 
to differences and confusion in terms of the categorisation of rights and applicable rights clearance 
mechanisms, and a need for more clarity and legal certainty. A relevant question is the extent to which 
one can assimilate the act of retransmission by digital networks with the traditional act of retransmission 
by cable e.g. in terms of business model and breadth of access (the compulsory collective management 
of cable retransmissions rights established in the Sat Cab Directive is limited to retransmission of a 
broadcast – coming from another Member State - within the territory of a Member State; this is not likely 
to be the case in an Internet-based retransmission scenario). 
Output to be achieved 
 
With regard to the question of retransmission of broadcast services (by satellite, cable and internet), the 
Study should (a) provide an overview of provisions at national level and relevant case law at national and 
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EU level, assessing in particular the extent to which there is a consistent interpretation of the 
"communication to the public" and "making available" rights across the EU (taking into account the hybrid 
nature of many services); and equally whether a consistent distinction is made between "primary 
broadcast" and "retransmission"; and (b) assess whether an update to Chapter III of the Satellite and 
Cable Directive is needed, including the clarification of the relevant acts (and services) covered by the 
Directive. 
 
 
It has been discussed with the Commission that the Study should focus on the notion of “cable 
retransmission to the public”, in particular the notions of the “initial transmission by wire or over the air” 
and the “retransmission by cable or microwave system for reception by the public”.  In particular it should 
be verified how these notions are interpreted, both at the European and the national levels, with regard to 
the qualification of transmissions of works (“primary” and “secondary” transmissions, technologies). 
II. The cable retransmission right 
This Study examines some questions regarding the right of retransmission by cable.  After an introduction 
of the topic and the questions (sub A), the cable retransmission right as dealt with in the SatCab Directive 
will be analysed (sub B).  We will discuss the provisions in the SatCab Directive, analyse the definition of 
the cable retransmission right and identify the constitutive elements.  It will be verified how the cable 
retransmission right is applied in the national courts. 
A. Introduction 
The broadcasting of radio and television programmes (containing copyright works) has been protected for 
a long time
382
.  A broadcasting right has been introduced in the Berne Convention at the Rome 
Conference of 1928 (current art. 11bis (1)(i) BC).  The rights of communication to the public of broadcast 
works have been adopted at the Brussels revision of 1948 (art. 11bis (1)(ii-iii) BC).  Since then the 
broadcasting and transmission technologies have evolved a fair deal.  When the broadcasting right was 
first adopted, radio and television programmes were transmitted by Hertzian waves.  Cable operators 
could distribute these programmes by capturing this broadcast Hertzian signal by means of an antenna 
and introducing these signals in their cable networks in order to bring the radio or television programmes 
to the connected radio or television sets.  At that time it was clear that a “broadcast” was a wireless 
transmission to a public and that other communications to the public (by cable) were not “broadcasts”. 
New technologies have made it possible to establish similar mass communications in various technical 
constellations.  Satellites can be used to broadcast programmes to a public in possession of an antenna 
and, if necessary, a decoder.  Satellite technology can also serve to transport content between 
professional distributors, so the programmes can be further distributed over the cable networks.  The 
same direct communication can be operated by means of professional platforms or “direct injections”, 
which allow bypassing the reception of the initial broadcast and the subsequent injection of the (modified) 
signal into the cable network.  In Member States with a dense cable network, it is common for some 
“broadcasters” no longer to emit their programmes via a wireless signal, but to serve their programmes to 
the public by cable only.   
                                                     
 
382 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, 
revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on 
June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967 and at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended on September 28 1979 (hereafter the 
“Berne Convention” or “BC”);   Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, Official Journal L 248 , 
06/10/1993, 15-21 (hereafter “SatCab Directive” or “SatCab Dir”). 
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In our era the technical possibilities to operate a (linear) communication to the public have multiplied.  
Television and radio shows can be watched in real time via internet (WIFI or cable), on a computer or 
other (handheld) devices, or via mobile technology, on a “smart phone” or “tablet”.  The public now has 
many ways to watch “television” or listen to the “radio” and they have access to various “bundles” offered 
by various economic operators (cable operators/internet service providers; “broadcaster”/internet content 
provider).  
It seems the convergence of technologies has affected our vocabulary:  the use of wireless technology is 
no longer tantamount to a “broadcast”, a “broadcaster” (at least in common language) does not 
necessarily serve its public over the air and a viewer could be watching “television” on her computer or 
her phone. 
The legal terminology, by contrast, has not evolved beyond the cable and satellite technologies.  The 
Berne Convention and the Satellite and Cable Directive define specific forms of communication to the 
public, while the Information Society Directive provides a general right of communication to the public.  It 
is not always straightforward to apply the existing legal framework to a technically more advanced sector. 
The traditional cable retransmission of a broadcast programme, as originally thought of in the Berne 
Convention, consists of an initial broadcast (by wireless means), which is captured by the cable operator, 
transformed into a cable signal and then retransmitted to the public via the cable network.  This technical 
scheme can be represented as follows: 
 
 
This transmission scheme is still used for the retransmission of free to air broadcasters’ programmes to 
cable subscribers (e.g. most of the European public broadcasters). 
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Initial transmission.  Television programmes can be also brought to the cable subscribers following a 
direct communication between the “broadcasting organisation” and the cable operator.  In this case, the 
transmission between the broadcaster and the cable operator may be performed by cable or by satellite 
and only the cable operator has access to these signals, as transmitted by the “broadcaster”.  The initial 
transmission is not accessible to the general public.  By contrast, the subsequent transmission via the 
cable network reaches a public, consisting of the cable subscribers.  
In this scheme the cable transmission is technically independent from any broadcast.  Some broadcasters 
may broadcast their programmes over air and, in parallel, transfer the programme signals to the cable 
operator, which transmits the programme to the cable subscribers simultaneously with the broadcast.  In 
other cases, there is no parallel broadcast:  the “broadcaster” determines the content of the programmes 
and the schedule but it does not necessarily undertake a wireless transmission to the public (hence the 
quotation marks).   
 
 
Examples of such cable transmission, following a direct transmission between the “broadcaster” and the 
cable operator, can be found in Belgium, The Netherlands or Denmark.   
Essentially, the question is when a first transmission is qualified as an “initial transmission” in 
the sense of the SatCab Directive and how it affects the qualification of the subsequent cable 
transmission.  The first transmission will determine whether the communication by cable should be 
considered a “cable retransmission” in the sense of the SatCab Directive or as an independent 
communication to the public by cable. 
The issues here are 1) whether the first transmission between the “broadcaster” and the “cable operator” 
can be qualified as an “initial transmission” in the sense of the SatCab Directive and 2) whether a 
simultaneous but parallel transmission by cable, which is technically independent of the broadcast, can 
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be qualified as a “retransmission by cable”. This qualification of the first and the second transmissions 
has certain legal consequences (in particular the mandatory collective management of the cable 
retransmission right).  
Retransmission by cable.  Television and radio programmes are not only accessed via the traditional 
cable network, they can also be transmitted to the public by means of other technologies.  These could be 
local networks, which are not installed by a traditional cable distributor but by alternative operators (e.g. in 
hotels).  Or the programmes are channelled to the public via alternative networks, such as the Web or the 
mobile network.   
In this scheme there may be an initial transmission in the sense of the SatCab Directive.  There is also a 
subsequent transmission to a public. However, the question is whether the secondary transmission can 
be qualified as a “retransmission by cable” if it is not operated via a traditional coaxial cable network, as 
known when the SatCab Directive was adopted.  This transmission scheme can be represented as 
follows: 
 
  
Examples can be found when a mobile operator offers “mobile television”, so the user may access the 
broadcast in real time via her mobile device, or when live streams of linear radio or television programmes 
are available via the Web.   
Essentially the question here is whether the “retransmission by cable” should be understood in a 
technology-specific or technology-neutral way. 
The issue here is whether the retransmission via another network than the traditional coaxial cable 
network can be qualified as “retransmissions by cable” in the sense of the SatCab Directive.  Inversely, it 
is noticed that some transmissions via a local cable network are not qualified as a “retransmission by 
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cable” but as generic “communications to the public” instead.   The qualification of such new transmission 
models has legal effects.  Depending on whether or not the notion of “cable and microwave system” 
should be understood in a technology-specific way, the effects of the directive will apply (in particular the 
scope of the mandatory collective management). 
Finally, brief reference may be made to the offer of certain cable distributors/internet providers to access 
broadcasts via the home network, using different devices (smart phones, computers, tablets).  We will not 
treat this question in this Study, since the issue of those bundled services is whether a distinct act of 
communication to public is performed, rather than their qualification as a retransmission by cable in the 
sense of the SatCab Directive.   
Having introduced the questions raised, we will proceed to a more detailed examination of the right of 
retransmission by cable.  We will first briefly describe the legal context of the European initiative to 
regulate the right of retransmission by cable of programmes originating in another Member State. We will 
then discuss the constitutive elements of the definition of the right of retransmission by cable.   
We will not discuss the legal consequences of the qualification as a cable retransmission, i.e. the 
mandatory collective management of the cable retransmission right, neither the exception in favour of the 
broadcasting organisations, nor the issues surrounding the “all rights included” contracts.  The provisions 
regarding the mediation will be left untouched as well. 
B. Cable retransmission right in the SatCab Directive 
Before examining the definition of the cable retransmission right in the SatCab Directive (sub 2 and 3), we 
will briefly describe the legal context in which this particular regime should be understood (sub 1).  We will 
point out the provisions in the Berne Convention and the origin of the SatCab Directive, including 
considerations that urged the European legislature to regulate this issue. 
1. Legal context 
The issue of cable retransmissions was addressed in the Berne Convention, before the SatCab Directive 
was adopted.  The Berne Convention treats it in a provision regarding the broadcasting rights (art. 11bis 
BC). 
The Berne Convention provides, for authors, a broadcasting right and “related” rights, i.e. the right of 
communication to the public of the broadcast of the work (by an organisation other than the original one) 
and the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, 
sounds or images, the broadcast of the work (art. 11bis (1)(i)-(iii) BC).  The members of the Berne Union 
are however free to regulate the exercise of these rights, provided that the limitations to the broadcasting 
rights and the related rights only apply on the territory of that country (art. 11bis (2) BC)
383
. 
                                                     
 
383 Article 11bis Broadcasting and Related Rights: 
1. Broadcasting and other wireless communications, public communication of broadcast by wire or rebroadcast, public 
communication of broadcast by loudspeaker or analogous instruments; 2. Compulsory licenses; 3. Recording; ephemeral recordings 
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing: 
(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, 
sounds or images; 
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by 
an organization other than the original one; 
(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the 
broadcast of the work. 
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. 
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At the time the broadcasting rights were regulated in the Berne Convention, the primary act of broadcast 
was characterised by a dispatch of signals by Hertzian waves.  It was said essential that “no intermediary 
body interposes between the emitting antennae and the aerial at the receiving point”
384
.  If the 
transmission to the public was operated via the cable network, then there was no broadcast but a primary 
communication to the public by wire, addressed in art. 11 BC (not 11bis BC).   
The primary broadcast was distinguished from the secondary retransmission by the (possible) 
intervention of other organisations than the broadcaster.  It was considered that “the same programme 
may be transmitted on the usual wavelength and simultaneously by VHF; what matters is that the whole 
operation is carried out by one and the same organisation”
385
.  A secondary communication to the public 
(by wire or not) was found if it was carried out by another organisation than the one that broadcast the 
programmes.  This secondary communication was then distinguished from the (primary) communications 
to the public by wire (in art. 11(1) BC):  the latter covered the cases where the cable operator transmitted 
its own programmes and the former referred to the cases where the cable operator transmitted someone 
else’s broadcasts.   
The Berne Convention was thus written to the size of a specific constellation of technologies and 
institutional actors.  The mode of transmission (by wire or wireless) was decisive, as was the identity of 
the transmitting body (original broadcasting organisation or other organisation). 
At the European level, the cable retransmission is regulated in Directive 93/83 on satellite broadcasting 
and cable retransmission. 
The harmonisation of these rights was deemed necessary
386
, given the unequal level of protection 
between Member States, the legal uncertainty as to the protection and the need of a certain level of 
protection for authors and holders of neighbouring rights (including the consideration that many 
individuals are involved in the creation and production of audiovisual works, many of whom have 
exclusive rights and hence the possibility of blocking the exploitation of the work, thus harming the 
interests of the other right holders).  The Directive was indeed meant to contribute to the realisation of the 
audiovisual internal market.   
The SatCab Directive deals with two types of rights:  the right of communication to the public by satellite 
and the right of retransmission by cable. While the satellite broadcasting right is not the focal point of this 
Study, it may pop up occasionally:  transmissions by satellite and by cable may be integrated in a 
technical scheme to reach a public and the qualification of the cable transmission as a cable 
retransmission in the sense of the Directive may depend on the qualification of the communication (to the 
public or private) by satellite.  The discussion of the satellite communications will consequently be 
incidental to the examination of the communication by cable. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration 
which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority. 
(3) In the absence of any contrary stipulation, permission granted in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article shall not imply 
permission to record, by means of instruments recording sounds or images, the work broadcast. It shall, however, be a matter for 
legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the regulations for ephemeral recordings made by a broadcasting organization 
by means of its own facilities and used for its own broadcasts. The preservation of these recordings in official archives may, on the 
ground of their exceptional documentary character, be authorized by such legislation. 
384 Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works (Paris Act, 1971), World Intellectual Property 
Organisation, Geneva, 1978, 67 (hereafter Guide to the Berne Convention 1978). 
385 Guide to the Berne Convention 1978, 67. 
386 Proposal for a Council Directive on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and neighbouring rights applicable to 
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(91) 276 final – SYN 358, 1991, 20 (hereafter 
SatCab Proposal). 
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Attention should be paid to the technical and commercial context in which the first discussions on the 
SatCab Directive were held
387
.   
Technically, the “retransmission by cable” referred to the transmission of signals that were broadcast to 
the attention of the public and captured by the cable operator, before being transmitted via the cable 
network to the public of cable subscribers
388
.  This was translated in a technical scheme, where the 
broadcasters communicated their programmes via terrestrial means or satellite so their public could 
receive the programmes
389
.  This scheme was not substantially different than the one in the Berne 
Convention.  The Commission considered that “there is no cable retransmission in the sense of this 
proposal, if the programme is merely delivered by point-to-point communication to the cable head end 
without being subject to a simultaneous primary broadcast”
390
.  The notion of “cable retransmission” 
extended to “multipoint micro-wave distribution systems where the latter perform the role of broadcast 
retransmission in areas where the establishment of a cable network is not economically viable”
391
. This 
system was installed in Ireland. 
It was underscored that the primary broadcaster decided the timing and the content of the programme 
and that it has the opportunity to clear all the rights involved on an individual basis
392
.  Cable operators 
merely retransmitted another party’s primary broadcast – at the same time as the original broadcast and 
without modifying the programmes).  It was explained: “for copyright purposes, however, a distinction has 
to be drawn between primary broadcasting and the simultaneous, unabridged retransmission of 
programmes by cable. In a primary broadcast, which includes the broadcast of an original programme via 
satellite, the broadcaster himself decides the composition of the programme.  He will include only works 
and protected performances for which he has already secured the broadcasting rights.  In cable 
retransmission, on the other hand, the cable operator cannot make up his programmes on the basis of a 
portfolio of rights which he has acquired beforehand.  The cable operator can decide only whether he 
wants to retransmit the primary broadcast in full or not at all”
393 394
.   
The distinction between the primary broadcast and the secondary retransmission was not a merely 
theoretic division:  it had practical consequences, in particular for the acquisition of rights.  It was 
decisive that the primary broadcasters determine the timing and the content of the programmes 
and it was derived from this circumstance that they had sufficient time to acquire the right holders’ 
                                                     
 
387 Discussion Paper “Broadcasting and copyright in the internal market”, prepared by the Commission of the European 
Communities on copyright questions concerning cable and satellite broadcasts, III/F/5263/80-EN, November 1990, 26-35 (hereafter 
“Discussion Paper”). 
388 In the Discussion Paper, a distinction was found between the retransmission of terrestrial broadcasts and the retransmission of 
satellite broadcasts.  In the former case, the cable retransmission rights were acquired in collective agreements and for a lump sum 
(given the dependence on the primary broadcast), unless the national copyright legislation provided a statutory licence.  In some 
countries there was no cable retransmission on a significant scale.  As far as retransmission of satellite broadcasts was concerned, 
the same legal principle applied, i.e.; a consent was required for the retransmission by cable.  However, in practice, the satellite 
broadcasters acquired the cable retransmission rights for the territory of its satellite’s footprint and then concluded further contracts 
with the cable operators.  Yet both types of retransmissions were considered secondary communications, re-broadcasts rather than 
broadcasts. 
389 Cf. the graphic representation of the broadcasting and retransmission schemes, as an annex to the Discussion Paper. 
390 SatCab Proposal, 36. 
391 SatCab Proposal, 36. 
392 Discussion Paper, 56. 
393 SatCab Proposal, 20. 
394 See also:  Discussion Paper, 56-57.  “This retransmission is entirely dependent on the primary transmission.  The cable 
operator can decide only whether or not he wants to retransmit the primary broadcast, he has no way of shaping or influencing the 
content of the programme.  This dependence on the primary broadcast also means that the cable operator does not have long 
advance notice of the components of the programme and particularly of any changes.  Unlike the primary broadcaster, therefore, the 
cable operator is not in a position to take timely steps to ensure that he has the rights necessary for simultaneous, unaltered and 
unabridged retransmission from each individual right owner.  He has very little time to clarify any disputed points of law   and as a 
rule he will be unable to switch to other programmes, for technical reasons or on legal grounds such as a legal obligation to transmit 
programmes in their entirety”. 
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consent on an individual basis
395
.  By contrast, it was impossible for a cable operator to acquire the rights 
in the same way, on an individual basis
396
.  The cable network operator, which takes over a primary 
broadcast without alteration and without having a say in the composition of the programmes it relays, is 
not in a position to identify the owners of rights in particular parts of the programme in advance.  It was 
dependent on the primary broadcast, which was captured and then transmitted to the cable 
subscribers, hence it could not know in advance which rights to clear (for television or radio programmes 
composed by the primary broadcaster).   
The Directive was meant to address this problem in a uniform way (at least for retransmissions coming 
from another Member State), i.e. by means of a mandatory collective management of this right.  By 
consequence, the central exercise of these rights by one or more collecting society was proposed, “in 
order to prevent rights in individual programme components from standing in the way of the cable 
retransmission operation as a whole”
397
. Moreover, the Directive was meant to solve the “outsider 
problem”.  In many Member States, collective agreements were concluded to deal with the cable 
retransmissions of broadcast programmes (even before the adoption of the directive).  However, the 
cable operators still faced the uncertainty of “outsiders”, i.e. right holders who are not affiliated to and 
therefore not represented by the contracting collecting societies and who therefore still have the 
possibility of claiming remuneration or blocking the exploitation by an action for injunction.   
Finally, attention was given to the particular situation of the broadcasting organisations.  An exception 
to the mandatory collective management was thought appropriate for broadcasting organisation.  These 
were entitled to exercise their cable retransmission rights themselves, without the mandatory intervention 
of collecting societies.  It was considered that the cable distributor did not encounter the same difficulty in 
acquiring all necessary rights before transmitting the programmes when dealing with broadcasting 
organisations.  Since the cable operator knew which broadcasters’ programmes it would retransmit, it had 
the possibility to acquire the cable retransmission rights from those broadcasters prior to the 
retransmission of their programmes (provided the broadcaster held the cable retransmission rights), 
especially considering that there was only a limited number of broadcasting organisations.  The 
intervention of a collecting society was not considered necessary to ensure a complete transfer of rights.  
The broadcasting organisation thus had the right to conclude a contract on the cable retransmission in 
relation to its own rights and to rights assigned to it:  “where a right owner transfers the rights for a 
primary broadcast and for any associated cable retransmission to a broadcasting organisation, these 
cable retransmission rights are to be exercised by the broadcasting organisation and not by a collecting 
society”
 398
. 
In whole, the conclusion of the analysis was that the conclusion of contracts (negotiation, renegotiation) 
could pose a problem.  The solution adopted in the Directive aims at facilitating contracts, on the one 
hand by imposing the exercise of the cable retransmission right via collective agreements, on the other 
hand by shaping a system of impartial mediators. 
2. Cable retransmission right v right of communication to the public 
Before examining the notion of cable retransmission, as defined in the SatCab Directive, it is worth paying 
attention to the relation between the cable retransmission right and the right of communication the public.  
The CJEU has issued several decisions in cases where some kind of transmission by cable is at stake
399
.  
                                                     
 
395 Discussion Paper, 78-79. 
396 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 23. 
397 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 43. 
398 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 44. 
399 CJEU, 7 December 2006, C-306/05, SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles (SGAE).  CJEU, Order of the Court of 18 March 2010, C-136/09, 
Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon v Divani Akropolis Anonimi Xenodocheiaki kai 
Touristiki Etaireai (Organismos Sillogikis); CJEU 7 March 2013, Case C-607/11, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TV Catch Up 
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Most of these cases resulted from the reception of television or radio signals by hotels and their 
distribution by cable in the bedrooms of the hotels. The Court has not always analysed these cases on 
the basis of the cable retransmission right in the SatCab Directive, but as acts of communication to the 
public instead, as harmonised by the InfoSoc Directive
400
 .  
The SatCab Directive does not impose, as such, an obligation for the Member States to provide a right of 
cable retransmission:  it requires that, in case of a retransmission by cable from another Member State, 
the copyrights and related rights be observed (art. 8 SatCab Dir and Egeda, par. 24, opinion of Advocate-
General La Pergola in Egeda, par. 14
401
).  It is however assumed that such act is covered by an exclusive 
right (rec. 27 SatCab Dir).  Since the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive, such cable retransmissions are 
considered to be protected as communications to the public (art. 3 InfoSoc Dir)
402
.   
The cable retransmission right is indeed treated as a species of the right of communication to the 
public
403
.  Where the court was asked to find whether a restricted act takes place, it answered by 
reference to the general right of communication to the public, given the fact that the SatCab Directive was 
intended to provide a partial harmonisation of certain aspects regarding the cable retransmission right 
(i.e. its exercise).  Furthermore, the objective of the Cable and Satellite Directive laid down in the 
preamble was to secure free retransmission of channels within the EU by ensuring legal certainty, and not 
to regulate transmissions of a national range. 
The Court was first questioned about the interpretation of the concept of cable retransmission as laid 
down in the SatCab Directive in the case Egeda v. Hoasa.  
Hoasa owned a hotel in Spain in which a system was installed for the reception of terrestrial and satellite 
television programmes which it then retransmitted internally through coaxial cables to the TV in the rooms 
of the hotel.  Egeda is the Spanish collecting society that manages the rights of audiovisual producers. It 
claimed for an infringement of its members’ rights because Hoasa had no authorisation for the installation 
of such a system. Consequently, Egeda brought a claim against Hoasa to suspend the retransmission of 
the programmes in the hotel rooms. 
Hoasa disputed that it had made any ‘communication to the public' or 'cable retransmission' within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Satellite and cable Directive. 
The Spanish courts asked the Court of Justice to define whether the reception by a hotel establishment of 
satellite or terrestrial television signals and their distribution by cable to the various rooms of that hotel 
constituted an "act of communication to the public" or "reception by the public" in the sense of the 
Directive.  The Spanish legislator had transposed the definitions of 'communication to the public by 
satellite' and 'cable retransmission' of the SatCab Directive literally into the Spanish copyright act. 
The Court declined to answer this question.  It considered (Egeda, par. 24-25): “It is clear from Article 8 of 
the Directive, and from the 27th recital in the preamble, that the Directive neither requires the Member 
States to introduce a specific cable retransmission right nor defines the scope of any such right. It merely 
imposes an obligation upon the Member States to ensure that when programmes from other Member 
States are retransmitted by cable in their territory the applicable copyright and related rights are 
observed.  It is clear from the foregoing that Article 1(2)(a) and (3) of the Directive does not provide 
information to enable the Court to answer the question whether the reception by a hotel establishment of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Ltd (TV Catch Up).  See also CJEU, 15 March 2012, C-162/10, Phonographic Performance v. Ireland (Phonographic Performance) 
on the right of communication to the public in the Rental and Lending Directive 2006/115. 
400 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Official Journal L 167 , 22/06/2001, 10-19 (hereafter also “InfoSoc Directive”).   
401 CJEU 3 February 2000, C-293/98, Egeda v. Hoasa (Egeda). 
402 See P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, « SatCab Revisited :  the past, present and Future of the Satellite and Cable Directive », IrisPlus 
2009/8 (7), 16.  See Egeda, par. 26-28. 
403 see SGAE, par. 30; TV Catch Up Ltd, par. 24. 
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satellite or terrestrial television signals and their distribution by cable to the various rooms of that hotel 
constitutes an 'act of communication to the public' or 'reception by the public'.” 
That prejudicial issue was addressed to the Court of Justice before the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive, 
which was considered the appropriate framework to answer the Spanish court’s question.   The SatCab 
Directive provided for only a minimum degree of harmonisation (Egeda, par. 17).  
The Advocate General was more willing to provide an answer to the national court
404
.  As is the case in 
Spain, cable retransmission is generally considered a restricted act under the law of copyright in all 
Member States
405
. Advocate general La Pergola held the opinion that the SatCab Directive was not so 
much concerned with the definition of the protected act, but with the exercise of this right.  An 
interpretation of the notion of cable retransmission could be found in the Berne Convention: 
“(…) in the case of cable retransmission (…) the Directive does not in this case require the 
introduction of an analogous exclusive right but assumes that other rights exist in national law 
('copyright and related rights') which have not been harmonised or defined, but observance of 
which the Member States must ensure (Article 8). I would therefore observe that for the purpose 
of this Opinion, the subject matter of the main action — the interpretation of broadcasting rights 
as regards communication to the public by cable of a protected work that has already been 
broadcast — lies outside the material scope of the Directive, which merely states that this right 
may be exercised only through a collecting society (Article 9). 
As the scope for such co-ordination by the Community legislature is of course limited, it is clear 
why the Directive — which devotes all of Article 1 (Definitions) to clarification of the meaning of a 
number of fundamental terms used in the rest of the Directive, for the purposes of ensuring the 
application of its substantive provisions, ('for the purpose of this Directive') — does not define 
'retransmission', 'cable system', 'public', 'communication to the public' or 'reception by the public' 
(see footnote 5, above). The definitions simply did not seem to be necessary. However, their 
meaning may be elicited from the international agreements on this subject, including of course 
the Berne Convention, which, as the Commission has stated, is the original source of many of the 
terms subsequently used in the Directive. I therefore agree with the applicant and the German, 
French and United Kingdom Governments that even if we admit that the main action concerns 
television programmes from other Member States, the preliminary ruling requested by the 
Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción n. 5 de Oviedo cannot be given on the basis of the 
Directive.”
 
(opinion in Egeda, par. 14-15) 
The Opinion of Advocate general La Pergola was thus based on art. 11bis of the Berne Convention. He 
stated (opinion in Egeda, par. 20-24): 
“(…) under the Convention, the grant of a television broadcast licence to a broadcaster does not 
cover any other use of the work — for example, communication to the public of the transmitted 
programme via loudspeakers or analogous instruments (in this case via television) — by third 
parties, particularly if this is for profit. This form of communication enables a new public to be 
reached which differs from the public the author had in mind when he first authorised broadcast in 
the exercise of his own exclusive right. 
(…) 
What criterion do I therefore suggest that the Court should adopt in the matter before it to 
distinguish between communications that are to the public and those that are not? In my opinion, 
the Convention lays down the principle that the author must authorise all secondary use of the 
broadcast work if this gives rise to independent economic exploitation for financial profit by the 
                                                     
 
404 Opinion of the Advocate General La Pergola delivered on 9 September 1999 in case C-293/98.  
405 B. HUGHENOLTZ, “Convergence, Copyrights and Transfrontier Television”, Iris plus, 2009/8, 16. 
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person responsible and also relates to the economic importance of the new public (paragraph 22 
above), which is the group of persons to whom the particular act of communication via the 
television is addressed.” 
The Advocate General concluded (opinion in Egeda, par. 27): 
“I therefore believe that when deciding the main action, the court which made the reference for a 
preliminary ruling must apply the principle whereby the retransmission by a hotel of a work 
broadcast by satellite or terrestrial television signals from another Member State to its guests via 
the televisions in each of its rooms constitutes communication to the public and therefore must be 
separately authorised by the copyright holders of the protected work.” 
The InfoSoc Directive was then adopted on 22 June 2001. Recital 23 of the Directive expressly provides 
that the right of communication to the public “should cover any transmission or retransmission of a work to 
the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting”.  
Consequently, following the opinion of Advocate general La Pergola and the decision of the CJEU in 
Egeda, the prejudicial issues addressed to the Court of Justice regarding a cable retransmission of 
television programmes were based on the notion of “communication to the public” as provided by article 3 
of the InfoSoc Directive. 
In 2006, the Court of Justice was once again questioned by a Spanish Court over a case resulting from 
the retransmission of television programmes to hotel bedrooms. The company Rafael owned a hotel in 
which it used television sets and played ambient music for distribution by cable in the rooms. SGAE, the 
collecting society managing the authors’ rights in Spain, took the view that Rafael’s activities involved a 
communication to the public of works belonging to its repertoire. 
That case was exclusively treated on the basis of the right of communication to the public, and the Court 
did not interpret the notion of cable retransmission, declaring (SGAE, par. 30): 
“It should be stated at the outset that, contrary to Rafael's submissions, the situation at issue in 
the main proceedings does not fall within Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on 
the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to 
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (OJ 1993 L 248, p. 15), but within Directive 
2001/29. The latter applies to all communications to the public of protected works, whereas 
Directive 93/83 only provides for minimal harmonisation of certain aspects of protection of 
copyright and related rights in the case of communication to the public by satellite or cable 
retransmission of programmes from other Member States. As the Court has already held, unlike 
Directive 2001/29, this minimal harmonisation does not provide information to enable the Court to 
reply to a question concerning a situation similar to that which is the subject of the questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling.” 
The Court found that the clientele of a hotel may constitute a new public and stated that the distribution of 
a signal by means of television sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever technique is 
used to transmit the signal – thus also in case of cable retransmission – constitutes communication to the 
public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive (SGAE, par. 42): 
“The transmission of the broadcast work to that clientele using television sets is not just a 
technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original broadcast in the catchment area. 
On the contrary, the hotel is the organisation which intervenes, in full knowledge of the 
consequences of its action, to give access to the protected work to its customers. In the absence 
of that intervention, its customers, although physically within that area, would not, in principle, be 
able to enjoy the broadcast work.” 
The Court thus concluded that there was a new act of communication to the public (subsequent to the 
broadcast of the work), but it did not qualify it as an act of retransmission by cable, which would require 
mandatory collective management. 
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The Court confirmed that statement in a later case, Organismos Sillogikis, once again resulting from the 
distribution of television programmes to hotel rooms.  
More recently, in the case Phonographic Performance v. Ireland, the Irish collecting society for the rights 
of phonogram producers (PPL) brought an action against Ireland.  It alleged that the Irish legislation 
allowed operators of hotels and guesthouses not to pay an equitable remuneration for the distribution in 
the bedrooms, by cable or other technology, of received centrally television or radio signals. PPL 
considered that the Irish legislation infringed the right to equitable remuneration as defined in Directive 
2006/115.  In its judgment, the Court of justice confirmed once again that a hotel operator which provides 
in guest bedrooms televisions and/or radios to which it distributes a broadcast signal is a ‘user’ making a 
‘communication to the public’ (Phonographic Performance, par. 47). 
Finally, the Court recently delivered a judgment in a case resulting from the simultaneous retransmission 
on internet of television programmes in TVCatchup.  
The company TVCatchup has developed an internet broadcasting television service available in the 
United Kingdom, according to which it offers its users the reception of free to air television broadcasts via 
internet live streams. TVCatchup ensures that the users receiving the TV programmes through its service 
have a TV licence. The service offered by TVCatchup is thus based on the following conditions: 
- It is limited to free to air channels. 
- It can only be accessed in the United Kingdom. 
- The users must have a valid TV licence allowing them to watch television in the United Kingdom. 
TVCatchup is able to control the respect of these conditions and to refuse the access to the users that 
would not comply with it.  However, several commercial broadcasters retransmitted by TVCatchup 
brought a claim against TVCatchup for infringement of their copyright, alleging that the activities of 
TVCatchup imply a communication of their programmes to the public. 
The Court of Justice analysed the lawfulness of TVCatchup’s system of “cable retransmission” under the 
right of communication to the public.  The Court defined the right of cable retransmission as a specific 
form of communication to the public and stated that the retransmission of a terrestrial television broadcast 
over the internet should be considered to be a ‘communication’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 
InfoSoc Directive, as it consists in a transmission of the protected works which is different from that of the 
broadcaster. According to the Court (TVCatchup, par. 23-25): 
“It follows, in particular, from recital 23 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29 that the author’s right 
of communication to the public covers any transmission or retransmission of a work to the public 
not present at the place where the communication originates, by wire or wireless means, 
including broadcasting. In addition, it is apparent from Article 3(3) of that directive that authorising 
the inclusion of protected works in a communication to the public does not exhaust the right to 
authorise or prohibit other communications of those works to the public. 
If follows that, by regulating the situations in which a given work is put to multiple use, the 
European Union legislature intended that each transmission or retransmission of a work which 
uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be individually authorised by the author of the 
work in question. 
Those findings are, moreover, supported by Articles 2 and 8 of Directive 93/83, which require 
fresh authorisation for a simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retransmission by satellite or 
cable of an initial transmission of television or radio programmes containing protected works, 
even though those programmes may already be received in their catchment area by other 
technical means, such as by wireless means or terrestrial networks.” 
The Court then examined whether a public was reached by TVCatchup. It held that the technique used by 
TVCatchup, giving access to the works through a one-to-one connection did not prevent a large number 
of persons to have access to the same work at the same time, representing an indeterminate number of 
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potential recipients constituting a ‘public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive 
(TVCatchup, par. 39): 
“(…) the main proceedings in the present case concern the transmission of works included in a 
terrestrial broadcast and the making available of those works over the internet. As is apparent 
from paragraphs 24 to 26 above, each of those two transmissions must be authorised individually 
and separately by the authors concerned given that each is made under specific technical 
conditions, using a different means of transmission for the protected works, and each is intended 
for a public.” 
In this case the retransmission was not operated via the traditional cable network but via the Web
406
.  It 
would have been interesting to see if the Court considered such secondary exploitation via the Web a 
retransmission by cable in the sense of the SatCab Directive.  Unfortunately, the core of the conflict was 
the existence of a secondary communication to the public, not its qualification and the exercise of rights.  
Since the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive, the Court of Justice defines the right of cable retransmission 
as a fragment of the right of communication to the public. Meanwhile, the scope of the SatCab Directive is 
restricted to cable retransmission of an initial transmission of protected works from another Member 
State. Consequently, the regime of mandatory collective rights management established by the SatCab 
Directive does not necessarily apply to cases of purely national retransmission, for which the Member 
States keep their autonomy (within the limits of art. 11bis BC and considering that such cable 
retransmission is an act of communication to the public)
407
.  
In the Nordic countries for instance, the mechanism of the extended collective licence covers 
simultaneous and unaltered cable retransmissions, both coming from another Member State and purely 
“domestic” ones
408
. According to this mechanism, if a collective rights management society concludes an 
agreement with a service provider, this agreement is valid not only for the authors and right holders 
represented by the organisation but also for works of non-represented right holders of the same 
category
409
. Specific provisions apply to the functioning of extended collective licences
410
.  
Summarising, a cable retransmission as harmonised by the SatCab Directive is a specific form of 
communication to the public.  The SatCab Directive was meant to harmonise only certain aspects in 
relation to this right, i.e. its exercise, but it does not require a specific right of retransmission by cable.  
Ever since the Information Society Directive was adopted, questions regarding the existence of a 
restricted act are answered by reference to the general right of communication to the public (art. 3 
InfoSoc Directive).   
                                                     
 
406 In this context we also bring to the attention that another preliminary question has been submitted to the court in case C-416/12:   
“Does the concept of communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC include the 
rebroadcasting, by wire, of a broadcast work in the case where the original broadcast can also be received by wireless means in the 
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see CJEU order of the President of the Court of 22 May 2013. 
407 Cf. also the SatCab Proposal, 35. 
408 Art. 35 (1) of the Danish Copyright Act: 
Works which are broadcast wireless on radio or television may be retransmitted simultaneously and without alteration via cable 
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rights held by broadcasters. 
409 J. ROSEN, “News from the Nordic countries”, R.I.D.A., 2011, n° 229, 183. For a complete presentation of the extended 
collective licence mechanism, see J. AXHAMN and L. GUIBAULT, Cross-border extended collective licensing: a solution to online 
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http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/guibault/ECL_Europeana_final_report092011.pdf.   
410 Art. 50-52 of the Danish Copyright Act. 
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After having examined the scope of application of the SatCab Directive and its relation to the Information 
Society Directive, we will turn to the constitutive elements of the notion of “retransmission by cable”.   
3. Elements of the “cable retransmission” (art. 1(3) SatCab Dir). 
As explained, it is assumed that the retransmission by cable requires the right holders’ consent, but the 
SatCab Directive does not impose, as such, an obligation for the Member States to provide a right of 
cable retransmission.  The question whether a particular cable transmission is protected is answered from 
the angle of the general right of communication to the public as harmonised in the InfoSoc Directive.  
Effects.  The SatCab Directive by contrast puts forward a regime for the exercise of the cable 
retransmission right (art. 8-12).  When an act of communication to the public is qualified as a 
retransmission by cable, it follows that this right should be exercised as determined in the SatCab 
Directive. 
The exercise of the cable retransmission right is subject to mandatory collective management (art. 9(1) 
SatCab Dir).  This provision is meant to offer more protection to the right holders than the Berne 
Convention:  under the Directive, the exclusive nature of this right is acknowledged, allowing right holders 
(be it through their collecting societies) to negotiate an agreement.  Statutory licences, allowed under the 
Berne Convention, are not permitted under the SatCab Directive.   
The “outsider problem” of right holders who have not transferred their rights to a collecting society has 
been solved by a presumption that the collecting society which manages rights of the same category is 
mandated to manage their rights.  The Directive provides a system of extended collective licences (art. 
9(2) SatCab Dir).  This provision is considered giving a concrete expression to the rule of the mandatory 
collective management
411
.   
The mandate of the collecting society is not limited to the financial aspects of the right, the exercise of the 
retransmission right as such is not excluded
412
. 
An exception is made for broadcasting organisations in respect of their own transmissions, irrespective of 
whether the rights concerned are its own or have been transferred to it by other copyright owners and/or 
holders of related rights (art. 10 SatCab Dir).   
The Directive also requires the Member States to provide a system of mediation, in case the interested 
parties do not manage to conclude an agreement (art. 11 SatCab Dir).  Finally, the Member States should 
provide a mechanism to prevent the abuse of negotiating positions, forcing the parties to enter into and 
conduct negotiations in good faith and to refrain from preventing or hindering the negotiations without 
“valid justification” (art. 12 SatCab Dir). 
Definition.  This regime is only applicable if a “cable retransmission” between Member States is 
established.  The cable retransmission is defined as the “simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged 
retransmission by a cable or microwave system for reception by the public of an initial transmission from 
another Member State, by wire or over the air, including that by satellite, of television or radio 
programmes intended for reception by the public” (art. 1(3) SatCab Dir). 
The definition of “cable retransmission” refers to two transmissions:   
1) an initial transmission by wire or over the air (including by satellite) for reception by the 
public of a radio or television programme and  
                                                     
 
411 CJEU 1 June 2006 Case C-169/05, Uradex SCRL v Union Professionnelle de la Radio et de la Télédistribution (RTD) and 
Société Intercommunale pour la Diffusion de la Télévision (BRUTELE), par. 21 (“Uradex”). 
412 Uradex, par. 22. 
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2) the retransmission of this initial transmission by a cable or microwave system for 
reception by the public.   
The initial transmission could be any primary broadcast, without distinction regarding the mode of 
transmission
413
:  it could be a primary broadcast by satellite or terrestrial means or even by wire.  It was 
stated in the Explanatory Memorandum that “however, there is no cable retransmission in the sense of 
this proposal, if the programme is merely delivered by point-to-point communication to the cable head end 
without being the subject of a simultaneous primary broadcast”
414
.   
The notion of cable retransmission covers retransmissions of the initial transmission, for reception by the 
public, via the cable network or multipoint microwave distribution systems, where these “perform the role 
of broadcast retransmission in areas where the establishment of a cable network is not economically 
viable”
415
.  Unlike the Berne Convention, the Directive does not require that the cable retransmission be 
operated by another organisation than the broadcasting organisation.   
In 2002, the Commission issued a report on the SatCab Directive
416
.  With regard to the definition of the 
cable retransmission right, it was found that the transmission technologies were evolving.   
The primary broadcasts were moving from terrestrial broadcasting technologies to satellite 
transmissions.  As far as the secondary transmissions were concerned, it was found that these were 
often operated by microwave channel, via internet and by satellite.  It was decided not to adapt the 
Directive to these technical evolutions
417
.  It was found too early to adapt the Directive to the 
retransmission by microwave channel.  Internet retransmissions should be assessed against the E-
commerce Directive and the Infosoc Directive.  The Commission found similarities between the 
retransmission by cable and the retransmission by satellite
418
, but it did not think it justified to extend the 
cable retransmission system to these forms of retransmission, given the larger impact of satellite 
transmissions.  Since the geographic footprint of the satellite transmission is international while a cable 
retransmission generally covers a national territory, an extension of the mandatory collective 
management was thought an excessive limitation of the right holders’ rights and it would interfere with the 
exploitation chronology (national basis).   
It was concluded that “the evolution of television services in the framework of the information society 
leads the Commission to reflect on the need to adapt certain current mechanisms relating to the 
protection copyright and related rights (settlement of disputes, role of collecting societies):  the methods 
of managing rights to cable retransmission and mediation will thus be assessed in the general context of 
the evolution of the media in the information society before considering whether or not to revise Dir 
93/83/EEC”.  It was thought that technological developments (digital TV and internet) would create more 
possibilities to offer cross-border audiovisual services and that viewers’ habits would change, probably 
                                                     
 
413 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 36. 
414 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 36. 
415 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 36. 
416 Report from the Commission on the application of Council Directive 93/83/EEC on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, COM(2002) 430 final, 26 July 
2002, 5 (hereafter 2002 Commission Report).  See also P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, “Copyright without Frontiers:  is there a future for the 
Satellite and Cable Directive?”, Die Zukunft der Fernsehrichtliie/The Future of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ Directive, Band 29, 
Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2005, accessed via www.ivir.nl;  J. CORBET, “Verslag van 26 juli van de Europese Commissie 
(toepassing van de richtlijn van de Raad over de satellietomroep en de kabeldistributie, COM (2002) 430 def), A&M 2003/3, 198-
202. 
417 Critical about this conclusion:  E. WERKERS, “Broadbank Content Services :  Intellectual Property Rights at War with 
Convergence?”, (August 24, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923695 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1923695.  
418 “A satellite distributor, which is neither a broadcasting organisation nor a satellite operator providing transport) includes in a 
single package a number of channels which have already had an initial broadcasting, rents transmission bans from a satellite 
operator and makes that package available to television viewers against payment of a subscription”.  See 2002 Commission Report, 
15. 
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evolve towards more individualised and personalised access to services.  It was considered too early to 
assess these changes and to consider extending the scope of the SatCab Directive. 
In the following section, we will examine the elements of the definition of the cable retransmission right.  
We will start with some preliminary considerations (sub a)), then we will analyse the initial transmission 
(sub b)) and finally the retransmission by cable (sub c)).  We will discuss the relevant decisions of CJEU 
and the few national decisions we have come across (mainly from Belgium, The Netherlands, Austria and 
Germany).   
a) Preliminary 
The right of retransmission by cable is formulated by reference to television or radio programmes.  This 
can be explained by its common origin with the Directive Television Without Frontiers and the pursuit of 
an audiovisual internal market
419
.  The definition does not refer to “works” or subject matter protected by 
neighbouring rights, but to “television or radio programmes”, which may of course contain subject matter 
protected by copyright or neighbouring rights.  However, the Directive does not explain what constitutes a 
“programme”
420
.  A “programme” may refer to one delineated creation, intended for broadcasting (e.g. 
game show, a talk show, an episode of a television series, perhaps a broadcast film).  However, a 
“programme” could also be understood as broadcast programming or the schedule, i.e. the whole of items 
selected for broadcasting in a certain chronology (linear).  The term “television or radio programmes” 
implicitly refers to a certain practice of the “broadcasting” sector, intrinsically (though not exclusively) 
connected to certain technologies.   
The definition of a programme has consequences for the assessment of the “unaltered” and “unabridged” 
character of the retransmission.  The question then arises how the practice should be regarded, which 
consists of retransmitting a television programme for a limited period of time or offering programmes of 
different broadcasters on the same channel.  According to DREIER, such practices may be considered 
cable retransmissions in the sense of the Directive, the purpose of the Directive being to facilitate the 
acquisition of rights in due course of time
421
.  This does not mean of course that the cable operator can 
operate a selection of the best parts of different programmes under the regime reserved for cable 
retransmissions. 
b) Initial transmission 
The Directive requires an “initial transmission from another Member State, by wire or over the air, 
including that by satellite, of television or radio programmes intended for reception by the public”. 
We will examine each element of this initial transmission:  (1) coming from another Member State, (2) by 
wire or wireless means, (3) intended for reception by the public. 
From another Member State.  The Directive only harmonises the applicable regime for transmission of 
programmes coming from another Member State.  Purely national situations, i.e. the retransmission on 
the territory of one Member State of programmes initially transmitted in the same Member State, are not 
                                                     
 
419 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or 
Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities,  OJ L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23–30, 
now Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1–24. 
420 P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, « SatCab Revisited :  the past, present and Future of the Satellite and Cable Directive », IrisPlus 2009/8 
(7), 13. 
421 Th. DREIER, “Satellite and Cable Directive” in M. M. WALTER & S. VON LEWINSKI (ed), European Copyright Law, Oxford, 
University Press, 2010, 420 (hereafter, DREIER, “Satellite and Cable Directive”). 
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covered by the Directive.  Similarly, the cable retransmissions of initial transmissions from third countries, 
outside the European Union, are not dealt with either.   
In both cases, the Member States retain full competence to regulate national cable retransmissions of 
broadcasts, both taking place on the territory of one Member State
422
. 
By wire or over the air.  According to the definition in the SatCab Directive, the initial transmission of 
television or radio programmes may be carried out by wire or over the air, including by satellite.  Unlike 
the Berne Convention, the cable retransmission right does not only apply to “broadcasts”, i.e. wireless 
communications to the public (art. 11bis(1)(ii) BC).   
The Danish Copyright Act defines the initial transmission as a wireless broadcast (s. 35 Danish Copyright 
Act)
423
.  It is required that there is a simultaneous wireless broadcast of the content. This does not mean 
that the retransmission (by cable or by wireless means) should technically be operated on the basis of 
this wireless broadcast signal.  A cable retransmission may be found, even if the content is delivered to 
the cable operator by means of a wired connection.  The content of the signal must be unaltered and 
unabridged, not the signal
424
.  Since the Danish law restricts the retransmission right to the retransmission 
of initial transmission by wireless means (rather than “by wire or over the air”), FOGED observes that the 
Directive has not been transposed correctly
425
. 
In France, the retransmission by cable is dealt with in art. L.132/20,1° CPI
426
.  It is stated that the 
authorisation to broadcast a work by Hertzian waves does not include the transmission by cable of this 
broadcast, unless the transmission is executed simultaneously and integrally by the organisation which 
benefits from this authorisation and without extending the geographical reach covered by the contract.  In 
other words:  the broadcaster may assume that it is entitled to transmit the work by cable, integrally and 
simultaneously, within the reach of the broadcast – unless the contract provides otherwise.  It should be 
remarked that this provision explicitly refers to a particular type of terrestrial broadcasts, by Hertzian 
waves.  As far as the retransmission by cable on the French territory of a work, broadcast in another 
Member State, it is stated that this right may only be exercised by a collecting society (Art. L132-20-1 
CPI
427
).   
Intended for reception by the public.  Finally the initial transmission of television or radio programmes 
should be intended for reception by the public.   
                                                     
 
422 Austrian Supreme Court (Oberste Gerichtshof) 21 February 2008, 4Ob89/08d, accessible via https://www.ris.bka.gv.at.  
423 T. FOGED,”DTT primary transmission and retransmission – copyright challenges”, 
http://www.ubod.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/ubo/articles/TF_article.pdf, 3 September 2009, p. 11. 
424 T. FOGED,”DTT primary transmission and retransmission – copyright challenges”, p. 11.  This appears from the explanatory 
note to the Danish copyright act, as quoted by this author.  According to her the SatCab Directive does not require it either, nor the 
BC.  
425 T. FOGED,”DTT primary transmission and retransmission – copyright challenges”, p. 13. 
426 Sauf stipulation contraire : 
1° L'autorisation de télédiffuser une œuvre par voie hertzienne ne comprend pas la distribution par câble de cette télédiffusion, à 
moins qu'elle ne soit faite en simultané et intégralement par l'organisme bénéficiaire de cette autorisation et sans extension de la 
zone géographique contractuellement prévue. (...) 
4° L'autorisation de télédiffuser une œuvre par voie hertzienne comprend la distribution à des fins non commerciales de cette 
télédiffusion sur les réseaux internes aux immeubles ou ensembles d'immeubles collectifs à usage d'habitation installés par leurs 
propriétaires ou copropriétaires, ou par les mandataires de ces derniers, à seule fin de permettre le raccordement de chaque 
logement de ces mêmes immeubles ou ensembles d'immeubles collectifs à usage d'habitation à des dispositifs collectifs de 
réception des télédiffusions par voie hertzienne normalement reçues dans la zone. 
427 I.-A compter de la date d'entrée en vigueur de la loi n° 97-283 du 27 mars 1997, le droit d'autoriser la retransmission par câble, 
simultanée, intégrale et sans changement, sur le territoire national, d'une œuvre télédiffusée à partir d'un Etat membre de la 
Communauté européenne ne peut être exercé que par une société de perception et de répartition des droits. Si cette société est 
régie par le titre II du livre III, elle doit être agréée à cet effet par le ministre chargé de la culture. 
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An important question is whether a transmission by cable to the public, following a transmission between 
the “broadcaster” and the cable operator, should be qualified as a “retransmission by cable” in the sense 
of the SatCab Directive.  Before examining the national decisions on this issue, we will examine the 
decisions of the CJEU in Lagardère and Mediakabel.  These decisions do not relate to cable 
retransmissions as such, but they are often referred to by courts dealing with the cable retransmission 
right.  It seems relevant to summarise the ruling in these decisions and to elaborate on the notion of the 
“public”, which has proven quite important in the case law of the CJEU. 
CJEU.  The CJEU has interpreted the notion of the “public” in Lagardère
428
.   
The facts of this case may be summarised as follows.  Lagardère was a broadcasting company, 
established in France.  Its programmes were transmitted to a satellite and went back to earth, where they 
were received by repeater stations in France, which broadcast the programmes to the public (FM), and by 
a transmitter in Germany, from where CERT (a Lagardère subsidiary) broadcasts the programmes to 
France on the long wave.  The French language programmes could be received on a part of the German 
territory (the border area), but were not exploited in Germany. In parallel, Lagardère had a digital audio 
terrestrial circuit, through which the signals could be sent from the Paris studio to the transmitter in 
Germany (in case the satellite did not function).  Lagardère paid royalty fees to performers and 
phonogram producers for the use of phonograms in its broadcasts in France (to collecting society SPRE) 
and a flat rate fee to GVL in Germany (which it deducted from the French remuneration).  In this case the 
transmission scheme consisted of a first transmission (by satellite) between the studio in Paris and the 
transmitters in France and Germany and, from there on, a wireless broadcast (FM or AM) to the general 
public.   
The issue was whether the first transmission by satellite (between the studio and the transmitters) should 
be considered an act of communication to the public by satellite (art. 1(2)a SatCab Dir).  If this were the 
case, then the satellite broadcast could be situated in France alone and only the French copyright 
legislation be taken into account.   
The Court of Justice decided that the initial transmission could not be seen as a satellite broadcast.  The 
Court found that this signal was not intended for reception by the “public”. The mere fact that the signal 
was transmitted on non-public frequency band did not per se exclude that was a broadcast.  In casu it 
was found that the satellite signal could only be received by professional equipment, which was not 
available to the general public.  Applying the criterion from Mediakabel (infra), the Court found no “public”, 
since a public must be made up of an indeterminate number of potential listeners (Lagardère par. 31 – cf. 
Mediakabel, par. 30).  Moreover, in relation to satellite broadcasting, the Court stated that the signals 
should be intended for the public and that it does not suffice that the programmes (carried by the signals) 
are meant for the public (Lagardère par; 35).  
In Mediakabel, the CJEU has indeed come up with a definition of what constitutes a “public”, albeit in the 
context of the definition of a “broadcasting service” according to the Television without Frontiers Directive 
(art. 1(a) Directive 89/552)
429
.   
In this case, the qualification of a service named “Filmtime” was at stake.  Mediakabel, a Dutch operator, 
offered a broadcasting service (“Mr Zap”) to its subscribers, via broadcasting systems operated by third 
parties, and in return for a fee.  Additionally, the subscribers could order films via the pay-per-view service 
“Filmtime”.  The issue was whether this additional service should be qualified as a broadcasting service or 
as an interactive service of the information society.  If it were a broadcasting service, then Mediakabel 
had to comply with all obligations, including acquiring the authorisation of a governmental agent and inter 
                                                     
 
428 CJEU 14 July 2005, Case C-192/04, Lagardère Active Broadcast v Société pour la perception de la rémunération équitable 
(SPRE) and Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL), Reports of Cases 2005 I-07199 (Lagardère). 
429 CJEU 2 June 2005, Case C-89/04, Mediakabel BV v Commissariaat voor de Media, Reports of Cases 2005 I-04891 
(Mediakabel). 
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alia broadcasting a certain quota of European programmes.  Interactive services of the information 
society by contrast were not subject to these obligations.   
The CJEU decided that the service was a broadcasting service, which according to art. 1(a) Dir 89/552, 
consists of the initial transmission of television programmes intended for reception by the public.  The 
Court stated that a broadcasting service “must consist of the transmission of television programmes 
intended for reception by the public, that is, an indeterminate number of potential television viewers, to 
whom the same images are transmitted simultaneously” (Mediakabel, par. 30).  In this case, the service 
was distinguished from an interactive service by the fact that the programme is not transmitted “on 
individual demand”:  the pay-per-view service subscribers had access to programmes selected by the 
broadcaster and at times set by the broadcaster.   
According to Dreier, this means a contrario that the making available on demand of content is not an 
initial transmission in the sense of the SatCab Directive
430
. 
Member States.  A number of decisions in the Netherlands and Belgium, have addressed the question 
whether a transmission of television programmes to the public by cable should be qualified as a 
retransmission by cable if it is preceded by a point to point transmission between the “broadcaster” and 
the cable operator.   
The Dutch courts have come to a uniform case law on this point:  a cable retransmission can be found if it 
is preceded by a communication to the public, i.e. the general public.  In Belgian copyright law, this issue 
remains controversial. 
The Netherlands.  The Dutch Supreme Court was asked to rule in a conflict between collecting societies 
Buma and Stemra and cable operator UPC, later ChelloMedia.  The facts can be summarised as follows.  
UPC produced television programmes and exploited some theme channels.  In order to send the 
television programmes to the public, it had set up a technical scheme in which UPC sent encrypted 
programme signals to the distribution satellite Telstar 12 (uplink).  From there on, the encrypted signals 
were sent to a cable headend (downlink).  The cable distributors had the means to decode the signal and 
to distribute a (newly encoded) programme signal to the cable subscribers.  At the same time, the 
encrypted programme signals were sent, from the Telstar 21 satellite, to the “Direct to Home” platforms 
(downlink), which sent a re-encoded signal by satellite to the “DTH” subscribers.   
It was agreed that the cable operators and the DTH platform operators performed acts of communications 
to the public (“openbaarmaking”) by sending the programme signals to their subscribers and the 
remuneration they paid for these communications were not questioned.  The issue here was whether the 
transmission by UPC to the cable distributors and to the DTH platform operators should be qualified as a 
communication to the public (“openbaarmaking”)
431
.  In order to solve this issue, the question was 
whether the addressees of the signals should be considered a “public”.   
The Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 provides in its art. 12(1) that the act of communication to the public 
(“openbaarmaking”) covers (inter alia) the broadcast of a work included in a television programme by 
means of satellite
432
.  It is stated in art. 12(7) that the “broadcast of a work included in a radio or television 
                                                     
 
430 Th. DREIER, “Satellite and Cable Directive” in M. M. WALTER & S. VON LEWINSKI (ed), European Copyright Law, Oxford, 
University Press, 2010, 419. 
431 It was accepted that the last transmission was an act of communication to the public and the rights for this transmission were 
cleared for a fee.  It was not under consideration whether this communication to the public was a cable retransmission. Instead, the 
issue was whether the preceding transmission was an act of communication to the public, for which another remuneration had to be 
paid.  This decision is however important, since the transmission scheme is similar to schemes in other cases where the cable 
retransmission right was at stake and because other courts have used this case as a relevant precedent, both in The Netherlands 
and in Belgium. 
432 Art. 12(1)(5°) :  « Onder de openbaarmaking van een werk van letterkunde, wetenschap of kunst wordt mede verstaan: (...)het 
uitzenden van een in een radio- of televisieprogramma opgenomen werk door middel van een satelliet of een andere zender of een 
omroepnetwerk als bedoeld in artikel 1.1 van de Mediawet 2008”. 
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programme by means of a satellite should be understood as the “act of introducing, under the control and 
responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals intended for reception by 
the public into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards the 
earth.  If the programme-carrying signals are encrypted, then there is broadcast of a work included in a 
radio or television programme by means of satellite, if the means for decrypting the broadcast are 
provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent”
433
.  This provision is the 
implementation of art. 1(2) of the SatCab Directive. 
The Court of first instance of Amsterdam decided in 2005 (some months before Lagardère) that the 
transmission by satellite to the cable distributors and the DTH platform operators should not be 
considered a communication to the public
434
.  The court came to the conclusion that there was no 
protected communication, since the signals, transmitted by UPC, are meant for the cable operators and 
the DTH platform operators, but not for the general “public”.  The Court referred to the SatCab Directive 
(rec. 17, 6) and to the Television without Frontiers Directive (rec. 4, 5).  The judge considered that the 
encrypted signal was transmitted to the satellite only to be received later on by the cable operators and 
the DTH platform operators (which were bound by contract), the only ones having the technical means to 
use these signals.  Moreover, the cable operators and DTH platforms only decrypted these signals in 
order to transmit the (re-encrypted) signals to the public (which had the means to decrypt them), a 
transmission that was indeed considered a communication to the public for which a remuneration is due.   
The Court of appeal of Amsterdam confirmed this decision in 2006
435
.  It referred to the CJEU’s 
interpretation of “public” in Mediakabel and Lagardère
436
.  In these decisions, a “public” was found when a 
broadcast of television programmes was addressed to an indeterminate number of potential listeners or 
viewers.  The Court considered that a select circle of operators of cable headends or DTH platforms was 
not a public.  Moreover, the transmission by UPC (Chello) could not be qualified as a communication to 
the public by satellite on account of the later transmission (via the cable operators resp. DTH satellite) to 
the public.  No communication to the public by satellite was found since the public was not reached in an 
uninterrupted chain, but in two phases instead.   
The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) confirmed this decision of the Court of Appeal in its decision of 
2009
437
.  The Court ruled that “public” should be interpreted in conformity with the interpretation given by 
the CJEU in SGAE/Rafael Hoteles (C-306/05) and in Lagardère, in the sense that a public consists of an 
indeterminate number of potential viewers.  According to this Supreme Court, the notion of “public” is the 
same in the directives SatCab (Lagardère) and InfoSoc (SGAE).  The Court of appeal came to the right 
decision, that a transmission to the cable operators and the DTH platform operators did not reach a 
“public” and that the signals should be meant for the public (not the programmes) in order to find a distinct 
act of communication to the public.   
Another Dutch case was brought by the collecting society NORMA, representing performers and artists, in 
a case against a number of cable operators and their collective organisation.  The cable operators 
                                                     
 
433 This is a non-literal translation:  “7. Onder het uitzenden van een in een radio- of televisieprogramma opgenomen werk door 
middel van een satelliet wordt verstaan de handeling waarbij de programmadragende signalen voor ontvangst door het publiek 
onder controle en verantwoordelijkheid van de omroeporganisatie worden ingevoerd in een ononderbroken mededelingenketen die 
naar de satelliet en terug naar de aarde voert. Indien de programmadragende signalen in gecodeerde vorm worden uitgezonden, is 
er sprake van het uitzenden van een in een radio- of televisieprogramma opgenomen werk door middel van een satelliet, indien de 
middelen voor het decoderen van de uitzending door of met toestemming van de omroeporganisatie ter beschikking van het publiek 
worden gesteld”. 
434 Court Amsterdam 12 January 2005, AMI 2005, 135-139, Buma/Stemra v UPC. 
435 Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 June 2006, AMI 2007/1, 11, Buma/Stemra v Chellomedia (previously UPC). 
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437 Hoge Raad 19 June 2009, LJN BH7602, 07/12553, Vereniging Buma v Chellomedia Programming, www.rechtspraak.nl 
consulted on 14 February 2013. 
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distributed television programmes to their subscribers.  In order to do so, the broadcasters (which held 
the rights to the primary broadcasts) made the broadcast signals accessible to the cable operators via a 
dedicated platform named “Media Gateway”.  This platform was not accessible to the general public.   
The issue here was whether the competence of the collecting societies extended to all communications to 
the public, including the first communication to the public of a signal.  The collecting society NORMA 
claimed a remuneration for the retransmission by cable in favour of the holders of related rights.  It acted 
both for affiliated and non-affiliated right holders, based on the provisions on the mandatory collective 
management of these rights. 
The Dutch Act on Neighbouring Rights provides a mandatory collective management of the rights of 
performing artists and phonogram producers to authorise the unaltered and unabridged re-broadcast of a 
performance or phonogram via a network as described in another act (media law)
438
.  A re-broadcast is 
defined as the simultaneous broadcast (“uitzending”) by one institution of a programme that is broadcast 
by another institution or broadcasting organisation (art. 1(h) Dutch Act on Neighbouring Rights
439
).   
The first court decided that the cable transmission to the subscribers is not a re-broadcast in the sense of 
the act on neighbouring rights
440
.  The collecting society’s intervention for the management of the rights is 
mandatory for secondary communications but not primary cable transmissions.  The Court of first 
instance of The Hague decided that the direct transmission by the broadcaster to the cable operator 
(either by satellite or by wire but in neither case accessible to the public) was not a broadcast by the 
broadcasting organisation.  By consequence, the subsequent distribution of the programmes by the cable 
operator should not be considered a re-broadcast but a “broadcast”.  There was no simultaneous 
broadcast.  The Court referred to the wording of the act, to the explanatory memorandum at the occasion 
of the implementation of the SatCab Directive.  Since the Dutch act does not impose any mandatory 
collective management in case of primary transmissions by cable, the claim was rejected. 
The Court of appeal confirmed this decision
441
.  After a summary of the history of cable retransmissions in 
The Netherlands and a comparison to the current situation, it observed that the general public has no way 
of accessing the programmes while these are being transmitted from the broadcasters to the cable 
operators:  the Cable operators do not work on the basis of broadcast signals anymore and the “Media 
Gateway” platform, where the cable operator retrieved the signal from the broadcaster, was not 
accessible to the general public.  The Court here referred to the CJEU decisions in SGAE (C-306/05), 
Lagardère (C-192/04) and its interpretation of what constitutes a “public” (an indeterminate number of 
potential viewers or listeners) and to the Dutch Supreme Court decision in Buma/Chellomedia.  It went as 
far as to state that the notion of “public” in Lagardère was the guiding principle for the “communication to 
the public” in the Dutch Copyright Act and that the same notion should apply when exercising 
neighbouring rights (harmonised under the Rental Rights Directive and thus inscribing in the same legal 
context).  
The Court then considered NORMA’s argument that “re-broadcasting” (heruitzending) covered both 
primary and secondary communications to the public, to the effect that a communication to the public that 
is not preceded by another communication to the public should also be qualified as a “re-broadcast”.  The 
Court rejected NORMA’s reasoning, based on an examination of the Dutch legislation and the SatCab 
Directive.  The Court noticed that the English version of the SatCab Directive refers to the “initial 
                                                     
 
438 Wet van 18 maart 1993, houdende regelen inzake de bescherming van uitvoerende kunstenaars, producenten van 
fonogrammen of van eerste vastleggingen van films en omroeporganisaties en wijziging van de Auteurswet 1912, via 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005921/, art. 14a Dutch Act on Neighbouring Rights. 
439 Art. 1(h) WNR:  “heruitzenden: het door een instelling gelijktijdig uitzenden van een programma dat door een andere instelling 
of omroeporganisatie wordt uitgezonden”. 
440 Rb. Den Haag 28 January 2009, case nr. 271796 / HA ZA 06-2844, NORMA v Vereniging NLKabel, IEPT 20090128, www.ie-
portal.nl.  
441 Gerechtshof ‘s Gravenhage 10 April 2012, case nr 200.036.425/01, NORMA v Vereniging NLKabel e.a., IER 2012, 38, 
www.rechtspraak.nl;  
The re-transmission of copyright protected content in digital networks 221 
 
transmission” and “retransmission”, both considered forms of communication to the public (rec. 23 
InfoSoc Dir).  The Court derived from this observation that both the retransmission by cable and the first 
transmission (or broadcast) should be “communications to the public”.  The retransmission by cable in the 
Directive is a secondary communication to the public and “heruitzending” in the Dutch act should be 
understood in the same way.  The cable operators perform a primary act of communication to the public, 
which, inversely, is not an act of re-broadcasting (heruitzending).  
Ad abundantiam the Courts considered the consequences of NORMA’s proposed interpretation.  If a 
primary communication to the public by cable were qualified as a cable retransmission, then it would be 
subject to mandatory collective management.  This would mean that individual right holders had no legal 
means of opposing such exploitation (since the right would be exercised by collecting societies alone).  
Moreover, the mandate of the collecting societies extends to right holders who are not affiliated to a 
collecting society (“outsiders”), so these right holders would have no say in the primary exploitation of the 
work.  The Court’s understanding of a “retransmission by cable” would not lead to such far-reaching 
consequences:  if the primary communication to the public is subject to the individual author’s 
authorisation, then she can exercise at least some control over the secondary communication to the 
public as well
442443
.   
NORMA has appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), which is expected to give 
judgement before the end of 2013. 
Belgium.  The decisions in Belgium qualify the transmission by cable following a “direct injection” in a 
less consistent way.   
The Belgian Copyright Act contains a definition of the right of retransmission by cable in its art. 52, which 
is nearly identical to the definition in the SatCab Directive.  The Dutch and French versions of the text are 
slightly differently worded, as is the case for the Dutch and French versions of the cable retransmission 
right in the SatCab Directive.  According to the Dutch version, a “transmission by cable”
444
 should be 
understood as the “simultaneous, unaltered and integral transmission, by means of a cable or 
microwave system, to the public of a first broadcast, by air or not, also by satellite, of television or radio 
programmes that are meant for reception by the public”
445
.  The French version by contrast defines the 
retransmission by cable as “the simultaneous, unaltered and integral retransmission, by cable or by a 
microwave system, for reception by the public, of an initial transmission, by wireless means or by wire in 
particular by satellite, of a television or radio programmes intended for reception by the public”
446
. 
The legal obligation for cable distributors to acquire the right holders’ consent for a distinct act of 
communication to the public was established, after long judicial battles, in the 1980s
447
.  A general 
contract concerning the retransmission by cable was concluded in 1983, between the cable operators and 
the right holders (collecting societies for authors and film producers and broadcasting organisations).  
                                                     
 
442 It may be pointed out that the performers’ rights are already restricted by the Rental and Lending Rights Directive (2006/115).  
According to art. 8 of the Directive, performers have an exclusive right to the wireless broadcasting and the communication to the 
public of their performances, except where the performance is itself already a broadcast performance or is made from a fixation.  
The broadcasting of the communication to the public on the basis of a phonogram, published for commercial purposes or its 
reproduction, gives rise to an equitable remuneration.   
443 However, if a work has been broadcasted in the context of a primary communication to the public without the authorization of 
the right holder, the secondary communication may nevertheless be lawful if it has been allowed by the collecting society holding the 
rights for such communication to the public,  
444 The Dutch text literally refers to a « transmission » rather than a « retransmission ». 
445 « Onder doorgifte via de kabel wordt verstaan de gelijktijdige, ongewijzigde en integrale doorgifte, door middel van een kabel- of 
microgolfsysteem, aan het publiek, van een eerste uitzending, al dan niet via de ether, ook per satelliet, van televisie- of 
radioprogramma's die voor ontvangst door het publiek bestemd zijn”. 
446 “La retransmission par câble s'entend de la retransmission simultanée, inchangée et intégrale par câble ou par un système de 
diffusion par ondes ultracourtes pour la réception par le public d'une transmission initiale, sans fil ou avec fil, notamment par 
satellite, d'émissions de télévision ou de radio destinées à être captées par le public.” 
447 M. GHYS, « C’était un soir, messieurs, mesdames,… mais la télé n’a jamais été en panne… », A&M 2006, 221-231. 
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Several (provisional) contracts have governed the issue until the mid 1990s, when several legal actions 
were taken between the different interested parties because of the termination of these contracts.   
In 1998 the Brussels Court of appeal issued a decision on the question of the initial transmission, 
preceding a cable transmission to the public
448
.  Uradex, the collecting society of the performing artists, 
claimed remuneration for the retransmission by cable of the performances of the affiliated and non-
affiliated performers, based on the right of retransmission by cable, as harmonised by the SatCab 
Directive.   
Many issues were dealt with in this decision
449
, among which the transmission by cable of radio 
programmes.  As far as a cable distribution following a “direct injection” was concerned, the Court 
considered this a retransmission by cable to the public.  A “direct injection” was defined as the distribution 
by cable of programmes, which are transmitted by the broadcaster to the cable operator by means of a 
dedicated line, in order to be then retransmitted to the public by means of the cable
450
.  Such direct 
injection could also be a retransmission by cable, based on the following considerations.  1) The Court 
found two transmissions:  an initial transmission between the broadcaster and the cable operator and a 
retransmission to the public via the cable network.  It was not considered relevant that the initial 
transmission was operated via a direct line (by telephone or otherwise), since the law includes initial 
transmissions by wire or wireless means and, in casu, it was meant for reception by the public.  2) The 
first transmission was captured or received by the cable operator, before being retransmitted.  The 
conclusion was that there was no substantial difference between a retransmission following a direct 
injection or following a broadcast of the programme, since in both cases there was a new communication 
to the public by a different organisation than the broadcaster, i.e. the cable operator (art. 11bis, §1, 2° 
BC). 
The Brussels Court of first instance deviated from this decision of the court of appeal in 2005, in a case 
opposing a broadcasting organisation (RTBF) and a number of cable distributors
451
.   
Following the termination of the global contracts with all parties concerned with cable transmission, the 
broadcasting organisation RTBF had entered a pre-agreement with the trade organisation of cable 
distributors, but a dispute concerning the scope of this agreement led to this conflict regarding the cable 
transmissions after 1 July 1996.   
One of the issues was whether there was an act of retransmission by cable, in the sense of the Belgian 
Copyright Act, when the programmes were transmitted from the broadcasters to the cable operators by 
“direct injection” and the cable operators subsequently transmitted the programmes directly to their 
subscribers, without a primary broadcast (by wireless means).   
The Court of first instance decided that this was not the case:  a cable transmission following a direct 
injection constituted one single transmission to the public by cable, not a cable retransmission.  Moreover, 
this Court of first instance explicitly discarded the earlier decision of the Brussels Court of appeal, dating 
                                                     
 
448 Bruxelles 25 June 1998, AM 1999, 212. 
449 Other issues were inter alia the quality of the collecting society to act on behalf of performers involved in an audiovisual 
production.  These points of law gave rise to the decision of the CJEU in Uradex (supra, case C-306/05).  The Court of appeal also 
decided that a transmission by cable could not be a “broadcast”, which could only be done by wireless means.  The qualification as 
a “broadcast” would have restricted the exclusive right of the performer, with respect to performances that were legitimately 
reproduced or broadcast (art. 41 Belgian Copyright Act).  The Court refused this qualification however, defining a “broadcast” by 
reference to art. 11bis BC as “any form of radio or television broadcast and any public communication by any other means serving 
to distribute by wireless means signs, sounds and images” (« la radiodiffusion doit être définie comme étant toute forme de radio et 
de télédiffusion ainsi que « la communication publique par tout autre moyen servant à diffuser sans fil les signes, les sons et les 
images »).   
450 « Attendu qu’il y a lieu d’entendre par « injection directe », la diffusion de programmes qui sont transmis par le radiodiffuseur au 
câblodistributeur au moyen d’une ligne propre pour être ensuite retransmise au public par la voie du câble ». 
451 Civ. Bruxelles 27 January 2005, RTBF v Société Intercommunale Namuroise de Télédistribution e.a., A&M 2005/2, 138. 
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back to 1998
452
.  The Court went on to establish that the cable operator should be held responsible for the 
communication to the public by cable, rather than the broadcaster.  It was considered that the cable 
operator owned the cable network, received a price for the distribution of the programmes to the cable 
subscribers (whether or not the programmes are first broadcast by terrestrial means) and thus made a 
profit from the communication to the public.  The broadcaster’s role by contrast was considered restricted 
to the provision of technical means to perform the direct transmission via cable in the form of a 
connection or an encrypted broadcast. 
The issue of the cable transmission following a direct injection was raised again in case involving the 
cable distributor Telenet
453
.   
Telenet is a Belgian cable operator and a mobile, internet and telephone provider, which offered 
television services to its subscribers via its cable network.  It transmitted the programmes via analogue 
and digital signals.  The “traditional” cable services (where a primary broadcast precedes the cable 
transmission) were covered by a contract, concluded by the trade organisation of the cable operators 
(RTD).  Where the programmes were directly injected in the cable network (commercial programmes), 
Telenet had no agreement with the collecting societies, but with the broadcasting organisations, which 
supposedly had acquired all the exploitation rights including the cable transmission rights (“all rights 
included” contracts).  Telenet initiated a legal action against several collecting societies, in view of 
obtaining a statement that the cable transmissions it performed (“Telenet Digitale Televisie”) did not 
require the right holders’ distinct consent.   
One of the issues was whether the “direct injection” should be considered a protected act.  The question 
was in particular if a direct injection of a programme and the subsequent cable transmission to the public 
should be considered as one unique protected act (primary broadcast via cable) or as two acts, which 
should both be authorised and remunerated. 
The Court of first instance of Mechelen decided in favour of Telenet
454
.  It considered that a cable 
transmission to the public subsequent to a direct injection in the cable of television programmes cannot 
be qualified as a cable retransmission in the sense of the Belgian copyright act and the SatCab Directive.  
Such transmission via cable should be considered a primary cable transmission.  The Court established 
that there was no broadcast via the air (terrestrial) or via satellite, there were no signals broadcast for 
reception by the public which are received and then retransmitted.  Instead there was a transmission to 
the cable distributors alone, the signal not being accessible to the public.  The first court adopted the 
definition of the “public” that the CJEU put forward in Lagardère, i.e. an indeterminate number of potential 
viewers or listeners.  A limited circle of people who can receive the signals by professional technical 
equipment (i.e. the cable operators in casu) is not a public, hence the criterion of art. 1.2a SatCab Dir was 
not met.  The circumstance that ultimately the programmes were meant for the public did not alter this 
conclusion.  The court also established that there was no restricted act in the sense of art. 11bis.1.2 BC, 
but instead a primary communication to the public in the sense of art. 11(1) BC.  For the Court, it was 
decisive that the public does not receive two distinct communications.  Since the cable transmission 
following a direct injection is considered a primary communication to the public by cable, the collective 
management of rights was not mandatory.  Finally, the Court found that the responsibility for acquiring the 
authorisation rests upon the broadcasting organisations.  The mere provision of physical facilities for 
enabling or making a communication (i.e. cable network) does not in itself amount to communication.  
The Court was satisfied with Telenet’s allegation that it had concluded “all rights included” contracts with 
the broadcasting organisations, without requiring access to such contract (although their existence was 
contested by the collecting societies).  
                                                     
 
452 Bruxelles 25 juin 1998 AM 1999, 212, supra. 
453 Rb. Mechelen 12 April 2011, I.R. D.I. 2011, 238, « Telenet »;  Antwerpen 4 February 2013, 2011/AR/1523, 2011/AR/2545, 
2011/AR/2546, 2011/AR/2578, 2011/AR/2582, SABAM e.a. c Telenet, unpublished 
454 Rb. Mechelen 12 April 2011, I.R. D.I. 2011, 238, « Telenet ». 
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The Court of appeal of Antwerpen issued an interim decision in 2013
455
.  On the issue of the cable 
retransmission, the decision is not straightforward and difficult to understand.  The Court of appeal first 
observed that the cable transmission to the public following a direct injection (of the programmes by the 
broadcaster into the cable network) should be seen as one unique act of “broadcasting via the cable 
network”.  Yet later in the decision, it found that Telenet’s operations should be seen as cable 
retransmissions. 
The Court of appeal started by stating that a cable transmission following a direct injection is not a 
retransmission by cable, since there is no primary broadcast to the public.  There was only one 
transmission by cable, which is assimilated to a primary broadcast.  It confirmed the standard of the 
“public” of Lagardère and it referred to the decision of the court of appeal of The Hague of 10 April 2012 
(supra).  It found confirmation of its decision that there is only one act of communication to the public, by 
reference to art. 11 and 11bis BC, which require two distinct acts of communication to the public.  Finally, 
the Court of appeal distinguished the circumstances of the Telenet case from those that gave rise to 
Airfield
456
, in the sense that Telenet does not reach a new public (since the signal transmitted by the 
broadcaster to the cable operator is not meant for the public).  So far the decision was quite 
straightforward.   
However, while deciding on the responsibility for the communication to the public by cable, the Court 
seemed to reach the opposite conclusion.  Unlike the first judge, the Court of appeal decided that Telenet 
(rather than the broadcasters) had the responsibility of acquiring the right holders’ consent for the cable 
transmission.  Telenet’s role was not restricted to the provision of physical installations for the 
transmission of signals, instead it offers different “packs” of programmes.  Quoting the rights of 
reproduction, adaptation, communication to the public and distribution and the right to cable 
retransmission, the Court found that Telenet, in case of direct injection, operated a “simultaneous, 
unaltered and integral transmission, by cable, to the public, of a first broadcast of a television programme, 
which is meant for reception by the public”
457
.  The Court of appeal concluded that the direct injection is a 
cable transmission, for which the right holders’ consent is required.  It thus rejected Telenet’s position that 
the direct injection of a programme is not a cable retransmission in the sense of art. 52 BCA and 
constitutes one single act with copyright relevance (communication to the public in the sense of art. 1 
BCA, art. 11.1 BC or art. 3 InfoSoc Dir).  The Court seemed to see no contradiction in finding on the one 
hand, a primary act of communication to the public by cable and, on the other hand, a (re)transmission by 
cable to the public, to which the mandatory collective management is applicable. 
It was then argued that, even if a cable retransmission was found, the broadcasters could grant the rights 
in “all rights included contracts”, which Telenet claimed to have concluded.  The Court disagreed:  the 
broadcasters could only grant a licence for the retransmission via cable for their own programmes, not for 
the ones they have bought
458
.  By consequence, the collecting societies could exercise the exclusive 
rights of cable transmission – except for the broadcasters’ own productions.  The case was adjourned to 
give the parties the opportunity to defend their positions on the exact scope of the use and who holds 
which rights (broadcasters, producers, collecting societies). 
                                                     
 
455 Court of appeal Antwerpen 4 February 2013, 2011/AR/1523, 2011/AR/2545, 2011/AR/2546, 2011/AR/2578, 2011/AR/2582, 
SABAM e.a. c Telenet, unpublished. 
456 CJEU 13 October 2011, Joined cases C-431/09 and C-432/09, Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van 
Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) (C-431/09) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA (C-432/09).. 
457 It should be noted however, that in the Dutch version of the Belgian Copyright Act, the right of retransmission by cable is 
worded as « transmission » by cable (kabeldoorgifte).  The French version uses the term « retransmission », which implicitly refers 
to a secondary transmission (« retransmission par câble »).  This connotation is lacking in the Dutch wording. 
458 The Belgian Copyright Act (art. 53, §3) provides that the broadcaster can exercise its right in relation to its own” broadcasts” 
(“haar eigen uitzendingen” or “à l'égard de ses propres emissions”).  By contrast, the SatCab Directive provides that “Member States 
shall ensure that Article 9 does not apply to the rights exercised by a broadcasting organization in respect of its own transmission, 
irrespective of whether the rights concerned are its own or have been transferred to it by other copyright owners and/or holders of 
related rights” (our emphasis).  
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The same question of the qualification of a cable transmission following a direct injection was posed to 
the Court of first instance of Brussels, which was seized to rule in a litigation between three collecting 
societies (SACD, SCAM and SOFAM) and a cable operator Coditel
459
.   
The Court considered the arguments but postponed its decision.  The Court depicted the technical 
background of the cable retransmission and described how, at first, the broadcast signals were captured 
by the cable operators, via their cable head-ends, and injected into the cable network so they could be 
retransmitted to the cable subscribers.  It was observed however that several broadcasters no longer 
broadcast their television programmes and that they use the technique of “direct injection” to transmit the 
programmes by wire or by satellite (encrypted) to cable distributers, which then distribute the programmes 
via the cable network.   
The Court considered that the direct injection should not be qualified as an act of broadcasting, but rather 
as a private communication.  Technically there is no longer a retransmission of a primary broadcast.  The 
Court referred to the decisions of the Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) in Chellomedia, the Court of appeal of 
The Hague (Norma); the Court of first instance of Brussels in 2005 and the Court of first instance of 
Mechelen (Telenet), concluding that there was no retransmission by cable.  On the other hand, it was 
considered that other courts have come to a different conclusion (Court of appeal of Brussels 1998).   
After having carefully set out the arguments in support of the qualification, on the one hand, as a unique 
communication to the public by cable or, on the other hand, a retransmission by cable, the Court decided 
to ask a preliminary question to the CJEU
460
.   
Other Member States. In Hungary, an expert opinion was delivered in 2000 in the framework of a 
litigation between cable operators and a collecting society, after the new Hungarian Copyright Act (HCA) 
became effective in 1999
461
 (but before the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive). The Expert Board was 
asked to express its opinion on the question whether broadcasting encoded signals results in 
simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retransmission by cable companies under the HCA. The 
applicant was looking for guidance on whether the technical contribution of (usually) cable companies to 
decode the encoded programming is a separate use [cable retransmission under Art. 28(2) HCA] or an 
integral part of broadcasting by television and/or radio organisations [under Art. 26(3) HCA]. The expert 
body held the opinion that the encoded broadcast should be considered as a part of the broadcast (art. 26 
HCA). Companies that provide decoders to end-users contribute to the broadcasting in a merely technical 
sense (even though they are sometimes cable operators) and the broadcaster initiates and controls the 
original data transfer.  Decoding and the transfer of decoded signals is seen as an integral part of the 
process (broadcasting) rather than as independent uses. Consequently such transmissions are 
considered neither independent broadcasting, nor cable retransmission.  This reading finds support in the 
text of the statute, according to which the cable company shall provide access to the decoded signals 
only under a written contract concluded between the cable company and the radio/television organization.  
This means that, in Hungary, cable companies are seen as only “contributing” to the radio/television 
organizations’ broadcasting activity.   
In Italy, cable retransmission is defined as the simultaneous (unabridged and integral) re-transmission, 
through a system of cable redistribution or through very high frequencies, addressed to the public, of a 
primary radio- or TV broadcasting emission, irrespectively of the modes of its diffusion, coming from 
another Member State and designed to be received by the public (art. 16-bis, c), Italian Copyright Act). 
This provision refers exclusively to the cable retransmission right (as specifically defined under art. 16-bis, 
c)).  The case law has not clarified the exact meaning and scope of the retransmission right, in particular 
with regard to emissions coming from broadcasters that are addressed to a cable operator, without being 
                                                     
 
459 Trib. comm.Bruxelles 29 January 2013, RG nr. 5865/11, Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques ( SACD), 
Société Civile des Auteurs Multimédia (SCAM), Société Multimédia des Auteurs des arts Visuels (SOFAM) c Coditel, unpublished. 
460 The case was adjourned to allow the parties to take positions on the wording of the preliminary questions. 
461 This case was settled and the agreement between the cable operators and the collecting society was confirmed by the court. 
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directly delivered to the public (with the cable operator merely capturing the transmission signal and re-
transmitting it into a different country). The definition provided by Italian law is particularly narrow, and it 
does not allow cable operators to take advantage of the regime of mandatory collective management for 
broadcasts that they retransmit while having received them directly from broadcasters (i.e., to do so cable 
operators will have to clear the right of communication to the public in the standard way) 
Finally, according to national experts, in France and in Denmark, the “initial transmission” needs to be an 
act of communication to the public in its own right.  
Comments.  With regard to the initial transmission, it is noted that the main uncertainty relates to the 
direct injection of television or radio programmes in the cable network, operated by the “broadcaster” and 
the cable operator.  In the discussed cases, the qualification of this initial transmission is approached from 
different angles.   
In some cases, the cable transmission to the public was not the subject matter of the discussion and the 
parties agreed that this constituted a protected act for which the right holders’ consent was required and a 
remuneration was due.  The legal issue was instead whether the initial transmission was an independent 
act of communication to the public, in addition to the subsequent communication to the public by cable, 
for which a distinct fee could be claimed (cf. Buma-Stemra/UPC-ChelloMedia).   
In other cases, the purpose was not only to establish the existence of two distinct acts of communication 
to the public, but also to qualify both transmissions and specifically to find a “retransmission by cable”.  
This qualification indeed allows collecting societies to establish the mandatory character of the collective 
management of the rights at stake or to represent non-affiliated right holders of the same category of 
rights they generally manage (NORMA, Uradex, Telenet). 
It may be noted that the criterion frequently applied to qualify the first transmission was the notion of 
“public” in Lagardère
462
.  This may seem surprising, since the legal issue in Lagardère was whether a 
transmission by satellite, preceding a (wireless) broadcast of television programmes, should be qualified 
as an act of satellite broadcasting.  The retransmission by cable was not treated or even mentioned, yet 
the notion of “public” applied in those particular circumstances was taken over in several other cases, 
relating to retransmissions by cable.  Moreover, this criterion stems from the Mediakabel case, which did 
not even solve any copyright issues. 
However, the CJEU in Lagardère distinguished between communications which could be received by the 
general public and transmissions that were de facto only accessible to a limited group of professionals (in 
possession of professional reception equipment).  This distinction can be recognised, mutatis mutandis, 
in the communication scheme of cable transmissions following a direct injection.  It is not relevant 
whether the “technical” transmission is operated by means of a satellite (Lagardère) or by cable (direct 
injection). 
Moreover, the CJEU has generalised the definition of the “public” in Lagardère, by applying it as well in 
the context of the right of communication to the public, as harmonised in the InfoSoc Directive (see 
SGAE, par. 37
463
).  This extension is reflected by some national courts, which include a reference to 
SGAE in their decisions
464
. 
                                                     
 
462 In favour of this reasoning :  D. VISSER, « Primair openbaar maken via de kabel », AMI 2007/2 (37) 40. 
463 CJEU  7 December 2006, case nr. C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, 
Reports of Cases 2006 I-11519, “SGAE”. 
464 In favour of applying this unique definition of the « public » to the primary transmission:  A. MAQUA & F. VANBOSSELE, « De 
Coditel à Telenet.  Le nouveau périmètre de la « communication au public » des programmes de télévision linéaires », RDTI 2011/3, 
5-25.  More critical:  E. TRAPLE, « TV signal delivery to cable operators and DTH platform operators », Jipitec 2011 (75) 82. 
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By contrast, the judges pay unequal attention to identifying the acts of exploitation and determining 
whether a communication constitutes an act of “primary” or “secondary” exploitation
465
. 
About the relation between a “broadcast” and a “retransmission.  Based on the explanatory 
memorandum to the SatCab Directive, the question may be asked how the initial transmission and the 
retransmission should relate to one another.  It was stated in the Explanatory Memorandum that 
“however, there is no cable retransmission in the sense of this proposal, if the programme is merely 
delivered by point-to-point communication to the cable head end without being the subject of a 
simultaneous primary broadcast”
466
.   
It could be defended that a strictly technical relation should exist and a retransmission by cable can only 
be found in case the signal of the initial transmission is materially captured and retransmitted to a new 
public.  Another understanding is that a rather economic dependence should exist, where the 
“broadcaster” (i.e. the organisation in charge of the initial transmission) determines the content and the 
timing of the television programmes and the cable operator merely transmits the same programmes to 
another public.  In this approach, it matters not whether the communication of this programme to the 
cable subscribers is technically operated on the basis of the publicly broadcast signal or on the basis of a 
simultaneous, directly injected signal.  The Explanatory Memorandum does not express a preference for 
the one or the other interpretation. 
The Danish copyright act seems to have chosen for the latter solution.  In some of the Belgian cases 
discussed, it seems that there is some confusion on this point.  The Court of appeal of Brussels, in its 
1998 decision, sufficed to find that the broadcaster transmitted a signal to the cable operator, which 
received it and transmitted it to the public (notwithstanding that the direct injection by itself was not 
accessible to the general public).  The Court of Appeal of Antwerp, in Telenet, explicitly stated that there 
was no cable retransmission in the technical sense (i.e. the reception of a broadcast signal and the 
subsequent transmission of this signal to the public of cable subscribers).  Yet this Court of appeal at the 
same time found that there was a “simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged transmission” of a first 
broadcast and considered that the cable operator was bound to pay a remuneration for this activity. 
Responsibility for primary act of communication to the public by cable.  In those cases where the 
direct injection and the subsequent cable transmission are considered a single act of communication to 
the public, then the collective management of rights is no longer mandatory.   
The question of the responsibility for this act (who is held to pay the remuneration?) is answered in 
different ways.  Some courts impose the burden of the restricted act upon the cable operators
467
, others 
consider it the broadcasters’ role to acquire the right holders’ consent and provide it to the cable 
operator
468
.  It could also be argued that it is more efficient for the broadcasters to clear all rights, since 
the broadcasters determine the content of the programmes and conclude a contract with the cable 
operators before making the programmes available for cable transmission
469
.  The role of the collection 
societies is then to be determined by the parties (right holders, collecting societies, broadcasters and 
cable operators). 
The consequence of qualifying the direct injection and the subsequent cable transmission as one 
(primary) act of communication to the public by cable is that the right holders’ consent is required once 
and that one remuneration is due for this unique restricted act.  However, TRAPLE correctly points out 
                                                     
 
465 In favour of a more economic approach :  E. TRAPLE, « TV signal delivery to cable operators and DTH platform operators », 
Jipitec 2011 (75) 86. 
466 Explanatory Memorandum, SatCab Proposal, 36. 
467 Cf. supra the decision of the Court of first instance of Brussels in 2005 (RTBF), the decision of the Hoge Raad in Chellomedia, 
where contracts with the cable operators existed,  In Telenet, the Court of Appeal seemingly contradicted itself by finding that there 
was no cable retransmission and that Telenet had to pay a remuneration for the cable transmissions it makes) 
468 Cf. decision of the Court of first instance of Mechelen in Telenet. 
469 See on this point D. VISSER, « Primair openbaar maken via de kabel », AMI 2007/2 (37) 42-43. 
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that this complex act of cable transmission is monetised at different stages, by the broadcaster and by the 
cable operator
470
.  The fact that a “public” is reached makes it possible for the broadcaster to close 
advertisement deals, while the cable operator receives the cable subscription fees.  The right holders may 
consent to the cable transmission of the programmes with one party only and calculate the fees without a 
precise idea of the total financial return for all economic operators involved.  This leads this author to 
conclude that the “interpretation of the term “retransmission” to cover only transmission of a signal that 
was initially intended for reception by the general public leads to a significant limitation of the level of 
protection of right holders”, contrary to the objective of the Directive (i.e. to create legal certainty for the 
cable operators as to the acquisition of rights and to ensure a high level of protection for the authors and 
right holders)
471
. 
c) Retransmission 
After having examined some national decisions regarding the “initial transmission”, we will now analyse 
the second part of the definition, the “retransmission by cable”.   
Article 1(3) of the Satellite and cable Directive defines the concept of cable retransmission as a 
“simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retransmission by a cable or microwave system for reception by 
the public” of the initial transmission described above. 
The issue here is whether a retransmission by other means than the traditional coaxial cable network are 
“retransmissions by cable” in the sense of the SatCab Directive.   Regardless of the initial transmission, it 
has become common to access linear broadcast via other means than radio or television devices.  Audio 
and audiovisual content is now listened to and watched, brought to end-users by all kinds of networks 
(Web, internet, mobile net) and devices (computers, mobile phones, “smart phones”, “tablets”).  The 
operators of these new types of services share the concerns of the operators of traditional cable 
networks:  how to clear the rights in time to transmit the programmes simultaneously to the original 
broadcast?  Hence the question is whether these alternative networks can be assimilated to “cable and 
microwave systems”, in the sense of the SatCab Directive.  If this is the case (technology-neutral 
approach), the operators of these new networks can turn to collecting societies to negotiate contracts for 
the retransmission of the broadcast “content”.  If not (technology-specific approach), they have to clear 
the rights on an individual basis.  
After having presented the issue of the approach used to define the retransmission “by cable”, we will 
examine the criterion of a “simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retransmission”.  Finally the 
retransmission by cable should be directed to a public
472
.   
Technology-neutral wording.  In the UK, the terms “retransmission by cable” receive a technology-
neutral interpretation, so that the provision includes a retransmission through Internet.  
The Austrian Supreme Court has issued a decision that addresses the question whether retransmissions 
by other means can be considered retransmissions by “cable”
 473
.  It ended up deciding the case on other 
                                                     
 
470 E. TRAPLE, « TV signal delivery to cable operators and DTH platform operators », Jipitec 2011 (75) 80. 
471 E. TRAPLE, « TV signal delivery to cable operators and DTH platform operators », Jipitec 2011 (75) 84. 
472 With regard to this condition, a recurring issue has been whether a cable retransmission to a circle of people should be qualified 
as a “reception” by means of a cable installation or as a protected act of cable retransmission.  This condition will not be further 
examined in this study, given the CJEU’s decisions in inter alia SGAE, Phonographic Performance..  It may be mentioned here that 
one of the expert opinions of the Hungarian Copyright Expert Board assessed whether access to radio/television programming in 
hotel rooms (that is simultaneously in several rooms and by members of the public) is a reception of signals by the users (hotel 
guests) or retransmission through cable initiated and controlled by the hotel that receives the signals via satellite or cable. The 
expert body voted in favour of the second option. The expert body concluded that the cable retransmission by hotels is allowed only 
with the consent of the right holders and after the payment of royalties.  
473 Austrian Supreme Court (Oberste Gerichtshof) 21 February 2008, 4Ob89/08d, accessible via https://www.ris.bka.gv.at. 
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grounds than the cable retransmission right
474
, but the decision still contains interesting considerations 
regarding the technology-specific or technology-neutral nature of the cable retransmission right.   
The facts of the case were the following.  A dispute had arisen between a private broadcasting 
organisation and a mobile network operator. The broadcasting organisation had acquired the exclusive 
rights for the matches of the Austrian football league for which it was realising the recordings of the 
matches. It had granted a sub-licence to the ORF (Örsterreichischer Rundfunk) for the free-to-air 
exploitation of the matches, so the ORF could broadcast the unaltered footage.     
The defendant offered television programmes (including ORF1’s) to its subscribers and streamed these 
via its mobile platform. The ORF broadcasting signal was first prepared in digital form:  the publicly 
accessible signal was received “live”, compressed, downscaled to a lower number of pixels (given the 
smaller size of mobile screens) and sent to the mobile devices in an encrypted data stream, via streaming 
servers.  
The broadcaster brought an action against the mobile operator for the cessation of the use of its signal 
broadcasting the matches of the concerned leagues for the territories concerned and the transmission in 
a way that mobile devices can receive the signals, such as streaming. The Austrian Supreme Court had 
to determine whether the transmission of broadcast programmes should be qualified as transmission in 
the sense of art. 17, or retransmission according to art. 59a of the Austrian Copyright Act.  
According to the Court, the Austrian legislator has chosen a technology-neutral wording for the 
retransmission right (“Weitersendung mit Hilfe von Leitungen”), which is not restricted to the transmission 
via a cable or micro-wave system. A transmission in that sense does not only cover the physical cable 
network but also wireless transmissions, hence streaming of a TV programme via UMTS mobile signal 
could be an integral cable retransmission by “lines” (“Leitungen”). In that case, cable operators should not 
conclude contracts with all right holders, but with the collecting societies. The Court reminded that the 
objective of the SatCab Directive was to lighten the burden of the cable operators, when it is not possible 
for practical reasons to acquire the rights in time of all people concerned by the retransmission.  This ratio 
is not affected by the means of transmission:  it does not depend on whether the cable operator transmits 
the broadcasts by means of wire or mobile broadcasting means, even if the mobile technology requires a 
modification of the signal and more time.  The simultaneous character of the transmission makes it 
practically impossible to clear the rights in time.   
Furthermore, the used technology for the retransmission is not relevant, according to the Court, as long 
as the receiver can only access the programme in a passive way, does not have any influence on the 
course or on the content of the transmission and cannot determine the time of the display on the mobile 
phone.   
The Court decided that there was no reason to treat the mobile transmissions differently from the 
retransmission by cable in a strict sense and the microwave systems that existed in Ireland at the time the 
directive was adopted.  The purpose of the regulation, to free the cable operators from individual rights 
management when the broadcasts are retransmitted in an integral, unaltered and simultaneous way is 
applicable to cable operators but to an equal extent to mobile phone operators: 
                                                     
 
474 Art. 59a: 
1) The right to use broadcasts of works, including satellite broadcasts, for simultaneous, complete and unchanged retransmission by 
cable may only be asserted by collecting societies; however, this shall not apply to the right to institute proceedings for infringement 
of copyright. 
(2) Broadcasts may be used for retransmission within the meaning of paragraph (1) if the retransmitting broadcasting organization 
has authorization to make such use from the competent collecting society. With reference to such authorization, authors who have 
not entered into a representation contract with the collecting society and whose rights are not asserted under an agreement on 
reciprocity with a foreign collecting society, shall enjoy the same rights and obligations as the beneficiary of the collecting society. 
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply, however, where the right of retransmission within the meaning of paragraph (1) is held by 
the broadcasting organization whose broadcast is retransmitted. 
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In the present case, the Court decided the case based on the notion of “broadcasting” . The Austrian 
Copyright Act gives the author the exclusive right to broadcast her work (art. 17) and it assimilates the 
transmission via “lines” (“Leitungen”) to a broadcast
475
.  It came to the conclusion that the integral, 
substantially unaltered and merely technically delayed transmission of the television programmes of ORF 
in Austria by means of streaming via a UMTS mobile network is a part of the original broadcast (art. 17, 3 
of the Austrian Copyright Act). As the claimant had authorised the ORF to exploit broadcast signal by 
means of television broadcasts, the defendant did not infringe the claimant’s rights. 
Technology-specific wording.  Other Member States provide a technology-specific cable 
retransmission right.  That right was analysed by the Court of First Instance in Hamburg in a case 
opposing film producers (Warner, Universal) and the operator of an online service.  This service was 
restricted to the German territory where broadcast programmes could be accessed via internet at the 
same time these are broadcast via free-to-air TV
476
. 
The claimants had granted licences covering the free-to-air broadcast of the films in Germany, with a 
clause excluding the transmission “online” resp. via mobile or Internet technologies.  However, the 
defendant had captured the broadcast signal (by satellite or other technologies), changed the format and 
encrypted the signal (at the servers of the defendant), and then transferred it to an internet node for 
retransmission. The defendant had concluded contracts with the broadcasters, in which its services were 
qualified as cable retransmissions in the sense of art. 20b of the German Copyright Act. The issue was 
whether the retransmission via the internet of broadcast programmes is a cable retransmission in the 
sense of that provision. 
The German Copyright Act provides a general provision regarding the exploitation rights (art. 15).  It holds 
a general right of communication to the public (“Recht der öffentlichen Wiedergabe”), which encompasses 
a transmission or broadcasting right (“Senderecht”)
477
 and a right of making available to the public (Recht 
der öffentlichen Zugänglichmachung)
478
.  According to art. 20b, the right of retransmission by cable 
                                                     
 
475 Art. 17 of the Federal Law on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights: 
“1) The author shall have the exclusive right to broadcast his work by radio, television on similar means. 
(2) Where a work is publicly communicated in Austria by an entity located inside or outside the country in a manner comparable to 
broadcasting but with the aid of conductors, such communication shall be assimilated to broadcasting. 
(3) The communication of broadcasts 
1. by a broadcasting relay system and 
2. via a community antenna system, 
(a) where all the receivers are located only on contiguous pieces of ground, where no part of the system uses or crosses a public 
road and where the antenna is not more than 500 meters away from the nearest receiver, or 
(b) where not more than 500 participants are connected to the system, 
shall not be regarded as a new broadcast. In other respects the simultaneous communication, with the aid of conductors, of 
complete broadcasts of the Austrian Broadcasting Organization.” 
476 LG Hamburg 8 April 2009, nr. 308 O 660/08, accessed via http://rechtsprechung.hamburg.de on 19 February 2012.  
477 Art. 20 of the German Copyright Act:  The right of broadcasting is the right to make a work available to the public by 
broadcasting, such as radio and television transmission, satellite transmission, cable transmission or by similar technical means. 
478 Art. 15 of the German Copyright Act:  
(1) The author has the exclusive right to exploit his work in material form; this right shall in particular include 
1.  the right of reproduction (Article 16), 
2.  the right of distribution (Article 17), 
3.  the right of exhibition (Article 18). 
(2) The author further has the exclusive right to communicate his work to the public in non-material form (right of communication to 
the public). The right of communication to the public shall compromise in particular 
1.  the right of recitation, performance and presentation (Article 19), 
2.  the right of making the work available to the public (Article 19a), 
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(“Kabelweitersendung”) can only be exercised by a collecting society, except for broadcasting 
organisations
479
.   
The Court of Hamburg decided that the retransmission of broadcast programmes over the Internet is not 
a cable retransmission in the sense of the German Copyright Act.  It refused to interpret the notion of 
“cable retransmission” in a technology-neutral way. By consequence the collective management was not 
mandatory.  It found an infringement of the transmission right or the right of making available, by 
communicating the films to the public via internet at the same time as the broadcast via free-to-air TV.  
As to the application of art. 20b of the German Copyright Act, the Court found that the wording of that 
provision was not conclusive.  The Court considered that it does not define which technologies are 
targeted and the travaux préparatoires contain no further explanation.  The Court found similarities 
between the network infrastructure of defendant and coaxial cable networks; moreover, taking only the 
wording of the provision into consideration, this internet network could be seen as a cable system in the 
sense of the act. However, the Court considered that the historical context and the system of exploitation 
rights in the German Copyright Act form an obstacle to such interpretation.  Inspired by the SatCab 
Directive, the object of the regulation was the retransmission of television and radio programmes via the 
proprietary coaxial cable network.  The “microwave system” referred to a particular technology only used 
in Ireland.  The possibility of retransmitting works via the Internet was not yet well known at that time and 
the business model was not yet developed.  The legislator did not have the objective to regulate this 
mode of transmission or any generic “cable” for that matter.  The preparatory works of the Directive show 
no indications that “cable retransmission” was meant to be a technology-neutral notion.  Furthermore, in 
its 2002 report, the Commission adopted an opinion contra the extension of this notion to internet 
transmissions. 
According to the Court, the provision on cable retransmissions entails a limitation of the rights, which 
should be interpreted narrowly.  By principle, copyright’s exploitation rights are managed on an individual 
basis.  The law impose the collective management of rights only if the burden of clearing the rights (due 
to the massive number of licences required) makes the operation impossible and if the right holders have 
not individually agreed to collective management of their rights.  In that case individual right holders have 
no influence on whether or to whom the use of the work is authorised and that constitutes an important 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3.  the right of broadcasting (Article 20), 
4.  the right of communication by video or audio recordings (Article 21), 
5.  the right of communication of broadcasts and of works made available to the public (Article 22). 
(3) The communication of a work shall be deemed public if it is intended for a plurality of members of the public. Anyone who is not 
connected by a personal relationship with the person exploiting the work or with the other persons to whom the work is made 
perceivable or made available in non-material form shall be deemed to be a member of the public. 
479 Art. 20b German Copyright Act : 
(1) The right to retransmit a transmitted work in the context of a simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retransmission of a 
program by means of cable systems or microwave systems (cable retransmission) may be asserted only by a collecting society. 
This shall not apply to rights asserted by a broadcasting organisation in respect of its broadcasts. 
(2) Where the author has granted the right of cable retransmission to a broadcasting organisation or to the producer of an audio 
recording or film, the cable operator shall nevertheless pay the author an equitable remuneration for the cable retransmission. The 
claim for remuneration may not be waived. It may be assigned in advance only to a collecting society and may be asserted only by a 
collecting society. This provision shall not conflict with the collective agreements, works agreements and joint remuneration 
agreement of broadcasting organisations insofar as the author is thereby granted equitable remuneration for each cable 
retransmission.  
A new bill presented in February 2013 proposed to review art. 20b German Copyright Act and to give a technology neutral sense to 
the right of retransmission by cable. See X, “Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Nutzung verwaister Werke und zu weiteren Änderungen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes und des 
Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetzes, Digitale Linke, 20 February 2013, accessible via http://blog.die-linke.de/digitalelinke/wp-
content/uploads/Ref.Entwurf.pdf.  However, that proposal was later withdrawn and does not exist anymore in the version of the bill 
presented by the Government in April 2013.  See an updated version of this document (5 April 2013) via 
http://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/RegE_Gesetzes_zu_Nutzung_verwaister_Werke_und_zu_weiteren_Aenderung
en_des_Urheberrechtsgesetzes_und_des_Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetzes.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
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restriction of the right holder’s rights.  The Court acknowledged that an internet operator may have the 
same interest in such facilitated management of rights (given the similarity of the retransmissions by cable 
and by internet network). Nevertheless, this mandatory regime cannot be extended to new exploitations 
but for a decision of the legislator.  Moreover, the retransmission via the internet is different, from a 
qualitative point of view, given its open and decentralised character, it is organised in a simpler and 
cheaper way and its reach can be easily increased. 
Finally, the Court in Hamburg decided that the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court could not have 
any influence on the case it was deciding.  It considered it as a decision on a particular national rule, a 
decision of the Austrian legislator to implement the Directive in a lenient way, without referring to the 
cable and microwave systems but to “lines” (“Leitungen”).  Unlike the German legislator, the Austrian 
legislator decided to implement the Directive in a technology-neutral way and it is a specific provision with 
merely national impact.  
In Poland and in France, the concept of cable retransmission is technology-specific and limited to 
“retransmission via cable”. It is the same in Denmark where the cable retransmission is provided to 
“retransmission via cable system” and “retransmission by means of radio systems”. 
The Italian Copyright Act is rather technology-specific with regard to the types of transmissions that 
should be covered by the retransmission right, whereas the same provision is neutral when referring to 
the modes of technical diffusion of the retransmitted broadcasts (art. 16-bis, c) Italian Copyright Act).  If 
the retransmission of a primary radio- or TV broadcasting emission coming from another EU Member 
State occurs through a system of cable redistribution or through very high frequencies, and the 
retransmission is addressed to the public, the right created under art. 16-bis (i.e., the retransmission right 
of the SatCab Directive) applies irrespectively of the modes of the initial broadcast diffusion. 
Unfortunately, the case law has not clarified the exact meaning and the scope of the retransmission via 
cable after the transposition of the 1993 SatCab Directive into Italian law.  However, it seems generally 
accepted that Italian law intended to define this particular type of right in a technology-specific way. As a 
result, transmissions occurring through other types of networks (mobile telephony or online transmissions) 
are not retransmissions by cable.  Consequently, there is no mandatory collective management for 
exploitation via these means and the authorisation should be sought in accordance with the default 
regime applicable to other communications to the public.  
Simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged. According to art. 1(3) of the Satellite and cable Directive, the 
retransmission must be simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged. 
The retransmission by cable should be simultaneous to the initial transmission.  According to 
HUGENHOLTZ, this entails that delayed retransmissions are no “retransmissions” and neither are, 
incomplete transmission (e.g. if the advertisement in the broadcast is cut or replaced by the cable 
operator).  However, “the application of mere technical procedures, such as analogue-to-digital signal 
conversions, remains within the ambit of the definition”
480
. 
In its abovementioned decision
481
, the Austrian Supreme Court found that the notion of “simultaneous” 
should not be understood in a strictly physical sense, but as a contrast to delayed transmissions or 
displays from recordings (“Aufzeichnungswiedergabe”).   
The retransmission by cable should also be unaltered. The broadcaster determines the composition of 
the programmes that it will broadcast (including by satellite). The cable operator that retransmits this 
primary broadcast cannot make up his programmes on the basis of a portfolio of rights which he has 
acquired beforehand. The cable operator can decide only whether he wants to retransmit the primary 
                                                     
 
480 P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, « SatCab Revisited :  the past, present and Future of the Satellite and Cable Directive », IrisPlus 2009/8 
(7), 12. 
481 Austrian Supreme Court (Oberste Gerichtshof) 21 February 2008, 4Ob89/08d, accessible via https://www.ris.bka.gv.at, p. 9. 
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broadcast in full or not at all
482
.  If the cable operator, by contrast, decides to alter the initial broadcasts, 
the circumstances that justify this regime of mandatory collective management are no longer present.  
This was confirmed by the Austrian Supreme Court in its abovementioned ruling
483
.  The Court also 
clarified that the unaltered character of the retransmission pertains to the retransmitted programmes, not 
the technical information support.  Moreover, the Court considered there was an unabridged 
retransmission if the live retransmission by streaming over the UMTS mobile network if the final user 
experiences a marginal time delay. 
In Denmark, the initial transmission’s signal has to be captured and transformed to be retransmitted by 
cable, in a technical sense. 
Summary.  The few national decision we have found bring no conclusive answer to the questions asked.  
Austria understands the retransmission by cable or microwave system in a technology-neutral way, 
whereas Germany sticks to a technology-specific understanding of the retransmission right.  Other 
Member States seems to consider the retransmission by cable as a technology-specific form of 
communication.  It is not known how contractual practice has developed between the right holders, the 
collecting societies and the alternative network operators. 
At stake is the scope of the obligation of collective management of the cable retransmission right.  If this 
right is understood in an technology-specific way, then only the retransmission of broadcasts via the 
traditional cable networks and the MMDS network (Ireland) are subject to this obligation.  Other 
simultaneous retransmissions should be cleared on an individual basis.  If by contrast the cable 
retransmission right is interpreted in a technology-neutral way, then the mandatory regime can be 
applicable to all operators in a comparable situation as the cable operators.  
In 2002, the Commission did not consider it appropriate to extend the mandatory collective-management 
regime to categories of retransmission other than the retransmission by coaxial cable. The economic 
study should assess whether there is a need now for such an extension. 
III. Conclusions 
In this Study we have discussed the cable retransmission right, as understood in the SatCab Directive.  
We have started by outlining the issues arising from the application of this right (sub II.A), then we have 
described the legal context in which the initiative to regulate the exercise of the cable retransmission was 
taken (sub II.B.1).  We have presented the scope of application of the SatCab Directive and its relation to 
the Information Society Directive (sub II.B.2). Then we have examined the elements of the notion 
“retransmission by cable” (sub II.B.3).   
Cable retransmission right and right of communication to the public. We have examined the 
decisions of the CJEU on cases involving a transmission via a cable network.  It was concluded that the 
CJEU has been consistent in its approach to assess the question of the protection of such cable 
transmissions in relation to the InfoSoc Directive, rather than the SatCab Directive.  The existence, 
definition and scope of the cable retransmission right have not been regulated as such in the SatCab 
Directive, which only requires the collective management of the cable retransmission right (letting alone 
under which legal heading it is protected).   
Initial transmission.  We have discussed some Dutch and Belgian cases and we have described the 
Danish provisions.  The main issue regarding the initial transmission appears to be the qualification of 
direct communications between the “broadcaster” and the cable operator (e.g. “direct injection”).   
                                                     
 
482 Explanatory Memorandum, Proposal, 23, 43. 
483 Austrian Supreme Court (Oberste Gerichtshof) 21 February 2008, 4Ob89/08d, accessible via https://www.ris.bka.gv.at, p. 9-10. 
The re-transmission of copyright protected content in digital networks 234 
 
There seems to be no uniform understanding of the notion “initial transmission from another Member 
State, by wire or over the air, including that by satellite, of television or radio programmes intended for 
reception by the public” (art. 1(3) SatCab Dir).  Most courts require a “public”, as interpreted by the CJEU 
in Lagardère and subsequent cases, both for the initial transmission and for the retransmission.   
The relation between the initial transmission and the retransmission is not clarified.  The consideration 
that the cable operator “depends” on the initial transmitter is sometimes understood in a literal way, as a 
technical requirement that the cable transmitter should receive the signal and retransmit that signal of the 
initial transmitter.  In other cases, it suffices that there is a simultaneous initial transmission (cf. Denmark).  
The explanatory memorandum of the Commission did not define the relation between the primary and the 
secondary transmission in a conclusive way.   
Retransmission by cable.   
We have then analysed two national decisions with relevance for the right of retransmission by cable.  In 
the Austrian Copyright Act, the retransmission right includes all secondary retransmissions, regardless of 
the technology or the nature of the network (including the mobile network).   The Austrian legislator has 
explicitly opted for a technology-neutral transposition of the cable retransmission right (Leitungen).  The 
cable retransmission right in the German Copyright Act by contrast does not extend to other technologies, 
such as the Internet.  The cable retransmission right was transposed in a technology-specific way.  This 
has consequences on the scope of application of the mandatory collective management of the 
retransmission right.   
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Introduction 
Amongst exceptions admitted by the article 5 of the Directive 2001/29/EC of 22d of May 2001 on some 
aspects related to copyright in the information society, some uses are privileged on the ground that they 
partake to transfer of knowledge and education. This is the case of exceptions benefiting to libraries or 
educational institutions. Within defined limits, libraries are allowed to make certain acts of reproduction of 
works they hold in their collection as well as making them available to the public for on-the-spot viewing 
and reading. Likewise, teachers and students can use works when needed to illustrate the educational 
activity, and researchers are entitled to reproduce and communicate works for the strict purpose of 
research.  
In its review of the Single Market
484
 the European Commission considered the free movement of 
knowledge and innovation as the "Fifth Freedom" in the single market. One year later, the Green Paper 
on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy
485
 highlighted the need to assess whether the exceptions and 
limitations to copyright and related rights that enable the public dissemination of knowledge, notably 
through libraries, educational and research institutions, were still fit for their purpose in the digital 
environment. The Communication that followed up the Green Paper
486
 announced some actions from the 
European Union to accommodate changing needs and issues of exceptions, some of them having 
already been unfolded, such as the directive on orphan works
 487
; the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Digitisation and making available of out-of-commerce works
488
, or the Licenses for Europe initiative that 
purports to develop licensing solutions for some uses of copyrighted works.  
None of these initiatives have revised the exceptions of the directive 2001/29 so far. This chapter aims at 
assessing whether there is a need to adapt limitations and exceptions provided for teaching and research 
to the digital environment in order to ensure that their application remains relevant – while, at the same 
time, ensuring the required balance with right-holders' legitimate interests and the normal exploitation of 
the work and other protected subject matter. This concerns the exceptions laid down in the article 5(2) c) 
(certain acts of reproduction by libraries, educational institutions, museums and archives), article 5(3) n) 
(making available for consultation on the premises of the same establishments) and article 5(3) a) (uses 
for illustration of teaching and for scientific research).  
Another activity of the library is equally relevant to disseminate works and cultural content to the public. It 
is the public lending right whose regime is governed by the article 6 of the Rental and Lending 
directive
489
. With the advent of e-books and online delivery of digital versions of literary works, digital 
forms of lending are increasingly envisaged and experimented by libraries, which justifies to study 
whether the public lending right that exists in most Member States, but limited to tangible copies of works, 
could and should be updated so as to cover digital transmissions.  
This chapter will begin by a general analysis of the system of exceptions to copyright and related rights in 
EU law (I) that will serve as the background for the study of the exceptions for libraries and for teaching 
and research. A second part will address the activities and exceptions relevant for libraries and similar 
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institutions, covering certain uses of works and other protected subject matter by libraries, which will 
cover the reproduction for preservation purposes, the on-site consultation and the e-lending (II). The last 
part will examine the exception for teaching and research (III). 
 
I. The system of copyright exceptions in EU law 
A. The exceptions in the acquis communautaire 
Exceptions to copyright and related rights are provided by four directives at the European level:  the 
Software directive 2009/24/EC
490
, the Rental and Lending Directive 2006/115/EEC
491
, the Database 
directive 96/9/EC
492
, and the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC
493
.   
The four directives co-exist
494
, as stated by the article 1(2) of the InfoSoc Directive that has left intact the 
earlier Community legislation, which begs the question of the conciliation or absorption of the exceptions 
they provide. This last directive is the more horizontal as it aims at harmonizing the exceptions to 
copyright and related rights and applies to all types of works at the exception of computer programs and 
databases that are left to their respective directives. The articulation of these four directives as to their 
exceptions is nevertheless an intricate issue that is not resolved
495
.  
One clear rule is that the exceptions in the vertical directives applying to computer programs and 
databases are considered as being lex specialis, as those directives confer privileges of use that are 
tailored to the specific subject matter of the computer program or the database, and have been left intact 
by the InfoSoc Directive of 2001.  
As far as software is concerned, the traditional exceptions might not fit well with the specific character 
and the functional features of the computer program anyway
496
, but this position is contradicted, as we 
will see below, by the increasing inclusion of computer programs and video games in the practices 
allowed under copyright exceptions. 
On the database front, the article 6(2) of the Database Directive authorises Member States to adopt 
limitations known for other types of works, such as private copying (limited to non-electronic database), 
use for illustration for teaching or scientific research, use for public security or administrative or judicial 
procedure. Additionally, “exceptions to copyright which are traditionally authorised under national law” can 
also be applied to databases protected by copyright, which is a “rather opaque provision”
497
 that can be 
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interpreted in two directions. Either the article 6(2) d) of the Database Directive is construed rather 
restrictively by meaning that it allows the application of exceptions already applied to databases prior to 
the adoption of the directive
498
. Or, and it should be in our view the preferred reading, national laws can, 
when transposing the directive in their national laws, expand the list of the exceptions of its article 6, to 
uses generally authorised under copyright
499
. The European Commission has however considered that 
the list of exceptions in the article 6(2) of the Database Directive is exhaustive
500
 
Under the second interpretation, the expansion of exceptions admissible for traditional copyrighted 
subject matter to databases is left to Member States and, in the cases already provided by the Database 
Directive, should not go beyond those specific exceptions. The list of exceptions contained in the article 5 
of the InfoSoc Directiveof 2001, or more exactly their implementation in national laws, will not 
automatically apply to databases
501
.  
The situation of the exceptions to related rights and the articulation of the Rental and Lending Directive 
and the InfoSoc Directive is more intricate. The article 10 of the 1992 directive (codified in 2006) in its 
chapter on related rights, takes over the exceptions of the article 15 of the Rome Convention on 
neighbouring rights and allows Member States to provide for limitations in respect of private use, use of 
short excerpts for news reporting, ephemeral fixation by broadcasters, use for the purposes of teaching or 
scientific research. In its second paragraph, the article 10 authorizes Member States to provide for the 
same kinds of limitations known in copyright. The adoption of the Directive 2001/29 that covers 
exceptions both to copyright and related rights has not modified the earlier directive on related rights 
(except for the application of three-step test). Some overlap between the exceptions listed in the two 
directives, both applicable
502
, is thus possible. Some authors consider that the reproduction right having 
been deleted in the Rental and Lending Directive and replaced, for related rights, by the article 2 of the 
InfoSoc Directive, the exceptions to such rights are now only governed by the latter
503
. For sake of 
consistency, when the scope of one exception differs in the two applicable directives, the exception of the 
directive 2001/29 should prevail so as to avoid a different treatment of copyright and of related rights. We 
will see further on the example of the exception for teaching that seems more strictly defined in the Rental 
and Lending Directive. The best solution would however be to abrogate the exceptions contained in this 
latter directive to replace them by the common list of the InfoSoc Directive
504
. 
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B. The exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive 
The advent of the digital environment has justified that the exceptions be integrated in the efforts of 
harmonisation of the InfoSoc Directive. On one hand, some uses of copyrighted works authorized by 
exceptions are increasingly undertaken on the Internet, hence acquiring a cross-border dimension, which 
has justified the inclusion of exceptions in the topics requiring harmonization
505
. On the second hand, new 
digital uses of works begged the question of whether the exceptions were adapted to the information 
society. In that regard, two issues arose. First, the digital application of exceptions could cause increasing 
harm to copyright owners and emerging models of new exploitations and thus could justify new conditions 
or limitations to existing exceptions. Secondly, users have argued that they need to benefit from the 
possibilities offered by the information society to carry out expanded or new uses of works, which could 
raise the question of an extension or adaptation of exceptions. This second motive has been particularly 
addressed in legislative documents that followed the 2001 directive, such as the Communication on 
Copyright in the Knowledge Economy
506
. The balance achieved by the careful delineation of exclusive 
rights and exceptions is consequently in need of an on-going reassessment and readjustment, that could 
either reduce, limit or adapt the existing exceptions. 
Exceptions are dealt with in the article 5 of the directive that enumerates cases where Member States are 
allowed to enact an exception to copyright and related rights. The list is exhaustive but optional, for 
Member States can decide not to implement all exceptions (but for the exception of temporary copying 
that is mandatory) but should refrain from introducing supplementary cases of authorized uses. The 
discretion left to Member States is not limited to the choice to implement or not an exception in their 
national copyright act. It also pertains to the conditions applicable to exceptions since the conditions of 
most exceptions laid down in the European text are not precisely determined, as will be seen when 
analyzing the exceptions concerned by the present study. As a consequence, the transposition of 
exceptions in the Member States is largely different, as the national lawmakers have implemented only 
the exceptions they deemed significant or adapted to their traditions and the conditions applicable to 
similar exception greatly vary from one country to another
507
. 
Member States can adopt exceptions to the reproduction right (article 5(2)) or to both the reproduction 
and communication to the public rights (article 5(3)) depending on the use concerned. The article 5(4) of 
the directive also allows the national legislators to similarly apply exceptions, when needed to the right of 
distribution, without specifying the particular uses that would exempt the application of the distribution 
right.  
A last and key element of the system of exceptions of the 2001 directive is its article 5(5) that inscribes 
the three-step test, already known in the Berne Convention and in TRIPS, within the acquis 
communautaire. Accordingly, exceptions and limitations shall only be applied in certain special cases that 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder. 
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C. The objectives of the exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive 
The directive 2001/29 participates to the European endeavour to create a general and flexible legal 
framework at Community level in order to foster the development of the information society in Europe
508
. 
To that end, the directive aims at harmonizing the principles and rules of copyright law that were deemed 
essential to the protection of works and creative content in the information society. An overall objective of 
the directive, as constantly reminded by the European Court of Justice
509
, is to increase legal certainty 
and provide for a high level of protection of intellectual property
510
.  
In this general frame, copyright exceptions are adopted to strike a balance between the rights and 
interests of copyright holders and of the public at large
511
. Their specific objectives read as follows in the 
recitals of the directive 2001/29:  
“This Directive should seek to promote learning and culture by protecting works and other subject-
matter while permitting exceptions or limitations in the public interest for the purpose of education 
and teaching”
512
 
“A fair balance of rights and interests between (…) the different categories of rightholders and 
users of protected subject-matter must be safeguarded. (…)”
513
.  
However, this concern for the promotion of culture and the safeguard of public interest should not be 
achieved, as asserted by the Preamble of the Directive,  “by sacrificing strict protection of rights or by 
tolerating illegal forms of distribution of counterfeited or pirated works”
514
, which again tilts the balance in 
favour of a high level of protection of copyright owners. 
The cultural objectives of the exceptions are further repeated in subsequent documents of the European 
Union, namely in the Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy:  
“Wider dissemination of knowledge contributes to more inclusive and cohesive societies, fostering 
equality of opportunities in line with the priorities of the forthcoming renewed Social Agenda”
515
. 
The directive 2012/28 of 25 October 2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works also grounds the 
newly enacted exception for libraries, in the promotion of learning and the dissemination of culture
516
.  
The contribution to the smooth functioning of the internal market and the development of the information 
society constitute other objectives of the directive 2001/29. To that end, recital 7 states that “those 
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national provisions on copyright and related rights which vary considerably from one Member State to 
another or which cause legal uncertainties hindering the smooth functioning of the internal market and the 
proper development of the information society in Europe should be adjusted, and inconsistent national 
responses to the technological developments should be avoided”
517
. As far as exceptions are concerned, 
the harmonization objective is explained in recital 31:  
 “The existing exceptions and limitations to the rights as set out by the Member States have to be 
reassessed in the light of the new electronic environment. Existing differences in the exceptions 
and limitations to certain restricted acts have direct negative effects on the functioning of the 
internal market of copyright and related rights. Such differences could well become more 
pronounced in view of the further development of transborder exploitation of works and cross-
border activities. In order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, such exceptions 
and limitations should be defined more harmoniously. The degree of their harmonization should be 
based on their impact on the smooth functioning of the internal market ”
518
.  
This limits the harmonization of the exceptions strictly to the differences that have an adverse effect on 
the functioning of the Internal Market. In other words, as stated in the first draft of the directive on 
copyright in the information society in 1997, “the degree of harmonization has been made dependent on 
their impact on the smooth functioning of the Internal Market, taking due account of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality and of the new WIPO obligations. Those exceptions or limitations, which 
have a greater impact on the Internal market, have been made obligatory or the conditions of their 
application have been harmonized to a larger degree, where appropriate. Therefore, the degree of 
harmonization (…) reflects the balance between Internal Market needs (…) and the principle of 
subsidiarity”
 519
.  
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D. The interpretation of the exceptions by the CJEU 
In the last three years, several cases involving the interpretation of copyright exceptions have been 
referred to the European Court of Justice that laid down several general principles to be applied to the 
interpretation of exceptions. There are more cases to come as preliminary questions have been recently 
referred to the Court about the parody exception
520
, the private copy
521
 or the exception for on-site 
consultation
522
.  
A key objective on which the Court has insisted is the attempt of the InfoSoc Directive to ensure 
consistency of the copyright rules and the functioning of the internal market. This overall objective of the 
directive should not, according to the EU judges, be distorted by Member States’ different legislation, but 
should arrive at a coherent application of the exceptions and limitations
523
. The Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged the discretion left to Member States to implement the exceptions in their national laws
524
, 
as well as the modalities thereof when the provisions of the directive do not expressly specify them
525
. In 
the Painer case, the European judges have however stressed that such discretion must be exercised 
within the limits imposed by EU law
526
, and notably according to the following principles
527
:   
- a principle of proportionality: accordingly, measures adopted by the Member States must be 
appropriate for attaining their objective and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
it
528
; 
- the compliance with the purpose of a high level of protection of copyright:  The Member 
States cannot, by exercising this discretion, compromise the principal purpose of the directive 
2001/29, i.e. the high level of protection of authors
529
; 
- the need for legal certainty: the conditions of exceptions cannot be dependent of uncertain 
circumstances, such as a discretionary human intervention
530
. 
In subsequent cases
531
, the CJEU has also said that transposing the directive “in an inconsistent and un-
harmonised manner which may vary from one Member State to another, would be incompatible with the 
objective of that directive”
532
.    
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Still in Painer, the Court adds two other principles, the strict interpretation and the compliance with the 
three-step test, that are more rules applying to the exceptions themselves, rather than principles limiting 
the leeway enjoyed by Member States.  
The principle of strict interpretation entails that provisions related to exceptions should be construed 
strictly as they derogate from the general principle of the directive, that of exclusive rights
533
. That being 
said, this principle has been attenuated to accommodate other considerations. First, the interpretation of 
the conditions of an exception must “enable the effectiveness of the exception thereby established to 
be safeguarded and its purpose to be observed”
534
. The rule has been further described in the FAPL 
case, as meaning that the exception must permit observance of the exception’s purpose and, as far as 
transient reproduction exemption is concerned, “must allow and ensure the development and operation of 
new technologies and safeguard a fair balance between the rights and interests of right holders, on the 
one hand, and of users of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those new technologies, on 
the other”
535
. The strict interpretation of exceptions is thereby opened up for a teleological approach that 
could mitigate a too narrow construction of the exception hindering its effectiveness in delivering what it is 
intended for in the directive 2001/29. When the exception aims at striking a fair balance between freedom 
of expression and the interest of the rightholder, it could go as far as making such freedom of the user 
prevail over some conditions normally required for the exception or refusing to add supplementary 
conditions to that prescribed by the directive
536
.  
This is by far the most liberal approach that the European case law has adopted regarding the 
exceptions. If upheld
537
, it would mean that exceptions should not be literally construed or applied but 
should be seen as means to the end they pursue. Within due limits, their conditions or constraints could 
be reasonably interpreted when needed to apply to new situations and developments.   
A last rule pertains to the application of the three-step test that could add further restrictions to the 
interpretation of the exception, whose conditions cannot be construed as harming the normal exploitation 
of the work or unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interests of the rightholders
538
. Nevertheless, the 
Court has so far refrained from interpreting the criteria of the triple test and has considered, in two cases 
related to the temporary copying exception, that the compliance with the conditions of that exception 
suffices to satisfy the three-step test
539
. 
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E. Other principles applying to exceptions 
1. Application of exceptions to unpublished works 
A principle that is not touched upon by the acquis communautaire is whether the exceptions can concern 
works that have not been published or legally made available. This is a requirement that applies in a 
number of Member States. In some cases, the exclusion of the benefit of any exceptions applies in a 
general way and is laid down in an introductory provision to the lists of authorized uses (e.g. Belgium, 
France, Greece or Italy). In other legislation, the exclusion of unpublished works is a customary condition 
applied to exceptions or (e.g. Germany, Spain) or explicitly appears in the text of specific exceptions (e.g. 
Denmark, the Netherlands).  The terminology also differs from “published works”, “lawfully published or 
made available”
540
, to “works that have been disclosed”.  
There are different reasons justifying this exclusion. First it is generally understood, despite the reference 
to “publication”, that the exceptions are considered to be admissible only after the author has divulged her 
work
541
. The author of an unpublished work might have refrained from divulging the work for any reason, 
including the fact that it contains private information that was not intended for public access
542
. 
The benefit of the exception is thus conditioned to the exercise by the author of her moral right of 
divulgation. This is explicit in the French Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle or the German law that relate 
the exceptions to the condition of the divulgation of the work. The Belgium Copyright Law refers to the 
lawful publication of work but this is interpreted as referring, as in France, to the moral right of 
divulgation
543
.  
It could also be said that the condition of prior publication or making available aims at preserving the 
exploitation of the work by copyright owners before leaving some space for exceptions. By extension it 
raised the question of the lawful source that was primarily addressed in relation to the private copy
544
, 
with the notable purpose to exclude the application of private copying to acts of downloading from 
unlawful peer-to-peer file-sharing websites or software. 
A supplementary ground lies in privacy concerns, which could occur when the work consists in private 
letters or photographs whose disclosure could prejudice the privacy of their author or of other persons.  
It is unclear however as to whether this limitation of exceptions to published or lawfully made available 
works is a principle of acquis communautaire. The question of lawful source related to private copy has 
been recently referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union
545
. But, the moral right not being 
harmonized at the EU level, its relationship with exceptions is all the more uncertain. One could suggest 
that an exception could less easily pass the scrutiny of the three-step test if applied to an unpublished or 
undisclosed work, as it could (it would not be necessarily so though) harm the normal exploitation of the 
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work that has not even taken place but could already be substituted by the use privileged by the 
exception, or prejudice the legitimate interest of the author to exercise his moral right of divulgation
546
.  
The question was addressed during the adoption process of the Orphan Works Directive, some countries 
showing reluctance in the application of the orphan works definition and of its consequence, the 
authorized use for libraries and archives through a new exception, to unpublished works. As a significant 
part of unpublished works contained in museums or archives might be orphan, it would be problematic 
not to include them in the scope of the directive. The compromise that was found reads as follows in the 
article 1(3) of the directive 2012/28/UE: 
“This Directive also applies to works and phonograms referred to in paragraph 2 which have never 
been published or broadcast but which have been made publicly accessible by the organisations 
referred to in paragraph 1 with the consent of the rightholders, provided that it is reasonable to 
assume that the rightholders would not oppose the uses referred to in Article 6. Member States 
may limit the application of this paragraph to works and phonograms which have been deposited 
with those organisations before 29 October 2014”. 
The exception enabled by the directive would thus apply to unpublished or undisseminated works, on the 
condition that the library, education establishment, museum or archive wishing to benefit from the 
exception, has made the work publicly accessible with the consent of rightholders and that those 
rightholders (not necessarily the same) would presumably not oppose to the making available now 
authorized by the directive.  
Actually, this provision is rather obscure and would cover only very limited cases of unpublished works for 
a number of reasons. First, the directive is limited to some categories of works, such as books, journals, 
newspapers, magazines and other writings, or to cinematographic or audiovisual works and phonograms, 
that would generally be published, except for “other writings” or, in some cases, audiovisual works. The 
question of application of the directive to unpublished works will therefore only cover some writings and 
audiovisual works that have never been published or publicly released. The second limitation relates to 
the mention of rightholders that appears as somewhat incongruous when dealing with orphan works. The 
rightholder must have authorized the library or other eligible institution to make his work publicly available 
some time in the past. Then the work was not orphan but has become eventually, either because the 
rightholder can not be located anymore or is deceased and his heirs are unidentified or unfindable. One 
can think of an author having left unpublished materials (private letters, unpublished manuscripts, 
unfinished or private films …) to a library, an archive or a museum, without excluding their mak ing 
available to the public of the establishments and who (or whose heirs) would not refuse that such making 
available is extended on-line. The presumption of the valid consent of the current rightholder is left at the 
appreciation of the library, which can be difficult to apply. There is no mention neither to the legitimate 
reasons that could incline the library to think that such a consent would be lacking, such as privacy 
concerns or respect of the honor of the author. Finally, the author having authorized at some point the 
library to make some public use of his unpublished work, it could be inferred that the author has thereby 
exercised his right of divulgation.  
For all this reasons, the question of undisclosed works, contained in the collection of a cultural heritage 
institution, might not be totally solved by this provision, as it would leave some unpublished material out of 
its scope. 
In any case, the directive on orphan works, despite this article 1(3), does not give any indication as to the 
general rule of application of copyright exceptions to unpublished works. The issue is particularly relevant 
for libraries, museums and archives that deal with diverse materials, published or unpublished. 
Particularly, archives are prone to hold unpublished content in their collections. Many unpublished works 
can also be critical for research as they could illustrate or give key information on motives, context or 
biographical elements of cultural creation or enlightening historical information.  
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There seems to be no common understanding of this issue at the European level. Copyright scholarship 
only mentions the principle in relation to their domestic laws when it contains a rule excluding unpublished 
or undisclosed works from the exceptions.  
2. Relationship of exceptions with licensing and market provision 
The infoSoc Directive has refrained from declaring exceptions of an imperative nature, as the European 
lawmaker has sometimes done in earlier texts, such as the computer programs or database directives
547
. 
The question of whether the exceptions can be overridden by contract is thus left to Member States, 
some of them having opted for a prohibition to contract out of the exceptions
548
.  
Without analysing the uneasy relationship between copyright exceptions and contract
549
, a more general 
perspective on the borders between the statutorily defined exception and the exercise of copyright by the 
rightowners should be addressed for the exceptions we will study. When the exception is not declared 
mandatory, it leaves some leeway for copyright and related rights owners to contractually prohibit the use, 
to license the use to the beneficiaries of the exception or to determine the conditions under which the use 
could take place. This possibility is sometimes included in the exception as spelled out by the directive, as 
we will see with the exception for on-site consultation. 
Another issue is whether the exception could substitute the provision of works on the market. We will see 
that some Member States sometimes carve out works that are still available on the market or could be 
provided by the rightowners, from the scope of an exception. This gives somepreference to the market 
and the exploitation of works by rightowners over the exception. The recent diversification of rules and 
situations in the European and national copyright lawmaking between out-of-commerce and commercially 
available works also indicates that the ambit of the authorised uses varies according to the economic 
reality of the work exploitation and is increasingly thought in gradual shades, from works not available in 
the market to works that are still exploited.  
These different points convey the confrontation between the exceptions and the remaining exclusivity of 
copyright and related rights owners. It raises two related questions: 1) once the perimeter of an exception 
is drawn by law, is the rightholder still entitled to defeat the legal authorisation by contracting over the use 
with the beneficiary of the exception, and 2) should the exception only occupy the space where the 
market cannot provide the benefit of the use ? 
The second question should be handled carefully. It could be read as a follow-up to the scrutiny by the 
three-step test that copyright exceptions should successfully pass, and notably the second step 
consisting in the absence of some harm to the normal exploitation of the work. This criteria of the normal 
exploitation should not however be construed as meaning that any market possibility would overcome the 
exception
550
. To define the criteria of ‘normal exploitation’, the WTO Panel decision on the three step test 
has referred to the ways right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the work (i.e., the 
copyright) and thereby deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains
551
. It also points at the fact 
that the absence of a licensing system would not be determinant in deciding whether the use in question 
does not take part to the normal exploitation of the work
552
, but it cannot be inferred that the provision of a 
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license for a specific use would exclude the application of the exception
553
. This opinion is substantiated 
by the preparatory work of the Stockholm Conference that has introduced the three-step test into the 
Berne Convention. It mentions  « all forms of exploiting a work, which have, or are likely to acquire, 
considerable economic or practical importance »
554
, this formulation being found also in the WTO Panel 
Report
555
. In our opinion, this indicates that the single possibility to provide the work to the user benefiting 
from the licence would not be enough in itself to consider that the exception counters the normal 
exploitation of the work. The scrutiny of the second step should rather look at the overall economic 
importance of the exploitation forms with which the exception would enter in economic competition.  
It is only if the systematic use of the exception could divest authors from major sources of revenues that 
are significant within the overall commercialization of works, that it would contradict the normal 
exploitation of works. In our view, the fact that some works are commercially available is therefore not 
sufficient to include in the relevant exception a general exclusion of works that could be acquired through 
normal trade.   
A reverse conclusion would mean that the exception is dictated by the functioning of the market and only 
answer to a market failure justification. Market failure has been regularly advanced, particularly in the 
writings of Chicago school of law and economics
556
, as a justification for exceptions. It could be defined 
as the principle according to which the exception would only be valid if the market is not capable, through 
provision of the work or licensing, to supply the demand of the user.  
This justification, though it can apply to some exceptions, has now been rejected by the majority of 
scholarship that considers that exceptions are grounded on diverse reasons, which cannot be always 
solved by the market. The analysis of the market failure as a valid explanation of fair use in the United 
States has been particularly addressed by W. Gordon, who was regularly misunderstood in that regard
557
. 
In a later paper
558
, W. Gordon distinguishes two categories of justifications for fair use: the market failure 
or malfunction, when the market cannot license the use due to high transaction costs, and the market 
limitation when non-economic values prevent to rely solely on the market and on economics to enable the 
use, thereby justifying a rule of exception. The exception will fall in the second category if the exception 
pursues public interests that cannot be overcome by leaving the market decide on the use and the 
beneficiary of the exception should be transferred some control over the use
559
.  
Both the European lawmaker and the international one refer to public interest as a key justification of 
copyright exceptions
560
. This motive should imply that the relationship between the existence of the 
exception and the market, but also between the condition of the exception and the market, should be 
tackled with due care.  
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Therefore, a criterion of market substitution should not be the only guide to draw of the boundaries of an 
exception, even though the triple test includes the consideration of an adverse market effect. We will see 
the difference between those two approaches and its practical application to the different cases of 
exceptions surveyed by the present study.  
II. The exceptions benefiting to libraries 
Libraries and other institutions, such as museums or archives, whose purpose is to maintain a collection 
of cultural artefacts and heritage, and to provide access thereto for research, education or private study, 
benefit from several exceptions in the acquis communautaire.  
Those exceptions aim at ensuring some acts of preservation of the collections (art. 5(2) c) of the directive 
2001/29), enabling consultation of some works on the premises of the establishment (art. 5 (3) n) of the 
directive 2001/29) and authorizing public lending by libraries (art. 6 of the directive 2006/115). To a 
different extent and in different ways, such exceptions limit copyright to accommodate key public-interest 
missions of the libraries, i.e. preservation and access to knowledge and culture. The digital evolution of 
libraries has significantly changed the possible impact of such exceptions, both on libraries’ needs and 
expectations and on the legitimate protection of rights and interests of copyright and related rights 
holders. Libraries would like to benefit from the activities authorized by those directives to a similar or 
even broader extent in the digital environment, whereas the copyright owners fear that the digital extent of 
such uses would disrupt the balance established by the exceptions when they were adopted, excessively 
prejudice their rights and hamper the development of new services and business models in the online 
world.  
This study aims at assessing the extent and relevance of those exceptions in the European copyright law 
and at considering whether adaptations to those exceptions are needed, particularly in the context of the 
digital environment. It will address successively the three exceptions, for certain acts of reproduction (B.), 
for on-site consultation (C.) and for public lending (D.).   
As a preliminary introduction, the activities of libraries, archives and museums will be explained in order to 
better understand the context in which those establishments operate (A.) 
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A. Role and activities of libraries, archives and museums 
1. The changing role of libraries, archives and museums 
Libraries, archives and museums aim at collecting, storing, preserving and making available diverse 
cultural items. They are the custodians of cultural and scientific heritage and are entrusted to keep that 
heritage for future generations.  
Part of their collections consists of works still protected by copyright. Therefore, when manipulating such 
works for the purpose of their public interest mission, they are likely to undertake acts of reproduction or 
communication to the public, which justifies that specific exceptions have been provided for by the 
InfoSoc Directive to accommodate some activities of libraries and similar cultural and scientific 
institutions.  
The development of digital libraries in recent years has the potential to change the way works are 
accessed to, enjoyed and used. Libraries have traditionally been a repository for cultural artefacts 
produced by a society, a place to get access to such culture, do research and learn. Furthermore, a large 
part of works that are contained in the collection of a library or archive, including in a film heritage 
institution, might be unpublished, out of commerce or distribution, or consist in one of the rare copies 
available, which renders the task of safeguarding this heritage by libraries even more crucial.  
Today, digitization of works could provide extended value to access to works, by maintaining the work in 
a quality that secures its future and frequent consultation, by adding search tools to the digitized items, by 
offering on-line lending that could seem equivalent for users to the acquisition of an e-book on the market. 
Digitization is also a privileged way to increase availability of collections and to envisage their 
dissemination on-line. The European Union has invested a lot in the Europeana project that would prompt 
all libraries and archives in the Member States to turn digital and offer works in their holding in a digital 
form. Audiovisual archives have also been developed by public broadcasters to digitize and preserve 
millions of hours of broadcasts that are a key testimony of history and culture of the 20
th
 century. 
The role of libraries has thus changed without changing. They continue to accomplish their basic mission 
of archiving, preserving and making available cultural and scientific documents and creations. However, 
libraries, archives and museums undergo dramatic changes in the digital environment and dream of an 
extended ambit to enhance accessibility of their collection that could challenge the models of exploitation 
by rights holders. Libraries used to be only limited competitors to the normal acquisition of works, as 
works could only be consulted on the site of the institution, through public lending limited in time and 
availability or, in limited cases, upon special request. By making works available on-line, libraries could 
become cultural entrepreneurs competing with copyright owners or provide to users a substitute to get 
access to works. To some extent, the lines between libraries activities and on-line commercial exploitation 
of works can be seen as blurring, except for the different motive that still distinguishes both activities. This 
renewed confrontation between the public interest of preserving knowledge and access thereto and the 
protection of copyright and related rights owners and of the normal market for works, entails some 
reassessment of the dividing line between the exclusive rights and the limitations in favour of libraries, 
archives and museums. 
2. The activities of libraries 
Libraries and other cultural heritage institutions carry out a discrete series of activities that, at different 
degrees, further the preservation and dissemination of knowledge. Some already existed in the analogue 
environment, others are an offspring of the unfolding of the digital environment. They may involve only 
reproduction of some works or of whole collections or, combine reproduction and making available or 
even reproduction and distribution. Their effect on the normal exploitation of the work and the interests of 
the copyright owners might vary from inexistent to troublesome. The different uses of works presented 
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here might not intervene in all libraries or institutions with equal importance or at the same frequency and 
some establishments carry out some uses more often than others. The category of the institution 
concerned also matters. For instance a library may engage more in making works available to its patrons 
than an archive, in general open only to scholars and researchers, whereas the latter may invest more 
resources in restoration and preservation of works. Even in the same category, the institutions can greatly 
vary. For instance a university library will operate rather differently than a generalist public library: the 
former has generally less patrons than the latter, their users do more on-site research and consultation 
than they borrow books
561
. The libraries in charge of administering the legal deposit will also focus more 
on missions of preservation and access for research. 
The type of works will be relevant too, as well as the tangible media in which they are embodied. 
Restoration of books will be less frequent and costly than the restoration of a film and it will concern 
mainly older books or often-consulted ones that are more likely to deteriorate. Conversely, movies of the 
first half of the 20
th
 century were filmed on cellulose nitrate film, being very unstable, flammable and 
subject to rapid decomposition over time, as is its replacement technology, the acetate film, that suffers 
from decay. The role of film archives and museums is hence fundamental to preserve our audiovisual 
heritage. As to the difference of media, analogue copies are paradoxically less likely to become obsolete 
whereas digital copies require adequate equipment capable to read the format that evolves quickly over a 
short time. 
Hence the difficulty to draw a common picture of the role of libraries, archives and museums, as it will 
greatly depend of their type, size, mandate, collections, the types of works and of media they hold. 
Nevertheless, the following activities can be proposed as an overall description of what libraries, archives 
and museums do with the content in their collection
562
:    
a) Activities related to setting up a collection 
A first activity of libraries and similar institutions will be to acquire works and content to constitute their 
collection. The major sources of acquisition will be found in buying, receiving through gifts or, for some 
institutions, through the obligation of a legal deposit. Generally such uses will not trigger copyright 
protection, as access to works by acquisition does not imply an act of reproduction, communication or 
distribution. However, as a consequence of the tremendous shift from printed to electronic information 
resources, new models of paying for access to these resources –monographs, articles, raw data – have 
largely replaced the traditional acquisition paradigm. This means that libraries do not have the ownership 
of those resources, which are made available for the patrons under the terms and conditions stipulated in 
the license agreements. Many acts of reproduction and communication can occur when downloading and 
installing the work in the library. They will generally be allowed by the license that will accompany the 
acquisition of the work. 
Institutions in charge of legal deposit can undertake acts of copying content available on the web also 
called “web harvesting” to acquire digital content that the applicable law would subject to legal deposit for 
preservation of digital heritage. Such activity will imply acts of copying of copyrighted works. 
Some libraries also reproduce copyrighted works when in charge of institutional repositories in 
universities and research institutions. Such repositories consist of collections of intellectual productions of 
their members, and particularly scholarly publications, research reports, theses and dissertations, or 
teaching materials. In a research environment that has to abide increasingly by open access standards 
and methodologies, the development of institutional repositories is an essential tool of the open access 
university policy.  Many universities and research institutions have indeed adhered to the Berlin 
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Declaration on open access
563
 and consequently, have mandated their libraries to implement the open 
access policy by collecting all research material produced by the researchers and making them available 
to all (or sometimes only to university members). Whereas the ultimate objective is to provide access to 
such materials within the institution or even outside thereof, the works will first have to be digitised (thus 
reproduced) to enter the repository.  
b) Activities of preservation 
Libraries, archives and museums have a traditional role of preservation. This preservation of their 
collections or parts thereof varies in intensity, depending on the objective. All the uses developed below 
result in an act of reproduction, but their effect on the work and its exploitation will differ. 
- Restoration of damaged works: When works are damaged or destroyed in part, libraries, 
archives and museums have to preserve them in the best way they can. Paper in books, 
photographs or films might decay or works may have been damaged by their readers. The act of 
preservation will require a reproduction of the missing part or a restoration of the damaged or 
decomposing element. The decision to restore a work will normally be taken individually for each 
work concerned. 
- Reproduction to preserve fragile works: Cultural heritage institutions also have to care for 
works on an anticipative way to prevent them from being damaged or destroyed. It is the case for 
fragile and at risk works which need to be preserved before it becomes impossible to make any 
copy thereof. The vulnerability of the work will depend on the type of tangible embodiment and 
the frequency of its consultation. Such preventive restoration will require some partial 
reproduction or more often, will lead to digitize the whole work.  
- Reproduction for format shifting: Finally, the institutions in question also need to be able to 
copy works for format-shifting purposes. If a format becomes obsolete or is no more usable 
because the technology to read or listen to works, does not exist anymore or is not easy to find or 
use
564
, they might decide to migrate all works existing in that format (analogue or even already 
digital) to a more recent one (generally digital). This format shifting will require reproduction and 
might occur on a regular basis, depending on the pace of obsolescence of the media concerned.  
- Mass-scale digitisation: A more extensive activity of reproduction consists in mass-scale 
digitization where no specific objective (restoration, to counter the vulnerability or the risk of 
obsolescence of the media) will justify the digitisation, but the need or wish to enjoy the 
possibilities spurred by the digital technologies (making available on-line, easier preservation, 
research capabilities…). Mass digitization does not select the works to which it applies but 
concern the whole collection or a significant and determined part thereof (e.g. the collection of 
daily newspapers of a national library, the collection of engravings or photographs…).  
Consequently, search in the collection of a library can cover metadata, the inside text of the work 
or even link with other web services
565
. The intended outcome of such operation is normally the 
making available of that collection to the public for research and cultural objectives. It could also 
be to constitute a collection of items that is more easily searchable and indexed, upon the 
condition that the digitization has applied text-recognition tools (OCR or Optical Character 
Recognition software). Generally it will not encompass works that are already in a digital format 
but some transition to another digital format might be needed to integrate the born-digital work in 
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the format chosen for the library’s collection or to be compatible with the indexing and searching 
tools developed for the whole collection.  
c) Specific acts of reproduction 
Additionally, libraries and archives may make specific acts of reproduction, such as:  
- Reproduction of a specific work upon request: Libraries and archives often answer to 
requests from library patrons or researchers to get a copy of a specific work. Copying by the 
library itself can be justified by the fragility of some works that advises against letting the patrons 
manipulating the work themselves. Librarians might also make copies for some patrons such as 
professors or researchers in a university library or an archive for research purposes. 
- Reproduction by library patrons: numerous acts of reproduction of works occur within the 
premises of the library and are made by patrons themselves. They will generally be authorised 
under the private copy or reprography exceptions. 
d) Acts of communication or making available 
Beyond acts of reproduction, dissemination of culture to the public is a fundamental activity of libraries 
and other institutions. It is a mission of public interest to make available – upon certain conditions – works 
they own for the public, for the society. Making works available to the public of the library may take 
several forms, from the on-demand consultation of works on-site or on-line, to the online public lending:  
- Sending a copy of a specific work upon request:  libraries and archives sometimes send a 
copy of a specific work upon request, traditionally by mail and in a regular paper format. A digital 
equivalent of that act of supplying a copy is the scanning and sending the document by email to 
the patron requesting it.  
- Making available for on-site consultation within the library: some parts of the collection of a 
library, museum or archive might be made available on computers or other equipments on the 
very premises of the establishment. The objectives pursued might vary greatly from an institution 
to another. Libraries will make available some works or databases whose access is often required 
(that frequency being a possible cause for damage to the works) or to facilitate the search within 
the document. Film archives will screen the movies they own in their screening rooms either upon 
request for research or in public screenings. Museums will offer for viewing some parts of their 
collections and archives might enable some consultation of works whose originals need to be 
preserved from too frequent manipulations. Extracts of works could also be shown on screens, as 
part of the exhibition of the museum’s collection or in a public library, to promote some works to 
the visitors. Such on-site consultation will result in an act of making available to the public. 
- Making available of specific works or databases for remote consultation: a functional 
equivalent of on-site consultation might consist in making some works available on request to 
researchers associated to the library (for instance in a university) or other members of the 
institution at distance. Benefiting from the digital networks, libraries extend the consultation off 
their walls to registered patrons who might be in their offices in the same or another building or 
even in a completely different location. 
- Making available for unrestricted on-line consultation or visit: As a follow-up of mass 
digitisation, libraries can become digital on the model of Gallica (and of Europeana that is a portal 
leading to national digital libraries) and offer to an undifferentiated public the possibility to browse 
their collections. Other examples are projects of making archived broadcasts available on a 
dedicated website (as the INA in France or the SONUMA in Belgium). An equivalent can be found 
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in museums that offer a virtual visit of their collections on-line. The extent of the making available 
may range from limited viewing in low-quality to downloading of copies. 
e) Activities of lending 
Public lending is one of the core activities of libraries, an activity which is not applicable to archives or 
museums (but for a use by another establishment). Other activities can be assimilated to lending, as they 
imply the transfer of a tangible copy of the work, even though they will not be considered as lending from 
a legal point of view. 
- Interlibrary loans: libraries will transfer some works to each other to meet the requests of their 
patrons who might not find a specific work in one institution but request it from another. This is a 
regular and organised practised of libraries working in networks for that purpose. 
- Lending for an exhibition: some originals or rare copies of works belonging to museum or 
archives, less often to libraries, might be requested by a museum or any other place to be 
included in an exhibition.  
- Public lending: works can finally be lent to patrons for a limited time and for no lucrative 
purpose. Lending will happen in libraries (regardless of the type of content they own, whether 
books, music, films, …), but normally not in archives or museums.  
All the uses of works described hereinabove constitute a whole range of possibilities for library and other 
cultural heritage institutions. It does not mean that all of them imply an act covered by copyright nor that 
each of them should be authorized under an exception to copyright. Those uses are regularly carried out 
by libraries, museums and archives and will continue to be in the digital age. Some of them will increase 
in the knowledge economy, will occur in a different form or have a different impact.  
This list of uses will help us determine their current status under the list of copyright exceptions laid down 
in directive 2001/29 and their possible entry to an adaptation of that list. They can be organised in a 
continuum that would distinguish acts of preservation of items of their collection and acts of making 
available. They range from selective acts of copying that deal with single items for specific reasons to 
more general reproduction of the whole collection. Likewise, making available can relate to a single item 
or expand to making works available from consultation within the premises of the establishment, 
consultation on-line with no possibility of printing or downloading to availability for downloading and e-
lending. The continuum will serve as a basis for our analysis. The following table illustrates the gradual 
activities of preservation and making available undertaken by libraries, museums and archives. 
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3. Intersection between libraries’ activities and copyright exceptions 
The exceptions of the acquis communautaire authorize some of the activities undertaken by the libraries, 
educational establishments, museums and archives to an extent that the present study will determine.  
In a nutshell, some acts of reproduction, notably to preserve collections, are allowed under the article 5(2) 
c) of the InfoSoc Directive; the making available works on the premises of the institution is authorized by 
the article 5(3) n) of the same directive, whereas the public lending is addressed by the article 6 of Rental 
and Lending Directive. No other act of making available is exempted from the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owners.  
 
 
 
Those activities seemed rather separated. Yet, the advent of digital technologies, by blurring the 
distinction between reproduction and making available and by enlarging the possibilities offered to 
libraries, has created some overlaps between the scopes of each exception. The question of preservation 
now immediately brings about the possibility of making available the digitised collection. The possible 
loosening of the on-site consultation raises the issue of a broader act of making available. The lending of 
e-books, when occurring on-line, anchors itself to communication to the public. We will also see that 
under the exception for some acts of reproduction, some Member States allow the sending of copies of 
works by libraries to users upon request, which is an act of distribution when happening by traditional 
mail, and of making available when happening online.  
In what follows, we will separate those three exceptions along the lines ascribed to each by the relevant 
legal provisions, but we will underline also the possible overlaps between the libraries’ activities. 
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B. The exception for certain acts of reproduction made by libraries 
The article 5 (2) c) of the directive 2001/29 authorises Member States to provide for an exception or 
limitation “in respect of specific acts of reproduction made by publicly accessible libraries, educational 
establishments or museums, or by archives, which are not for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage”.  
This exception, as well as its implementation in Member States, will be analysed in order to
566
: 
- examine whether major problems have emerged in Member States as a consequence of the 
implementation of this exception to the reproduction right; 
- assess whether clarifications are needed as regards the type (analogue or digital) and number of 
copies that may be authorised and also whether the precise objective of the permitted acts of 
reproduction should be specified;  
- assess whether other updates to this exception are needed to ensure the right balance between 
the interests of users of public establishments and rightholders. 
First, the notion and scope of the reproduction exception for public libraries, educational establishments, 
museums or archives as provided for in the directive will be described (1.). Then the transposition thereof 
in the Member States will be reviewed so as to underline possible inconsistencies or difficulties (2.). 
Collective agreements, when existing, will be addressed as well (3.). Finally the issues possibly resulting 
from the exception itself or its implementation in national laws will be considered (4.) and some 
recommendations will be formulated (5.). 
1. Scope of the exception in the directive 
Article 5(2) c) of the directive 2001/29 pertaining to exception for libraries is broadly formulated and does 
not specify detailed requirements to benefit from the exception. Only the exempted exclusive rights, the 
beneficiaries and the limitation to non-commercial purposes are indicated. Therefore, the provision must 
be read in conjunction with the travaux (that do not say much more about the scope of the exception) and 
with the recital 40 that provides that:  
“Member States may provide for an exception or limitation for the benefit of certain non-profit 
making establishments, such as publicly accessible libraries and equivalent institutions, as well as 
archives. However, this should be limited to certain special cases covered by the reproduction 
right. Such an exception or limitation should not cover uses made in the context of on-line delivery 
of protected works or other subject-matter. This Directive should be without prejudice to the 
Member States' option to derogate from the exclusive public lending right in accordance with Article 
5 of Directive 1992/100/EEC. Therefore, specific contracts or licences should be promoted which, 
without creating imbalances, favour such establishments and the disseminative purposes they 
serve.” 
The following criteria could help determine the scope of the exception: the objectives (a.), the 
beneficiaries (b.), the works concerned (c.), the authorised acts (d.), any further conditions imposed to the 
benefit of the exception (e.). 
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a) Objectives  
The article 5 of the directive only refers to “specific acts of reproduction” without explaining further for 
what purposes those acts of reproduction are allowed. It is generally understood that the objective served 
by this provision is to enable libraries to copy works for preservation purposes, but the purpose is actually 
broader than strict preservation
567
, as revealed by the legislative history of the directive. 
The report prepared by the European Parliament for the first reading of the directive mentioned the acts 
of reproduction made for documentation or conservation purposes
568
.  It relied on the opinions of the 
different Committees of the Parliament that referred to the purpose of archiving and preservation
569
 as 
being included in the authorized acts. This does not say whether other objectives could be comprised as 
well in the specific acts of reproduction. Conversely, the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the 
Media equated the specific acts to preservation and conservation
570
. The amended proposal sent by the 
Parliament to the Council specifically added the objective of archiving or conservation purposes within the 
text of article 5(2) c)
571
 and further explained that “this paragraph (…) states that the acts of reproduction 
concerned may have only two purposes: archiving or conservation”. 
This amendment was not however taken on board in the Common position that returned to a provision 
not defining the purposes to be pursued by the specific acts of reproduction
572
. In the Communication 
related to the common position, the Commission explained that the Council had preferred to limit the list 
of beneficiaries (the Parliament proposing an open list) but to allow for more flexibility as to the purpose of 
the acts of the reproduction that could go beyond archiving and preservation
573
. 
This va-et-vient leaves two questions open. First, what is the meaning and scope of preservation and 
archiving, to which the Parliament wanted to restrict the exception? Nothing in the preparatory acts of 
the directive explains what they cover, or what is the difference between preservation and archiving.  
Preservation/archiving can be understood more or less broadly. ‘To preserve’ is defined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary as ‘maintaining (something) in its original or existing state’, as well as ‘keeping safe 
from harm or injury’. It has both a conservative meaning and an pro-active one It can cover strict acts of 
conservation aiming at keeping a work that would otherwise be lost and range from the restoration or 
replacement of a deteriorating or damaged copy, the reproduction of works on fragile media to more 
sustainable ones, to anticipative copying for format-shifting to counter foreseen obsolescence. “Archiving” 
could be understood as referring to copying to place or store in an archive or collection.  
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Migrating to another digital format can be encompassed in the notion of preservation if it is required 
against destruction or obsolescence. But, does it enable multiple and subsequent acts of digitization 
(once digitized in one format, another digitization in a more recent format would also meet the criteria of 
preservation); and can we still talk of preservation when format-shifting deals with born-digital works (the 
act of digitization is only a shift of digital format as the work has never existed in an analogue form).  
A more fundamental question is whether the preservation purpose justifies projects of mass digitization, 
beyond works selected for reasons of damaged or fragile state, on the basis of a hypothetical risk to the 
preservation of the library or archive collection? It seems that mass digitization as such was not foreseen 
at the time of the adoption of the directive. To allow mass-digitization under the terminology of 
“preservation” would assume a more functional meaning to that term: it would cover activities that 
maintain the collection in a state that enables the key public-interest mission of the establishment 
concerned and notably the provision of access to works for research and private study. Having recourse 
to the notion of “archiving” that was also discussed in the process of adoption of the directive goes in the 
same direction. Under this conception, digitization, when necessary to keep up with the technological 
development, could be qualified as “archiving”.  
Does the exception authorise the making of copies to be used for consultation purpose to prevent the 
original material to be damaged due to too frequent viewings and manipulations? Does it cover any kind 
of replacement copies or should the making of a copy of a damaged/lost work be limited if it still possible 
to acquire a similar copy on the market?  
Actually, there is some ambiguity in the word “preservation”. Its main purpose is to preserve the object 
(the physical copy owned by the library) but indirectly the conservation of the artefact can help preserve 
the work itself (and therefore the cultural heritage), depending on the number of existing copies of the 
work. A good example concerns films whose only subsisting copy can belong to a film archive. Restoring 
the print would at the same time preserve the tangible copy and the audiovisual work itself that will be lost 
if its tangible embodiment falls in decay. In any case, the mission of a public library would be to preserve 
its collection, irrespectively of the fact that many copies thereof may exist elsewhere. But the question is 
whether this should be done under an exception or not.  
A second question relates to the other purposes mentioned by the Commission when rejecting the 
amendment of the Parliament that would have restricted the exception to preservation or archiving. What 
could be such other purposes? If one refers to the list of acts regularly carried out by the libraries, 
elaborated in introduction of this report, not all of them strictly relate to a “preservation purpose”. One 
example is the reproduction of a work to reply to some request from users. But this purpose seems 
explicitly forbidden by the recital 40 of the directive that states that the exception “should not cover uses 
made in the context of on-line delivery of protected works or other subject-matter”, except if “on-line 
delivery” is interpreted strictly as only referring to making available to any users on-line, at the exclusion 
of acts of selectively sending some material to users
574
.  
But what about the digitization of some works that are frequently browsed to enable their consultation in a 
digital format, less at risk of deterioration, and by many readers simultaneously? Strictly speaking, it does 
not serve a preservation purpose, but only indirectly. Is that the type of purpose that the Commission 
intended to cover beyond mere preservation?  
We have seen that libraries undertake other acts of reproduction in relation to the setting up of a 
collection, particularly when they act in their obligation of legal deposit (archiving multimedia works, such 
as websites or video games) or for universities libraries, when they archive the scientific productions of 
their researchers in the institutional repository. Such acts can certainly be covered by the archiving 
purpose that was proposed by the European Parliament. 
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In sum, few acts seem to be outside of the “preservation and archiving purpose”. In any case, the text of 
the exception, as it stands today is not restricted to those two objectives, which leaves open the definition 
of the acts of reproduction covered. Some national legislators, when transposing the directive, have 
somehow clarified the notion of “preservation”, as it will be seen below
575
, by indicating which “specific 
acts of reproduction” are concerned
576
. 
b) Beneficiaries 
The beneficiaries of the exception are publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums 
and archives. Recital 40 of the directive specifies that the exception only applies to non-profit making 
establishments such as publicly accessible libraries and equivalent institutions, as well as archives.  
During the process of adoption of the directive, the European Parliament proposed an amendment to 
enlarge the list of beneficiaries, listing “libraries and archives and other teaching, educational or cultural 
establishments” only as examples of “establishments which are not for direct or indirect economic or 
commercial advantage” benefiting from the exception.  The principle of a non-restrictive list has eventually 
been rejected by the Common position, which has been explained by the Commission as follows:  
“the Council opted for an exhaustive list of the beneficiaries (publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, 
and museums as well as archives) and for more flexibility as regards the purposes of the acts of reproduction which 
may now also be for purposes other than archiving or conservation provided that there is no economic or commercial 
advantage”
577
. 
Libraries and archives are easy to define. Educational establishments referred to by the exception, 
encompass any institution offering education, such as schools, universities or establishments offering 
continued education for adults (upon the condition they are of a non-profit nature as we will see below). 
Museums are also included in the list without being precisely defined. They will be generally understood 
as institutions offering public exhibitions of collections of objects, whether works of arts or not
578
. Beyond 
text-based works that museums can have in their collection as in libraries, acts of preservation might 
specially be relevant for recent works of art, using technology such as videos or even digital formats. 
Many artists have started to use video as a medium in the 60’s and those works begin to be unreadable 
and need to be digitized and format-shifted.  
Film heritage institutions are eligible to the exception as they can be considered, depending on the 
context, as archives or even museums holding a collection of films.  
Two conditions further qualify the establishments eligible to the exception. 
First, they should be accessible to the public. The requirement to be “publicly accessible” only refers to 
libraries, educational establishments
579
 and museums but not to archives, for the text of article 5(3) c), in 
most language versions, refers to “publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments or museums, 
or by archives”, archives being mentioned separately
580
. In other words, archives that are not publicly 
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accessible can benefit from the exception
581
. Being publicly accessible to the public does not mean to 
have regular opening hours but requires that the access to these institutions is allowed “to the general 
public on a non-discriminatory basis”
 582
. For instance a museum will be publicly accessible if it grants 
public access to its collection, even if some parts thereof might be stored in reserve and not be always 
accessible. 
Second, the library, educational establishment, museum and archive need to be non-profit making 
establishments, as indicated by recital 40 of the directive. This is resumed in the text of the article 5(2) c) 
in the formulation of “which are not for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage”, which can 
also be read as relating to the conditions of carrying out the acts of reproduction concerned that we will 
address in the next point. 
This non-profit character does not mean to be free of charge or to be publicly funded or operated
583
. 
Therefore, private museums can benefit from the exception to the extent the conditions of the exception 
are satisfied
584
. A non-profit organisation such as the Internet Archive could equally be eligible, if it 
satisfies the other conditions of the exception. Charging a profit or fee exceeding the administrative or 
operation costs would be labelled as a direct commercial advantage
585
. Charged fees must not serve for 
“additional profit or to cover expenses of another institution or company”
 586
. 
Some difficulty in determining the non-profit nature of an establishment could arise when it results from a 
public-private partnership. S. von Lewinski and M. Walter gives the example of a private company running 
a library, that could yield some publicity or goodwill effect creating an indirect economic commercial 
advantage
587
. One further question is whether the library itself must carry out the acts of reproduction or 
can outsource them to another person, such as a private company. It does not seem to be excluded by 
the directive, but the exception should only benefit the acts of reproduction specifically done for the library 
and satisfying the requirements of the exception.  
c) Works concerned 
(i) General principle 
Nothing in the directive or in its preparatory work indicates which types of works can be reproduced in the 
framework of this exception. As a principle therefore, all types of works can be reproduced by libraries 
and archives for preservation purposes.  
The objective of the authorized reproduction being rather broad, discriminating between works is probably 
not necessary. However, the different notions of preservation that could be discussed could result in 
different treatment of some works, depending on their need to be preserved and their state of 
deterioration. Should the purpose of preservation be understood comprehensively and include digitization 
for format-shifting and preventive conservation, then all types of works could be concerned, even born-
digital works, if there is a need to shift from the original digital format to a more recent one. 
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(ii) Unpublished works 
The case of unpublished works is not addressed in the directive. Some Member States only apply 
exceptions to published or disclosed works as a matter of principle, notably to preserve the moral rights of 
divugation of the authors. We have seen earlier that the acquis communautaire does not say anything as 
to the applicability of exceptions and limitations to unpublished or undisclosed works. Hence, as far as 
copying for preservation is concerned, it can also pertain to unpublished works if not prohibited by the 
domestic law
588
. The question is particularly significant for archives and museums that could hold in their 
collections some unpublished papers, manuscripts, pictures or other types of works, the historical, cultural 
or scientific interest could be significant and merit similar efforts of preservation than published material. 
The issue of unpublished works will be more relevant when further acts of communication (which is 
normally not the case under that exception) will occur, as it will trigger issues of moral right of divulgation. 
(iii) Computer programs and databases 
On the ground that the directive 2001/29 is without prejudice of exceptions applicable to specific subject 
matter governed by other directives, databases and software appear to be excluded from the scope of the 
exception for preservation. The effect on software might be minimal as there will be few libraries or 
archives collecting and preserving software. However, museums of videogames are developing and seek 
to archive old games. To the extent that videogames are deemed to be computer programs, no exception 
for preservation will apply and the specific exception for back-up copying does not fit with a preservation 
purpose. Following the BSA decision of the Court of Justice that has considered that the graphic user 
interface was a work subject to the general rules of the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29 and not to the lex 
specialis of the directive 2009/24 on the legal protection of computer programs
589
, specific acts of 
reproduction for preservation of the video game could be exempted by virtue of the article 5(2) c) of the 
former directive
590
. The Court of Justice could soon elaborate further this distributive application of the two 
directives to computer programs, as one pending case concerns the application of technological 
measures of protection (and incidentally of exceptions) to video games
591
. The Advocate General, in her 
conclusions in that case
592
, has held that:   
“Directive 2009/24 concerns only computer programs, whereas Directive 2001/29 concerns 
copyright and related rights in intellectual works in general. The latter leaves intact and in no way 
affects existing EU provisions relating to, inter alia, the legal protection of computer programs. The 
Court has thus stated that Directive 2009/24 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to the provisions 
of Directive 2001/29. In my view, that statement must be read as meaning that the provisions of 
Directive 2009/24 take precedence over those of Directive 2001/29, but only where the protected 
material falls entirely within the scope of the former. (…) Where complex intellectual works 
comprising both computer programs and other material are concerned – and where the two cannot 
be separated – it seems to me that the greater, and not the lesser, protection should be accorded. 
If that were not so, rightholders would not receive in respect of that other material the degree of 
protection to which they are entitled under Directive 2001/29”. 
This opinion is in favour of applying the two directives cumulatively to complex creations, such as video 
games, that mix the characteristics of computer programs and other types of works, in order to grant them 
the greater protection. Could it be construed as not applying the exceptions of the InfoSoc Directive to 
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video games in order to maintain a higher protection of copyright owners? This question is not referred to 
the Court and the Advocate General does not elaborate on that point. Maybe the decision to come in that 
case will shed some light on the intricate hybridation of the two directives when applied to complex works 
such as videogames. 
As to databases, no specific exception from copyright or sui generis right to the benefit of libraries, 
museums and archives is provided for in the directive 96/9 on the legal protection of the database
593
. 
However, the article 6(2) d) of that directive allows the Member States to provide for a similar exception to 
those traditionally authorized under national law. The exact meaning of that provision is disputed
594
, as 
discussed above, but it could be understood as allowing the application of an exception known in 
copyright law to the particular subject-matter of database. It shall thus be a matter for national legislators 
to authorize the preservation of databases similarly to the exception applicable to other copyrighted 
works, at least for copyright protection of the database. No exception would be applicable to the sui 
generis right, despite the fact that the preservation of a database certainly amounts to an act of extraction 
of a substantial part of the database. 
(iv) Works still available on the market 
The article 5(2) c) does not mention anything regarding the possibility to acquire a work on the market in 
order to replace a damaged or deteriorating work. We will see that some Member States exclude in such 
a case the benefit of the exception.  
d) Authorised acts 
The exception only exempts specific acts of reproduction, which leaves untouched the exclusive rights 
of communication. By virtue of the article 5(4) of the directive, the exception can also be extended to 
necessary acts of distribution “to the extent justified by the purpose of the authorised act of reproduction”. 
Additionally, the directive, by its recital 40, clearly excludes on-line delivery of works. Therefore, 
reproduction of works made under the exception cannot result in dissemination or making available of 
works
595
.  
The acts of reproduction carried out by libraries and other eligible establishments must be “specific” 
which is not further defined in the directive. It should be read in conjunction with the purpose allowed for 
the reproduction, including preservation and archiving. In any case, it does not provide the concerned 
establishments with a blanket exception for any type of reproduction and for their whole collection or 
catalogue
596
.  
“Specific acts of reproduction” could be understood either as referring to strictly defined acts or to acts 
limited in volume. S. von Lewinski and M. Walter affirm that further conditions must be described by 
national laws
597
 and refer to the compliance with the “special cases” requirement in the three-step test
598
, 
which finds also support in the recital 40 of the directive that holds that the permitted acts “should be 
limited to special cases covered by the reproduction right”.  Coupled with the rule of strict interpretation of 
exception, it suggests that mass-digitization of a whole collection or catalogue is not authorized by the 
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exception. Most commentators are of the opinion that the exception would not cover bulk copying of 
cultural institutions collections
599
. 
Another question relates to the admissibility of making several copies notably because of the 
obsolescence of digital formats. In order to guarantee the preservation of works in different formats, 
multiple copies will be necessary and this seems not contrary to the wording of the directive
600
. In any 
case, the acts of reproduction in question must be strictly necessary for the purpose pursued by the 
library
601
. Copies should be incidental to the act of preservation.  
The specific acts must not be “for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage”. In the text of 
article 5(2) c, this factor can be understood as referring both to the eligible beneficiaries and to the nature 
of the authorized acts. This condition was borrowed from the directive on rental and lending rights
602
 in 
which this criterion serves as the distinguishing factor between rental and lending (thus pertaining to the 
act and not the institution).  
An act not carried out for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage is defined in that directive 
as not giving rise “to a payment the amount of which does not go beyond what is necessary to cover the 
operating costs of the establishment”
603
.  
Beyond the analysis of this criterion as determining the non-profit nature of the eligible institutions, the 
application of the absence of any commercial advantage to the acts of preservation sounds rather 
rhetorical as it is difficult to envisage what advantage a mere act of copying to preserve an item of the 
collection of a library or museum could yield on its own. Generally the possible economic advantage 
would result from the exploitation and communication to the public of that copy
604
, which are acts not 
allowed under this exception, and not to the mere preservation. On the contrary, the fee possibly charged 
by the institution could influence, if excessive, the not-for-profit nature of the eligible establishment.  
e) Further conditions 
The directive does not impose any further conditions, for example as to the number of copies or their 
format. 
The exception for the benefit of libraries and similar establishments does not provide for a fair 
compensation to be paid to rightholders. That does not prevent Member States to apply some scheme of 
compensation, as the recital 36 of the directive allows such possibility for any exception. Recital 35 lays 
down some principles to determine the form and level of such fair compensation and insists on the 
criterion of the harm caused to the rightholders. When the harm is minimal, it could even lead to no 
payment. In cases of reproduction for preservation by libraries and archives (without any communication 
or consultation), one can wonder what would be the level of the harm suffered by the copyright owners.  
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2. Implementation of the exception in the Member States 
Although optional, the exception of the article 5(2) c) has been transposed in all the Member States that 
are analyzed by the present study
605
. However, many disparities have resulted from national 
implementations and from the ample discretion that the provision of the directive leaves to Member 
States. Particularly, Member States have been generally more detailed in the requirements imposed on 
the conditions and in many cases, more restrictive than the directive.  
a) Objectives 
Member States have generally restricted the purposes of the exception, left open in article 5(2) c) of the 
directive, to preservation or equivalent notions. The Belgian Copyright Law mentions the general purpose 
of preservation
606
, as in Denmark
607
, Luxemburg
608
 and France
609
, whereas Hungary
610
 refers to archiving, 
Spain to conservation
611
 and Poland
612
 to maintaining and protecting collections.  
Some national laws have even restricted the notion of preservation to more limited specific cases or have 
recourse to terminology that seems to aim mostly at restoring or replacing a damaged or deteriorated 
item. For instance, the UK limits the acts carried out by libraries to the purpose of replacement (even 
though its article 42 embraces two purposes, “to preserve or replace”)
613
. The Danish law includes the 
possibility to make copies of missing parts of a work
614
.
 
The Netherlands restricts the reproduction made 
by libraries and other similar establishments to the sole purpose of restoration of the specimen of the 
work and the retention of a reproduction of the work if the specimen is threatening to fall into disrepair
615
. 
Germany is a special case as the directive has not been transposed in that regard, the lawmaker having 
considered that the existing exception authorizing copying for “inclusion in a personal archive”
 616
 and “for 
other personal use” already covered acts of reproduction made by libraries
617
. The terminology used limits 
the purpose to the internal use of the library. Another exempted purpose is the delivery of copies of works 
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upon individual request
618
, which clearly exceeds a preservation purpose and involves a limitation to the 
right of distribution. 
On the contrary, some countries use a broader terminology that appears to cover less restrictive acts of 
copying, going even beyond strict preservation purposes. The most extensive example is Italy
619
 that 
formulates the exception “for the services of the institution” (but the exception is limited on several other 
accounts). Hungary
620
 adds the purpose of scientific research and public library supply, as well for the 
internal purposes of the entity (but only for extracts of works).  
As a result of a mix of the exceptions for on-site consultation and for reproduction, France
621
 allows the 
reproduction and the performance of works, to the extent it aims at preserving the conditions of 
consultation for purposes of research or private study. This is also the case in Hungary
622
 and 
Luxemburg. France further authorizes the institutions in charge of legal deposit to make copies if 
necessary for the collection of works
623
.  
The Netherlands is the only country that deals with format-shifting by mentioning the purpose of “keeping 
the work in a condition in which it can be consulted if there is no technology available to render it 
accessible”
624
. That does not mean however that format-shifting could not be allowed in other countries in 
the more general purpose of “preservation”
625
. 
Finally Denmark
626
 “[h]as a […] statute governing the making of digital copies for library users. It permits 
digital copies of articles and other works, but subject to an extended collective license and the right of the 
owner to demand remuneration”.
627
 According to the British Copyright Act, librarians and archivists can 
similarly make and supply a copy of a work upon request of a user for research and private study, as well 
supply it to other libraries
628
.  
b) Beneficiaries 
(i) Types of Institutions  
All Member States comply with the exhaustive list of beneficiaries appearing in the directive (comprising 
only libraries, educational establishments, museums and archives) but are sometimes more restrictive.  
Libraries and archives are covered in all the legislations analysed for the present study. Libraries are 
precisely defined in Polish Law
629
.  
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Hungary specifically include pictures and audio archives, whereas Spain includes record, films and 
newspapers archives. 
Museums are not mentioned in Germany, Poland and the UK
630
. The current draft to review copyright 
exceptions in the UK plans to include museums and galleries in the list of the institutions eligible to the 
exception for preservation purposes
631
.  
Educational establishments are often not listed in the beneficiaries: only Luxemburg
632
, Hungary
633
 and 
Poland
634
 grant the exception to educational establishments
635
, but their libraries or archives are covered 
in Italy
636
 (school libraries), Belgium
637
 and Spain
638
.  This reveals a rather functionalist approach of the 
establishments covered instead of a structuralist one: this is the function of library and archives that is 
eligible to the exception not the institution in which this library is hosted or operated. 
Again a specific case is Germany that does not precise the beneficiary of the exception allowing copying 
for scientific use or inclusion in a personal archive, but requires that it is done by an archive acting in the 
public interest
639
. 
(ii) Functional requirements 
The requirement according to which the beneficiaries of the exception (but the archives) being publicly 
accessible has been taken from the directive but sometimes applied randomly.  
Only libraries have to be publicly accessible in Belgium
640
, France
641
, and Luxemburg
642
. The 
Netherlands
643
, Hungary
644
 and Italy
645
 apply the public accessibility condition to libraries and museums.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
1. The main tasks of libraries include: 
  1) the collection, preparation, storage and protection of library materials; 
  2) services, primarily consisting of making collections accessible and information activities, especially information about the 
collection of their own, other libraries, museums and scientific information centres, as well as interaction with the archives in this 
area. 
2. The tasks of the library may also include bibliographical, documentary, scientific-research, publishing, educational, popularizing 
and instructional-methodical activities.  
630
 K. CREWS, Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, op. cit., p. 32: “The United Kingdom law 
permits copies by librarians of prescribed libraries. The statute further defines "librarian" broadly as a person acting on behalf of a 
librarian. Where relevant, the U.K. statute gives similar treatment to "archivist." The U.K. law evidently is not limited to professional 
librarians, nor is it apparently limited to employees or regular staff of the library”. 
631
 Draft regulations for research, libraries and archives, June 2013, www.ipo.gov.uk/techreview-research-library.pdf 
632
 Article 10, 10° of the Luxemburg Law of 18 April 2001 on Copyrights, Neighbouring Rights and Databases. 
633
 Article 35, (4) of the Hungarian Act LXXVI of 22 June 1999 on Copyright. 
634
 Article 28, (2) of the Polish Law No. 83 of 4 February 1994 on Copyright and Neighboring Rights. 
635 
For a definition of the Hungarian notion of educational establishment, see article 33, (4) of the Hungarian Act LXXVI of 22 June 
1999 on Copyright.
 
636
 Article 68, (2) of the Italian Law No. 633 of 22 April 1941 for the Protection of the Copyright and the Other Related Rights to its 
Exercise. 
637
 See the discussion in M.-CH. JANSSENS, « Commentaar bij art. 21, 22, 22bis en 23bis Auteurswet », La loi belge sur le droit 
d’auteur. Commentaire par article. Hommage à Jan Corbet, 3
e
  éd. révisitée, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2012, p. 170. 
638
 Article 37, (1) of the Spanish Consolidated Text of 1 April 1996 on Intellectual Property,, including museums, libraries and 
archives that form part of institutions of cultural or scientific character (this at least should include universities, but maybe not 
schools by default of a reference to “institutions of educational character). 
639
 Article 53, (2), subparagraph 1, point 2, with subparagraph, 2, point 3, of the German Act of 9 September 1965 on Copyright and 
Related Rights. 
640
 Article 22, §1, 8° of the Belgian Law of 30 June 1994 related to Copyright and Neighboring Rights. 
641
 Article L-122, subparagraph 1, 8° of the French Intellectual Property Code of 1 July 1992.  
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 275 
 
Against the text of the directive, some countries also impose that archives be accessible to the public, 
such as Denmark
646
, Italy
647
, Hungary (implicitly), the Netherlands. 
The other condition appearing in recitals of the directive, the non-profit nature of the establishments 
concerned is not often explicit in national laws, but is transformed into a general requirement for the 
libraries not to act for commercial advantage. Only the UK copyright regulations explicitly excludes 
libraries and archives that are conducted for profit, which is defined as meaning “a library or archive which 
is established or conducted for profit or which forms part of, or is administered by, a body established or 
conducted for profit”
648
.  
Stricter conditions are sometimes applied. For instance, Spain requires that the concerned 
establishments are in public ownership or form part of institution of cultural or scientific character in the 
reproduction exception
649
, museums in Denmark must be State-run museums, libraries must belong to 
the State or to public authorities in Italy
650
.  
c) Works concerned 
Most of the countries analyzed authorize the reproduction of all works, whatever their type.   
Belgium mentions safeguarding the cultural and scientific heritage
651
 similarly as Luxemburg
652
, which 
speaks about “heritage” when determining the object of the purpose of preservation.  
Denmark excludes computer programs but not computer games
653
. Italy has a two-prong exception, one 
targeting reprography of literary and printed works in public libraries and other establishments
654
, the 
other covering the reproduction in one single copy of sound and video recordings
655
. The Netherlands 
refers to literary, scientific or artistic works and the UK to literary, dramatic and musical works, but 
excludes sound recordings, films and broadcasts
656
. However, the current review of copyright exceptions 
considers extending the exceptions, for preservation and for making and supplying a copy to user or to 
other libraries, to all classes of copyrighted works, including broadcasts, sound and audiovisual works. 
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When supplying other libraries with copies of works, the Danish libraries can only copy articles from 
newspapers, magazines and composite works, brief excerpts of books and other published literary works, 
as well as illustrations and music reproduced in connection with the text
657
. The UK Copyright and 
Designs Protection Act also provides different rules for acts of making a copy and supplying it to users 
upon request, depending on the category of works
658
.  
As to the portion of works that can be copied, it is subject to restrictions in Hungary as far as copying for 
the internal purposes of the institution are concerned (minor parts or a published work or newspapers or 
periodicals articles).  
Concerning out-of-print works, their authorized use is extended in comparison with what libraries can do 
with other types of works, in Denmark
659
, in Germany (other personal uses are then possible) and in 
France, by virtue of a recent law on out-of-print works
660
. On the other hand, the making and supplying of 
a copy of unpublished works are subject to more restrictive conditions in the UK
661
. 
d) Authorised acts 
Even though the expression of “specific acts of reproduction” in the article 5(2) c) of the directive tends to 
indicate that authorized acts ought to be described in applicable laws, few Member States have 
elaborated on the acts of copying that would be admissible.  
The purpose of preservation, as explained above, is sometimes restricted to restoration or replacement 
of a damaged or lost item (the Netherlands, UK, Denmark and Poland to some extent), to copying when 
the work is threatening to deteriorate (the Netherlands) or more rarely to format-shifting to counter 
obsolescence (the Netherlands).  
Another declination of the “specific acts of reproduction” that is listed as an exception in UK, Germany 
and Hungary, is the possibility to send a copy of a work in the collection of library upon an individual 
request. In such a case, the conditions to be complied with are strictly defined and generally limited to a 
purpose of research or private study. At first sight, it does exceed the acts of reproduction for 
preservation, but the exception is not limited to that objective in the directive. The legislations concerned 
do not however specify what is the regime applicable to the sending of that copy to the requesting user. If 
the copy is sent by normal post, it is an act of distribution that could be added to the exception by the 
Member States on the ground of the article 5(4) of the directive, but the countries in questions have not 
referred to that provision specifically. The sending by email would be an act of communication that would 
go beyond what the directive allows, except if one considers that it does not amount to a communication 
to the public but only to one individual.  
Some countries (e.g. France, Hungary, Luxemburg) authorise as well the copying of a work to the extent 
necessary to enable the on-site consultation provided for in another exception, which bridges the 
exception of article 5(2) c) to that of article 5(3) n) for on-site consultation (see infra).  
Albeit the Directive does not forbid digital copies, some Member States have decided not to include the 
making of digital copies in the exception or only grant this possibility upon some conditions. The German 
copyright law only allows the archiving of a work on paper and for analogue uses
662
 and similarly, only 
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paper copies or digital copies as a graphic data file (thus equivalent to photocopies) can be sent to users 
requesting a copy of a work by libraries
663
.  
The Italian copyright act only deals with photocopying within a library, archive or museum, of literary and 
print works, which does not permit the making of a digital copy
664
. As far as phonograms and videograms 
are concerned, only one reproduction is allowed and commentators claim that digitization of such 
materials should also be allowed under this provision “in order to enable purposes of long-term 
preservation of recordings in analogue or physical format”
 665
.
 
 
An important limitation in the directive is that the acts concerned must not be “for direct or indirect 
economic or commercial advantage”. This has been reproduced in mostly all the Member States we 
have analyzed, verbatim (as in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands) or in similar 
wording (“not with gainful intent”
666
, “not done for commercial purposes”
667
, “not intended for earning of 
increasing income even in an indirect way”
668
). It is however generally not defined any further. 
e) Further conditions 
Belgium
669
 limits in a general manner the number of copies to what is required by the purpose of 
preservation. Similarly the Netherlands
670
 permits any task, hence any number of copies, reasonably 
useful to achieve the specific preservation purpose included in the relevant provision. In France, as 
nothing is determined, several copies may be authorised when useful or needed to achieve the 
preservation purpose. 
Italy
671
 only allows a single copy in the case of reproduction of phonograms and videograms by libraries 
and record or video libraries belonging to the State or to the public authorities. 
When dealing with the making of copies to supply upon request (which is, as seen earlier, an odd 
extension of the exception for preservation), the UK CDPA
672
 states that no more than one copy of the 
same article or no copies of more than one article contained in the same issue of a periodical are to be 
delivered per person; no more than one copy of the same material or no copies of more than a 
reasonable proportion of any work; and no more than one copy of the same material deposited in the 
library or archive before the work has been published. 
Also applicable to the UK exception of making and supplying a copy, the payment of a sum at least 
equivalent to the cost attributable to the production of the copy is foreseen
673
. For a similar exception 
                                                     
 
663
 Article 53a of the German Act of 9 September 1965 on Copyright and Related Rights. Electronic delivery of works by public 
libraries is also possible for the purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research, to the extent justified by the non-
commercial purpose to be achieved, or when it is not manifestly made possible, upon agreed contractual terms, for members of the 
public to access the contributions or small parts of a work from a place and at a time individually chosen by them and on fair terms. 
664
 G. MAZZIOTTI, “Tecnologie digitali e diritti culturali: quale ruolo per le biblioteche?”, in A. Maggipinto and G. D’Ammassa (ed.), 
Diritto e tecnologie digitali per la valorizzazione e l’accessibilità delle conoscenze, Atti del Convegno 19-20 ottobre 2007, Nyberg, 
Milano, 2009, p. 87. 
665
 See S. ERCOLANI, Il diritto d’autore e I diritti connessi, Torino, 2004, p. 290. 
666
 Article 37, (1) of the Spanish Consolidated Text of 1 April 1996 on Intellectual Property.  
667
 Article 16b of the Danish Consolidated Act No. 202 of 27 February 2010 on Copyright 
668
  Article 35, (4) and 38, (5) of the Hungarian Act LXXVI of 22 June 1999 on Copyright. 
669
 Article 22, §1, 8° of the Belgian Law of 30 June 1994 related to Copyright and Neighboring Rights, M.B., 27 July 1994, p. 19297. 
670
 Article 16n of the Dutch Auteurswet of 23 September 1912. 
671
 Article 69, (2) of the Italian Law No. 633 of 22 April 1941 for the Protection of the Copyright and the Other Related Rights to its 
Exercise. 
672
 Respectively articles 38, 39 and 43 of the British Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 15 November 1988 
673
 ibidem.  
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 278 
 
(delivery of copies), Germany
674
 has opted for an exception with an equitable remuneration to the author 
and Denmark
675
 applies an extended collective license system (which is actually not an exception but the 
very exercise of exclusive rights). 
There is an interesting rule in the Belgian exception that deals with the distinction between the 
ownership of the item produced by the preservation and the exercise of the rights in the work itself (that 
is a key distinction in copyright between the work and its support). The article 21, 8° of the Belgian 
Copyright Act provides that “the material thus produced shall remain the property of these institutions 
which shall not engage in any commercial use or use for profit. The author may have access to the 
material, subject to strict respect for the preservation of the work and fair remuneration for the intervention 
of the institutions”. This provision comes from the former exception (before the transposition of the 
directive 2001/29) that benefited only to the Film Archive. It is not rare that a Film Archive is the holder of 
the only subsisting copy of a film. Its restoration is hence of particular interest to the copyright owners 
who need access to that copy to exploit their rights. The rule has been taken over with the extension of 
exception to all libraries and archives. It enables copyright owners to have access to the restored or 
preserved copies of their works when needed for exploitation of their rights, whereas the rights of the 
library or archive that has undertaken the preservation are preserved.  
The library exception in Belgian law cannot be contracted out
676
, but this status has been qualified 
somehow when transposing the directive to consider that the exception is not imperative when the work is 
available at a place and a moment individually chosen by the user (on demand)
677
. The UK Government 
plans to introduce a similar rule in the CDPA when revising the exceptions for libraries. The exceptions of 
preservation will not be overridable by contract and any provision contrary to the law will be deemed 
unenforceable.  
3. Overview of existing licensing mechanisms or collective agreements between 
stakeholders (namely for mass digitization) 
The directive in its recital 40 encourages the recourse to specific contracts or licenses for what exceeds 
the “specific acts of reproduction” enabled by the article 5(2) c). At least for on-line delivery of protected 
works and other subject matter, agreements with copyright owners are indicated as a feasible solution to 
authorize such activities by libraries.  
This solution was adopted by the Danish copyright law that organises the delivery of documents held in a 
library’s collection under the frame of an extended collective license.   
The European Union has followed up that first call towards collective agreements by making the relevant 
stakeholders agree on a Memorandum of Understanding related to out of print literary works (for books 
and images embedded therein)
678
 that encourages voluntary contractual agreements between right 
holders and digital libraries based on collective management
679
. In the MoU on out-of-print works, 
conditions of use of the works are negotiated within a predefined framework. The collecting societies will 
issue collective licenses to libraries and other concerned institutions. These collective agreements are to 
be negotiated in the country of first publication of the work and provide the type of permitted uses of 
works. When a right holder has not transferred its economic rights to a collecting society, the society 
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which manages the rights of the same category of works in the State of first publication, is presumed to 
manage these rights, provided that it has made efforts to alert the rights holder. Besides, if the scope of 
the agreement “includes cross-border and/or commercial uses, the collective management organization 
may limit its license of works that are out-of-commerce to those of represented right holders”. In such a 
case, “a specific procedure should be considered in order to reach the right holders who are presumed to 
be represented and whose works are used frequently or intensively”. In addition, the presumption of the 
collective management organization “shall also apply to acts of use of the work covered by the license 
which occur in a Member State which is not the Member State in which the license was agreed”. It 
therefore belongs to the signatories to implement it.  
The Commission has stated that the MoU on out of print works should serve as a model for other sectors 
and does not exclude that "for the large-scale digitisation of out-of-commerce works, legislative backing 
for licensing solutions voluntarily developed by stakeholders may be needed in the Member States, taking 
into account the need to ensure a cross-border effect"
680
. Indeed, “Rights information databases 
connected at European level can bring down transaction costs for rights clearance. Such mechanisms 
should therefore be encouraged in close cooperation with all stakeholders”
681
. Member States should 
establish "the legal framework conditions to underpin licensing mechanisms identified and agreed by 
stakeholders for the large-scale digitisation and cross- border accessibility of works that are out-of-
commerce" in order to “improve conditions for the digitisation and online accessibility of in-copyright 
material”
682
.  
Projects inspired by the MoU start to emerge in Europe. A forerunner (not in the EU though) is an 
agreement entered between the Norwegian CMO Kopinor and the National Library of Norway on pilot 
project called "Bookshelf" that purports to make available on the internet all the Norwegian literature of 
the 20
th
 century to users of a Norwegian IP address. The books will be digitized and could be consulted 
on screen but not downloadable, printed or borrowed.  
In 2012, the Dutch Royal Library has cleared with national CMOs the right to digitize and making content 
from magazines from 1850 to 1940 available to the public through a dedicated website
683
.  
On the legislative front, France and Germany have opted for collective management to foster digitisation 
and diffusion of cultural heritage. A recent law on the digital exploitation of unavailable works (that 
includes orphan works and out-of-print works)
684
 sets up a principle of mandatory collective management 
for the digital exploitation of out-of-commerce books. Under the law, an unavailable book is a book 
published in France before 1 January 2001 which is no longer the subject of a commercial release by a 
publisher and which is not currently the subject of a publication in printed or digital form. The effect on 
libraries is only indirect and subsidiary, as the collective management that will exercise the rights in 
unavailable books
685
 by default of an opt-out or of an exploitation by the rights holders
686
, will only grant a 
free license of reproduction and making available to libraries if the copyright owner could not be found 
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within ten years after the first authorization to exploitation
687
. The main purpose of this scheme is 
therefore not to address the issue of digital libraries. 
The German lawmaker has also proposed Amendments to the German Copyright Administration Act 
(“Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz”) with the objective to enable the digitisation and making available 
of out-of-commerce works through collective management. A registry of out-of-commerce works will be 
set up and authors not opting out of this registry will be presumed to be represented by the CMO of their 
respective field (text or image). Libraries holding such works in their collection will be authorized to 
reproduce and make those works available for non-commercial purposes.  
A Task Force has been created by IFRRO to help implement the MoU at the European level
688
.  
Agreements on digitization of audiovisual works are less easy to negotiate as they concern more 
copyright owners. Yet, examples of agreements leading to digitization of extensive archive of moving 
images have been reached in France (digitization and making available of the TV broadcasts of INA), the 
Netherlands (Images for the Future project of digitization and making available Dutch films and TV 
programs) and Belgium (project of online availability of the archives of the public TV broadcasting), all 
concluded with the national collective management organisations.  
The process of Licenses for Europe launched by the European Commission in 2013 includes one working 
group on the audiovisual sector and cultural heritage institutions purporting to identify collaborative 
solutions to the online availability of audiovisual works (particularly those that are out of distribution). The 
MoU of 2011 on literary works could serve as a model but other types of solutions, such as framework 
contracts or best practice approach, are also envisaged.  
The United Kingdom has started an interesting project of a so-called Copyright Hub whose objective 
would be to make the users and copyright owners meet to conclude licences to use copyrighted works. 
Digitization projects of libraries are envisaged as one of the application fields of this project aiming at 
making easier licensing related to high-volume, low-value transactions with high administration costs. This 
will provide another example of collective solutions put in place to help digitization endeavours by 
libraries.  
It should be noted that all the examples listed here relate to the digitization and making available of 
works. For acts of digitization alone, we have not found collective agreements of any kind. This lets 
suppose that libraries rely on the exception for preservation purpose even if it is uncertain that it covers 
large-scale digitization projects.  
4. Assessment of the exception – Issues and uncertainties 
a) Assessment of the adequacy of the exception in the directive 
The exception provided for in the article 5(2) c) of the InfoSoc Directive actually proves to be rather open 
and likely to meet numerous needs of the libraries. It is an open exception that potentially enables many 
acts of reproduction, to the extent they are specific, hence precisely described by the laws enacting it, 
and carried out with no direct or indirect commercial or economic advantage.  
Acts of preservation and archiving are allowed but not defined. They certainly cover restoration or 
replacement of damaged or fragile items of a collection, as well as copying for format shifting to migrate 
the format of a work that has become obsolete or for which the means to access to its content are not 
easy to find.  
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Beyond preservation, the history of the legal provision indicates that other purposes are legitimate as well 
but does not indicate which ones could be considered. Some further interpretation may be needed here. 
However the exception may not cover projects of mass-scale digitization as they shall probably go 
beyond the notion of “specific acts of reproduction”
689
. Yet, libraries, archives and museums in Europe 
have relied on that exception to engage in mass digitization, despite the absence of any legal security.  
  
 
 
b) Restrictive national transpositions 
National transpositions of the exception have been often more restrictive than the European directive 
itself to the effect some national copyright laws do not meet the needs of digitization and preservation 
initiatives of heritage institutions. Four reasons can be identified to explain the more restrictive exceptions 
resulting from national transpositions. 
The purpose of preservation has been generally interpreted strictly which prohibits libraries and other 
eligible institutions of some Member States from carrying some acts of preservation of their collections, 
notably acts of format shifting.  
Not all categories of works are covered by the national laws, which can discriminate between libraries 
depending on the type of content they own. For example, in the UK, the exception does not apply to 
sound recordings or films, which has been denounced by the Gowers Report and the Hargreaves Report, 
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the latter proposing a revision of the exception to extend it to audiovisual cultural heritage 
690
.  On the 
contrary, text-based works are not concerned by the exception in Italy. 
The making of digital copies is not allowed in some national laws, which creates a particular difficulty for 
film heritage institutions that have no other choice than to migrate audiovisual works from analogue to 
digital format both for reasons of fragile and deteriorating supports and for reasons of lack of projectors 
still capable of screening former formats.  
The number of copies authorised for preservation of works constitutes another issue. For instance, UK 
only allows the making of a single copy, when digital preservation will involve multiple and serial copying 
and reformatting”
 691
.  Digitization, especially for format-shifting, requires multiple copies. 
 
 
c) Lack of harmonization and cross-border issues 
At first sight, the acts covered by the exception of the article 5(2) c) does not have any cross-border 
dimension, since the acts of reproduction undertaken by libraries take place on a determined territory, 
that of the eligible institution.  
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Notwithstanding the normally localised character of the acts of reproduction, some activities directly or 
indirectly concerned by the exception have a cross-border effect.  
Firstly, if a library or other eligible institution wants to outsource the digitization of works abroad, the 
question of the territorial application of the exception can arise. As a principle, we consider that the 
outsourcing will not influence the eligibility of the library to benefit from the exception, that benefit being 
governed by the law of the country in which the library is established. The application of the exception to 
the library, and not the entity that carries out the acts of reproduction on its behalf and upon commission, 
would not prevent however that the acts undertaken by the latter be subject to copyright infringement 
should they exceed the boundaries of the exception and yield some independent benefit for the entity that 
digitizes the items of the library collection
692
.  
A second case of transnational activity is the sending, by a library or archive, of copies of documents or 
works to a user upon request. That possibility is allowed in some national copyright laws, but with some 
uncertainty when a cross-border element, such as the fact that the user requesting the copy resides in 
another Member State, intervenes.  In principle, the exception should apply depending on the location of 
the institution eligible by its national law to satisfy such demand for a copy of a work, but could it answer 
as well demands coming from abroad? When the exception, as it is often the case, is limited to research 
or private use, how would the library verify that the users requesting the copy meet those requirements?  
Libraries can also collaborate to develop digital libraries projects and then assume a cross-border 
dimension, even though in such a case the transnational aspect will mostly relate to acts of making 
available that are situated outside of the scope of the exception.  
Finally, the activities of the libraries have a transnational effect on a concrete level. On the one hand, 
heritage institutions are encouraged to mutualise their digitization activities to do economies of scale. As 
stated by recital 6 of the Recommendation on the digitisation and online accessibility of cultural material 
and digital preservation of 2006, a “concerted action by the Member States to digitise their cultural 
heritage would lend greater coherence to the selection of material and would avoid overlap in 
digitization”
693
. Article 1 recommends that Member States “gather information about current and planned 
digitisation of books (…) and create overviews of such digitisation in order to prevent duplication of efforts 
and promote collaboration and synergies at European level”. This has been further reminded in the 
update of the Recommendation in 2011, that insists on  “the pooling of digitisation efforts by cultural 
institutions and cross-border collaboration, building on competence centres for digitisation in Europe”
694
. 
In other words, as underlined by the Council of the European Union, the aim is “to optimise the use of 
digitisation capacity to achieve economies of scale, keeping in mind the potential for cross-border 
collaboration”
695
 in order to “ensure that online accessibility of Europe’s cultural heritage reaches a critical 
mass”
696
. Therefore, if a work is digitized by a library in a given country, it should be used by another 
library in the same country or in another Member State in order to achieve economies of scale to foster 
the development of digital libraries.  
A last point should be highlighted as well. Since different conditions apply to the activities of libraries in 
Member States, due to inconsistent transposition of the exceptions, the inputs of national libraries or other 
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similar institutions to transnational projects dealing with cultural heritage, might largely differ. Imagine a 
national library digitizing its collection of newspapers from the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, in the frame of a 
Europeana project to put on line newspapers relating to the construction of the European Union after 
1945. It makes no doubt that the on-line dissemination of the newspapers, still protected by copyright, will 
require authorization of the copyright owners in all Member States. Depending on the national copyright 
law applicable to the library, the conditions to digitize the newspapers will be either exempted by an 
exception or not, which will have an indirect effect to the capacity of the national library to provide material 
to Europeana. Indeed, the more newspapers will be digitized, the more they could be of some use for 
digital projects. Additionally, a digitization with OCR mechanisms will enable search engines to properly 
index and locate relevant articles within the newspapers, which will save time and cost to libraries looking 
for material related to the European Community. Should some libraries be impaired in their efforts to 
digitize parts of their collections due to lack of harmonization of the exceptions to the benefit of libraries 
and archives, all cultural heritage institutions will not be on equal footing in such trans-European projects. 
For all these reasons, more efforts should be put on increasing the harmonization in relation to the 
exception for certain acts of reproduction made by libraries. 
5. Possible options 
The assessment of the exception in the directive and in its national transposition has showed two 
significant issues. Current needs of preservation are not permitted by the exception, either due to 
uncertainty of its scope or to development that could not be envisaged at the time of adoption of the 
directive. A second issue results from the very diverse implementation of the exception in the Member 
States that creates a fragmented scene for a European agenda of digitization of cultural heritage.  
To address these issues, some possible initiatives will be now addressed. A primary exercise would be to 
find the gravity point where the exception ends and the exclusive rights resumes. It may not be a clear 
frontier, as some uses can be exempted but subject to fair compensation and the exclusive right can be 
mitigated, namely through collective exercise of rights, to accommodate particular needs and difficulties 
of digitization of cultural heritage. The watershed delineating the scope of exception and that of the 
exercise of copyright should be at least decided. A second stage would be to try and solve the issue of 
weak harmonization of the exception for libraries.  
We will start by laying down the different factors and principles that should be weighed in the balance in 
devising the proper scope of the exception (a.). Based on those principles, we will analyze the option of 
revising the exception in the directive and define its possible scope and conditions (b.). Then different 
alternatives to increase the harmonization of the exception for libraries within the European Union will be 
considered (c.). Finally, on the other side of the (maybe redefined) exception, where the copyright owners 
can exercise their rights, some accommodations of the issues faced by libraries and similar institutions 
could be envisaged as well (d.) 
a) Overarching principles and weighing factors 
In defining the adequate boundaries of an exception for some of the activities of libraries and similar 
institutions, some balance should be found between apparently contradictory objectives, on one hand 
securing the rights and interests of the copyright and related rightholders, on the other permitting the 
preservation of cultural heritage to the interest of the whole society and of future generations. The needs 
of the library increasingly developed in the digital environment but they should not be the only ones to 
dictate the scope and shape of the exception. 
In a study commissioned by WIPO on the exceptions for libraries, K. Crews noted that “the library 
exceptions for preservation and replacement reflect a tension between meeting the needs of the library 
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while protecting the interests of copyright owners”
697
. This tension explains that any accommodation of 
the needs of libraries and similar institutions to pursue their public interest mission could prejudice the 
interests of copyright owners in protecting their works and their business models, existing or to be 
developed.  
The assessment of the need to revise the exception of certain acts of reproduction by libraries and 
archives and the methods for achieving such revision should then rely on two principles that need to be 
weighed in the balance. Firstly, the exception should serve the key role of libraries in preserving 
European cultural heritage; secondly, a high level of protection of copyright owners should be ensured 
which entails not to authorize acts that would adversely affect the market for copyrighted works. This 
balancing exercise should then conform to the three-step test that limits the exception to special cases 
that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rights owners.  
(i) The objective of the preservation and the role of cultural heritage institutions  
There is a strong political commitment of the European Union towards digital libraries and digitization of 
the cultural and informational heritage of the European Union, as demonstrated by a succession of policy 
documents and initiatives such as the High Level Group on digital libraries set up by the Commission in 
2006, the Recommendation of the Commission on digitization of 2006 and its revision in 2011, the Report 
of the Comité des Sages on the Digitization of Europe’s cultural heritage, the Council conclusions of 2012 
on digitization of cultural heritage. All insist on the need to foster long-term digital preservation of cultural 
material, in full respect of international and European copyright laws. The New renaissance Report 
affirms that “Digitization is more than a technical option, it is a moral obligation”
698
. 
When the InfoSoc Directive was adopted in 2001, digital libraries were only beginning and no 
comprehensive efforts of digitization of libraries collection existed. The exception envisaged in the 
directive to the benefit of libraries, archives and museums mainly related to specific acts of preservation 
of works in case of deterioration, lost or frailness, not of mass-digitization that seems unattainable at that 
time. 
The increasing need and political will to digitize en masse our cultural heritage may have disrupted the 
balance completed in the directive of 2001, as it changes the necessities of the knowledge society to put 
libraries on the front scene. 
All initiatives should then take into account their impact on the development of digital libraries and of 
digitization of the European heritage. This would meet the demand of the CJEU to ensure the 
effectiveness of the exceptions (see supra). The additional principle of strict interpretation of the 
exceptions should equally require legal certainty. 
(ii) The protection of rights and interests of copyright holders  
On the other side, one important objective of the InfoSoc Directive is to grant a high level of protection of 
copyright. Exceptions should remain limited and never prevail over the protection and the exploitation of 
copyright works and other subject matter. This favour granted to the protection of copyright explains the 
wide definitions of exclusive rights, the conditions that are generally required for exceptions, the rule of 
strict interpretation of exceptions.  
Any revision or extension of the exception to meet the needs of digital libraries should not unduly harm 
the emergence of new business models, whether for books, movies or any other types of works likely to 
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be digitized by libraries. Publishers of e-books for instance are wary that the development of digital 
libraries be detrimental to their nascent new economical models and that through the exception, the 
libraries and similar institutions be authorized to transform their collection into digital objects, without 
acquiring the new digital products provided by the market. Some economic study of the possible impact 
on the interests of rightholders should assess whether the acts of digitization themselves for preservation 
purposes (and not the ensuing acts of making available that would not be covered by the exception) are 
likely to prejudice the interests of the copyright owners and the normal exploitation of works. In what 
follows, some hypothesis will be formulated when relevant. 
(iii) The Balancing test 
Balancing between the legitimate needs of libraries for preservation, that have been recognised by the 
European and national lawmakers as being of public interest, and the high level of protection of 
rightholders is a delicate exercise.  
It should be done under the guidance of the three-step test. Reproduction for preservation is without 
doubt a specific case and fulfils the first step. The absence of harm to the normal exploitation of work 
would result in rejecting the exception if it creates a situation that has an adverse market impact.  
Libraries should not become the normal way to access works and prevail over market.  
Already at the adoption of the directive, there was a certain fear that exempting too generously the 
activities of libraries could transform them into providers of copyrighted works at the detriment of nascent 
business models of on-line delivery. This idea can still be found in the recital 40 of the European text. 
The three-step test adds to the exercise the absence of any unreasonable prejudice to the interests of 
copyright owners who could benefit accordingly of some compensation should an exception deprive them 
of some remuneration
699
 or whose moral interests could be affected by the exception. 
This balance will in some cases raise the question of whether the copyright owners could not provide the 
means to exercise the privileged use, namely by substituting the reproduction allowed by the exception by 
an acquisition of a copy of the work on the market. We have seen in the general introduction on the 
system of copyright exceptions in the European Union, that this possibility of market intervention should 
not be the only factor deciding on the limits of the exception. In what follows, we will address this dividing 
line between the exception and the intervention of the market, depending on the different objectives and 
acts authorised by a possibly revised exception, taking into account the high protection of authors.  
b) Revising the scope of the exception 
(i) Keeping the status quo 
Before developing what could be done to clarify or revise the scope of the exception for libraries in the 
directive, a first option could be not taking any initiative and considering that the current situation should 
be maintained.  
Such a choice could find support in the open nature of the exception that seems to cover a broad range of 
purposes, to leave enough discretion to Member States to authorize specific acts of libraries according to 
their needs, and not to require any adaptation to fit the new digital needs of libraries, considering that 
such needs have already been taken into account in the text of 2001.  
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The recent case law of the CJEU further promises to bring more flexibility in the interpretation and 
application of the exceptions. We have seen in the introduction of this study that a series of decisions 
have attenuated the principle of strict interpretation of the exceptions and mixed it with a call for more 
harmonization and more purpose-bound effectiveness. According to the European Court, Member States 
have the obligation, when transposing the exception, to consider the harmonisation objective of the 
directive 2001/29 and to enable the exception to deliver what is was aimed for. On the one hand, Member 
States have been prevented to bring inconsistency in the European harmonized copyright framework and 
even, in one decision, to add supplementary conditions to exceptions already detailed in the directive
700
. 
On the other hand, the court of Luxemburg affirmed that the strict interpretation of the exceptions should 
leave some room for a teleological approach and the need to ensure the effectiveness of the exception, 
according to its objective as pursued by the directive
701
.  
This twofold position of the CJEU indicates that the Member States should refrain from differing too much 
from the wording of the exceptions in the directive 2001/29 or at least, from prescribing conditions to the 
exercise of an exception that would hinder its objective and its value to achieve information society 
needs.  
More generally, the European judges have reduced the margin of implementation and interpretation by 
the Member States by giving their autonomous interpretation of an increasing list of notions in the 
directives of the acquis.  
Should the CJEU keeps that path and pace, the exception for reproduction by libraries, museums and 
archives may find soon some clarification in the case law, without the need of any legislative action.  
Advantage(s) 
The main advantage of this option would be that it does not require to re-open the highly politicized 
debate of copyright exceptions and that it would leave intact an exception that seems in itself not 
problematic and balanced.  
Disadvantage(s)  
Relying on a possible intervention of the CJEU to clarify the exception for preservation benefiting to 
libraries is a risky bet, for the Court will only haphazardly answer to preliminary questions referred to its 
jurisdiction. Past decisions showed that the questions were often limited and did not allow the European 
Court to address the overall context of a copyright exception as the lawmaker could do. 
Besides, the recent shift of the case law towards a more flexible interpretation of the Court is only nascent 
and at the margins of stronger principles that dominate the interpretation of copyright, such as the need to 
grant a high level of protection to copyright owners.  
Another factor in disfavour of inaction is that digital libraries have become an issue that is high on the 
agenda of the European Union. More legal certainty as to the scope of authorized activities by libraries 
and as to the ways libraries could clear copyright to engage in digitization projects has been repeatedly 
asked by the European Council
702
 and by the Commission itself
703
. Revising the exception is maybe not 
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the right solution or not the only one, but maintaining the status quo would give a wrong signal at a time 
when, to paraphrase J. Ginsburg, “digital libraries are all the rage”
704
. 
(ii) Adoption of an interpretative document 
This study showed major uncertainties as to the scope of the exception of acts of reproduction for 
libraries that result from the directive and, to a larger extent, from its transposition by Member States. At 
the risk of repeating ourselves too much, the biggest holes in the understanding and effectiveness of the 
exception are on the side of the directive itself, the uncertainty as to the treatment of mass-digitization 
projects and digitization for format-shifting (which seem both rather not covered by the exception), and, 
on the side of national transpositions, exceedingly restrictive conditions that prevent libraries to actually 
benefit from the room given to them by the EU lawmaker. 
An interpretative document or guidelines published by the Commission
705
 could provide two answers. 
One would specify the purposes of the exception and ascertain whether reproduction, even of whole 
collections, for format shifting or mass-digitization, is allowed. The other would identify the objective of the 
exception that should not be impaired by Member States in their own copyright law, for instance by 
prohibiting digital copying, excluding some classes of works or admitting only one copy to be made.  
Due to its nature, an interpretative communication could not go in a much detail as the revision of the 
exception but it could follow the lines that will be addressed in the next point related to the revision of the 
exception in the directive.  
Advantage(s) 
Without re-opening the Pandora box of copyright exceptions in the directive 2001/29, an interpretative 
document would provide a soft law instrument to clarify pressing issues of the exception in favour of 
cultural heritage institutions. It could provide useful guidance to Member States about the scope and 
conditions of the exception without requiring starting the whole process of defining and exception and 
implementing it in the national copyright regulatory framework. It could be sufficient as we have seen that 
the issue is more about the interpretation of the open wording of the directive than about too restrictive or 
outdated conditions (which would rather require a legislative intervention). 
By interpreting the directive more than 10 years after its adoption, the Commission could emphasize the 
overall objective that was intended in 2001 to the benefit of libraries without impairing the high protection 
and legitimate interests of copyright holders, and its continued significance and need for adaptation to 
current needs of libraries. Instead of waiting for the CJEU to address the uncertainties of the article 5(2) 
c) and probably giving answers, case by case, to the questions identified here, it could further more 
harmonization and consistency by addressing the whole context of the use of copyrighted works by 
libraries and similar institutions. 
Disadvantage(s) 
Interpretative documents are not a habit of the European Union in the field of copyright. Communications 
of the Commission in some fields or evaluation reports of directives sometimes give some clues as to how 
some provisions of an European text ought be understood and applied. However, such interpretation 
would not be binding. Examples of interpretative document at the European Union level always affirm that 
they do not provide authentic interpretation of the commented legal instrument. The CJEU and the 
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Member States would remain free to refer to such soft-law guidelines
706
, even though one should mention 
that the European Court has sometimes referred to the interpretative guide to the Berne Convention
707
 
while interpreting the provisions of the Berne Convention in copyright cases.  
Beyond the question of legitimacy and binding nature of such document, its efficiency as to its time of 
adoption could also be doubted. Interpretative documents can be particularly useful when adopted 
simultaneously to the legislative acts they comment (as recitals of a directive do) or when there is a need 
to address new issues
708
. As far as article 5(2) c) is concerned, an interpretation of its wording and scope 
more than ten years after its adoption and many years after its implementation in the Member States, 
might come too late. Restrictions as to the scope of the exception mainly result from national copyright 
laws that the Member States will not modify only for the sake of complying with an interpretative 
document, whose legitimacy to impose such a revision at the Member States level, would be dubious. 
One can also doubt that national courts, when applying a national exception, would make prevail an 
interpretative document of the European Commission over national legal provisions.  
(iii) Modification of the exception in the directive 
The exception of the article 5(2) c) was adopted at a time where libraries were only emerging as digital 
actors. The hot topic of “digital libraries” would be created only a few years afterwards. That might explain 
that the directive, in 2001, only touches upon specific acts of reproduction that were then undertaken by 
libraries to preserve or restore works but not upon more comprehensive activities that would result from 
the new role assumed by libraries in the information society.  
Exceptions are, as reminded by the Preamble of the directive itself, a way to create some balance 
between the rights of copyright and related rights owners and the interests of the society as a whole and 
particularly, of access to information and education. Time influences, not the very need for balance, but 
the extent and way this balance is conveyed in law. The needs of libraries and cultural heritage 
institutions evolve, as well as their activities. Consequently the extent of the authorized acts could evolve 
both to allow for some new activities and to restrict some uses that have endowed new significance to the 
detriment of the interests of the rights holders. This on-going adjustment of the exceptions (and of the 
balance they embed) is thus not one-dimensional.  
This change of circumstances, the libraries being more digitally active, is a first argument pleading for a 
revision of the exception to their benefit. The argument is reinforced by the calls of the Commission itself 
and the Council to look at the way the activities of cultural heritage institutions are aided by the copyright 
law
709
, “in full respect of intellectual property right” as it is carefully reminded in all instances
710
.  
Consequently, the Commission could thus propose amendments to the InfoSoc Directive to the effect that 
the exception of article 5(2) c) regarding the specific acts of reproduction undertaken by libraries, 
museums and archives, be better defined and its exact scope determined. 
Should the European lawmaker decide to re-open the directive and revise some of its provisions, an 
intervention may be needed in two directions, responding to the two issues emphasized in the 
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assessment of the exception done above, i.e. the lack of certainty as to the scope of the exception and 
the lack of harmonization amongst Member States.  
Therefore, in order to properly revise the exception for libraries, one should endeavour, on one hand, to 
address the material scope of the law and, on the other hand, to achieve more harmonization as to its 
implementation at national level. The second line of action will be addressed in a later point.  
Advantage(s) 
Revising the exception and finding ways to reduce the margin of appreciation of the Member States in its 
implementation would be one way to answer to the difficulties that libraries are facing with digitization 
projects, as pointed out by numerous policy documents of the European Union.  
It could give better direction to Member States to revise their own exception and hence, reduce 
discrepancies and lack of harmonisation. 
Disdvantage(s) 
The exception contained in the article 5(2) c) of the directive, as worded, is open and flexible enough, as 
we have showed, to accommodate the changing needs of the libraries to a large extent
711
. It is rather the 
transposition made by some Member States that proved to be too restrictive. Therefore, changing the 
directive will not help if no further harmonisation efforts are equally accomplished by the Member States. 
Revising the directive is a tricky and lengthy process with difficult political issues. The recent discussion 
for an international Treaty to enact a copyright exception for the benefit of the visually impaired showed 
the reluctance of copyright owners and of some States to put the topic of exceptions on the legislative 
agenda in fear of precedent and of a Pandora-box effect. The analogy is not completely accurate as the 
libraries exception already exists in the acquis communautaire but fails to deliver its objective to some 
extent. 
Should the exception be revised in the directive, a first question should be addressed: to what extent of 
details the conditions of the exception should go?  
Legislative drafting techniques greatly differ from one Member State to another
712
, from the traditionally 
synthetic and open exception of French copyright law
713
 to the intricate and detailed approach of common 
law
714
. The list of the exceptions in the article 5 of the directive is mixed. Some exceptions are simple and 
open-worded (eg parody, private copy…), while others know strictly defined conditions (eg temporary 
copying, on-site consultation, …). The exception of article 5(2) c) is an example of the first kind. Detailed 
conditions have the advantage of reducing the discretion left to Member States to veer away the objective 
pursued by the European text. However it could add difficulties of two kinds. First, reaching a political 
compromise on many conditions and elements of the exception is certainly more arduous. Second, it 
imposes a peculiar legislative drafting style to Member States that could interfere with their own traditions.  
Depending on the level of details the exception should comprise, the following conditions need to be 
factored in: the objectives pursued by the exception, its beneficiaries, i.e. the institutions eligible to the 
benefit of the exception, the works concerned, the authorized acts, as well as any further conditions or 
limitations. 
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- The objectives of the exception 
The directive already authorises diverse purposes for the “specific acts of reproduction” that libraries, 
museums and archives can benefit from, without identifying them precisely. The history of the adoption of 
the directive mentions preservation and archive.  
It could be useful to specify which purposes can be enabled by the exception, as it would provide the 
general frame of the limitation to copyright.  
This purpose will certainly include preservation and archiving that would deserve some definition, 
preferably in recitals or an interpretative document.  
The notion of preservation and archiving can encompass the following activities, depending of a strict or 
broad interpretation: 
- Restoration of damaged parts of a work (mainly literary work, sound recording, broadcast or film) 
whose support has deteriorated or missing parts; 
- Replacement of a lost or decayed item 
- Anticipative preservation of fragile works or works in fragile support that threaten to fall in 
despair; 
- Copying often-consulted works in a format that would better sustain regular viewings by library 
patrons; 
- Format-shifting i.e. migration of works from a format that is obsolete or for which there is a 
difficulty to find viewing or reading material, to a more stable format (not always digital); 
- Copying to archive a work in a library or archive collection, including web harvesting in order 
to archive web content. 
Beyond mere preservation, libraries or archives sometimes copy works in their collection either to supply 
other libraries or users requesting such copy for research or private study.  
Many libraries have engaged in mass-digitization of their collections or of substantial parts thereof. 
Digitizing a whole collection without differentiating between works and their specific needs for 
preservation can pursue many purposes. It could be a way to shift the analogue format of a collection to a 
digital one to ensure its preservation over time. Usually such format-shifting will be done regularly to 
follow the on-going change of readable formats.  
Once digitized, the collection of an archive, library or museum, depending on the process of digitization 
(whether in graphic file or in a text-based version capable of being recognised by OCR tools), could be 
more easily searchable and indexed, which adds significant value of the digital library. 
The ultimate purpose of mass-digitization projects is to make the works available on-line, which is an act 
that exceeds largely the strict purpose of preservation and would hamper the development of on-line 
services by the copyright owners themselves. The recital 40 of the directive clearly indicates that the 
exception should not cover on-line delivery services. 
In the revision of the exception, its objectives should be clarified. It implies deciding where the exception 
would stop in the continuum of the discrete activities of copying undertaken by the concerned institutions:  
Restoration – replacement – anticipative preservation of fragile works – format-shifting – copying 
for archiving, including web harvesting – copying and supplying upon request – mass digitization 
for preservation – mass digitization with search capabilities – mass-digitization and making 
available 
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Possible scope of a revised exception: 
 
In our opinion, the following purposes should be included in the scope of the exception:  
- any act of preservation of single works aiming at countering a risk of losing a specific item in a 
collection should be allowed, as it is already the case in the exception. It would cover restoration, 
replacement, anticipative copying of fragile works or of often-consulted items. Such acts do not 
normally affect the normal exploitation of works or the interests of copyright owners. Some 
national laws restrict acts of copying to replace lost or damaged works where the work is still 
available by the publisher or in normal trade. In that case indeed, it could be discussed as to 
whether the library should not acquire a new copy of the work rather than copying it to replace 
it
715
. It seems that the restoration only concerns a small part of the work, it might be done by an 
act of reproduction (e.g. of one missing or torn page) without having to replace the whole work by 
a new copy. 
- Format-shifting should be authorised by the exception, as probably already covered by the 
directive and as recommended by the Recommendation of the Commission on digitization
716
. In a 
digital environment, format-shifting constitutes a key concern for cultural heritage institutions that 
need to keep up the pace of rapid changes in technology. Particularly in case of ‘technological 
obsolescence’, when technologies evolve and works are no longer “usable” because the 
technology needed disappeared
717
, preservation if done only once, would be useless. Maintaining 
works in formats that might not be readable anymore by future generations would severely impair 
the preservation mission of those institutions. Updating the format of a work only substitutes one 
format to another that is useless or will be soon. It does not in principle substitute for the 
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acquisition of the work on the market and its normal exploitation as the library has already 
acquired the work. It could be discussed though whether the normal exploitation of a work does 
not imply to sell DVDs of a film to a library even if it has already a VHS of the same film in its 
collection. Most probably the cost of acquiring the film in the new format will be lower for the 
library than the cost to migrate the VHS into a digital copy and its quality will be better than a 
digitized version of an analogue copy.  
- Mass digitization appears to be the utmost comprehensive act of preservation that can be 
undertaken by a library or archive. As such, its status under the article 5(2) c) is uncertain as it 
probably exceeds the notion of “specific acts of copying”. Digitization aims at achieving three 
objectives for a library: preservation, accessibility and collection management
718
. 
As far as preservation is concerned, the digitization of a whole collection or of parts of it can be 
seen as a way to achieve format-shifting, the analogue format being increasingly, and particularly 
for sounds recordings or audiovisual works, condemned to disappear or rendered unreadable by 
lack of analogue equipment. Yet, a key mission of cultural heritage institutions is to keep the 
works in a state that enables their viewing and consultation. In a digital environment, they would 
fail that mission if their collection stays in an analogue format only. For that reason, we consider 
that mass-digitization should be considered as an act of preservation
719
.  
An important rationale of digitisation projects for cultural heritage institutions is to provide 
increased availability to the items in their collection, preservation sometimes being secondary. 
Transforming an analogue collection into a digital one is in some cases required to make it 
accessible. For instance when part of the collection consists of photographic negatives, they 
could be effectively accessed and viewed by the public once digitized.  
The mere act of digitization, irrespective of further uses that could be made of such digitized item, 
such as the making available, even of a whole collection, does not in itself harm the normal 
exploitation of the works, if the copies serve the same purpose than the analogue works they 
replace.  
The addition of search tools and indexing in text-based works digitized and OCRized gives more 
value to a digital collection. On one hand they are the digital equivalents of research tools already 
offered by libraries to their analogue collection but in a more sophisticated and efficient form
720
. In 
itself its addition to mass-digitization processes should not disqualify digitization activities from 
benefiting from the exception. For instance, a national library that digitizes its collection of 
newspaper would include a search tool based on text-recognition and keywords which will greatly 
facilitate the research on some topics. There is no reason why the library should be limited to 
offer only index cards and not take advantage of new digital search capabilities. Nevertheless, 
coupling digitization and search tools should not end in making a database of works that would 
compete with a product existing on the market. For instance a law library could not digitize all its 
law reviews to constitute a searchable database instead of acquiring existing products offered on 
the market. In such a case, the benefit of the exception would be in contradiction with the normal 
exploitation of protected subject-matter (the articles as works and the database of articles).  
The other purposes enabled by the digital copies of the works in the collection of a library, such 
as consultation on screens or making available should be considered on their own. 
Other purposes merit further discussion: 
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- Copying for archiving and web harvesting has been assumed by some projects to archive 
digital contents found on the web. Two separate activities should be distinguished. Libraries can 
sometimes collect on the internet copies of works that are subject to legal deposit obligations. In 
other cases, not always initiated by traditional libraries or archives, the purpose is to operate a 
bulk copying of webpages to constitute an archive of everything that was ever posted online. 
Allowing web harvesting to the whole web under an exception would be too extensive and 
beyond the webpages it would capture as such, it could also copy all types of works included 
therein. Some specific acts of reproduction could be allowed to libraries in charge of legal deposit 
when the creator, publisher or other person liable to deposit a copy of the work under the law 
failed to do so
721
. Other libraries could not constitute their collection by making their own copies 
and not acquiring works in normal trade. However the historical and research interest of web 
harvesting merits that further discussion be dedicated to such activities
722
. 
By way of comparison, the “Section 108 Study Group” entrusted by the US Copyright Office to 
provide recommendations on a revision of exceptions for libraries, has proposed to allow libraries 
and archives “to capture and reproduce publicly available online content for preservation 
purposes, and to make those copies accessible to users for purposes of private study, 
scholarship, or research”
723
 provided the copies integrate a label indicating the archived nature of 
the copy and its purposes. However, it is also suggested to allow rights holders to opt-out of that 
system by indicating that their online content should not be harvested
724
. This extension to web 
harvesting was considered as being too broad by the US Copyright Office. 
- Copying and supplying on request contradicts the recital 40 of the directive that excludes on-
line delivery of works from the scope of the article 5(2) c). However it could be interpreted as 
referring to acts of making available on-line, whereas sending a digital copy of a work upon 
request of an individual user has a more limited scope and impact. When authorized in national 
laws (e.g. UK or Germany), many conditions apply to ascertain that the request is motivated by 
research or private study and that only single copies will be sent. The supply of copies on request 
should not substitute to existing services by copyright owners. It would actually be a way to 
acquire works, outside of normal trade, but this is exactly what libraries have always offered. The 
question is rather whether the extent of what could be allowed by the exception could constitute 
the normal way of acquiring works and impair thereby the normal exploitation of the work.  
- Making available digital copies of the works contained in libraries collection for consultation or 
on-line, save for what is authorized under the exception of the article 5(3) n), should in any case 
be excluded. It is not an act of reproduction nor does it aim at preservation. 
- Beneficiaries – eligibility 
The article 5(2) c) is very clear in the identification of the beneficiaries of the exception. It is a closed list 
encompassing libraries, archives, educational establishments and museums. This list should not be 
changed or extended to other institutions as it already covers the justified candidates for the exception of 
preservation of cultural heritage.  
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Some doubt has arisen as to the inclusion of film heritage institutions but those should be considered as 
archives or libraries. To lift any uncertainty, the revision of the directive or an interpretative document 
could specify that film archives are covered.  
The conditions applicable to the eligible institutions, i.e. the not-for-profit nature and the openness to the 
public (but for archives), further restrict the exception to reasonable application and should be kept.  
Possible additions, through revision or interpretative document, could be:  
- requiring that the institution pursues a public service mission or scientific or educational 
goals, as it appears in some national laws; 
- allowing outsourcing of digitization activities by private companies or any other person acting 
on behalf of eligible institutions and within the conditions applicable to the latter. This could be 
done a recital similar to the recital 41 of the directive 2001/29 applicable to the exception for 
ephemeral recordings that states that “When applying the exception or limitation in respect of 
ephemeral recordings made by broadcasting organisations it is understood that a broadcaster's 
own facilities include those of a person acting on behalf of and under the responsibility of the 
broadcasting organization”. The CJEU has considered that the intention of the EU legislature was 
“to maintain a close link between that third party and the broadcasting organisation, which 
ensures that the third party cannot profit, independently, from the exception in respect of 
ephemeral recordings, the sole beneficiary of which is the broadcasting organization”
725
. Similarly, 
a close link between the library and the person undertaking the acts of copying should be 
required and the latter could not profit in any way of the copies made in that process. As to the 
justification of this outsourcing possibility for the exception for ephemeral recordings, the 
European Court has found it in the freedom of conduct business contained in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights
726
, which would be applicable as well to libraries.  
Outsourcing, in the form of public-private partnerships, is also seen as a privileged way to 
assume the costs of digitization for libraries by the Report of the Comité des Sages. In the United 
States, the Study Group in charge of assessing the Section 108 of the Copyright Act related to 
libraries exceptions also recommended that these institutions be allowed to outsource their 
activities to outside contractors provided the contractor “is acting solely as the provider of a 
service for which compensation is made by the library or archives and not for any other direct or 
indirect commercial benefit”
 727
 and that he does not retain any copies of the work other than 
those necessary to accomplish its task. 
- Works concerned  
The Directive does not restrict the types of works benefiting from the exception and there should be no 
reason to exclude any classes of works. Yet, some Member States allows the reproduction only for 
literary works or exclude audiovisual material. This limitation in some national laws could hamper the 
preservation of the European heritage as a whole and the development of an information society 
including all types of content, from texts to images, sounds and multimedia works.  
In our view, there is no rationale to exclude some classes of works from the preservation ambition for 
there is no reason for a different market effect depending on the type of works, to the extent the exception 
only covers preservation and not dissemination. 
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As no exclusion of content results from the directive, the exception does not need to be adapted in that 
regard but it could be made clear, in a recital or in an interpretative document, that it applies (and should 
apply) to all types of works. 
It should be reminded here that computer programs and databases, protected on the grounds of other 
directives, are not subject to a similar exception. As further developed above, there is a nascent need and 
desire of specialised archives and museums to archive and preserve computer games and programs. 
Technically, by virtue of the distributed application of directive 2001/29 to graphic elements of the 
software and of directive 2009/24 (computer programs directive) to literary elements operated by the 
CJEU in the BSA case, computer games could enter the scope of the article 5(2) c) at least for their 
graphic elements. As to databases, Member States are entitled to apply thereto a similar exception for 
libraries, according to article 6(2) d) of the database directive. 
However, some clarification and overall application of the preservation exception across the different 
subject matters would be a welcomed clarification and would bring consistency in the acquis 
communautaire and in the understanding of the law by libraries.  
There may be further discussion on the following points: 
- Unpublished works: there is no tradition in the acquis communautaire to apply a differentiated 
treatment to published and unpublished works. However the reason thereof is more related to the 
reluctance to deal with moral rights than to a consideration that the issue is irrelevant. In many 
Member States, exceptions are only admissible once the work has been published, publicly made 
available or disclosed and it would be difficult to intervene in that field, that is very sensible in a 
number of countries, as the discussion of the orphan works directive has showed. A sound 
solution would be to leave the matter at the discretion of Member States. However, unpublished 
works have often a critical importance for historical, scientific or cultural reasons and intrinsically 
belong to the cultural heritage whose preservation has been declared as a European policy 
objective. If the act is limited to reproduction for archiving and preservation, its effect is similar to 
the holding by the library of an unpublished work. The issue of a divulgation beyond the intention 
of the author will rather intervene if the work is made available to the public, in contradiction to the 
moral right of divulgation and possible privacy concerns. We would suggest that the exception for 
preservation allows the reproduction of unpublished works for preservation and archiving 
purposes, including format-shifting and mass digitisation, upon the condition that some indication 
of the unpublished status of the work appears on the copies, but that further acts of public 
disclosure or communication be restrained, by lack of the explicit consent of the copyright 
owners. 
- limitation of preservation to works no longer commercially available 
The High level Group of Digital Libraries suggests that preservation should be justified only for 
works that are no longer commercially available in any format, considering that if the work is 
available on the market there would no need to preserve it except within national libraries’ deposit 
schemes. This opinion comes from confusion between a work and its artefact: an item in a library 
is a particular embodiment of a work, for instance an edition with a precise date, by some 
publisher, with some typographical arrangement. That justifies the need to preserve it as it is, as 
a singular item, and not as a work (that is the immaterial content detached from its many 
embodiments in tangible support). Even if the work is still available in another format or revised 
edition, preservation of all editions is relevant for cultural heritage. Conversely, in order to replace 
a damaged or lost item, libraries and similar institutions could be imposed to acquire the work in 
general trade if it still exists in the same format and edition. 
A differentiated treatment depending on the purpose pursued may be justified on that question, 
as it was already suggested when addressing the different purposes of the exception. As a rule, it 
could be proposed that when the reproduction act belongs to the key and public-interest mission 
of cultural heritage institutions to preserve and archive works, the market would not be best 
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placed to determine the modalities of the preservation for normative reasons, except if the act of 
reproduction harms the normal exploitation of the work. 
Should the exception cover some limited activities of copying and delivering on request, it would 
have an adverse effect on the market for the work concerned if the copyright owners offer this 
work on demand. For that reason, the delivery upon request should not be admitted if the work is 
subject to licensing conditions that prohibit such making available. The case of format-shifting is 
more disputable. One could argue that libraries could shift to a digital format by acquiring on the 
market new digital editions of works they hold in an analogue format. Libraries would object that, 
in order to avoid constant format-shifting, they would need to shift the works in the most perennial 
format possible that might not be the format available on the market. If the format of the works 
offered on sale on the market promises to last, is less costly than digitisation by the library itself 
and has a better quality than the copy digitised from the analogue item, cultural heritage 
institutions will naturally acquire the works through normal trade. In the case of format-shifting, we 
would plead that the market would not be efficient to substitute to the decision of the libraries, 
archives and museums as what would be the best way to accomplish their preservation mission. 
- born-digital works: The need for digitization of works that have been created or first 
commercially exploited in a digital form appears less justified, as there is no need to preserve 
such works by migrating them into a digital format. However, librarians, archivists and museum 
curators who regularly deal with those type of works are particular aware of their peculiar 
‘fragility’, firstly because their digital format tends to be more rapidly unreadable than analogue 
works, due to the rapid pace of technological change, and secondly since the digital format itself 
is sometimes more precarious and less reliable than the analogue. The first digital works of the 
80’s, like the first computer games or digital videos, are nowadays difficult to read due to the 
obsolescence of their format and the lack of adapted devices capable to play them.  Museum of 
contemporary art that hold a collection of videos of that period, spend a lot of work and time to 
restore such material due to their very volatile medium.  Preservation is hence certainly needed 
for born-digital works.  
Besides, born-digital works will be the primary candidates for regular format-shifting and for web-
harvesting (should these objectives be covered by the revised exception). 
- Acts covered by the exception 
The exception of article 5(2) c) only encompasses acts of reproduction. There is no need to cover any 
other acts. No dissemination of preserved or digitized works for other purposes should be allowed by the 
exception as it could impair the development of exploitation models by copyright owners themselves.  
The only exceptions could be:  
- the supplying of a single copy of a work to users for research and private study, as considered 
above; 
- acts of communication that are ancillary to the act of  reproduction and that do not have any 
independent significance (e.g. the sending of a copy to the person in charge of the digitization 
process); 
- acts of communication based on digitized copies that are authorized by copyright law on other 
grounds, such as on-site consultation (see below) or circulation of a tangible digital copy to other 
libraries in the frame of interlibrary loans
728
.  
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A particular case could be the supply of a copy of a work once digitized to another cultural heritage 
institution in order to share the costs of digitization. The mutualisation of digitization efforts by the 
institutions concerned is recommended by the Report of the Comité des Sages
729
 and by the European 
Council
730
.  
In order to curb restrictive transpositions in Member States, it should be made clear that: 
- digital copying is covered by the exception: some member States chose not to authorize digital 
copies of works for preservation, or to authorize them upon certain conditions. In its interpretation 
of copyright exceptions encompassed in the article 5 of the directive 2001/29 on copyright in the 
information society, the European Court of Justice has insisted on the overall objective of the 
directive to adapt copyright to the digital age
731
. Accordingly, restricting preservation of works and 
the exercise of the corresponding exception to analogue format only, is pointless.  
- multiple copying is allowed: Limiting the exception, as some Member States do, to one single 
copy does not make sense in the digital environment where even a single act of reproduction 
might imply many technical copies and digitization inevitably results in multiple copies. Format-
shifting will necessitate regular copying and cultural heritage institutions should be able to make 
as many copies as necessary in order to adapt to new formats to preserve works.  
The High Level Expert Group on Digital Libraries recommends that libraries and archives were 
authorized to make more than one copy of works whose purpose is preservation. It also advises 
that institutions coordinate themselves at the European level to avoid duplication of these works 
and thus streamline the process
732
. The conclusion of the report of the Comité des Sages goes 
the same way. To facilitate the work of conservation by institutions, which often need to migrate 
from one format to another, it should be allowed to make multiple copies for archiving
733
. 
Nevertheless, the making of multiple copies to multiply access to them instead of purchasing 
duplicate copies or additional licences should not be authorised
734
.  
The terminology of “specific acts of reproduction” has been construed restrictively by some Member 
States and creates uncertainty when more comprehensive acts of copying (for instance for format 
shifting) are at stake. Limitations of the format and number of the copies are also triggered by the fear of 
Member States not to comply with the requirement for the acts to be “specific”. A solution to provide some 
flexibility as to the acts of copying that are concerned, without affecting the interests of copyright owners 
or the normal exploitation of the work, would be to replace the “specific acts of reproduction” by  “acts of 
reproduction necessary to their purpose”. A similar expression appears in the Belgium law. It entitles the 
eligible institutions to carry out any copy, to the extent it is required by the preservation or other 
authorized purpose, without being bound by restrictive technicalities.  
Finally, a useful addition could be to explicitly define the condition of “not aiming at direct or indirect 
economic or commercial advantage” that appears in the conditions of the article 5(2) c), generally 
understood as applying to the eligible institutions and/or to the acts they undertake. This requirement has 
been taken from the directive 2006/115 on rental and lending rights. According to that directive, the 
absence of direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage that distinguishes lending from rental, 
occurs, in case of any payment when its amount does not go beyond what is necessary to cover the 
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operating costs of the establishment. An adapted definition could be usefully taken over in the recitals or 
an interpretative document of the library exception. 
- Further conditions  
The exception in article 5(2) c) of the directive does not require fair compensation to copyright owners 
but Member States, as for any exception of the directive, can decide to apply one.  The need to apply a 
fair compensation regime does not seems justified as there appears to be no unreasonable or significant 
harm done to copyright owners if the authorized acts are limited to copying for preservation and archiving, 
even if one decide to understand it broadly and include therein reproductions for format-shifting and 
mass-digitization.  
One further recommendation could be to get inspiration from a specific provision of Belgian copyright law 
that gives copyright owners access to the copy made by the library and archive for preservation. This 
solution could be particularly justified when the restoration, for instance of a movie, concerned a rare work 
or the last copy available. Copyright owners have an interest in getting access to the only copy available 
to exercise their rights, once the work has been restored,. 
That solution might prove interesting when such access would be necessary for copyright and other 
related rights holders to exercise their rights and without prejudicing the legitimate interests of the library 
or archive having preserved the work. It could contribute to one objective of the preservation of cultural 
heritage put forward by the Council conclusions and recommendation of the Commission on digitization, 
i.e. the fostering of new exploitations of works. Providing access to restored copies when needed to 
copyright owners would help them to develop new exploitations of their works in line with such objective. 
Some remuneration to contribute to the efforts of digitization made by the institution concerned should be 
paid by copyright owners if they benefit from the preserved or restored copy. 
As a conclusion, the different conditions for each possible extension of the exception could be as follows: 
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c) Efforts towards more harmonisation in Member States 
Revising the exception in the directive 2001/29 might not be sufficient. Indeed the issues for digitisation of 
cultural heritage did not come mostly from the directive itself but of the discretion left to Member States in 
its transposition and in the ensuing discrepancies in the scope of authorized acts amongst the national 
copyright laws. Fundamentally, the leeway felt to Member States when implementing the exception has 
often yielded restrictive approach that made the promises of the directive in favour of libraries rather 
empty or intricate to apply in practice.  
Furthermore, even though the acts of reproduction undertaken by libraries to preserve and archive their 
collection do not have a immediate cross-border dimension, the lack of harmonisation and the differing 
scope of the exception from one country to the other create difficulties for libraries collaborating in 
European projects. This has raised uncertainties for libraries that need to ascertain the scope of what 
they could do in one country or the other, as well as for copyright owners who need to know what are the 
boundaries of their exclusive rights in each country.  
The lack of harmonization of exceptions, despite the intent of the directive of 2001, has been regularly 
regretted or denounced
735
.  
Working towards more harmonisation of the libraries exceptions should be done in parallel to the possible 
revision of the content of such exceptions 
(i) Making the exception mandatory in the Member States 
The most daring solution to increase harmonization would be to make some exceptions in the list of 
article 5 of the directive compulsory. This is only the case now of the exception for transient copy, 
provided for in article 5(1). The optional character of the exceptions has always been preferred by the 
European lawmaker in all copyright and related rights directives
736
.  
Granting a mandatory nature to some exceptions could be justified on three grounds: 
1° Internal Market operation: an exception should be mandatory for Member States when 
inconsistent implementation would distort and create discrepancies in the Internal Market. This 
does not appear to be the case, as we have seen, with the exception for libraries, archives and 
museums as it primarily relates to acts of copying located in one Member State. The question of 
the impact on the smooth functioning of the internal market seems irrelevant because works are 
not supposed to be communicated between Member States. Digitization for preservation – 
without making available – only deals with the market of a given Member State. However, 
different conditions for the preservation of collections from one Member State to another could 
create a fragmented approach in the safeguarding of European cultural heritage, which could 
have an indirect effect on the Internal Market for that purpose. 
2° Fundamental freedom recognised by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: when the 
exception is grounded on the need to enable the exercise of a fundamental freedom that is part of 
the EU Charter, such as the freedom of expression, the freedom to information or the freedom to 
conduct business, it can be argued that such exception should be part of the copyright framework 
in all Member States. Another opinion could be that it suffices that copyright law or the judicial 
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system otherwise takes the fundamental freedom into account (for instance by admitting the 
direct defence based on the fundamental right).  
3° European public interest : M.C. Janssens argues that, considering that the exceptions reflect 
“the need and desirability for society to use a work against the impact of such a measure on the 
economic incentive for rightholders”, it will be necessary to support a coherent European 
copyright system “to (gradually) abandon the long cherished belief that the notion of what 
constitutes a legitimate or public interest should always accommodate national particularities”
737
. 
One could develop her argument further. Indeed exceptions convey some policy objectives that 
are deemed sufficiently significant to curb the exclusive rights of copyright owners. The directive, 
by opting for a non-mandatory list of exceptions, acknowledges the different policy objectives that 
Member States may desire to protect. The EU lawmaker could go a step further by 
acknowledging the policy objectives that, at the European level, are considered as requiring some 
accommodation to the normally high level of protection of copyright. The European Union has 
stated some key objectives that are of European public interest. One logical consequence would 
be to give the European Union the means to achieve such policy objectives by refraining Member 
States from deciding of the opportunity to implement an exception justified by this very public 
interest.  
That justification to make an exception mandatory could apply in the case of article 5(2) c), as the 
development of digital libraries is one of the key objectives of the Digital Agenda
738
, and the 
digitization of cultural heritage is promoted by the Council and the Commission
739
. European 
institutions agree on the need to promote the Europe’s cultural heritage in the online environment. 
Europeana and cultural heritage institutions have a key role to play in preservation and 
dissemination of culture by providing access to the public, to foster the knowledge society
740
 and 
contribute to the free movement of knowledge and innovation
741
. The enhancement of digital 
libraries does not necessarily mean that the copyright principles should leave the way for broad 
exceptions to the benefit of libraries (and policy documents dealing with digital libraries have 
always paid attention to develop digital libraries in full compliance with copyright law).  
Nonetheless, when an exception is considered as being legitimate to exempt some activities of 
libraries to fulfil their mission in the Information Society, it indicates at least that this exception is a 
means, amongst others, to achieve the mandate given to the European Union to engage in the 
preservation of its cultural heritage and that its implementation in Member States should be made 
compulsory to secure its objective at the European-wide level. 
A mandatory exception allowing for acts of preservation by libraries and archive could either be 
precisely worded and identify all applicable requirements or could only indicate some minimal 
conditions in critically important areas while imposing a precisely defined objective. Mandating the 
transposition of the exception under already precise conditions will limit the leeway for Member 
States.  
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Advantage(s) 
The key benefit of a compulsory exception is the creation of legal certainty as to what is authorized in all 
Member States. The interpretation of the exception and of its conditions is then left to the European Court 
of Justice that can develop an autonomous and uniform principle of copyright law. This process was 
demonstrated with the temporary copying exception that has already resulted in three decisions of the 
CJEU that gave an interpretation of its many conditions that is binding to the Member States. There will 
be no risk of different implementations in the Member States, and hence no discrimination or 
differentiated treatment between libraries in the Member States. 
It also has the advantage of giving some weight to the clear intention of the European Union to develop 
digital libraries and preserve European cultural heritage, not necessarily at the expense of the protection 
of copyright. In fact, making the exception mandatory, with strict requirements, could equally secure the 
rights of copyright holders, by limiting the freedom of Member States to enact an extensive exception. 
Finally, without creating a European copyright code, as recommended by some, introducing a closed list 
of mandatory exceptions in the directive 2001/29, would contribute to the goal of a coherent copyright 
system that not only harmonizes exclusive rights but also key exceptions and limitations. 
Disadvantage(s) 
The choice for a list of compulsory exceptions within the general list of admissible exceptions would 
create a much-contested territory. Both users and rightholders would argue for and against the upgrading 
of some exceptions to the mandatory status, which would add to the complexity of copyright lawmaking. 
This would be a new direction in EU copyright law.  
As a rule, imposing too many rules through directive runs counter to the proportionality principle or the 
subsidiarity principle.  
(ii) An optional exception with precisely-defined conditions or objective 
Without going so far as enacting a mandatory exception, an alternative could be to adopt an optional 
exception with precisely defined conditions (as to the types of works, copies, purposes, as developed 
above) or with a prescribed objective. The harmonization effect could then be supported by a recent 
CJEU decision has stated that: “(…) although it is open to the Member States (…) to introduce an 
exception (…) into their domestic law, an interpretation according to which Member States which, 
exercising that option afforded to them by European Union law, have introduced an exception of that kind, 
are free to determine, in an un-harmonised manner, the limits thereof, (…) would be contrary to the 
objective of that directive (…), inasmuch as the limits of that exception could vary from one Member State 
to another and would therefore give rise to potential inconsistencies”
742
. In other words, even if Member 
States are free to implement an optional exception of a European directive, they are not allowed to 
undermine the objectives of the exception in the directive. An exception should be interpreted in a way 
that enables its effectiveness and the achievement of its purpose
743
. This teleological interpretation can 
prescribe to Member States to implement the exception so as to abide by the objective ascribed by the 
directive
744
 and more generally to “allow and ensure the development and operation of new 
technologies”
745
. When the conditions of the exception are detailed in the directive, the discretion left to 
Member States is reduced accordingly. We will see further on the example of the exception for on-site 
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consultation that has generally be transposed verbatim by Member States, due to the precision of the 
directive as to the conditions of the exception. 
Recitals of a revised directive or an interpretative document could then elaborate on the objective of the 
exception in permitting the safeguarding of European cultural heritage. This could curtail restrictive 
application of the exception by the Member States. 
The overall objectives of the exceptions in the directive – i.e. to promote access to culture and to facilitate 
the internal market and the development of the information society (see above) – are already described in 
the recitals, but the precise objective of each exception is not clearly determined.  
Advantage(s) 
Further clarifying the objective and scope of the exception in favour of libraries would give a general 
mandate for the Member States without imposing the details of the legal provision authorizing the 
concerned activities.  That would leave some leeway to Member States which could better determine, 
depending on their national context, how to achieve the objective of safeguarding their cultural heritage. 
Harmonisation does not necessarily mean uniformity, as was pointed out by the Legal Advisory Board in 
an early critique of legislative precedent to the directive
746
. Distinctive features in national laws could then 
subsist if they do not hinder the operation of the internal market, which is normally not the case with acts 
of copying carried out within libraries. 
Disadvantage(s) 
The explicit definition of the objective of the exception of article 5(2) c) may not be sufficient to achieve 
harmonization, even partially. Member States have well understood the objective pursued by the directive 
in that regard, though that did not prevent them from adopting very diverse exceptions for libraries, with 
different scope and conditions. The efficiency of the apparently simple solution mainly relies on the recent 
case law of the ECJ that favours a teleological approach of the exception. The court decisions in question 
however are triggered by questions of interpretation of an exception and of unclear conditions. It does not 
go so far as modifying the requirements imposed by the national law to the benefit of the exception, 
except in one decision where one requirement of the national law was left aside to make prevail the 
freedom of expression enshrined in the exception
747
.  
d) Facilitating copyright clearance by libraries 
Once defined the exact scope and boundaries of the exceptions to the benefit of libraries, museum, 
educational establishments and archives, some activities undertaken by those institutions in their mission 
of preservation, archiving and keeping accessible our cultural heritage will be necessarily left outside of 
the exception. Cultural heritage institutions will need to get authorization from copyright owners for such 
activities, that may be, depending on the choice as to the extent of the exception, acts of web harvesting, 
mass-digitization, sending upon request or, in all probability since dissemination of works should not be 
exempted, making available the digitized collection online.  
When accomplishing such tasks, libraries and other similar institutions face high transactions cost by 
reason of the number of works and rightholders concerned, the high-volume of transactions of little 
individual value.  
The interests of the libraries could be accommodated by the European lawmaker, by having recourse to 
other tools than exceptions, that would help conclude such transactions between those particular users 
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and the rightholders. The recital 40 of the directive already suggests that “specific contracts or licences 
should be promoted which, without creating imbalances, favour such establishments and the 
disseminative purposes they serve”. The cultural mission of the libraries and archives was clearly seen 
then as a justified ground to qualify the exercise of exclusive rights and developing adapted licensing.  
This section envisages initiatives that could be taken by the European Commission to help libraries and 
other eligible institutions to clear copyright for the uses of works that will not be governed by a revised (or 
not) article 5(2) c) of the directive 2001/29. It will cover successively the recourse to framework contracts, 
Memorandum of Understanding or other licensing agreements, compulsory collective management and 
extended collective licensing. 
(i) Encouraging Memorandum of Understanding or other arrangements between 
stakeholders 
The European Commission has launched diverse initiatives in the recent years to promote dialogue 
between stakeholders where some valuable uses of copyrighted works were not easy to clear and 
licensed, either due to the high volume of works, generally for little value for each transaction. Some of 
this initiatives related to uses of works by libraries have been addressed earlier.  
Memorandums of Understanding are sector-specific stakeholder-driven agreements negotiated 
amongst organisations representing users of works on one side and publishers, authors and their 
collecting societies on the other. It contains the key principles that will govern the license of the envisaged 
use and generally encourage voluntary collective licensing.  
The existing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning the use by libraries of out-of-print works 
has been analysed above. The European Commission has also helped to draft a Memorandum of 
Understanding on access to works for persons with print disabilities. The increase recourse to MoUs is 
justified by context where there is a need, without allowing for an exception, to achieve consensus 
amongst stakeholders on how to solve practical issues of copyright clearance and licensing.  
Framework contract will provide a more detailed frame for copyright licensing as it will state the 
provisions of a contract that could serve as a model for the copyright license that concerned users and 
copyright owners could decide to enter. 
In the Licenses for Europe initiative, the Commission has also started a dialogue between relevant 
stakeholders on some identified issues of copyright licensing in order to deliver “practical industry-led 
solutions to these issues, without prejudice to further public policy action, including legislative reform, as 
appropriate"
748
. Possible outcomes of such discussion, that includes a strand (see above) on digitization 
and availability of audiovisual cultural heritage, could be the collection of best practices, MoUs or 
framework contracts. It is too early to know the practical result of the Working Group on Audiovisual works 
but at mid-term, there seems already to be some consensus to work on an MoU for digitization of films 
that are out-of-distribution on the model of the one existing in the print sector. 
The European Commission could develop further and help stakeholders to structure their dialogue by 
such types of framework documents, for all activities that it decides not to be included in the exception.    
Advantage(s) 
MoUs and other framework arrangements have the great advantage of being based on voluntary 
agreement stemming from all the parties concerned without any need to change the law. The MoUs 
promote a pragmatic approach to copyright licensing, while taking into account the specific needs of 
users and the mission they might assume. Its advantages are its flexibility for the right holders and users, 
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the possibility of negotiation of the terms and conditions with the libraries (that might evolve over time), as 
well as the absence of a choice for any particular legal system. For libraries, the MoU could help them 
accomplishing their task in the digital environment while reducing the constraints and increasing legal 
security as to the conditions and modalities of copyright licensing. It also decreases transaction costs, as 
negotiating contracts with copyright holders is framed on a commonly-agreed model. When the 
agreement provides that the licensing will be achieved through collective management, it helps the 
concerned institutions to identify the copyright owners and clear copyright through single points of contact 
that are the collective management organisations.  
MoUs will generally be sector-specific which may better fit the concerns and needs of each creative 
sector.  Furthermore, they ensure sufficient flexibility in the granting of the licenses.  
Disadvantage(s) 
MoUs and other framework arrangements are generally non-binding and could not be endorsed by all 
stakeholders. To counter such risk, the existing MoUs at the European level have gathered around the 
table the most representative actors of the users and copyright owners concerned.  
When the arrangement has recourse to collective management organisations, some legislative backing 
would be useful to ensure that all rightholders are represented by the CMO in their sector. 
(ii) Compulsory collective management 
Compulsory collective management of an exclusive right limits the individual exercise of copyright by 
entrusting these rights by law to a collective management organisation. This is a solution that has 
sometimes been put forward to deal with situations where the multiplicity of works whose copyright should 
be cleared creates significant transaction costs and the risk not to identify all copyright owners is too high. 
As a consequence, libraries, museums and archives could enter in negotiations with collective 
management organisations to clear rights concerned by their activities of digitization and dissemination.  
The French law on out-of-print-works sets up a regime of almost compulsory collective management, 
since authors and publishers of works that are not commercially available and who have not opt out of the 
system, will see their rights exercised by a CMO. 
The system of compulsory collective management is a very straightforward solution but seems 
contradictory with the process of both MoUs and Licenses for Europe that insist on voluntary collective 
management (and to some extent with the process of the draft directive on collective management).  
(iii) Extended collective licensing  
The mechanism of extended collective licensing comes from the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden). Initially, this system is characterized by a voluntary transfer, by the right 
holders, of their rights to a collecting society for the licensing of the use of their works. The essential 
element is the voluntary membership of the right holders
749
. CMOs then establish contracts with end 
users allowing certain uses of the repertoire they make available to them. This is only in a second stage 
that these licensing agreements might be extended, by legislation, to all right holders of certain categories 
of works. The repertoire managed by the collective society is then extended to right holders who were not 
initially members. The only requirement is that the collecting society demonstrates its legitimacy in that it 
already represents a significant part of a given category of works. The extended collective license is 
automatically extended to all the authors in a given sector, including foreign authors, except where the 
law provides for a system of opt-out for authors. 
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This system is already in place for acts of mass-digitization and making available undertaken by libraries 
in Denmark (reproduction upon request y libraries), Finland, Norway (both countries provide ECL for 
reproduction and communication to the public by libraries, archives and museums), and Sweden 
(distribution of works to individual library patrons). 
It could either be proposed to Member States as a solution for the clearance of rights for some activities 
of libraries not covered by an exception or be introduced at the European level as a uniform rights 
clearance system. 
Advantage(s) 
This system is a sort of mandatory collective management that is imposed on non-members of a 
collecting society. Similarly to compulsory collective management, it helps users to get a license for a 
whole repertoire without the need to verify who is actually represented by the CMO concerned. An added 
value of the ECL is that it is triggered only when a CMO is considered as being representative of the 
authors in a specific sector and has already negotiated licenses for that kind of uses on their behalf.  
As stated by the Hooper Report commissioned by the British Government, “ECL will appeal more in areas 
where licensing is characterised by high-volume, low-value transactions with high administration costs for 
individual clearance”
750
, which is the case of many uses envisaged by libraries that might not be covered 
by the exception. It could provide a workable solution for cultural institutions to get proper licenses 
covering their activities.  
Disadvantage(s) 
This solution is typical to Nordic countries and may not be transposed easily in other legal traditions that 
could not be adapted to welcome such a foreign transplant. Yet, the ECL is seducing an increasing 
number of Member States that consider their implementation in their national copyright law. For instance 
the UK Intellectual Property Office recommends the solution of ECL for mass-digitization and orphan 
works
751
, as well as the Report Lescure commissioned by the French Government.  
The regime of ECL presupposes a representative CMOs with good governance and transparency and 
that has some volume of licensing the use in question (before such licenses can be extended to non-
members). The inherent problem of representativeness and of protection of the interests of non-members 
by the CMO concerned is particularly present for foreign authors who will be “absorbed” by the system. 
One significant problem with ECL is its cross-border operation. The CMOs is generally only 
representative of national authors
752
 and the question of the remuneration of foreign authors for acts 
authorised under an ECL is still disputed. 
Introducing the ECL at the European level could be seen as contradictory to the subsidiarity principle.  
  
                                                     
 
750
 R. HOOPER & R. LYNCH, Copyright works. Streamlining copyright licensing for the digital age, 2012, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/dce-
report-phase2.pdf, §142. 
751
 See R. HOOPER & R. LYNCH, op. cit., Annex I. 
752
 J. ROSEN, "News from the Nordic Countries", RIDA., Janvier 2011, p.185. 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 307 
 
 
C. The exception for on-site consultation in libraries 
The article 5(3) n) of the InfoSoc Directive authorizes Member States to provide for an exception or 
limitation for the “use by communication or making available, for the purpose of research or private study, 
to individual members of the public by dedicated terminals on the premises of establishments referred to 
in paragraph 2(c) of works and other subject-matter not subject to purchase or licensing terms which are 
contained in their collections”.  
This exception has been introduced in the text of the directive at the stage of the common position, 
following the demand of some Member States to add to the previously limited list of exceptions of the 
article 5, some other uses that were either existing in their national law or considered as relevant. There 
is no other indication in the preparatory acts as to the rationale of the exception. 
This exception aims at enabling consultation of works in a digital format
753
 on specific equipment under 
similar conditions to the browsing of a book in a library. It will generally imply a first act of digitization of 
the work in order to make possible its consultation on dedicated devices. During that process, search 
capacities could be added to the digitised work to help the research and consultation by end-users. The 
evolution of digital practices and the virtual abolition of the distance between users and content, wherever 
the latter is kept, have generated an increasing number of requests from users and researchers to be 
able to consult the collection of libraries at distance. The exception of article 5(3) n) was not aimed at 
making the items of a library accessible online. The key issue, should the lawmaker consider the 
exception outdated and in need of adaptation to broader possibilities of consultation, would be to 
determine the scope of the notion of “on-site consultation”. The existing exception is limited by spatial and 
technical restrictions, for the consultation should occur on the physical premises and through dedicated 
terminals.  If one wishes to abolish those walls (of the library and of the equipment), the question is what 
should be the proper boundaries of place and means where the consultation can take place.  
This part will assess whether the scope of this exception has not become too narrow in the context of 
technological changes and examine whether the restrictive nature of the permitted consultations 
(research or private study) of digital archives should not be updated 
754
. 
To this end, the notion and scope of the on-site consultation exception in the directive will first be 
analysed (1.). Then, the national implementations of the exception in Member States will be described 
(2.). This will enable the assessment of the exception and the possible issues and uncertainties it raises 
(3.). Finally, some recommendations will be made (4.).  
1. Scope of the exception in the directive 
a) Objectives 
Contrary to the exception benefitting the libraries by virtue of article 5(2) c) of the directive, the objective 
of the acts authorised by the article 5(3) n) is clearly and strictly stated. The making available of works by 
libraries for consultation on their premises should be limited to research and private study.  
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Nothing in the adoption process of the directive or in the preparatory acts define the notions of “research” 
or “private study”.  
Contrary to the exception for teaching and scientific research (see infra), research is not accompanied by 
the requirement of “scientific”, but should nevertheless exclude research for commercial purposes
755
.  
Excluding research for commercial purposes would normally preclude consultation in libraries undertaken 
for professional purposes, such as lawyers consulting law reviews articles within a library to prepare a 
case 
756
. The commercial purpose should however be reasonably interpreted. A researcher in a university 
still does non-commercial research even if it results in a publication of a book (that could maybe yield 
some revenue)
757
. 
Private study could be defined as “study which is not done directly or indirectly for a commercial 
purpose”
758
 but should aim at exploration and acquisition of knowledge and not merely at 
entertainment
759
.  
b) Beneficiaries 
The act of consultation should take place on the premises of the institutions referred to in article 5(2) c), 
i.e. publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums and archives. Those institutions 
are the beneficiaries of the exception and are authorised to make works available for the purpose of 
research and private study. What has been said earlier in the frame of the analysis of the exception for 
some acts of reproduction can be summarized here.  
The institutions covered encompass libraries, educational establishments, museums and archives that 
are not further defined by the directive. Amongst those institutions, libraries and archives are likely to offer 
for consultation some parts of their collections. It might be less frequent in museums and educational 
establishments. 
The eligible institutions should be publicly accessible, at the exception of archives as we have seen 
above. This requirement means that the access to libraries, museums and educational establishments is 
allowed to the general public without discrimination. It does not require regular opening hours or ban 
conditions for access (as the payment of a fee or a registration as a student for instance).  
The second condition is the non-profit nature of the institutions concerned. This is referred to in article 
5(2) c) as the requirement that those establishments are “not for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage”. This does not amount to a public nature of the institutions. Privately funded or operated 
libraries would be eligible if their activities do not aim at making a profit. Requiring some fee to enter or 
consult the collection is also admissible if it does not exceed the costs incurred by the library or archive.  
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c) Works concerned 
The exception is not restricted to some categories of works. There is no limitation either as to the quantity 
of works (such as extracts or small parts) that can be subject to consultation.  
Two conditions pertain to the object of consultation though. Firstly, the works that could be offered for 
viewing on-site, should be contained in the collections of the libraries, educational establishments, 
archives and museums concerned. Therefore, on-line viewing of library’s collection on another library’s 
premises is not covered
760
. But that also seems to prevent those institutions from putting on consultation 
terminals works they have temporarily borrowed or received from other institutions or persons or to link 
those terminals to webpages where works could be consulted.  
The second condition excludes from the benefit of the exception works that are subject to purchase or 
licensing terms. The objective is to enable the rights holders to conclude contracts with libraries to 
determine the conditions for such on-site consultation, which could be particularly relevant for some 
scientific works whose presentation or business model includes viewing and searching capabilities. This 
condition also means that the exception can be contracted out. 
The interpretation of the scope of this requirement is however not easy, as demonstrated by the recent 
referral to the European Court of Justice by the German Federal Court of Justice in a case involving the 
Technische Universität Darmstadt
761
. The university library had digitized one book about Modern History 
to make it available on electronic readings points, whereas the publisher of the book proposed to the 
library to purchase e-books of the textbooks it published, including the book in question. That offer was 
not taken up by the library.  
Amongst the questions referred to the European Court, the exact scope and meaning of the condition of  
“works not being subject to purchase or licensing terms”: does it include an offer by the rightholder to 
conclude licensing agreements?  
A broad construction of the condition would exclude the application of the exception as soon as the work 
is available on the market for purchase or licensing under terms that prohibit the on-site consultation by 
libraries
762
. In other words, if a work is “offered for sale or can be licensed on the market”
 763
, the 
exception does not apply. That would prevent libraries to make available on their terminals digitized 
copies of works they hold in their collections, if the same work is now available in a licensed version 
governing such making available.  
A more restrictive approach would consist in interpreting the condition as meaning that the library should 
not be bound by a specific contract that prohibits or regulates making a work available for on-site 
consultation. Only a contract actually agreed upon with the library would override the exception, not the 
mere offer to contract.    
The Technische Universität Darmstadt case lies in the middle as it is not the mere availability of the 
textbook in an electronic format subject to licensing terms that bothers the German court but the 
existence of a specific offer made to the library to purchase that electronic copy and to enter in a 
contractual relationship with the rightholder.  
The reading of the directive does not offer much guidance and the different linguistic versions are open to 
similar ambiguity (‘non soggetti a vincoli di vendita o di licenza’, ‘non soumis à des conditions en matière 
d’achat ou de licence’ in French, ‘que no son objecto de condiciones de adquisicion o de licencia’ in 
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Spanish’, ‘für die keine Regelungen über Verkauf und Lizenzen gelten’ in German). The Dutch version 
appears to include a mere offer to purchase a work, by referring to “werken die niet te koop worden 
aangeboden of aan licentievoorwaarden zijn onderworpen (that can be translated by works not offered for 
sale or not subject to licensing terms).  
The most restrictive approach is nothing else than a repetition of the contractual prohibition applicable to 
the libraries (and the statement that this exception can be contracted out). The other interpretation leaves 
more leeway to copyright owners to develop business models enabling consultation of their works on the 
premises of libraries which can be an important development for works likely to be often viewed for 
research or private study purposes, such as textbooks, newspapers or other scientific works. However, it 
would mean that the benefit of the exception would depend on changes of exploitation models decided by 
the rightholder. The making available of one work by a library for consultation purpose could suddenly not 
be legitimate anymore if the publisher decides to release an electronic version subject to unilaterally 
decided license terms. In other words, is a mere offer from the rightholder sufficient to rule out the 
exception of article 5(3) n) ?  
The German Bundesgerichtshof, in its referral to the CJEU, argues in favour of the broader position on 
the ground that copyright owners should not be refrained from granting the user the rights on appropriate 
terms. The principle of the directive for a high protection of copyright also inclines to agree with that 
position. The question is now left for the CJEU to decide. 
A last point worth mentioning is the fact that databases and software are not subject to the limitation as 
exceptions to such subject-matter are dealt with in other directives. As to computer programs, their on-
site consultation does not make much sense, except once again for computer games. Indeed, specialized 
archives or museums have no other means to provide consultation of those particular cultural items for 
research or private viewing than installing and making them available on devices within their premises. 
No exception authorizes such making available in the directive 2009/24 on the legal protection of 
computer programs
764
.  
No exception would apply to the making available of databases for on-site consultation. The consultation 
of databases on dedicated terminals is certainly important for libraries, but the acquisition of databases by 
libraries and the rights of using them will generally be subject to licensing conditions. Such consultation 
also forms a core element of the exploitation of the types of databases (generally scientific databases) 
that are likely to be significant for libraries and should hence not be allowed by an exception. 
d)  Authorised acts 
(i) The explicit limitations of the exception 
The directive allows the use by communication or making available.  
Such communication should be restricted to individual members of the public. The exception does not 
allow the communication directed towards the general public or to a gathered audience
765
. One can 
wonder whether the making available of some works contained in the collection of a museum to visitors 
qualifies as a communication to individual members of the public. For instance a film museum could 
provide extracts of films to illustrate the history of cinema on specific terminals along the visit of the 
collection, as it might not be directed to individual members of the public.  It will depend on the 
circumstances of the making available and of the purpose thereof (that should remain research or private 
study to be admissible). If the works are viewable as public performances, the exception would certainly 
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not apply, but if they are at disposal for individual visitors wishing to know more about the topic of 
exhibition, the exception might in our view be admitted. In some cases, the exception of quotation could 
subsidiarily apply to the showing of film extracts to illustrate the exhibition of the museum
766
. 
The communication that is authorised by the directive is limited in two respects. It has to happen through 
dedicated terminals and on the premises of the eligible establishment. The first limitation (by dedicated 
terminals) is technical and refers to specific equipment. That could be the case if the work is made 
available for consultation on a format that requires a specific reading device (for instance, microfilms or 
projectors capable to play old film formats). However, the convergence of formats enabled by the digital 
evolution would allow that standard computers, audio and video terminals accessible to individual users 
of institutions, are covered by the exception, to the extent that their use is reserved by the library to a 
consultation function
767
. Usually the terminals provided by the libraries to view some specific works, also 
enables other functions such as research within the catalogue or on the Internet. It seems reasonable not 
to exclude such terminals from the benefit of the exception, even if the directive does not solve the 
question
768
. On the contrary, extending the provision to the personal computers used by the users 
themselves to get access to the works on the website of the library would be contrary to the exception, in 
its current wording. The recent ECJ case law that opened the interpretation of exceptions to a teleological 
approach in order to enable the purpose of the exception (in this case the consultation of the work on the 
premises of the library) could however provide for more flexibility. 
The limitation to dedicated terminals can also be understood as pursuing a security objective. It aims at 
ensuring that the consultation is limited to that device and could not extend the access to works it 
provides to users beyond mere consultation. This objective appears in the recent reference for 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU, in the question related to the possibility for the user to print the consulted 
work or make a copy thereof on an USB key, a question we will analyse in the next point. Some libraries 
disable the copying functions of the terminals or computers they provide for consultation of their 
collections or parts thereof to limit them strictly to consultation purposes. 
The second limitation, i.e. the premises of the establishment, is a spatial restriction. The English 
terminology of “premises” can either refer to the building occupied by the library, archive or museum 
(which results from the Dutch version using ‘gebouwen’), or to a more locally restrained notion of rooms 
or spaces occupied by the library or archive itself, which appears more clearly in other languages of the 
directive (‘locali’ in Italian, ‘locaux’ in French, ‘locales’ in Spanish, ‘Räumlichkeiten’ in German). This 
subtle difference of interpretation could have significance in the case of a library hosted by a research or 
education institution. Should the terminals dedicated to on-site consultation be placed within the library 
itself or could they also be provided in other places of the institutions, hence enabling a remote 
consultation within the building? The requirement of dedicated terminals restrains in any case this 
possibility.  Under the current formulation of the directive it does not seem possible for researchers within 
a university to consult works made available by the university library remotely from their offices
769
 
The conjunction of those two requirements restricts the consultation to the location of the library, 
educational establishment, museum or archive and does not completely abolish the distance between the 
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work held by the latter and the reader
770
. The exception does not in any way enable a completely remote 
consultation of the collections of cultural heritage institutions
771
.  
It also raises a difficulty to centralized libraries with some delocalised services. This happens often in 
geographically large countries that entrust the national library, usually located in the capital, with the legal 
deposit, but organise delocalised libraries in other important cities
772
. At first sight, the current notion of 
“on the premises” contained in the article 5(3) n) does not allow the central library to make works of its 
collection available to researchers or other uses requesting access thereto in a local section of the library, 
except under a teleological interpretation that seems more reasonable.  
(ii) Unsolved questions 
The article 5(3) n) itself does not mention acts of reproduction which begs the question as to whether 
the beneficiaries of the exception can digitise works they hold in order to make them available under the 
conditions of the exception. This question is also referred to the European Court of the Justice in the 
Technische Universität Darmstadt case.  
Two responses can be formulated. Such digitization could be allowed under the reproduction exception 
for preservation. In such a case, the legitimacy of the act of reproduction would depend on the notion of 
preservation applicable to the article 5(2) c).  
Another ground to admit the act of digitization preliminary to the making available for consultation could 
be its ancillary nature, as transferring the work in a digital format will often be necessary to enable its 
consultation on dedicated terminals. 
This is the position adopted by the German Federal Court in its referral to the Court of European Union. It 
explains that “the effectiveness of the provision would not be safeguarded if libraries were not permitted 
to digitise the printed works they held in order to make them available on terminals, but were instead 
required to purchase an equivalent number of digital reproductions”
773
. 
Another question referred to the Court is whether the article 5(3) n) of Directive 2001/29/EC goes so far 
as to enable users of the terminals to print out on paper or store on a USB stick the works made available 
there. Those acts exceed the making available by libraries but could define the extent of the possibilities 
offered by those institutions to users under the exception. They also indicate the boundaries of the 
consultation for research or private study if it can result in the users getting a copy of the work, at the 
detriment of the normal exploitation of the work. The German referring court distinguishes between the 
printing out and the copying on an USB stick. The first one would amount to an act of private copy of 
reprography if limited to the personal use of the library patron
774
, but the referring decision admits that the 
exception is limited to dedicated reading workplaces that normally would not permit printing. 
Nevertheless, the federal court considers that “in today’s world academic work with texts is generally 
practically possible only if important passages of a text can be marked and annotated and the relevant 
extracts can be taken from the library for further study. (…) Therefore, in order to work meaningfully with 
the texts communicated or made available on terminals for the purpose of research and private study it 
must be possible to print out and work on the texts concerned”
775
. 
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The same is not true with the digital storing of consulted works on a USB key, that is not essential to 
academic research and would conflict with the normal exploitation of the work
776
.  
A last question concerns the multiplicity of access rendered possible by the making available on 
dedicated terminal. The directive does not appear to limit the number of copies that could be installed for 
consultation of reading workplaces, or the number of simultaneous access. The fact that the work should 
be in the collection of the library does not necessarily imply that the number of access should equal the 
number of copies owned by the libraries.  
e) Further restrictions 
The directive does not impose any further conditions, and is not accompanied by the obligation of fair 
compensation to be paid to rightholders. As for the exception of article 5(2) c), that does not prevent 
Member States to apply some scheme of compensation based on the possible harm caused to the 
rightholders.  
f) Concerned users 
As indicated before, the making available of the work is reserved to individual members of the public for 
the purpose of research or private study.  
2. Implementation of the exception in the Member States 
The exception for on-site consultation has not been transposed in 9 Member States
777
. Amongst the 
countries we have analysed, the United Kingdom does not know any exception enabling the making 
available of works for consultation on the premises of libraries and archives, but the current process of 
revising the exceptions intends to add a new provision in the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act for that 
purpose.   
The countries having enacted the exception have generally implemented in a way that is identical or very 
close to the text of the directive.  
a) Objectives 
The purpose of research and private study has been literally taken over in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands. 
Similar purposes such as personal viewing or study in Denmark
778
, research or learning in Poland
779
. 
Spain only mentions research as the purpose of this exception.  
None of those countries further define the ‘research’ or ‘private study’, but the UK draft for a new 
exception limits its purpose to non-commercial research or private study. 
The Luxemburg adds to the literal transposition of article 5(3) n) the communication of audiovisual works 
within film archives with the objective of promoting the film cultural heritage
780
.  
                                                     
 
776
 Ibidem, paragraph 36. 
777
 According to the first report on the evaluation of the directive 2001/29, Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK have not transposed the article 5(3) n) of the directive.  
778
 Article 16a, (1) of the Danish Consolidated Act No. 202 of 27 February 2010 on Copyright. 
779
 Article 28, (3) of the Polish Law No. 83 of 4 February 1994 on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights. 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 314 
 
b) Beneficiaries 
The directive aligns the beneficiaries of the exception for on-site consultation on those enumerated in the 
article 5(2) c) for certain acts of reproduction. This parallelism appears also in the national 
implementations of the exception.  
The exception benefits to libraries, educational establishments, museums and archives in Belgium (where 
educational establishments is extended to teaching and scientific establishments), in Denmark
781
, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain
782
, as well as in the draft text revising the UK Copyright law. 
Educational establishments are not listed in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and museums are 
missing in Poland (that includes libraries, archives and schools). In France, the law related to the legal 
deposit of 1992 has been amended to implement the article 5(3) n of the directive and to allow the 
consultation of collections on the premises of the libraries in charge of such legal deposit. 
All relevant national provisions require that the beneficiaries do not search direct or indirect commercial 
or economic advantage, at the exception of Denmark (that requires though that the beneficiaries are 
financed in whole or in part by the public authorities), Italy and Poland. One can think that this limitation is 
implicit in those countries. Hungary explicitly states that the displaying and the communication should not 
be intended for earning or increasing income even in an indirect way.  
c) Works concerned 
The national copyright laws generally apply the exception to all categories of works. The Netherlands only 
mentions literary, scientific or artistic work, which seems to exclude sound and audiovisual works.  
Most countries repeat the requirement laid down in the directive according to which the work must be in 
the collection of the library or similar establishment. 
All national laws, but France and Poland, exclude the application of the authorized use when the work is 
subject to purchase or licensing terms. Those terms are not more defined than in the directive. The 
Netherlands replaces the formulation of the directive by “unless otherwise agreed”. 
Finally, Denmark and Germany impose that the work be published to allow for the exception. A similar 
requirement appears in France, Luxembourg and Belgium in a general provision applicable to all 
exceptions to copyright and related rights
783
. The draft revision of the Copyright Act in the United Kingdom 
would require that the work be lawfully acquired. 
d) Authorised acts 
Usually the communication and making available are covered by the exception (with slight deviations 
such as display in Poland). In France the exception is merged with that authorizing libraries, museums 
and archives to undertake acts of reproduction or communication for preservation purposes. A second 
objective of enabling on-site consultation appears in the same provision
784
. 
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As said above, France
785
 also allows the reproduction of works to the extent necessary for the 
consultation for purposes of research or private study. 
The on-site condition has been implemented sometimes by using different terminology but with the same 
result than the directive. As to the definition of the equipment through which the communication can 
occur, France
786
, Germany
787
, Italy
788
 refers to dedicated terminals as in the Directive (as does the UK 
draft revising the copyright exceptions), whereas other Member States use the terminology of special 
terminals (Belgium
789
), technical equipment (Denmark
790
), the screens of dedicated terminals (Hungary), 
information technology system terminals (Poland
791
) or add a requirement of communication through 
closed network (the Netherlands
792
) or closed and internal network (Spain
793
) to the condition of dedicated 
terminals. The French legal provision on legal deposit, that doubles the copyright exception for on-site 
consultation, refers to individual consultation posts whose use is exclusively reserved to researchers
794
.  
Concerning the premises, this spatial limitation appears in all legislations but the Netherlands that 
mentions the buildings of the institutions (‘gebouwen’), which could be construed more broadly.  
e) Further restrictions 
In addition, the payment of an equitable remuneration is required in Germany
795
 and Spain
796
.  
Germany also adds conditions related to the number of copies made simultaneously available that cannot 
exceed the number of copies of the works owned by the institution. 
f) Concerned users 
As the Member States usually take over the purpose of research and private study and the 
communication to individuals, there is no need to further specify the final beneficiary of the making 
available. One notable exception is the French law on legal deposit that requires, for consultation of 
works organised by the institutions in charge of the legal deposit, that the communication be only 
addressed to accredited researchers
797
. 
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3. Assessment of the exception – Issues and uncertainties 
a) Assessment of the adequacy of the exception in the directive 
The exception for on-the-spot consultation of works in the directive 2001/29 is limited in different ways 
with a twofold objective: on one hand the models for consultation decided by the copyright owners will 
prevail on the exception by means of the limitation to work not subject to licensing terms; on the other 
hand, the making available will be kept in a closed environment, both by the terminals and in the location 
in which it can occur. 
As to the exclusion of works subject to licensing terms, it does not seem unreasonable as it 
accommodates the development of business models by publishers to offer adapted products for such 
searching and consultation, which is part of the normal exploitation of scientific books. The article 5(3) n) 
of the directive has chosen that the exception is only subsidiary to the development of a market 
organising the provision of consultable works to libraries. The provision by the publisher of an electronic 
version of some works with embedded consultation possibilities and licensing terms authorizing libraries 
to install those searchable and viewable versions should then prohibit the beneficiaries of the exception to 
bypass the works available on the market to such end.  
The extent of the market prevalence is the only matter left for discussion, as already indicated by the 
questions referred to the Court of justice for interpretation. Is it enough for copyright owners to offer some 
works with purchase or licensing conditions that prevent or govern on-site consultation or should the 
library be a party to such a contract for the works it has purchased or acquired? One should wait the 
answer of the Court to that question. In our view, a high protection of copyright owners and the principle 
of strict interpretation of exceptions would tilt towards an interpretation that authorises the exception only 
if the eligible institutions cannot acquire in trade, when reasonably possible, the copies of works enabling 
such consultation upon conditions determined by the rights owners.  Otherwise, the library could rely on a 
digitised copy of a work it previously held in its collection not to buy the new digital products provided by 
publishers for the purpose of consultation. However, it could be discussed whether the restriction to works 
not subject to licensing terms also pertain to material whose license merely prohibits any use, without 
organising the conditions for making available for viewing for research purposes. In such a case, the 
copyright owners would have the power to block any act of consultation of the work without providing an 
alternative.  
The spatial and technical limitation to the premises of the institutions and dedicated terminals is 
more contested. It has often been pleaded that the requirement of ‘dedicated terminals’ is outdated and 
too narrow and does not grant enough leeway to libraries in providing services to their patrons798. 
EBLIDA, the European Association of Libraries, argues that “it keeps the serious study and enjoyment of 
European Culture firmly within the technological constraints of the 20th century”799. The arguments in 
favour of this position are indeed the technological evolution and the ensuing convergence in equipments 
and formats. Viewing some digital works does not have any longer to de done on adapted devices but 
can be undertaken by anyone using a digital device such as a computer, tablet or even a smartphone. 
Whereas, at the time of the adoption of the directive, on-site consultation was considered as being a 
peripheral service offered by the libraries for some specific works whose digital browsing was preferred 
(namely to preserve the analogue copy or answer to needs for frequent consultation by users), libraries’ 
users and researchers are now accustomed to view research or study material in a digital format and on 
the screens of their computers and expect to be able to do the same in a library or archive. They also 
claim that they should be entitled to consult the works made available by their libraries from their offices 
or at distance through a secured connection.   
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b) National transpositions 
The national transpositions are not more restrictive than the directive. The level of discrepancies amongst 
the Member States is also rather minimal, as most of them have literally transposed the exception, 
differences between the national versions of the exception being almost inexistent or irrelevant. Besides, 
the on-site consultation, to the extent it remains defined by a spatial criteria is localised on the specific 
institution and does not take on a cross-border dimension.  
Therefore, the only issue that may be found in the exceptions provided at the national level for on-site 
consultation of works is identical to that addressed to the directive itself and lies in the technical limitation 
of the consultation to dedicated terminals.  
There is normally no cross-border issue as the exception is limited to the physical premises of the library 
making the works available. As a principle, the benefit of exception does not have cross-border 
dimension. Libraries will be subject to the national law of the country in which they are located.  
4. Possible options 
The assessment of the exception for on-site consultation in the directive and in its national transposition 
has revealed some narrowness of the authorised acts that could only take place in a spatially and 
technically closed environment. Researchers complain that libraries (mostly of scientific libraries and 
archives) do not provide them with less restricted conditions of access to the works for research 
purposes. The criterion of licensing condition that excludes the application of the exception would also 
merit some clarification. 
As for the previous exception, some possible initiatives will be now addressed and will focus on the 
twofold restriction related to dedicated terminals and physical premises of the library.  
We will start by laying down the different factors and principles that should be weighed in the balance in 
devising the proper scope of the exception (a.). The second step will be to analyze the option of revising 
the exception in the directive by deleting the requirement of dedicated terminals (b.).  
There is no need to enhance the harmonisation of the exception amongst the Member States as no 
significant discrepancies have been identified. It is neither justified to make it mandatory, for the same 
reason. There would be no sufficient ground for such a mandatory character, as the exception does not 
have an effect on the internal market if it is still confined within the premises of the library and is not 
justified by a fundamental freedom or European public interest
800
. However, the exception could well have 
some cross border effect in the future if it is revised or interpreted to allow for online viewing and 
consultation.  
In the case of the exception for certain acts of reproduction, we have explored some means to facilitate 
copyright clearance by libraries for acts that would remain outside of the scope of the exception. This is 
not necessary in our view for consultation of works on the premises of the institution, for the exception 
already allows for licensing solutions if decided by copyright owners for some works. Making available 
works for consultation has not the same scope that mass-scale digitization and is not marked by the 
same high transaction costs (which was one of the reasons of facilitating licensing in case of mass-scale 
digitisation). Individual clearance and licensing is certainly easier to achieve which reduces the value of 
collective agreements such as Memorandums of Understanding or extended collective management. 
Larger projects of online communication of works exceed the objective exception but could fall in the 
solutions already provided for orphan works (specific exception allowing the making available) and out-of-
print works (Memorandum of Understanding in favour of a collective management).  
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a) Overarching principles and weighing factors 
The factors to be considered to assess the need to revise the exception could be taken over from the 
exception for preservation purposes, though with some qualifications. If the objective of the exception can 
be opposed to the need to secure a high level of protection of copyright and related rights, it will not have 
the same weight than the objective of preservation of cultural heritage that is part of the political and 
cultural agenda of the European Union, as expressed in many policy documents. The exception for on-
site consultation serves libraries in accomplishing their public-interest mission of making their collections 
available for research and private study and helps the development of effective digital libraries but is not 
considered as a fundamental objective for the European Union. Therefore, one could say that the interest 
and objective pursued by exception for onsite consultation do not significantly outweigh the interests and 
rights of copyright owners. 
In the current exception the balance has already been tilted in favour of the rights of copyright owners, 
entitled to preclude the exception by offering licensing conditions to govern such making available.  The 
models of exploitation that include possibilities for on-site consultation thus prevail over the exemption 
offered to libraries and archives.  That indicates that this exception has been considered as a case of 
market failure: copyright owners regain their exclusive rights if they are able to propose some license 
covering the use by the eligible institution. Therefore, the reasoning is radically different than for the 
exception for preservation and would more easily welcome the intervention of the market when possible. 
b) Revising the scope of the exception 
(i) The need to revise the exception or to maintain the status quo 
The exception provided for by article 5(3) n) does not present the same difficulties than the article for 
preservation activities of cultural heritage institutions. Its beneficiaries complain of the narrowness of the 
exception, particularly of the requirement to make works available only on dedicated terminals that 
contradict the customary use of personal equipment by researchers and library users.  
Revising the directive would focus on the suppression or adaptation of that requirement, but could 
eventually challenge the notion of “premises” that will remain a limiting element of the exception. The 
other uncertainties of the exception will soon be lifted by the European Court of Justice to which a series 
of questions has been referred on the interpretation of the exception.  
Besides, the possibility to consult works within a library is possible in most Member States. Compared to 
the article 5(2) c) that did not cover key new activities of digital libraries, that were urged by the European 
institutions to contribute to the preservation of European cultural heritage, the exception lacks the 
emergency or public interest that characterised the digital preservation of libraries and archives’ 
collections. 
All those reasons could plead for a status quo while waiting for the forthcoming decision by the Court of 
Justice, or at minimal for a slight adaptation of the condition.   
The adoption of an interpretative document does not seems to be an option here, as there is no element 
in the directive that needs clarification, but the elements subject to the referral to the EU jurisdiction. The 
most troublesome element is the notion of “dedicated terminals”. However the notion does not raise issue 
of interpretation and uncertainty, but is blamed for its narrowness. No interpretative document could 
extend the notion. The usefulness of an interpretative document in the case of article 5(3) n) is also 
doubtful as the issue is not to curb too restrictive national implementations of an unclear exception but to 
adapt an exception that has become too narrow in the information society.   
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(ii) A possible modification of the exception  
- Unmodified conditions 
The objective of the exception, i.e. the consultation for research or private study, as well as the list of 
beneficiaries, do not need to be modified.  
- Types of works 
The exclusion of the benefit of the exception for works subject to purchase or licensing conditions, 
that makes the market prevail over the exception, should neither be changed in our view, should the 
European Court of Justice interpret it reasonably.  
The exclusion of database from the exception for on-site consultation through the effect of the lex 
specialis rule of the directive 96/9 does not raise any issue in practice as databases will generally be 
subject to licensing conditions that would govern the conditions of use, consultation and extraction. 
As to software, the similar rule of exclusion from the exceptions of the InfoSoc Directive is more 
problematic for archives and museums specialised in the history of software and video games that 
contain source code protected under the directive 2009/24.  Yet, the making available on some 
equipment is the only way to make them available for research. Therefore the application of the exception 
provided for in the article 5(3) n) to such types of works should be clarified. 
As a matter of principle, the application of the exception to unpublished works should be left to Member 
States. If excluded from the exempted use, they would still be consultable by researchers on the 
premises of the library in an analogue format (which does not infringe any rights of reproduction or 
making available) at the condition they do not exist only in a digital format (for instance because an 
unpublished work has been created in a digital format). The interest of research could nevertheless point 
at another solution that would include unpublished works under that exception, upon the requirement that 
such making available to individual researchers does not amount to a public divulgation of an undisclosed 
work. 
- Technical and spatial limitations 
The focus of a possible adaptation of the exception will be on the requirements of dedicated terminal and 
limitation to the premises of the eligible establishment.  
The limitation to dedicated terminals can also be explained by security reasons and the need to limit the 
effect of the exception. The perimeter of use is bordered and controlled by the technical features of the 
device, as (normally) decided by the library. Generally it will imply that the user will only be able to view 
the material and not to make any copy of it, except maybe for print-outs. By comparison, allowing the user 
to get access to the works through her own device makes the work more open to further reproduction and 
other uses that will go beyond the mere consultation. Here also, the German Federal Court has asked to 
the CJEU to decide whether some possibility of copying and printing should not be authorized for users to 
fulfil the needs of research. 
More generally, the use being bound to the physical premises of the institutions, the purpose is not to 
compete with services offered on line by copyright owners.  
In summary, the discussion opposes an evolving notion of the needs of consultation for research that 
refuses to be bound to technical constraints and the need to confine the exception in strict and secured 
boundaries to prevent interference with the normal exploitation of works. Should the condition of 
dedicated terminals be abolished to allow more broadly the consultation of library’s collection on any 
device connected to website of the library, there might be a need to secure the consultation if it happens 
on standard devices, for instance by requiring that the works be viewable only in a format that permits the 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 320 
 
acts strictly necessary for research or private study, such as the browsing, searching, possibly printing 
out, but that disables permanent copying or retransmission on-line or to another device. Such an 
obligation of technical securisation would be in charge of the libraries and other institutions making the 
works available  
A second question yielded by the deletion of the technical constraint, would be to determine the new 
perimeter opened by the suppression of this technical restriction that leaves only the spatial limitation to 
the premises of the institution.  
The current approach of the directive is both technical (dedicated terminals) and spatial (on the 
premises). An approach that would only be spatial and related to the physical premises of the library, 
museum or archive, would imply in any case that the researcher wishing to view the material made 
available under the exception be connected to the network of the library. The making available will then 
have an extended scope, as it would occur at least through the intranet of the institution. In such a case, 
why should the researcher still come to the library in person, if connecting to the library on-line (even with 
a secured connection) is sufficient? What can she not consult the collection provided by the library from 
her office or even when working at home?  
Considering that the user does not need to view the work on dedicated devices, but could get access to 
the work through his own computer, it could result in the access to the premises of the library becoming 
only virtual. No remote consultation is allowed under the current provision of article 5(3) n) altogether. 
Yet, deciding about the proper interpretation the “on the premises” condition, severed from the 
requirement of restricted reading points, will amount to determine the extent of remote consultation. Here 
are the successive and gradual approaches that could substitute to the technical/spatial one that is 
currently in force:  
- spatial limitation:  if one decides to suppress the condition of dedicated terminals without 
extending the exception, the making available could still be bound to the premises of the 
institution, that would be spatially defined. Therefore, the communication of the work or making 
available would only be authorised if taking place within the premises of the library, whether on 
standard equipment available for research or private study or on the equipment of the user 
requiring such consultation. Such a solution could appear as unnecessarily restraining the 
possibilities of consultation as the physical restriction has no necessity if the connection happens 
through a remote connection in any case. 
- institutional limitation:  An institutional approach would extend the consultation beyond the 
physical location of the eligible establishment, the premises encompassing all the locations of the 
institutions from which its members entitled to carry out research or private study could access to 
the library services, for example the researchers of a university in their offices without being 
obliged to walk to the library site. An even broader approach, but still bound by an institutional 
definition, would be to allow the entitled members of an institution to access the collection from 
whatever location but through a closed network. The researcher could then consult the work 
made available by its university library from home or wherever in the world through a secured log-
in. An institutional perspective of the notion of “premises” could also overcome the non-
application of the exception to delocalised sections of some institutions. One example is a 
national library in charge of legal deposit, that would permit the remote consultation of works in its 
collection by researchers that are present on the premises of its affiliates libraries located in other 
major cities of the country. On the other hand, one could contend that the institutional approach is 
only valid for institutions such as universities that have an institutional relationship with their 
researchers but would be difficult to apply in generalist libraries, museums of archives that are 
likely to welcome any individual claiming an access for research or private study. The exception is 
defined by its purpose of allowing consultation for research and private study, which could be 
potentially exercised by anyone. Opening consultation should then allow any access by an 
individual doing research or private study. This constitutes a significant obstacle to an institutional 
approach, broadly defined, as it could potentially allow almost unlimited on-line consultation of 
libraries’ collections. Some limitation could be found in the requirement of registration of the user 
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at the library (of her region or country of residence), to mimic the conditions for on-site 
consultation.  
- Functional limitation:  a functional approach, based on the objective of consultation for research 
or private study would be the last frontier. It would open up the exception to the largest extent, 
and probably to an excessive extent. It would mean that the eligible institutions could make 
available works of their collections for research or private study to users demonstrating such 
purpose (which could be difficult to ascertain for private study
801
. Then, the “on-site” limitation of 
the exception would disappear. Actually, this would extend the on-site consultation to on-line 
dissemination of works, with the only limitation (subject to evidentiary difficulties) of the purpose 
of consultation. That could however prejudice the normal exploitation of works and not be 
allowed.  
 
 
 
This successive extension demonstrates that any extension of the notion of ‘premises’ beyond a strict 
physical location (the building or even the rooms occupied by the library), once abolished the requirement 
of dedicated terminals, would be a slippery slope. Opening the consultation at distance quickly steps over 
an unlimited act of making available that is generally not encompassed in the exceptions benefiting 
libraries and other cultural heritage institutions, but covered by licensing agreements with copyright 
owners. Yet the evolving communication possibilities could equally induce that the notion of on-site 
consultation be relatively free of tangible and spatial restraints.  
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Should the exception be extended by adopting a larger notion of “premises”, the following requirements 
(as discussed in the different approaches) could be considered: 
 
 
 
As to the other acts authorized by the exception, copies for private uses in the case of on-site 
consultation are necessary counterparts to research and private study, but they will normally be dealt with 
the private copy and reprography exceptions
802
. In addition, the user should also agree that the use of 
these extracts is strictly dedicated to purposes of study, research or teaching, excluding any commercial 
end
803
. 
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Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 323 
 
 
D. Digital public lending 
With the outbreak of commercial exploitation of e-books due to the success of the Kindle by Amazon and 
soon after, of tablets and other e-readers, libraries have embarked on the practice of making e-books 
available to their patrons in what resembles to the traditional activity of lending. Patrons are increasingly 
in demand of finding e-books in their libraries. While e-lending has become a reality in some countries, 
such as the US where thousands of libraries propose to download e-books, experiments have started in 
many European States. In all those cases, remote loans of e-books are organized by licensing between 
publishers and libraries, generally with the intercession of an intermediary offering a dedicated platform 
for e-lending.  
Lending is understood in the European Union as pertaining only to books and other works in tangible 
format. Hence, offsite lending of digital content cannot in principle benefit from the regulatory frame that 
exists in most Member States and authorizes public libraries to engage in lending against remuneration to 
authors (from which some establishments can even be exempted).  
E-books will certainly become a new cultural product. Generally defined as "an electronic version of a 
printed book,"804, an e-book does not necessarily have a printed equivalent. Soon, some specialized 
books might only be commercialized in an electronic version. But e-books have also escaped the literary 
form and have been developed as multimedia products for smartphones and tablets. Early examples of 
such new types of digital creation, particularly children’s books, include features that would not fit on 
paper such as animated images or interactive narration805.  Audiobooks in digital version can also enter in 
the category of e-books. 
Libraries have started to buy these new cultural objects and would like to include them in the offer of 
books that can be borrowed by their patrons. The question is whether this new form of lending should 
follow the regime of traditional lending, that is rather permissive for public libraries, or whether it should 
remain controlled by the exclusive right of copyright and related rights, which would require libraries to 
obtain the proper license before making their e-collections available. 
This part of the study aims at examining a possible and limited update of the public lending of digital files 
held in public establishments and whether and under which conditions it would be possible to provide for 
remote access to such files806.  
The activity of lending addressed in this report encompasses two different situations:  
- the first one covers the lending of e-books, either by installing them on devices of the user 
(tablets , smartphones or computers) or by lending an e-reader on which some content has been 
loaded by the library; 
- the second one could be called the e-lending that would stand for the making available of digital 
works by public libraries for a limited duration through the Internet or libraries’ networks, by 
downloading, streaming or similar modes of transmission807. 
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The e-lending will be the primary focus of this report, while the setting up of digital content on e-readers 
will only be subsidiarity examined. 
Commercial books retailers have also started to develop e-lending services. A typical case is Amazon 
that offers one e-book each month808 for a premium yearly subscription of 49$. Such business models 
have only the name of e-lending as they have not much to do with public lending right, but could rather be 
considered as forms of rental. They will not be discussed further. 
Like lending, e-lending is generally understood as referring only to literary works, i.e. e-books. Yet, public 
libraries have carried out activities of lending for other types of content, such as music, films on DVD, 
audiobooks, videogames. Similarly, experiences of making music recordings available by music libraries 
have been also tempted, for instance in the Netherlands809. Music and films will not be the primary focus 
of this report but will be addressed only incidentally. 
This report will be made of three parts. The first one will present the current context of public lending by 
libraries, both in practice and in legal perspective (1.). A second part will examine the shift from traditional 
lending to on-line lending, its consequences and its legal treatment in EU law (2.). Then the report will 
consider whether the current framework of public lending right should be modified to extend to e-lending 
and if yes, under what conditions (3.). 
1. The context of public lending by libraries 
a) The different situations of lending in libraries 
Lending of books or other cultural or scientific items is a major activity of libraries, belonging to their 
mission of making culture available to the public.  
However the volume and objective of lending significantly differ from one type of library to the other, with 
the consequence that the activity presents a varying impact on the practices of users, market of 
copyrighted works and protection of rights holders.  
A first distinction has to be drawn between academic and research libraries on one hand and general 
public libraries on the other. Academic and research libraries can be defined as institutions that are either 
associated with universities or research establishments. Their aim is to support scholarly or scientific 
research. Their main activity is to constitute a collection of scholarly books, journals or databases, that will 
be mostly consulted on the premises of the library. Acts of lending happen but are more limited than in 
general libraries.  Researchers and students will check out books from those libraries, when they need 
more time to search in the book what they are looking for. The objective of the lending is thus research 
and thorough consultation, without necessarily an extensive reading of the book. Academic and research 
libraries will also engage more often in interlibrary loans.  
The National Library that exists in most Member States (e.g. the British Library or the Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France) and is in charge of the legal deposit and of the preservation of a cultural heritage of 
a State can be considered as a research library. The lending activity will be minimal compared to on-site 
consultation for research and the provision of materials to other institutions through the interlibrary loan. 
Besides, a significant part of their collection, consisting of documents, maps, manuscripts, newspapers, 
magazines, prints and drawings, music scores, photographs, or old publications, is not subject to lending, 
due to their historical importance, state of decay or uniqueness. Research libraries or national libraries 
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are sometimes referred to as ‘reference libraries’ as a more or less large part of their collections can only 
be viewed on site in reading rooms. 
General public libraries have a different mission. They aim at providing the public, with no discrimination, 
with materials for private study and entertainment. Their main activity is lending and the consultation of 
their books or other items on the premises of the establishment is rather limited (except for reference 
books or magazines). They can have a specialised section (e.g. for children books) and organise specific 
activities for some types of public. The patrons of those libraries check out books mainly for private 
enjoyment and study. 
In addition to these two major categories, libraries can also serve special needs of a limited part of the 
public. For instance, social institutions such as hospitals, prisons or schools might have a library that 
provides books or other works to the patients, inmates or students. They will be reserved to a limited 
public. The main activity of such libraries will be to lend books to their specific users. 
Some libraries can also provide specialised documentation to professionals and know restricted 
conditions of admission. For instance, some libraries are operated by governments to the benefit of their 
civil servants, but can equally be open to individuals upon defined conditions. For example the libraries of 
judicial courts generally admit professional lawyers who are registered at the bar. Usually those types of 
libraries will not lend books beyond the members of the institution they serve. Other specialised libraries 
will not be open to the public, such as libraries of private companies or governmental libraries with 
restricted admission policies. 
Within the public libraries, some distinction could also be drawn depending of the type of cultural items 
subject to lending. Libraries generally refer to books in the general opinion, but public institutions deal 
with other types of content as well, such as phonograms, DVDs, videogames or audiobooks. Public 
libraries can either have collections of different categories of works. Or content other than books might be 
hold and made available by dedicated multimedia libraries or médiathèques. Lending also occurs in those 
institutions, under somewhat adapted conditions.  
The public targeted by libraries will depend on their category. Whereas general public libraries by 
definition address the needs of the general population to get access to cultural content, academic and 
research libraries are primarily visited by the members of their institutions (students, professors, 
researchers for academic libraries) and researchers in a broader sense. They are nevertheless open to 
the public and used to cater to the needs of professionals looking for specialised information (such as 
private lawyers visiting law libraries). Specialised libraries in social institutions will have a more limited 
audience. Public libraries also play an important role for people with reading disabilities. Dedicated 
libraries exist in many countries to provide books in Braille, audiobooks or other adapted forms to visually-
impaired people, but general libraries also try to have a collection of large print books and audiobooks.   
In summary, the following comparison can be made :  
 Academic/Research 
library 
Generalist Public 
library 
Specialised library 
Collections Scholarly or research 
books 
All types of books 
Sometimes other types 
of works 
Limited collection 
Part of lending in the 
library activity  
Limited number of 
loans 
Not a major part of the 
activity 
Important number of 
loans 
Major part of activity 
Limited number of 
loans  
Major part of activity 
(except for professional 
libraries) 
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Public Researchers, 
professors, students 
+ interested public 
General public, 
including young 
people, socially 
disfavoured people and 
older persons 
Public of the social 
institutions or 
members, employees 
and admitted 
professionals 
Objective of the 
lending 
Research and 
consultation 
Reading, private study 
and enjoyment 
Reading, private study 
and enjoyment 
Duration of lending Longer and renewable 
duration 
Limited duration 
(normally renewable) 
Limited duration 
Other elements Regular recourse to 
interlibrary loans 
Organisation of other 
activities 
 
b) The legal context of lending 
(i) The scope of public lending right in the European Union law 
Rental and lending rights have been introduced as exclusive rights in the European copyright by a 
directive of 1992, that has since been codified in the directive 2006/115 of December 12
th
, 2006. Article 1 
of the directive810 states that “in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, Member States shall 
provide, subject to Article 6, a right to authorize or prohibit the rental and lending of originals and copies 
of copyright works, and other subject matter as set out in Article 3(1)”. The notion of lending contained in 
the directive only refers to acts of public lending since, according to its article 2 (1) b), “’lending’ means 
making available for use, for a limited period of time and not for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage, when it is made through establishments which are accessible to the public”.  The terminology 
of public lending right is however generally used to refer to the right of remuneration that the article 6 of 
the directive allows Member States to enact instead of the exclusive lending right stated as a principle. 
Certain categories of establishments can even be exempted from the payment of the remuneration.  
Lending is covered by the directive when:  
- a work is made available for use: Recital 10 excludes from the lending (and the rental) right 
certain acts of making available such as for example “making available phonograms or films for 
the purpose of public performance or broadcasting, making available for the purpose of 
exhibition, or making available for on-the-spot reference use”811. In addition lending “should not 
include making available between establishments which are accessible to the public”812, which 
refers to interlibrary loans. Such transfers of works between libraries avoid then the application of 
the exclusive right. Interlibrary loans (in a tangible format) are not subject to the authorisation of 
copyright owners, not because of an exception, but simply as they are not covered by the 
exclusive right of lending. The directive further allows for similar cases where there would be no 
use within the meaning of lending, that would therefore not be covered by the directive813. 
- for a limited period of time, which is a common element to rental and lending; 
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 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental and lending right and on 
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- not for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage : this criterion distinguishes 
lending from rental and is further defined by the recital 11 of the directive that provides that 
“Where lending by an establishment accessible to the public gives rise to a payment the amount 
of which does not go beyond what is necessary to cover the operating costs of the establishment, 
there is no direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage within the meaning of this 
Directive”. Therefore, the payment of a fee for lending does not exclude the qualification of 
lending814. Contrary to the exception of the InfoSoc Directive for certain acts of reproduction by 
libraries, archives and museums, analysed supra, this condition applies to the act of lending and 
not to the beneficiary; 
- by establishments which are accessible to the public : this notion is not defined in the 
directive815. The initial proposal for a directive included a list of the eligible establishments 
encompassing “public libraries, research libraries, specialized libraries, school libraries, church 
libraries, collections of new media or of works of visual art, libraries organized or sponsored by 
public or private companies, and other collections of subject matter”816. The condition of public 
accessibility should be broadly construed and includes libraries open to a specified public.  
The exclusive lending right shall belong to the author, the performer, the phonogram producer and the 
producer of the first fixation of a film (Article 3(1)). Buildings and works of applied art are not covered with 
the directive817.  
Article 6818 allows Member States to replace the exclusive right by a remuneration right and even to 
exempt certain categories of establishments from this remuneration. This could include “traditional public 
libraries, but also libraries of universities and educational establishments”819. The exception for public 
lending right “reflects the compromise found at the time between complying with the Internal Market 
needs on the one hand and taking account of the different traditions of Member States in this area on the 
other”820. 
The objective of such derogation is clearly the promotion of cultural objectives, which is referred to in 
article 6(1) as justifying the leeway left to the States in determining the remuneration.  Some 
establishments could be exempted from any remuneration, at the exception of lending of phonograms, 
films or computer programs (if those categories of works are encompassed in the lending right). The law 
could also dispense some institutions, e.g. university and school libraries, libraries in social institutions or 
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some public libraries, from any remuneration obligation. The European Court of Justice has nevertheless 
decided that Member States are not entitled to exempt all public libraries from the payment of the 
remuneration, as such a large-scale exemption would result in emptying the public lending right of any 
relevance821. 
More recently, the European judges have decided that the remuneration to authors for public lending 
cannot be calculated solely on the basis on the number of borrowers of works, but that the amount of the 
remuneration should also take into account the works available to the public, so that the biggest public 
lending establishments pay more than the smaller institutions822. 
The legal form of the derogation is left to the Member States
823
. The exemption of the exclusive right is 
often understood as creating an exception in the form of a statutory license, with a right to 
remuneration
824
. In other countries, the public lending right is just recognised as a remuneration right for 
the copyright and related rights owners. For the present study, we will opt for the terminology of statutory 
or legal license to designate the exception created by the public lending right in favour of libraries. 
(ii) The national implementations of the public lending right in Member States 
Without describing in details the different transpositions of the lending right in the Member States, that is 
not necessary for this study, the situation in the Member States we have analysed will be rapidly 
sketched.  
Most Member States have seized the possibility to transform the public lending into a remuneration right, 
instead than an exclusive right, as well as the possibility to exempt some establishments from any 
remuneration825.   
As to the beneficiaries of public lending, Belgium826 limits the exception to institutions that are 
approved or officially established by the public authorities for the educational and cultural purpose. 
Likewise, only libraries and record libraries belonging to the State or to public authorities and making 
loans exclusively for purposes of cultural promotion and personal study enjoy the exception under Italian 
law.827 Likewise, the UK828 provides for the exception for the benefit of local library authorities. 
Germany829 grants the exception to publicly accessible institutions (library, collection of video or audio 
recordings or other originals or copies thereof) and Denmark830 to public libraries (as in France831, Italy832 
and Hungary)833, the elementary school libraries and the Danish National Library for the Blind. 
                                                     
 
821
 E.C.J., judgment of 26 October 2006, C-198/05, Commission / Italy, ECR, 2006, I-107; E.C.J., judgment of 26 October 2006, C-
36/05, Commission / Spain, ECR, 2006, I-10313; E.C.J., judgment of 6 July 2006, C-53/05, Commission / Portugal, ECR, 2006, I-
06215. 
822
 C.J.E.U., 30 June 2011, VEWA, C-271/10, ECR, 2011, I-5815. 
823
 M WALTER & S. VON LEWINSKI, op. cit., n°6.1.16. 
824
 Ch. ALLEAUME, “Le droit de prêt public (en France et au-delà)”, Propr. intell., 2004, n° 12, p. 726. 
825
 See The Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on the 
Public Lending Right in the European Union, 12 September 2002, COM(2002) 502 final. 
826
 Article 5 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2004 related to the right to remuneration for public lending of the authors, the 
performers, the producers of phonograms and the producers of first fixations of films. 
827
 Article 69 of the Italian Law No. 633 of 22 April 1941 for the Protection of the Copyright and the Other Related Rights to its 
Exercise. 
828
 Article 1 of the British Public Lending Right Act of 1979. 
829
 Article 27 of the German Act of 9 September 1965 on Copyright and Related Rights. 
830
 Article 5 of the Danish Consolidated Public Lending Right Remuneration Act No. 1175 of 17 December 2002. 
831
 Article L.133-1 (library open to the public) of the French Intellectual Property Code of 1 July 1992. The eligible libraries are further 
defined by the article R. 133-1 as libraries of territorial collectivities, scientific, cultural or professional public establishments and 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 329 
 
Libraries, archives and schools benefit from the exception in Poland834. If libraries and archives as 
museums are in public ownership or belong to institutions of general cultural, scientific or educational 
interest without gainful intent, they also benefit from the exception in Spain835.  
As far as the type of works subject to public lending is concerned, the UK836 specifically reserves the 
exception to books. Similarly France restricts the public lending to a work “subject to a publishing contract 
for its publication and distribution in a book format” 837. 
Belgium838 limits the works concerned to literary works, databases, photographic works, scores of musical 
works, sound and audiovisual works while Hungary839 only applies the exception to literary works and 
printed music sheets. The Italian provision includes literary and print works (with the exception of music 
scores and sheets), phonograms and video recordings embodying cinematographic or audiovisual 
works.840 
As required by the directive, remuneration is granted to authors in Belgium841, Luxemburg842, 
Denmark843, France844, Germany845, Hungary846, the Netherlands847 and the UK848. Depending on the 
countries, it is fully supported by the public authorities organising libraries or partially by the libraries’ 
users. Poland seems to be still discussing the modalities of the perception and amount of 
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remuneration849, as well as Spain850 where a draft for a Royal Decree to regulate the compensation for 
public lending851 has recently been introduced. 
In particular, publishers are added to authors and related rights holders as beneficiaries of the right of 
remuneration in Belgium852 and France853.  
Several Member States provide for an exemption from the payment of the remuneration. This 
exemption concerns teaching and research establishments in Belgium854, Luxemburg855, the 
Netherlands856, libraries of teaching institutions in Spain857.  
In addition Belgium858 provides for the exemption for healthcare institutions and institutions created for the 
blind, visually-impaired, deaf and hearing-impaired. The Netherlands also excludes libraries acting for 
visually-impaired people as well as the Koninklijke Bibliotheek (the National Library of the Netherlands)859. 
Luxemburg860 broadly exempts from payment of the remuneration institutions and establishments carrying 
out specialized lending, thematic lending or lending to a targeted public.  
An embargo period or release window, i.e. a minimum period of time after the first commercialisation of 
the work, is applied to lending in the UK861, Belgium and Italy. Belgium requires that sound or audiovisual 
works may not be loaned earlier than fourth months862 and Italy863 at least eighteen months since the first 
putting in the market of that work or, in the case the right of distribution has not been exercised, at least 
twenty four months since the realization of phonograms and videograms containing cinematographic or 
audiovisual works or sequences of moving images, with or without sound.  
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2. From lending to e-lending 
a) Development of e-lending through licensing 
In many countries libraries have started to make e-books available online to their members864. Lacking 
any legal authorization to undertake e-lending, this development was made possible by licensing 
agreements with publishers and the intervention of dedicated platforms hosting and delivering e-books to 
libraries’ users.  
Distribution models may vary, but the most common way of proceeding for a library is to have recourse to 
“an intermediary distributor (sometimes referred to as an “aggregator”), which sells access to e-books 
titles and copies of e-books, often from multiple publishers”865. The distributor offers full-service packages 
to libraries, with the licensing rights to e-books and the hosting of the e-book collection866. Libraries can 
serve as an interface, through their websites, for their readers to get access to the collection of titles that 
are available for downloading. The e-book will eventually be sent by the platform operated by the 
distributor to the user that has requested it. 
Some publishers do sell e-books to libraries and allow them to provide them directly to their members, but 
the proportion of sales is rather small compared to licensing and remote access for libraries867.  
The primary model governing e-lending can be described as follows868: 
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Source: D. O’BRIEN, U. GASSER and J. G. PALFREY JR., E-books in Libraries : A Briefing Document Developed in 
Preparation for a Workshop on E-lending in Libraries, Berkman Center Research Publication, n° 2012-15, p. 12. 
This model includes four actors: the publisher or copyright owner, the distribution platform, the public 
library and the reader that is the end-user of the loan.  
The publishers license the rights for distribution with e-book distributors, a new type of actor on the book 
market that has emerged to provide services of e-lending to libraries. They sublicense the rights to e-
books to libraries for making them available on-line to their patrons, along with additional services such as 
the operation of a web platform that hosts the e-books, provides a searchable interface for users, 
manages the availability to readers and the accounts of its libraries clients, and controls the conditions 
and duration of the loan. This requires the use of Digital Right Management tools embedded in the e-
books that are made available, and generally developed and operated by the e-book aggregator.  
Platforms for lending are for instance “OverDrive” that dominates the English library market869, NetLibrary,  
Ebscohost in the Netherlands870, Dilicom in France or Onleihe.net in Germany.  
The relationship between the publishers and the distributors triggers the availability of the book on 
the platform. Publishers decide the format and conditions under which the book will be offered for lending 
in a way that tends to align the modalities of accessing to e-books to the restraints usually endured by 
library readers. We will address the differences and similarities of such restraints below. 
The relationship between the libraries and the distributors is governed by a license that stipulates the 
conditions of access to e-content by the library and the terms of use. Due to the intercession of an 
intermediary, the public libraries do not host e-books as they do with tangible books, for they are kept by 
the intermediary on its platform. The provision of a collection of downloadable titles can be organised in 
different models. The most common is the so-called ‘perpetual access’ model871, by which libraries 
acquire an individual copy of an e-book title that will be integrated in the e-collection of the library (in 
contracts with the subscription model where the access to the title terminates if the subscription is not 
renewed). In most cases, only one reader at a time can borrow the e-book (one copy/one user model) 872. 
It is a kind of “digital replication of the use pattern for a print-on paper library book”873. 
Several licenses can be bought for popular works to be entitled to lend them to more users 
simultaneously. The number of licenses then resembles the number of acquisitions of tangible books and 
its corresponding number of simultaneous readers. Other possibilities are the subscription model with 
unlimited number of loans per title and limited simultaneous users, or the pay-per-view model.  
Books can be bought by individual titles or per packages by the library. Further conditions are laid down 
by the license and relate to the devices on which the e-book can be downloaded and read, the 
possibilities to print out and to what extent. Some licenses impose the renewal of the license after some 
delay or a certain number of loans (e.g. license valid for one year or for 30 circulations), so as to mimic 
the way tangible books wear out after a few readings and oblige libraries to buy a new copy. The e-books 
could be proposed in different formats but usually in ePUB that is a format dedicated to e-readers, or in 
pdf that is readable on more devices.  
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A remuneration is due by the library for the services performed by the e-book distributor and its platform, 
that is added to the remuneration agreed upon for the loans themselves. 
The relationship between the library and the user follows the model put in place. The lending will 
generally be restricted to the users registered in a library. They will get access to the collection of 
available titles through the website of their library and can install the e-books on their computers or other 
devices (such as smartphones, tablets or e-readers). Only a maximum number of books for a determined 
period could be downloaded and the book will be unavailable at the end of lending term that is generally 
rather short (2 or 3 weeks).The duration is renewable if the book has not been reserved by another user. 
Once the book is installed on the device, it can be read offline. Usually, the readers have only access to 
the e-collection of their library, i.e. to the collection of titles for which the library bought a license. This is 
the model of the German Onleihe platform where patrons registered in one library have only access to the 
part of the platform hosting titles for which their library have a license. Other models include consortiums 
of local libraries (e.g. LibrariesWest in the UK) that have acquired a bulk license for e-books they all 
propose to their registered patrons. 
Users may also be required to assent to contractual terms which impose additional limitations and 
restrictions on access and use of software or e-books874.  
b) Differences between lending and e-lending 
E-lending presents some key differences from lending of tangible items that make a simple transposition 
of rules of public lending right to e-lending rather intricate.  
Traditional lending does not require any intervention from the right holder or intermediary. Libraries buy 
books from publishers, bookstores or specialised intermediaries and become full owners of those books. 
In some legal systems such as the United States, the authorisation of public lending flows from the 
application of the first sale doctrine or exhaustion principle: once the book is bought by the library, its 
further distribution, including lending to library patrons is not an infringement of copyright. On the contrary, 
the European Union law interposes an exclusive right of lending, generally transformed at State level into 
a right of remuneration that annuls the exhaustion rule. The act of distribution is legally qualified as an act 
of lending that is not exhausted but re-enters into the field of control of copyright owners (either by an 
exclusive right or a right to remuneration). This is clearly stated by the recitals 28 and 29 of the InfoSoc 
Directive that preclude the application of the distribution qualification and of the rule of exhaustion to 
rental and lending875.   
Whatsoever, even if the act of lending has to be authorised or compensated, the ownership of the copy 
by the library gives it some autonomy in the lending activities.  
The overall picture of e-lending is radically different. E-books
876
 are acquired under licensing conditions 
and digitally transmitted to libraries
877
. They are usually not ‘bought’ and no transfer of ownership occurs 
at the benefit of the libraries. That explains that in the United States, e-lending could not be developed on 
the ground of the first sale doctrine878 but that exclusive rights of copyright regained their primacy.  
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E-books are acquired by libraries from publishers or intermediaries that have emerged to play the role of 
‘e-books aggregators’. Models of purchase differ greatly depending of the type of the digital product, from 
electronic journals, scientific publications or textbooks to more mainstream e-books. Vendors propose 
either an outright purchase, that will result in the downloading of the e-book by the library, or a 
subscription model where e-books are stored on the intermediary’s platform and can be downloaded by 
the user when the book is checked out. In all cases, a license agreement is entered into and defines the 
applicable terms of use, that are usually embedded in the digital file by digital rights management (DRM) 
features. In most cases, the library does not actually ‘buy’ books but acquires access to a platform and a 
number of book titles from various publishers.  
Such recourse to a platform is useful for all the parties involved. Publishers, specially the smaller ones, 
are saved the cost of developing and operating a dedicated platform and technological tools (such as the 
DRM needed to secure the terms of use). Likewise, libraries do not have to develop a platform to make e-
books available to their users. The users of the library can then access and search the titles covered by 
the license through a single interface, whatever the library they are subscribed to, and get access to e-
book in a format compatible with their e-reader (generally in ePUB format, less often in pdf).  
This change of model has namely the following consequences:  
- the book remains in control of the intermediary or platform and largely escapes from library 
choices or control; 
- the book is not bought but is subject to a license; 
- the terms of use are enforced by digital rights management systems embedded by publishers and 
intermediaries and not anymore by the rules and governance of the libraries
879
; 
- not all published books are available for lending, but only the titles available as e-books (that will 
certainly increase in the future to cover the whole catalogue of publishers), formatted to a non-
proprietary format
880
 and compatible with the platform
881
 (which in theory could limit the offer 
compared to the offer of traditional lending);  
- the digital format of an e-book permits multiple downloads and readers whereas a paper book 
can only be given to one reader at a time. 
These differences rooted in the technical features of the digital format and digital transmission, are both a 
source of concern for publishers that fear that e-lending will potentially undermine their emerging 
business models related to e-books, and a new landscape where the legal rules and the traditional roles 
of libraries and publishers do not fit in the same way than for public lending. 
c) e-lending in EU law 
The directive on rental and lending does not explicitly excludes e-lending or lending of digital items from 
its scope. However some elements point in that direction. The article 1 that provides the exclusive right of 
lending applies it to “the original and copies of copyright works, and other subject matter”. This 
formulation is usually interpreted as encompassing the “first materialisation” of the work and further 
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reproductions thereof882. Since the on-line lending includes a transmission of a digital file, and not of a 
tangible item, it should be considered as being outside of the scope of the lending right883. 
In the proposal for a rental and lending directive, the European Commission referred to “objects (…) 
which incorporate protected works or performances”884, indicating that it had tangible items in mind885. 
The question was addressed in the Council Working Group, during which the Member States did discuss 
the coverage of electronic rental or lending but decided that they did not want to deal with it at the time, 
considering that the topic was still premature886. Some scholars consider that the purpose of the directive 
was to cover the entire situation of rental and lending, including electronic forms thereof887. 
Yet, the inclusion of digital products in the public lending right was not completely closed as demonstrated 
by later documents from the European Commission. In the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights 
of 1995, it was discussed whether the lending and rental rights may be applied by extension to digital 
transmissions888. It seems that the starting point for the reflection was the application of the rental right to 
services on demand, such as video-on-demand, that were emerging at the time889. In its comparison 
between traditional lending and new forms of making available on-line, the Green Paper went as far as 
stating that “the definition of lending  does, however, cover digital lending by establishments accessible 
to the public” and the on-line consultation of a work from a public library comes to the same thing as 
borrowing a copy of the work”890. The Commission document nonetheless acknowledges that such an 
extension should be confirmed in legislation and its details should be spelled out in order to reconcile “the 
cultural and educational functions of bodies such as public libraries and universities, which have the aim 
of ensuring the widest possible dissemination of works and data, (…) with the legitimate protection of 
rightholders”891. True, the Green Paper warned against new forms of uses within libraries in respect with 
the protection of the interests of copyright holders, but still stressed the interests of the different parties 
concerned: “authors must be able to control the use of their works, libraries must ensure the transmission 
of available documents and users should have the widest possible access to those documents while 
respecting the rights or legitimate interests of everyone”
892
. The European Commission then came to the 
conclusion that “the application of the lending right to electronic transmission should also be reviewed 
with a view to maintaining a balance between the interests of public libraries and those of rightholders”893. 
Such a generous position in favour of libraries might seem surprising. It should be reminded that this 
Green Paper was released at a time prior to the mainstream development of the Internet and without any 
digital products yet commercially available on-line for consumers, such as e-books or movies. The 
economic impact or the development of digital libraries could not have been anticipated in 1995.  
That view was given up in the Follow-up to the Green Paper in 1996. Even though, it was therein 
reiterated that on-demand transmissions, such as VOD, enter in the field of application of the rental 
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right894, the opinion of most Member States against an extension of the rental right and distribution right to 
on-line transmission was followed. No reference was made to on-line lending.  
The European Commission preferred to cover all forms of on-line transmission, whether on-demand or 
not, under a broadly defined right of communication to the public, as it was the direction that took the 
discussion around what would become the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 opted for a right of making 
available, that would cover on-demand services. The fate of on-line rental and lending as falling out of the 
box of those rights was sealed. The adoption of the InfoSoc Directive and its communication to the public 
right should then be considered as being a lex specialis for all forms of making available right and would 
prevail over an extensive interpretation of the rental and lending rights in the earlier directive of 1992895. 
The recital 40 of the InfoSoc Directive that recommends that acts of making works available on demand 
by libraries be subject to licensing with rights holders could also be interpreted as rejecting e-lending 
outside of the right to remuneration for which most Member States opted by transposing the lending 
directive896. However, as we have seen earlier, that recital relates to the exception for some acts of 
reproduction for libraries and aimed at excluding acts of making available, but does not appear to be 
connected with lending activities of such institutions. 
A further argument against the e-lending in the current state of EU copyright law is the closed list of 
exceptions in the Directive 2001/29 that would prevent the recognition of any new exception not already 
listed in the directives in force897. This is not a convincing argument. The InfoSoc Directive and the 
exceptions it provides are without prejudice of existing exceptions by virtue of other directives. Therefore 
the exception that the Rental and Lending Directive allows Member States to enact a public lending right 
in the form of a right of remuneration is not affected by the directive on copyright in the information 
society. The question as to whether it could be extended to a form of lending that relates to the 
information society (that is governed by the later directive) is uncertain though. It is also worthwhile to 
remind that the closed list of the article 5 of the directive 2001/29 has not prevented the directive on 
orphan works to authorize libraries to make such works available. A new exception, not included in the 
list, has hence been enacted in the European Union acquis. 
Not all libraries are satisfied with the interpretation against the coverage of off-site lending by the directive 
2006/115 and its national transpositions. In the Netherlands the Vereniging van Openbare Bibliotheken 
(Association of Public Libraries) has brought the matter before the courts. They started a test case 
against the collective management organisation in charge of the lending right to be allowed to provide e-
books in libraries for download898.  
The UK Government has also commissioned a review of e-lending that has resulted in a recommendation 
to extend the public lending right to remote e-lending899. Following that report, the British Government has 
announced its intention to make libraries able to offer digital books to their readers, by revising the Public 
Lending Right in two stages900. First, and it was started by the Digital Economy Act of 2010901, the Public 
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Lending Right Act 1979 was modified to include audio-books and e-books in the notion of “books”902. 
However this does not extend to the making available of an e-book by means of electronic 
transmission903. Only the provision of e-books on readers should be included in the public lending right 
when the law will enter into force, which is not yet the case due to financial restrictions904. More precisely, 
“copying or issuing a copy of the e-book as an act incidental to lending it” shall not be considered as 
infringing the rights conferred by copyright or related rights.  
In a second stage, the Government contemplates to enable public libraries to offer remote e-lending 
services to their readers and to recommend further legislative changes accordingly, while acknowledging 
that the EU directive 2001/29 probably stands in the way905.  
As a conclusion, one could say that e-lending is not covered by the Rental and Lending Directive but is a 
form of making available that should be authorised by copyright and related rights owners in conformity 
with the InfoSoc Directive.  
3. The revision of the regulatory framework 
The development of e-lending pilots in Member States proves that libraries and readers have an 
increasing interest in expanding lending to offsite lending. It also shows that the market is ready to 
provide e-books and other digital products for e-lending services.  
But is there a need for a legislative intervention to help libraries to propose on-line lending to their 
members or rather to regulate it? This Part will first ask whether a legislative intervention is desirable (a.). 
Then, the type of a possible intervention will be addressed (b.) before examining the conditions that could 
apply to e-lending (c.). 
a) The need and opportunity of a legislative initiative on e-lending  
The growth of e-lending experiments based on licensing between libraries and publishers, in lack of any 
certainty as to the status of e-lending, demonstrates that the market is capable of providing literary works, 
and sometimes other types of cultural content, to libraries and their readers. That does not prevent that 
some public interest objectives could justify, despite the capability of copyright owners to license their 
works for offsite lending by libraries, a legislative intervention either to make a limitation of copyright 
prevail on market-based initiatives or to provide some general frame to the private ordering of public 
lending.  
Our reasoning will be developed in two stages. First, the objectives of public lending and their sustained 
validity for e-lending will be addressed (i.). In a second stage, one will look at the economic impact of e-
lending on the new markets for e-books (ii.). It should be verified whether the rights owners have reason 
to fear that the development of e-lending by libraries would defeat their exploitation of e-books. This study 
not being an economic one, only the criteria to take into account will be stressed. 
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(i) Objectives of lending  
Some objectives of lending persist in e-lending by libraries and can be tied up to the public mission of 
making works available to the public at large. Libraries’ mission is to serve as gateways to knowledge and 
culture.  
The cultural promotion objectives referred to in the provision of the Rental and Lending Directive 
authorizing Member States to limit the exclusive right of lending are rooted in the need to ensure 
circulation of works in the public sphere and beyond the mere operation of the market. Public lending right 
purports to provide access to works in a number of cases, namely:  
- Libraries provide access to works to a larger public of readers, enabling access by some 
populations who cannot afford buying all the works they read, view or listen to. This lack of 
access can be grounded on economic reasons but not only. For instance, libraries will cater to the 
cultural needs of low-income population, children and teenagers, but also of people having 
difficulty to move to a bookshop or living in remote places (public lending can then be ensured by 
mobile libraries or by post), as well as people staying in institutions (e.g. prisons, hospitals, 
nursing homes,…). More generally libraries complement the commercial offer to making books 
available to the general public, whatever their financial means or access restrictions to books. 
They bring authors and readers together in a different way than the market. Many big readers go 
often to libraries to fulfil their reading habits, while equally buying many books in bookshops and 
retailers.  
- Libraries provide larger access to works than the market: as bookshops have only a limited 
percentage of published books in stock and the average life of a book in bookshops is less than 
one year, public libraries, through their preservation mission, might offer a more extensive 
collection, depending on their size and budget
906
. Another limitation of the market in providing 
books is absent in the way libraries operate. Whereas the market will mostly obey to a demand-
rule, libraries tend to choose the works they acquire on other criteria (namely cultural ones, 
notably a selection of local and national authors), or in a exhaustive way, if they are in charge of 
legal deposit, which can lead to more cultural diversity in the offer. On the other hand, when an 
embargo rule is applied to public lending, the offer of newly released books, CDs or DVDs will be 
more restricted than the market, with due cause, and the readers would be incited to go and buy 
the newly released book. 
- Libraries provide access to sources for research (mostly in academic and research libraries) as 
they hold extensive collections of publications on scientific topics. Researchers who need to 
consult many sources of documentation could not afford to buy all the relevant books published in 
their field and rely on consultation within the library, and additionally to lending to get access to 
the material they need. Academic libraries also provide scientific books to students to carry out 
research required for specific assignments or papers. 
Transposed to e-books and e-lending, these objectives could still be sustained: 
- as to access to works by a larger public of readers: some segments of the libraries readers 
will still need access to works by libraries as they could not afford getting access to culture 
otherwise or only partially. This is the case of younger people, low-income populations, or people 
in institutions with no access to culture but by the library of such institution (hospitals, prisons, …). 
On the other hand, e-lending will require to get access to e-readers which could constitute a new 
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hurdle to access to culture for some categories of people and increase the cost of access through 
libraries, except in the case where libraries also provide the device to read the e-book. The 
libraries’ offer of e-books will still play a role in complementing the reading of big readers ; 
- as to access to a broader and extensive offer of content: Not all works will be offered by the 
market in e-book format or some e-books might not be commercialized after some time. Libraries 
could keep their role of preserving works and providing them to the public long after they have 
been put off the market, even though the development of e-books has also lengthened the period 
of availability of e-books in a catalogue of a publisher. E-books are in a logic of demand, whereas 
physical books are based on a logic of offer and depend of the number of copies the publisher 
decided to print.  
Public libraries consider that one of their key missions is to provide to their members with the 
diversity of commercially published literary and artistic works. E-books will form a significant part 
of the literary production of the years to come and will sometimes have no paper equivalent. As 
far as music and movies are concerned, they might be soon be released only as downloadable 
digital products. Excluding them from the public libraries collection would deprive their users from 
a significant part of cultural content; 
- as to access for research purposes: academic and research libraries are accustomed to deal 
with digital resources. Besides, scientific books or textbooks might be amongst the types of 
content that will be more systematically proposed in an electronic format. The access to such 
works for research, that includes episodic lending to researchers or students, will not decrease 
with the shift to e-books. 
Libraries argue for some preservation of their role as providers of culture and information and demand 
that they could offer e-books under reasonable terms and conditions907. The Sieghart Review on e-
lending, commissioned by the UK Government, warns that “whatever analysis you make about the impact 
of remote digital borrowing on the physical footfall in libraries, it is plain that an inability to offer digital 
lending will make libraries increasingly irrelevant in a relatively short time”908. Similarly, the Lescure 
Report in France acknowledges that libraries constitute a “third sector” for the dissemination of culture 
and information, between the commercial sector of cultural industries and non-market exchanges 
between individuals909. The key role of libraries in our societies is to guarantee some collective use and 
dissemination of creation and culture. That does not mean that an exception or limitation should 
necessarily cover e-lending (a question we will turn to later on), but that the objectives of maintaining 
some alternative of provisions of books, by the channel of public libraries, is still justified for digital 
content. The third channel of dissemination of books cited by Lescure, i.e. the sharing between 
individuals, might also decrease as an e-book, at least in a proprietary format such as Kindle, can usually 
not be transmitted to someone else.  
The public interest role of libraries and the remark of the Lescure Report, considering the libraries as 
being a third sector in the provision of cultural content, justify in our view that libraries should not be 
completely left to the market operation. When discussing the public lending right in 1992, most Member 
States wanted to carve out some space for public libraries from the exclusive right conferred to copyright 
and related rights holders. It is doubtful that their position will change today and that the public space in 
which libraries operate be closed for e-lending.  
                                                     
 
907
 See IFLA, IFLA Principles for Library eLending, August 2013, www.ifla.org/node/7418, 3 p. 
908
 W. SIEGHART, op. cit., p.8. 
909
 P. LESCURE, Mission « Acte II de l’exception culturelle », Contribution aux politiques culturelles à l’ère numérique, 2013, 
www.culturecommunication.gouv.fr/Actualites/Missions-et-rapports/Rapport-de-la-Mission-Acte-II-de-l-exception-culturelle-
Contribution-aux-politiques-culturelles-a-l-ere-numerique, p. 185. 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 340 
 
What this public space could be in the copyright framework, whether a limitation or exception or some 
other legislative intervention to facilitate the conditions of licensing or other limitation from a full-fledged 
exclusivity, will be discussed below.  
The necessity to provide a high level of protection to copyright and related rights owners first dictate to 
look at the other side of the balance and notably to consider the possible impact on the market of the 
development of e-lending by public libraries. One should add that the economic aspects of e-lending are 
being considered in a  separate study commissioned by the European Commission. 
(ii) Economic impact of e-lending 
The book publishing industry is the largest cultural industry in Europe and its interests should be 
preserved. The requirement that copyright legislation ensures a high level of protection of the rights of 
intellectual property holders entails that e-lending by libraries should not impair the development of new 
products and business models of this industry in the information society910.  
It cannot be contested that public lending has an impact on retail sales of books as readers can have 
access to some book without buying it. However, this individual and potential impact of each act of 
lending needs to be substantiated and extended to an assessment of the overall impact of lending 
activities, including e-lending, on the market for e-books and their normal exploitation. 
This assessment will help determine on the basis of the three-step test scrutiny whether the e-lending 
could be allowed under a limitation of the exclusive rights, in the form of a statutory license or another 
form of limitation with fair compensation, as it is generally the case for public lending, and whether the 
application of the three-step test precludes an extension of such limitation to the making available of e-
books and other digital content. This will be done below when discussing the possibility for an exception 
to copyright. An economic impact assessment
911
 could also provide guidance as to the conditions 
applicable to e-lending, whether in the form of a copyright limitation or under a specific licensing frame, in 
order to limit its possible impact on the market for e-books.  
It might seem contradictory to admit that the market is capable to provide works for e-lending, as 
demonstrated by current collaborations between publishers and libraries, and afterwards verify whether e-
lending by libraries does not interfere with the normal exploitation of works.   
Yet public lending right is a peculiar case, particularly when considering its extension to e-lending. Indeed 
most copyright exceptions authorize acts of reproduction or communication to the public that are ancillary 
to another legitimate activity. For instance, works are reproduced to enable their preservation by libraries, 
extracts of works are communicated to pupils to illustrate teaching or a work is transformed to perform a 
parody. The provision of the work is authorised under the exception to enable a broader legitimate 
activity. Comparatively, the very purpose of lending is to provide the work to the user and is hence in 
direct confrontation with the exploitation of the work on the market. Its normal effect is to substitute to the 
acquisition of the work. Users get access to works by public lending and are dispensed then to buy the 
work (even though they might still buy the work after having read it by a library loan).  
Public lending by libraries aims at providing an alternative way of getting access to published works for 
reading, viewing, research, private study or enjoyment. The assessment of the effect of the exception on 
the market and normal exploitation of copyrighted works is hence delicate as some market substitution 
will necessarily flow from public lending. Borrowing a book from a library is in direct competition with 
buying it in a bookshop.  
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It is not sufficient then to affirm that borrowing a book avoids buying it and would necessarily decrease 
sales of that book
912
, for the very effect of public lending is to act as an alternative to the market. The 
economic assessment of the impact of public lending should instead focus on the overall competition 
between lending and retail market. The activities of lending by libraries should not go as far as making the 
access to books and other copyrighted works through libraries more convenient compared to access from 
the regular market for such content. The possibility for the copyright owners to deliver the work for lending 
is therefore not enough to preclude the public lending by libraries under the limitation of the exclusive 
right (with or without compensation). The lending activities by libraries could not conversely, due to their 
ease for the users, avert the public from buying works from commercial platforms and publishers.  
Such competition and direct substitution between public lending and market acquisition of a work is 
precisely what copyright owners fear, in the hypothesis of an extension of the current favourable regime 
of public lending to online downloads by libraries. Such fear should be substantiated by an economic 
assessment of the effect of e-lending on the overall exploitation of copyrighted works and a balance 
needs to be found between the key principle in EU law of a high protection of copyright and related rights 
and the objective underlying the public lending by libraries.  
This study, limited to the legal issues of e-lending, could only point at the factors that need to be 
considered for such an assessment. In a recent study on e-lending commissioned by the Dutch 
government913, economists have distinguished four impacts of lending on the market that should be 
assessed:  
1. the effect of a development of e-lending through licensing which would create new licensing 
revenues for publishers and authors; 
2. the direct substitution between the buying of an e-book through an online commercial platform 
and its borrowing through public lending ; 
3. the indirect positive effect of e-lending on sales of e-books, due to the increased diffusion of e-
books in the general public; 
4. the indirect substitution between e-lending and sale of published books (as tangible goods). 
Publishers mostly argue that the development of e-lending by libraries, under an exception and without 
their control, could undermine the development of a market for e-books, and indirectly reduce the sales of 
tangible books, thus referring to the second and fourth impacts listed above. 
The second impact should in our view be reformulated.  In the Dutch study, it is understood as an 
investigation as to whether the lending of an e-book by a public library will offer an attractive alternative to 
its acquisition on the retail market914. It will certainly for some people offer an alternative to the market, but 
the real question is whether, in general and not only theoretically for one book, the e-lending offer by 
public libraries would have a significant impact on the overall market?  
On that basis, an economic study should assess the real competition between libraries and booksellers 
and the overall effect of public lending on retail sales, notably by taking into account the attractiveness of 
lending versus buying.  
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This is where e-lending will change the picture of traditional public lending. There are differences between 
borrowing a physical book at a public library and buying it that still tilts the balance for the readers who 
can afford to buy a book, towards bookshops, for instance:  
- the need of a library membership; 
- the need to physically go to a library within its opening hours to check out and most of all, to 
return the book by its due date; 
- the unavailability of books for lending due to a waiting list or to the application of an embargo 
period; 
- the sometimes poor quality of books that have been often borrowed; 
- The limited collection of the library, compared to the possibility to order any book from its 
publisher; 
- The lack of unlimited possession and ownership of the book; 
- The impossibility to annotate the book or keep it for further reference. 
Some of those differences between lending and buying, also called ‘frictions’, might be attenuated or may 
well disappear for e-books and on-line delivery915: 
- The journey to the library’s premises is not required anymore, and no specific act of returning the 
book will occur if it is automatically disabled at the expiration of the lending term; 
- The e-lending services will be available 24/7; 
- Due to their electronic format, e-books can be sent to several readers simultaneously which could 
reduce the wait for the book to be available; 
- E-books will not wear out by the number of readings; 
- Buying a book gives possession of a tangible good to its acquirer whereas borrowing a book from 
a library is only for a limited time. Even though the same difference exists between a bought e-
book and a borrowed e-book, the immateriality of the e-book might reduce the perception of such 
a difference, as the acquisition of e-books give few elements of possession to the buyer as well. 
From a legal perspective, the provision of an e-book by download could be defined not as a 
sale916 but as the provision of a service, and no transfer of ownership would occur
917
. 
Therefore, in terms of comfort, the gap between e-lending and buying an e-book might be reduced which 
would ultimately have an impact on sales if the modalities of e-lending are not constrained. This will lead 
to imposing some conditions to e-lending to maintain its lower attractiveness. We will address these 
frictions when analysing the possible conditions of e-lending in a legislative revision of public lending 
right. 
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In terms of the economic impact of e-lending, the differences between types of libraries could also matter. 
Indeed the situation of research and academic libraries is rather specific compared to general public 
libraries. Such libraries are the main market of scientific publishers, in contrast with general publishers 
who rely mostly on the retail market. This might have an effect of the extent of the substitution effect, as 
the readers of the research libraries do not constitute the major market for scientific publishers. Fears of 
piracy are also higher for mainstream books than for scientific ones and academic libraries have a long 
time habit of managing electronic resources licenses by scientific publishers, two reasons that might give 
more confidence to scientific publishers to allow for e-lending in research and academic libraries.  
b) The instruments of a legislative intervention 
If some legislative intervention to attenuate or limit the exclusivity of copyright and related rights over e-
lending is decided, it could take several forms, from an interpretative instrument of existing regulatory 
framework applicable to public lending, soft law instruments regulating licensing of e-lending to a 
limitation of copyright and related rights as it is now the case in most member States for the public lending 
right. 
Possible options are:  
- Keeping the status quo: Not revising the current situation would mean that the public libraries 
could engage in e-lending only with the authorisation of rights holders. That would give a green 
light to licensing models to continue to govern e-lending. Such licensing has proven in Europe 
and elsewhere that it could spur the offer of e-books by libraries. The model put in place by the 
market also relies on solid infrastructure, both technical and organisational, that is operated by 
intermediaries playing the role of an interface between publishers, libraries and readers. Libraries 
do not need to develop or invest in costly technical infrastructures . 
Some shortcomings might however be pointed out. Fundamentally, in our opinion, the traditional 
role of libraries in providing an alternative to get access to cultural content should be preserved in 
the digital environment and their mission should be extended to the provision of e-books and 
other digital content. To that end, their autonomy should be preserved. Relying only on the market 
to deliver e-books to library readers could potentially dictate unreasonable terms and conditions 
to libraries or transform public lending into another commercial service provided by the 
publishers. Apparently, this is not the case right now and all studies on the models of e-lending 
rather show an apparently balanced relationship between libraries, publishers and intermediaries 
and conditions that seem reasonable and fair both for libraries and for readers. In the United 
States, though, where the commercial model of e-lending is more developed, some concerns 
have been voiced about the independence of libraries from the intermediaries and the 
infringement of some key principles and values applied by libraries, notably concerning privacy 
issues918 and some terms imposed by the publishers to the intermediaries919. 
Another consequence of leaving e-lending to the market is that it could limit the content available 
for e-lending to e-books that are licensed for that purpose by publishers and would prevent to 
some extent libraries from deciding which books should be offered to their readers920. Some 
publishers are also reluctant to allow e-lending by libraries and have not developed e-lending 
models yet. Developing a bigger catalogue of e-books for e-lending while securing the interests of 
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publishers and libraries alike, could be an argument in favour of some legislative intervention in 
the field. 
- Adopting a Memorandum of Understanding or Standard Licensing Model for e-lending: 
even if the preferred option would be to let the market develop comprehensive licensing for e-
books through collaborations between libraries, publishers and dedicated platforms and 
intermediaries, hence not expanding the limitation of exclusive right to e-lending, some 
accompanying measures could be considered to regulate the conditions applicable to e-lending 
licensing.  
One mechanism may consist in the drafting of a Memorandum of Understanding or Standard 
Licensing Terms for digital lending. This option is considered by EBLIDA, the European 
Association of Libraries, with the objective of guaranteeing “Fair Licensing Models” 921.  One key 
advantage of such soft law instruments would be to integrate the public interest mission of 
libraries in market-defined licensing terms and devise solutions to facilitate e-lending by libraries 
while protecting the rights and interests of copyright holders and publishers. It would also have 
the effect of applying similar conditions to e-lending throughout Europe and for all public libraries, 
whether important or small ones. Instead of an exception or limitation which, at the European 
level, cannot include too many conditions, an MoU has the advantage of permitting to be more 
detailed in the conditions that should apply to e-lending, namely to create some ‘frictions’ as 
opposed to a normal sale of an e-book. It could also differentiate between the types of works 
concerned, from e-books to music, films or video games, as well as fiction works or scientific 
books, the types of libraries, generalist, research or academic or specialised ones, all conditions 
that will be examined below. 
The 2011 Memorandum of Understanding on digitization and making available of out-of-
commerce works can already apply to e-lending of such works as it is a form of making available. 
The Lescure Report, commissioned by the French Ministry of Culture, namely recommends 
encouraging publishers to apply voluntary collective management to digital lending922.  
- Adopting an interpretative document: the adoption of an interpretative document to the Rental 
and Lending Directive would not be very useful. Indeed, interpreting the notion of lending as 
including the making available on line would only recognise that the e-lending is an exclusive right 
of the copyright owners. It would not impose to Member States to expand the right of 
remuneration they might have provided in their law to digital lending. Moreover, the scope of an 
interpretation document should be limited to interpret a current provision whose scope is 
uncertain, not to extend its scope.  
- Revising the provisions of the directive 2006/115 or the directive 2001/29 to allow for e-
lending:  
As to the principle of an exception: 
Adopting an exception for e-lending, probably in the form of a statutory license with fair 
compensation for authors, could be justified by the public interest that underlies the provision of 
access to works that is one key mission of libraries. No market failure happens here as the 
market is capable to organise and license e-lending, but the copyright limitation would be 
explained by a market limitation, for normative reasons related to the central role of public 
libraries. 
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The current system of lending is not conceived strictly as an exception in the acquis 
communautaire. The directive 1992/100, then codified in 2006, affirms the exclusive right of 
lending of authors and related rights owners, then allows Member States to reduce it to a right of 
remuneration. In a last movement, it also permits to national legislation to exempt certain public 
institutions from the payment of some remuneration.  
The enactment of a limitation to the exclusive right is thus left to the discretion of national laws 
and could take several forms: a right of remuneration f-granted to authors, a legal license with fair 
compensation, or in part for exempted libraries, a mere exception with no return to copyright and 
related rights holders.  
From a legislative point of view, the situation is exactly the reverse of the exceptions listed in the 
article 5 of the directive 2001/29. There, the parameters and boundaries of the exception are 
imposed to the Member States that cannot extend the exception but could restrict its scope even 
further. Revising some exception of that list entails, as we have done above for the other 
exceptions benefiting libraries, to spell out the details of the conditions of the exception that the 
national law should conform to, in order to increase harmonisation and ensure that the objective 
of the exception be attainable.  
Public lending right is slightly different. The conditions that are enumerated in the directive 
2006/115 (as to the beneficiaries, the aim of the making available) are not strictly speaking 
related to the exception that Member States can opt for, but pertain to the definition of what 
lending is. It is only indirectly that they become conditions of the limitation/exception when the 
Member States decide not to implement the public lending right as an exclusive right. Precise 
conditions for the lending are then determined at national level with no overall European 
guidance. 
As a consequence, the decision to extend the regulatory frame of lending to off-site lending 
(should this option be chosen) will probably require a legislative intervention that might need to 
transform the system of an exclusive right that can be qualified and attenuated by the Member 
States into a limitation of copyright and related rights with precise conditions. This will have some 
effect on the principle of subsidiarity and on the principle of a high protection of copyright and 
related rights that should not be neglected. 
Another target for revision might be the InfoSoc Directive as the off-site lending is most often 
considered as an act of making available covered by that later directive. Therefore, creating an 
exception to such right could be done by inserting a new exception of the list of article 5. However 
it would create a hybrid system of lending divided into two EU directives. A last solution would be 
to enact a completely new legislative proposal that would cover lending of tangible copies of 
works and other subject matter as well as the on-line provision of digital products by libraries. 
As to the compliance with the three-step test 
The first criterion of a “special case” in the triple test consists in verifying whether the exception or 
limitation corresponds to a clearly defined case and pursue some particular objectives923. All 
opinions converge on the view that the requirement stems from a qualitative understanding and 
favours exceptions that are of public interest924. As regards the digital public lending, there is no 
doubt that public libraries act in the public interest when offering access to works to their readers. 
Public lending right is furthermore restricted to not-for profit institutions and should not aim at any 
direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage which pleads in favour of the “special case”. 
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The economic analysis sketched above could help determine whether e-lending conflicts with the 
normal exploitation of work, which in that case is constituted by the sales of e-books by publishers 
and on-line bookshops.  If the effect of e-lending on e-books market and retail sales is noticeable, 
that would interfere with the normal exploitation of works925. This assessment will also influence 
the contours of a possible limitation of copyright that would require adopting restrictive conditions 
that would reduce the possible attractiveness of e-lending over an acquisition of the work on the 
market.  
The last test consists in the absence of an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of 
the right holder. As regards to digital public lending, the prejudice caused to the right holders, as 
already explained, seems to be justified by the public interest the public libraries pursue. That 
being said, as for the analogue world and in order not to raise discrimination between analogue 
works and digital works, right holders should perceive remuneration for the public lending 
exception
926
. Other conditions could apply to e-lending, if governed by a copyright limitation, so as 
to accommodate the legitimate interests of copyright owners, such as the imposition of release 
windows or embargo (see below). 
c) Elements for an extension of the public lending right to e-lending 
Whatever the avenue chosen to include the off-site lending into the activities of libraries, e-lending should 
not be authorised to such an extent that it would interfere with the normal exploitation of works and 
decrease the volume of regular sales. The conditions applicable to lending, whether in the frame of a 
copyright limitation, in a Memorandum of Understanding or in standard license terms, should aim at on 
one hand not making e-lending similar to downloading an e-book from a commercial website in terms of 
comfort and ease, and on the other hand at guaranteeing the conditions of a normal exploitation of works.  
Public lending through libraries might well supplement the market by acting where the latter knows 
limitations, but public lending has also intrinsic limitations compared to the market. These are called 
frictions that need to be maintained for e-lending. For instance: 
- Access to works owned by a library will depend of the number of copies and of the simultaneous 
demand by other readers. Getting the last novel of Harry Potter at the time of its public release, 
might be easier in a bookshop than in a library. Library readers are accustomed to not getting 
what they are looking for or having to wait for it.  
- The number of simultaneous readers/listeners/viewers of the same book/CD/DVD depends on 
the number of copies of the work owned by the library, which diminishes the harm to the market 
for the work. 
- The duration of the lending is limited in time, which implies that the comfort of reading is not as 
large than for an acquired book. 
- A library might not have some works whereas, save for out-of-print ones, a bookshop can place 
an order to the publisher. 
When, and if, one decides to transpose the public lending to the digital environment, both the possibilities 
offered by the technological development and the constraints inherited with the practice of lending in the 
analogue world should be considered.  
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(i) Objectives of the exception 
The objectives of the limitation of lending right for public libraries are not explicit in the directive. They are 
generally understood as the enhancement of access to culture and for academic and research libraries, 
promotion of research. 
Same objectives could cover e-lending. They do not need to be reminded. Another option would be to 
define more precisely what objectives for what type of libraries would frame the possible limitation of 
copyright to permit the making available on-line of digital items by public libraries. Depending on the 
defined objective, different modalities and boundaries will apply to the activity of lending. E-lending could 
also be restricted to specific objectives, such as the making available of works to defined segments of the 
populations who are deprived of a regular access to culture due to some reasons (eg handicapped 
people, people with reduced mobility, people living in an institution, …). 
That last option would however be in contradiction with the normal mission of libraries to provide access 
to culture to all. Some works existing only in an e-book format would then be excluded to lending for 
people that would not enter in those categories. 
(ii) Beneficiaries 
There is no need to modify the definition of libraries that are considered, under EU law, to be eligible to 
carry out lending under a right to remuneration for rights holders. Only the non-for profit libraries that are 
publicly accessible should benefit from public lending right.  
Nonetheless, the development of e-lending would imply to be capable to secure the making available of 
works, which requires some technical capacity and a significant information system. Not all libraries have 
the means to make e-books available. The current development of e-lending relies on specialised 
intermediaries that manage the needed information and technological platforms and ensure the 
technical protection of e-books that can be transmitted to library users. Should some part of e-lending be 
authorised outside of the exercise of exclusive right and licensing, a similar outsourcing of the technical 
and operational act of making the e-book or other type of digital content available might be needed, at 
least for some libraries. That will require that any regime of e-lending authorises public libraries to have 
recourse to the services of a third party, that could guarantee the security of the on-line loans offered by 
the library.  
Some distinction between libraries can also be relevant. Not all libraries are the same as far as lending 
is concerned and e-lending could have a different impact depending on the type of library in which it is 
done. Therefore, different conditions could apply depending on the library. We will highlight this possibility 
of differentiation when relevant in the analysis of the other factors. 
We have already indicated that e-lending could be reserved to some identified categories of libraries’ 
users, which would be privileged due to a particular situation, e.g. people living in a remote region, or 
with reduced mobility. However this sort of restrictive condition runs counter to the normal objective of 
public libraries.  
Libraries normally cater to the needs of the local population. When making e-books available on-line, they 
would offer their services to the whole world. That explains that current e-lending pilot experiments are 
restricted either to registered members of a library or to residents of a country. This requirement applies 
for instance in the Norwegian e-lending project in which the Norwegian literature of the 20
th
 century is 
available on-line for lending to any resident of Norway upon verification of his or her IP address
927
. This 
restriction to residents of a country or likely users of a local library even though it negates to non-territorial 
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dimension of the Internet, could be justified by the cultural promotion and social objectives of public 
lending. It could be imposed through a secure log-in. 
(iii) Works concerned 
Public lending right only apply to published works. This is implicit in the directive 1992/100 but is 
generally required in its national transpositions. It follows from the fact that by lending, a library distributes 
a copy of a work in its published format. It should not deliver undisclosed or unpublished works, an 
activity that could be discussed under the making available by libraries of their collections for research or 
private study. The possibility for libraries to make their collection available online tends to blur the 
distinction between the lending of published works and the making available for research and private 
study that could pertain to any document held by a cultural heritage institution, as demonstrated by the 
Europeana project. 
However, lending, whether occurring offline or online, should strictly be limited to published editions of 
works, whether books in hard copies or e-books. 
An additional y question is whether the libraries could be allowed to lend works published in an analogue 
format but that libraries have digitised or whether lending should be limited to works acquired in a digital 
version. The principle according to which only published books are subject to lending should entail that 
the library could only provide e-books that have been published as such. That would however limit the e-
lending to digital works that have been created or published (or re-published) in that format. Out-of-print 
works could not then be transformed by the library into downloadable items for lending purposes, except 
if libraries get the authorization from copyright owners, possibly under the more favourable conditions laid 
down by the MoU on digitization of out-of-commerce works.   
Another practical consequence of such a limitation to published e-books is the difficulty it would create on 
a technical level. A paper book is by nature lendable as it only implies to transfer it to the user, hand to 
hand. Providing a library member with a copy of an e-book requires sending a digital file compatible with 
the equipment of the user. Some e-books are sold on the market in a proprietary format and with 
restrictive features that limit the installation of the book on a limited number of devices. Therefore, an e-
book that a library will buy in a regular e-books store will probably not be usable in e-lending as it would 
require to disable the technical restriction to identified e-readers. We will come back to that difficulty. 
In the offline world, lending also covered other types of works such as audiobooks, phonograms, DVDs, 
videogames. Current discussions on e-lending tend to be limited to literary works and e-books. Libraries 
would argue that access to culture is not limited to books and that their mission is to promote culture in all 
its forms.  Making available music or films on-line by e-lending could potentially harm the market for 
video-on-demand or music streaming services, the practical difference between e-lending and these 
services appears to be rather thin. Some economic assessment should explore further whether a 
difference is justified between e-books and other digital content as far as e-lending and its impact on the 
market for those works is concerned. 
Conversely, audiobooks should be treated as e-books, especially as they cater to the needs of visually-
impaired people that strongly rely on public libraries to access reading material. The public interest of 
providing those books to this particular public cannot be rejected and the potential harm to the market 
would probably be measured in a same way as for e-books.  
In our view, an exception of e-lending should not exclude from its scope works subject to licensing 
conditions. It would be too easy for publishers to provide e-books in standard contracts that preclude 
lending, which would empty the exception of all relevance. 
(iv) Authorised acts 
E-lending would necessitate several acts of reproduction or making available. To enable lending of e-
books installed on e-readers, brought by the user or lent by the library with the work, the library should be 
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authorised to copy the work on the device and make it available to the patron with the reading device. For 
remote e-lending, making the work available for download and for a limited time should be allowed, as 
well as any incidental copying that might prove necessary.  
As said above, e-books are released in a DRM-protected format that secure the work to an authorised 
device and to an authorised user with no possibility of further installation on another e-reader. This raises 
a difficulty for libraries to undertake acts of reproduction, distribution and making available autonomously. 
If the lawmaker decides to extend a possible existing limitation benefiting lending by public libraries to e-
lending, the exception might be vain if it cannot be exercised by the libraries without the collaboration of 
publishers or intermediaries. For the sake of technical compatibility, the exception might become 
irrelevant and recourse to a licensed copy might be the sole option.  
Such limitation to copyright should hence impose on publishers the provision of e-books in a format 
enabling their making available on-line by libraries. That does not mean that such e-books will be devoid 
of any protection against further use. A non-proprietary or open format does not mean an unprotected 
format. At least the possibility to making the work available to several users successively should be 
possible. To achieve such objective, the solution of the article 6(4) of the directive 2001/29 on copyright in 
the information society could be applied by analogy. This provision encourages the voluntary initiatives of 
rights holders to allow for some authorised uses of their works, despite the presence of DRM, and 
imposes to Member States to provide some remedies for the beneficiaries of the exceptions frustrated by 
DRM in lack of voluntary measures by rights holders
928
. Publishers could be incited to provide 
interoperable and platform-neutral e-books to public libraries in order to be integrated in their information 
systems and be capable of online access by the public and reading by with many applications and e-
readers. 
If the legislative intervention is limited to guarantee fair conditions by the adoption of a Memorandum of 
Understanding or Standard Licensing Terms, it could provide that the license does not unduly impair the 
capacity of libraries to undertake the acts necessary to e-lending and that some interoperability should be 
aimed at.  
A recent document of IFLA on the Principles of e-lending licensing further insists that eBook 
licensing/purchase options must respect copyright limitations and exceptions available to libraries and 
their users in national law, namely the copying of a portion of the work, the reformatting of the work for 
preservation purposes if licensed or purchased for permanent access or to enable access for people with 
print disabilities
929
. This raises the issue of the contracting over copyright exceptions. But fundamentally, 
this demand underlines that libraries are now increasingly acquiring e-books in licensing terms with the 
objective of making them available through lending and might have no other copies on which they can 
undertake their other tasks of preservation or archiving.  
(v) Conditions 
A first condition that is inherent to the definition of lending is the limitation to acts of making available not 
for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage. A fee can be required from the user 
(namely to cover the remuneration for the authors) but should not yield any benefit for the library.  
In the e-lending developments based on licensing, a number of constraints are applied to the conditions 
of use in order to replicate the “frictions” that one reader experiment when borrowing a book from a 
library, instead of buying it on the market. With the objective to mitigate the impact that lending could 
have on the normal market for books and e-books, the simplicity and comfort of getting a book at a library 
should not too easily divert readers from buying books. When e-books are concerned, the downloading of 
a book on a library’s website avoids the trouble of going to the library’s premises to check out the book 
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and most of all to return the book by its due date. Publishers fear that this reduction of friction jeopardizes 
the development of the e-book market and demand that other constraints be applied to mitigate the 
apparent simplicity of on-line lending. Other ‘frictions’ could replicate the traditional restrictions entailed by 
lending: 
- A limited duration : this a defining feature of lending, but it could be shorter for e-lending. 
- The limitation of one user per title: this is the model of one book / one user that prevails on 
current e-lending services. Libraries can only lend the book to one user at a time for each license 
it has concluded with the publisher or platform. It does create waiting lists, making the e-lending 
less attractive than the acquisition of the book at online bookstores. This could be a condition of a 
copyright limitation for e-lending. 
- emulation of deterioration: some providers of e-books impose to libraries to renew their license 
after a certain number of loans to replicate the deterioration of a paper book. This condition is not 
well accepted by libraries. Its objective is dubious, as the price for an e-book could instead reflect 
the greater number of uses and loans without any loss of quality. 
- It could be imposed to libraries engaging in e-lending to encourage possibility of purchase for 
instance by inserting a hyperlink to web bookshops where the book can be found. This could 
raise some issues of privacy and data protection. In the United States, Amazon had achieved a 
deal with Overdrive that is the leader platform for e-lending in libraries according to which a 
reader will receive an hyperlink towards the website of Amazon where the book she has 
borrowed would be available for sale. This will also enable Amazon to know which Kindle owners 
are library borrowers and possibly, which types of books they like to read, which is a very 
valuable information for the leader in the e-book market. This entails some processing of personal 
data of libraries patrons that would be strictly regulated under the European Union data protection 
law. Libraries have also a tradition of being very protective of the privacy of their readers. 
Therefore any encouragement of purchase of books should be done with the appropriate 
safeguards and by the libraries themselves. 
- Recourse to technical protection measures: e-books are products that have been developed 
and marketed with embedded DRM. Without such a technical protection, the e-lending initiatives 
developed between libraries and publishers would not have been possible. The digital format of 
an e-book exposes it to further copying, manipulation and transmission. Therefore, securing and 
limiting the lending on-line should necessarily be aided by technical measures that prevents 
printing, copying, further lending, and enforces the principle of a limited duration by disabling the 
access to the book at the expiration of the term. If e-lending is authorized by a copyright 
limitation, some technical protection could be imposed to the libraries benefiting from the 
protection, even though that would create some difficulty and cost for libraries in implementing e-
lending. The scope of technically prohibited acts might depend on the type of work (e-book, music 
or audiovisual file) and on the type of libraries. For instance, one can imagine that borrowing a 
scientific book for research or study from a research or academic library could allow for printing or 
copying of limited portions or making notes that could be then extracted from the book.   
- Application of an embargo or windows release period before a work can be available for e-
lending: the principle of a prohibition to lend the work during some period after its commercial 
release is applied in many national laws on public lending right. The idea is also known in the 
exploitation of audiovisual works that applies successive dates of availability from the release of 
the movie in theatres, in DVDs to VOD services. As 75% of the revenues yielded by a book are 
generated in the first six months after its publication
930
, an embargo period of a few months 
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makes the commercial exploitation of a work prevail. New e-books will not be immediately 
available on libraries’ websites for download and a significant part of readers will not wait public 
lending to get access to their favourite authors. The fixation of an availability date applies in the e-
lending models in many countries. For instance, in the United States, the publisher Penguin 
requires a delay of 6 months before making available e-books to libraries. In Sweden, the 
embargo is about 3 or 4 months and could be extended to 12 months, as in the Netherlands, it 
may vary depending from one to three years
931
.  
This principle has some downsides though. Such windowing has namely been increasingly given 
up for audiovisual works as the lack of availability of new releases has resulted in more piracy. 
However a key difference between movies and e-books is that the film was not available on a 
legal downloadable format months after its release in cinemas. The first exploitation of a book 
would be in an e-book format that could be lawfully acquired by a reader. In the United States, the 
inclusion of recently published materials for e-lending has contributed to increase the demand 
from the public
932
. 
The rule of embargo might not be justified in all cases, namely for scientific works whose e-
lending in academic and research libraries could occur sooner as such loans, as seen above, are 
not in the same competing relationship with sales.  
The current EU regime for public lending right admits a derogation from the exclusive right of lending but 
on the condition of the payment of a remuneration (or some form of compensation) to authors and other 
rightholders. In limited cases, the Member States can even derogate from this obligation of remuneration. 
If the system of lending is extended to off site lending on the same model than that existing in Member 
States, a remuneration or compensation should equally be granted to authors for e-lending in Member 
States that have replaced the exclusive right by a right to remuneration. The CJEU has determined the 
criteria of such right to remuneration focussing, as in private copying, on the criteria of the prejudice 
occurred by the authors
933
. The remuneration due to authors might receive a different treatment for 
analogue or digital lending as the harm is not equal.  It could also be foreseen that this right of 
remuneration (when the Member States has not provided another form of compensation) cannot be 
waived by authors, similarly to what is provided for the right of remuneration for rental. 
(vi) Cross-border dimension 
A territorial application of lending is relevant as libraries tend to provide books or films in the language of 
their population (except for music to some extent) and are subsidised by Member States to sustain 
objectives of cultural promotion, that generally stress the need to promote the culture of the country or 
region and the works in the national language and by national authors.  
A limitation of the lending to users who are members of the library or to a verification of the IP address 
could limit the cross-border demand of e-books. But it would contradict the creation of one European 
cultural space.  
Lending in academic and research libraries should similarly be restricted to the registered members of the 
library or the affiliated establishments (e.g. school or university). There might be a demand from 
researchers to get access to content held by academic libraries in other countries, but such access 
should not be satisfied by e-lending, but rather by interlibrary loans (whose application to e-books should 
also be considered). The question of remote access to the collection of an academic library would also 
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depend on what is done with the exception of the article 5(3) n) of the InfoSoc Directive allowing for on-
site consultation.  
III. The exception for teaching and scientific research 
The directive of 22 May 2001 on copyright in the information society, according to its Recital 14, “should 
seek to promote learning and culture by protecting works and other subject-matter while permitting 
exceptions or limitations in the public interest for the purpose of education and teaching”. The article 5(3) 
a) of the directive 2001/29 provides for an exception to copyright and related rights for the sole purpose of 
illustration for teaching or scientific research. This exception pursues two objectives:  first “to reconcile the 
legitimate interests of the rightholders with the wider goal of access to knowledge”
934
 and second, to 
ensure “an adequate level of protection of exclusive rights and at the same time enhanc e  the 
competitiveness of European education and research”
935
.  
This report aims at assessing whether the scope of this exception is adequate and appropriate taking into 
account technological changes and the development of e-learning.  
Activities concerned by the exception for teaching on one hand and for research on the other will first be 
described in this introduction. The assessment of the exception will then be carried out in three parts. The 
first one will analyze the exception for education and research in the EU directive and its national 
implementations (A.). On that basis the assessment of the adequacy of the exception for education will be 
undertaken with a particular emphasis on its cross-border dimension and impact (B.). The same exercise 
will be done for research purpose (C.) before developing several options to address the possible issues 
raised by the assessment (D.) 
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A. Activities of education and research 
Teaching and research may involve numerous uses of copyrighted works
936
, which have only increased in 
the last decade with the development of the Internet and e-learning. One can distinguish at least the 
following acts of use carried out in educational or research activities: 
1. Educational uses 
By teachers 
o a teacher might reproduce works for the preparation of her lessons and include some 
works as illustration of her presentation, textbook, exercises or any other material she 
provides to students 
o copies of works or extracts thereof can be distributed to students as reading material, as 
exercises or exams 
o a teacher might show some films, display or communicate other types of works to her 
class as illustration of her teaching or as material to launch a discussion or an exercise 
o a teacher might upload copies of her presentations (powerpoint slides) (including 
copyrighted works, textbooks, reading material or supplementary material, …) on the web 
platform dedicated to her teaching (generally operated and hosted by the educational 
establishment) 
By students 
o students might include copyrighted works in whole or in parts in their assignments, 
upload and make their assignments available on the webpages of the class, or present 
them to other students and the teacher in the classroom 
o students, and mostly pupils in primary schools, might create webpages or blogs as 
educational exercises with copies of works illustrating the topic covered by the page 
o students might share copyrighted works they find useful for learning with other students 
in dedicated webpages or forums (or even through social networks) 
o students might perform a protected work (a play or some music) as exercises, exams or 
in school events 
By teachers or students 
o teachers or students might translate some works to prepare or to answer to exercises 
By institutions 
o educational institutions might produce anthologies of works for the students 
o educational institutions might host on their servers educational material for e-learning 
comprising protected works 
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o educational institutions, on their own or in collaboration with other schools or universities, 
might deliver on-line teaching without any physical meeting between teachers and 
students, such online courses comprising extracts or whole works or other protected 
subject matter. 
 
Such activities will happen either in the classroom in face-to-face teaching or at distance, using more 
traditional technologies such as broadcasts or recordings or, in an increasing manner, digital technologies 
(e.g. smart boards etc.) and networks (e-learning). Those discrete uses might imply some reproduction, 
communication, making available and distribution of protected works and other subject-matter. Different 
acts will be done by teachers, students or any other personnel of the educational institution (e.g. teaching 
assistants, secretarial or administrative staff, as well as in universities by offices dedicated to support 
educational activities…).  
E-learning can be developed as a supplementary tool offered to students enrolled in a course (webpages 
storing teachers’ presentations, textbooks, reading material, discussion forums, assignments, …) or can 
be provided as stand-alone virtual modules to students registered only for online learning activities. An 
additional feature of e-learning activities is its possible cross-border dimension, as the students might 
be residing in other countries than that of the institution or teacher providing the courses. Moreover e-
learning programs can be offered jointly by a number of universities or schools established in different 
countries and transmissions of content can reach students in a great number of locations. A recent 
development in distance learning, called MOOOCs for Massive Open Online Courses, brings such 
educational services to a new level. “Massive” refers to the huge number of students following the course, 
a number that can go up to more than 100.000 students. The program is said to be open as it is based on 
open access principles and does not require any tuition fee. The course is fully taken on-line as there is 
usually not prior connection between the students and the university delivering the course. First initiated 
in the US in 2011, MOOCs are a new hype in distance learning that is also unfolding in Europe, generally 
by collaborations between universities.  
From a copyright point of view, MOOCS will raise two specific issues: the open access thereto does run 
counter to the requirement of the dissemination of the educational material to a limited number of enrolled 
students, as well as the cross-border dimension that will be particularly intricate, given its potential for 
global reach. 
2. Research uses  
Uses of copyrighted works or other protected subject matter in research activities will be both similar and 
different from educational uses.  Researchers will use two categories of material for research. On one 
hand, works constitute a topic for research and will be reproduced or communicated for that purpose. For 
instance, an art historian might use copyrighted artistic works in her research, a researcher in linguistics 
will analyse an important corpus of literary works, a researcher in cultural studies will need to reproduce 
and use contemporary cultural content. On the other hand, all researchers, irrespective of their 
disciplines, will use scientific papers and articles published in their field. In some academic fields, 
researchers will have regular recourse to databases comprising data, works or other information, as basic 
material for research, mining or statistical purposes
937
. This distinction could separate the use of 
copyrighted works as subject matter for research from the use of scientific works as tools for research 
and would be relevant for this study as it could elicit some different effects. 
Use of works as subject matter for research:  
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o Researchers might reproduce works to analyse them or use them as illustrations, include 
them in their research papers, publications or conference presentations 
o Researchers might share protected works with colleagues through the Internet in the 
context of collaborative research 
o Researchers might use digital mining techniques to process huge amounts of texts or 
data. For instance, researchers in linguistics might analyse a great number of texts to find 
the frequency of some words or formulations. Such text and data mining is the topic of 
another study to be delivered to the European Commission. 
Use as scientific works as tools for research: 
o Researchers might make copies of scientific papers or even share them with colleagues 
within the frame of a research project 
o Researchers might extract data from datasets for analysis and research 
o Research institutions might organise repositories of scientific works of their researchers 
and make them available within the institution or even towards a broader public 
3. Intersection between education and research activities and copyright exceptions 
It should be pointed out that all uses listed above to illustrate the context of educational and research 
activities do not necessarily imply an act covered by copyright, or that they should necessarily be covered 
by an exception. They only aim at depicting the broad range of activities that teachers, learners and 
researchers are likely to engage in within their educational and research activities. In most cases, those 
uses imply an act of reproduction, communication, making available or distribution. They are carried out 
with analogue or digital means and might occur on digital networks. Performance within a classroom is 
aimed at a public, even if it is restricted to a limited number of enrolled students, the assembly will be 
considered in many Member States as not qualifying as a family circle or a private audience exempted 
from copyright application. It will also qualify as a public under the European case law that defines the 
public as a an indeterminate and fairly large number of people
938
. Students accessing contents through e-
learning programmes will similarly considered as a public even if they are in the privacy of their homes 
and receive the content in separate places and at different times.  
Depending on the international, European and domestic laws, different limitations to copyright apply to 
the use of works by schools, teachers and students, some being specifically provided for teaching 
purposes, others having a sufficiently broad scope to apply also to learning activities. For instance:  
- use for illustration of teaching: copyrighted works can be reproduced or communicated to the 
students for purpose of illustration of teaching. This exception, as we will see, exists in the earlier 
versions of the Berne Convention and is included in the list of the article 5 of the InfoSoc 
Directive;  
- use for scientific research: the use of illustration for teaching is often accompanied by an 
extension to research purposes. The purpose of research is mentioned in the Berne Convention, 
the EU directive 2001/29 and in many national laws. 
- use for exams: a specific exception covering the use of copyrighted works as material for exams 
sometimes appears in domestic laws 
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- making of anthologies for education: a second specific exception for education aims at 
authorizing the making of teaching material by reproduction of works in anthologies or textbooks 
to be used in classrooms
939
  
- use of works during school activities: An exception to copyright is sometimes provided in 
order to allow the performance of works during school events or activities upon the condition that 
such performance does not have any commercial purpose and is done for free. The performance 
could serve as illustration of the teaching, as an exercise (like the staging of a play by students) 
or even for mere entertainment purposes
940
.  
- quotation: the quotation exception might be the most common exception in copyright laws 
around the world, due to its (probable) mandatory character in the Berne Convention
941
. The 
purpose of education and teaching is generally one of the motives justifying the quotation. 
- private copying and reprography: Arguably, copying by students in their learning process might 
qualify as copying for private purposes. In addition, many acts of reprography could occur during 
learning or research activities. In some domestic laws, the compensation system for reprography 
is organised separately for acts of photocopying occurring in schools or libraries. 
- library exceptions: learning activities can also rely on exceptions benefiting libraries that 
authorise making available or copying for private study and research.  
This study will be limited to the exception of the article 5(3) a) allowing use of works and other protected 
subject matter for illustration of teaching and for scientific research.  
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B. The exception for education and research 
1. The international framework  
a) The exception in the Berne Convention 
Teaching is one of the few exceptions listed in the Berne Convention and was present in the international 
text since its adoption in 1886. The exception though is a matter for national legislation. In its current 
version, the article 10(2) of the Berne Convention states that:  
“(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special agreements 
existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the extent justified by the 
purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound 
or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice. 
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this Article, 
mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon.” 
This provision dates back from the 1967 Stockholm revision of the Convention. The original exception 
enabled the States to allow “the liberty of extracting portions from literary or artistic works for use in 
publications destined for educational or scientific purposes, or for chrestomathies”. 
A key evolution was the enlargement from “portions of works” to simply works, even though the addition 
of “to the extent justified by the purpose” could result in limiting the use of works to parts thereof where 
the in extenso copying is not necessary
942
.  
As to the apparent restriction to uses by way of publications, broadcasts or audiovisual recordings, all 
commentators acknowledge that it should not entail a restrictive interpretation.  The subsequent revisions 
of the Berne Convention all aimed at enabling educators “to take full advantage of the new means of 
dissemination provided by modern technology”
943
. It should not thus be construed to be limited to the 
techniques referred to
944
. 
The objective of the exception should be the “illustration for teaching”. This formulation has replaced 
earlier versions that referred to “educational or scientific purposes” (original text of 1886). This 
modification did not narrow the scope of the exception in any way. At the Stockholm conference, the 
concern was rather related to the amount of a work that could be used for education purposes
945
. As no 
consensus could emerge on the most accurate wording (that hesitated between ‘portions’, ‘short extracts’, 
‘excerpts’ or ‘borrowings’), the terminology of ‘illustration’ was opted for to ensure that, with the 
suppression of any quantitative restriction, the use was indeed limited to illustrate the teaching
946
. The 
notion of illustration for teaching is more open-ended as it would not preclude the use of the whole of a 
work if necessary for proper illustration, for instance in the case of an artistic work or a short literary work.  
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“Illustration” indicates at least some link between the teaching purpose and the use of third parties works, 
both as to its need and extent. The use of the work should be subsidiary to the teaching
947
 and serve to 
give example, explain or support it. 
“Teaching” under the Berne Convention is understood as applying at all levels of the educational 
systems, from elementary schools to universities
948
 and includes both public and private institutions. 
According to most authors, adult education courses appear to be excluded from the exception
949
. 
This presentation would not be complete without a brief reminder of the ‘minor reservations’ doctrine. 
Failing the introduction in the Berne Convention itself of a list of exempted uses, due to the diversity of 
exceptions in domestic laws, a formal declaration was made in the Report of the Brussels Conference to 
confirm that exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights are available to national legislation
950
. This 
declaration explicitly listed ‘the needs of child and adult education’ as an example. This allows domestic 
laws to provide for other educational exceptions to the extent they are de minimis and comply with the 
three-step test.  
b) Exceptions for education and research in other international treaties 
The Rome Convention on Related Rights of 1961 similarly includes an exception for teaching and 
research. Its formulation is shorter than in the Berne Convention as it refers to “use solely for the 
purposes of teaching or scientific research”
951
. It also appears narrower due to the presence of ‘solely’. 
However, as it is anterior to the revision of its counterpart in the Berne Convention, this difference in the 
wording is probably irrelevant.  
Education and research have then repeatedly stressed in the Preambles of all the ensuing Treaties in 
Copyright or Related Rights as elements of the balance that copyright should achieve. Both the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances include in the public interest 
element of the balance “education, research and access to information”. More recently, the Marrakesh 
Treaty
952
 replicates the same formula and insists of the enjoyment by persons with visual impairments “of 
the right to education, and the opportunity to conduct research”.  
2. Education and research exception in the EU acquis communautaire 
Exceptions for educational and research purposes are found in three European directives. Beyond the 
InfoSoc Directive that will be the object of our study, the article 10(1) d) of the Rental and Lending 
Directive allows Member States to limit related rights for “use solely for the purposes of teaching or 
scientific research” and the articles 6(2) b) and 9(b) of the Database Directive, respectively for copyright 
and sui generis right, admit an exception for the purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research.  
The wording of the exception in the Rental and Lending Directive is similar to that laid down in the article 
5 of the InfoSoc Directive, except that it does not mention ‘illustration’ but simply ‘use for the purpose of 
teaching’.  
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The exception to copyright in the database refers to the ‘sole’ purpose of illustration for teaching, which 
appears at first sight as being more restrictive than its counterpart applying to the sui generis right that 
does not include this adjective.  
Another difference between the exceptions applicable to the copyright or sui generis in the Database 
Directive lies in the fact that any use is exempted from copyright, which is interpreted as referring to all 
exclusive rights granted by the directive under copyright
953
, i.e. reproduction, communication to the public 
and distribution whereas only the act of extraction is as far as sui generis right is concerned. As a result, 
online transmission of a database for educational purpose would be considered as infringing the sui 
generis protection of its contents even though the Member States can exempt the transmission of the 
structure of the database from copyright protection for the same purpose. As 're-utilization` is defined by 
the directive as  “any form of making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a 
database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission”, the limitation 
of the exception to the sole extraction makes it rather useless for teaching as the use of a database to 
illustrate some course will necessarily require its making available or distribution to the classroom, hence 
to a public
954
.  
Additionally, recital 51 of the database directive leaves to Member States the possibility to restrict even 
further the exception to the sui generis right to “certain categories of teaching or scientific research 
institutions”, without stating any criteria for such a limitation.  
3. The exception in the directive 2001/29 
Article 5(3) a) of the directive on copyright in the InfoSoc Directive of 2001 leaves at the discretion of 
Member States the adoption of an exception covering the “use for the sole purpose of illustration for 
teaching or scientific research, as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless 
this turns out to be impossible and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved”. 
This exception is worded in a very open-ended manner as it does not give any specifications or limits in 
any way the beneficiaries or the works or protected subject matter concerned. The key factor 
circumscribing the exception is its purposes: illustration for teaching or scientific research.  
a) Objectives 
(i)  Illustration for teaching  
The exception exempts uses ‘for the sole purpose of Illustration for teaching”. This objective runs parallel 
with the exception of the article 10(2) of the Berne Convention.   
The purpose should be solely illustration for teaching. Reference to ‘sole’ was already qualifying the 
similar exception in the rental and lending directive (‘use solely for the purposes of teaching’) and in the 
database directive (the adjective ‘sole’ being applied only to the exception to copyright, but not to sui 
generis right).  It entails that a use that would pursue several objectives including illustration for teaching 
would not be privileged under article 5(3) a)
955
. It does not restrict any further the exception.  
The notion of ‘teaching’ is not defined in the directive. It can be interpreted as under the Berne 
Convention as referring to schools at all levels of education. The directive in its recital 14 also refers to 
education that it places aside of teaching. Indeed that recital provides that “this Directive should seek to 
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promote learning and culture by protecting works and other subject-matter while permitting exceptions or 
limitations in the public interest for the purpose of education and teaching”. There is no explanation in the 
text of the directive or in its preparatory acts of the difference between the two notions. Two 
interpretations can be tempted. The first one would be to relate education to the process of getting 
knowledge while teaching would instead refer to the imparting of knowledge. As a consequence the 
exception of the directive would be limited to use of works by teachers only, excluding uses by students 
and pupils. Another interpretation would be to define education as referring to any type of training, 
schooling or instruction, regardless of the institution or persons providing it and the situation and age of its 
recipients. Conversely, teaching would designate the institutions recognised by the State, such as 
schools, colleges or universities, to deliver education. In that case, adult education might be excluded 
from the scope of the directive. Both interpretations result in a narrower notion of teaching compared to 
education.  
Lacking any indication in the preparatory acts as to the possible meaning of the two words, one could 
look into the several language versions of the directive. It reveals that the opposition between education 
and teaching is not as straightforward in the other EU languages. Two different words have also been 
used in the many versions (‘éducation et enseignement’ in French, ‘fini educative e d’insegnamento’ in 
Italian, ‘onderwijs en scholing’ in Dutch, ‘fines educativos y docentes’ in Spanish, ‘Ausbildung und 
Unterricht’ in German) but they do not mirror exactly the English words, are being used more 
interchangeably or loosely or are sometimes accompanied by a third word (‘scopo didattico’ in Italian, 
‘educatieve doeleinden’ in Dutch). For instance many versions of the directive (e.g., the Spanish or Dutch 
ones) have opted for a reference to ‘education’ in the text of article 5(3) a) which can be understood in a 
broader sense than the notion of teaching used in the English, German or French text
956
. The European 
Parliament also considered ‘education and learning’ during the legislative process of the directive
957
. 
This seems to indicate that, during the process of adoption of the directive, education and teaching were 
viewed as synonyms and should still be.  
Some questions subsist though as to the proper scope of ‘teaching’ as referred to in the article 5(3) a) 
(and of similar expressions in the other language versions).  
Most scholars consider that in any case adult education is disqualified
958
, as preparatory work of the 
Berne Convention, from which the notion of teaching is taken, only refers to “educational institutions and 
universities, municipal and State schools, and private schools” but excludes “education outside these 
institutions, for instance general teaching available to the general public but not included in the above 
categories”
959
. Adult education would be covered however if performed by the schools and universities 
referred to
960
. 
S. von Lewinski also affirms that the use of works for exams would not be encompassed by ‘teaching’ as 
the latter refers in its ordinary meaning, to the “conveyance of knowledge or experience to others”
961
. 
Such an interpretation would be very restrictive and theoretical. All teachers know that the process of 
examination takes an essential part in the teaching and has didactic purposes. Consequently, using 
works for exams should definitely belong to a teaching activity, even though the supplementary condition 
of illustration might restrict what could be done during an exam. 
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For the same reason, our opinion is that ‘teaching’ should not be construed as to limit itself to the use of 
works by teachers, but should cover as well uses of works that are undertaken by students and pupils 
during the course of their learning process, provided that such use remains within the limits prescribed to 
the exception and namely the restriction to ‘illustration’. By reason of the undecided terminology of 
education or teaching that the many languages of the directive reveal, all actors of the education process, 
teachers and learners alike, could be considered as taking part in the teaching. Peer-education, i.e. an 
educational process in which students interact with other students and learn from each other, is also 
playing an increasing role in teaching methodologies. A distinction between teachers and students for the 
application of the exception would hence be discriminatory. Some uses of works and other subject matter 
by pupils could be covered by other exceptions such as private copying or quotation. Nevertheless, the 
notion of ‘teaching’ is broad enough to encompass uses by students too
962
. The activity of ‘teaching’ 
“includes the use of works as part of a lesson (…) or an exercise (…) but also a reading (…) to write a 
paper, or to participate in debate, or simply to study”
 963
.  
Beyond those precisions, the broadness of the ‘teaching’ means that it can take several forms, for it does 
not only include face-to-face teaching, but also distance instruction, including online courses. Recital 42 
of the directive specifically refers to distance learning.  
The exception of the directive restricts the use of the works to illustration of such teaching. According to 
Article 10(2) of the Berne Convention, such illustration could consist in “publications, broadcasts or sound 
or visual recordings”. Contrary to what this enumeration tends to indicate, all commentators agree that the 
technical means listed in the article 10(2) are only examples of media that could be used by teachers 
during the educational process. At the time of the Stockholm conference, which adopted that text, those 
were the techniques that came to mind and raised concern
964
. But any means and media (e.g., showing, 
performing a work or an excerpt thereof, including it in a powerpoint presentation, …) would be covered 
as well. It is even clearer in the EU directive that does not mention specific means or techniques for the 
exempted illustrative use.  
‘Illustration’ itself is no defined. In its ordinary meaning, illustrate means “to clarify something by giving, or 
serving as, an example or a comparison”. In an educational context, it could be understood as allowing 
the teacher to reproduce or otherwise use a work “as an example”
965
 illustrating the topic of her course, 
as well as providing material to better explain or apply the teaching. An illustration can be examplative, 
demonstrative, explanatory, for application or for clarification. 
The work or any other subject matter used for illustration has to be related to the lesson given to the 
students, in the sense that a link needs to exist between the work used and the topic of the lesson. The 
link can be direct when the teaching is about the work. For instance, extracts of writings by philosophers 
can serve to explain a course of contemporary philosophy; reproduction of paintings can be showed to 
students in an art history class; reproduction of copyrighted works that have been the matter of a litigation 
can illustrate the teaching of the court decision in a copyright course.  
But illustration could also in our view comprise the provision of works as tools or materials to understand 
better a more abstract element that is taught. The link would be more indirect then. A teacher could use 
extracts of novels to explain grammar or make a dictation exercise; writings can be translated in class or 
pop music can be listened to when learning a foreign language; works of art can be shown to students to 
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exercise copying their style or technique. It could go as far as to provide further materials to students to 
prepare a lesson, as a list of required readings
966
. 
Actually, as the condition of ‘illustration for teaching’ was taken from the language of the Berne 
Convention, it should be reminded that such wording was intended to substitute to uneasy discussions 
about the length of the work that could be used (extracts, excerpts or borrowings were proposed by 
Delegates at the Stockholm conference). Therefore, it should not be given a too restrictive interpretation, 
for it was not aimed at limiting the scope of the exception for teaching that existed until then
967
. 
The condition of illustration may be interpreted differently depending on the types of works used. Indeed, 
“while this wording allows the use of entire works such as photographs or poems, the condition of 
‘illustration’ is limiting in principle; to illustrate a lesson, it will often be sufficient to use a part of a work 
only”
968
. The taking of a whole work could be appropriate in some circumstances
969
 
Therefore, illustration could be more than quotation, both as to the extent of the borrowing as to its 
purpose
970
. Quotation is allowed under another exception of the directive 2001/29 for purposes such as 
criticism or review, and many Member States have listed ‘education‘ in the purposes allowed for 
quotation. The two exceptions might overlap in some circumstances. 
(ii) Scientific research 
Article 5(3) a) also refers to uses of works in the context of “scientific research”, without defining such 
notion. The notion of research has maybe appeared so self-evident that there was no need to define it
971
. 
Likewise, scholarly articles focusing on ‘research’ exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive have generally not 
bothered to elaborate a definition of the notion
972
. 
No help can be found in the Berne Convention on the notion of ‘research’ as it has been deleted in the 
Stockholm revision at the time of introduction of the three-step test in the Berne Convention. The triple 
test was supposed to cover inter alia the use of scientific literature for research purposes, removing the 
need to maintain an express reference to “research” in another provision of the Convention
973
.  
An important case decided by a WTO Panel concerned the Canadian exception for research in patent 
law, but the decision does not define the notion of ‘research’ anywhere in its long decision
974
. Some 
countries apply an exception to patent for research purposes but without a clear definition of the notion. In 
the patent field, the exception regularly oscillates between strict scientific goal, defined by G. van 
Overwalle as “aimed at expanding knowledge or testing a proposition”
975
 and a “mixed scientific and 
commercial goal aimed at developing new applications, improving therapeutic effects, more effective 
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production methods”
976
. The recent Proposal for Regulation for the Unitary effect patent has opted for the 
second option by enacting a limitation of the exclusive rights for acts done for experimental purposes 
relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention
977
. Analogy with research in patent field is not 
really transposable to copyright as inventions are used differently.  
In a reference manual of OECD on research and R&D, research and experimental development are 
defined as “creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, 
including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications”
978
.  
Directives prior to the InfoSoc Directive of 2001 also referred to scientific research with the same 
imprecision. The objective of research appears in the article 10(1) d) of the Rental and Lending Directive 
and in the articles 6(2) b) and 9(b) of the Database Directive. The latter directive explains in a recital that 
the term 'scientific research’ covers both the natural sciences and the human sciences, a precision that 
seems to have resulted from different meanings of ‘science’ in the many languages of the European 
Union
979
. 
Concerning the meaning of ‘scientific research’, the addition of ‘scientific’ probably refers to more than 
research, in the sense it has to be “carried out in a methodological and systematic way”
 980
, but one could 
also presume that all research is by definition scientific.
981
 When the European lawmaker wishes to refer 
to research made by individuals outside of a scientific purpose, it has recourse to the term ‘private study’. 
For that matter, some domestic laws, when implementing the directive, have dropped the adjective 
‘scientific’, on the basis that research is necessarily scientific. This was the case in the UK where this 
argument was explicit
982
. Another interpretation of ‘scientific’ would be to understand it in opposition with 
commercial research, but then it would only repeat the requirement that the research be done for non-
commercial purpose. Actually this is rather the articulation of research with the condition of non-
commercial that might be difficult to apply in practice. What is clearly excluded is research made by a 
commercial company, even it it uses scientific methods. But what about research undertaken by an 
university but with private funding by a company that intends to develop commercial products out of the 
research? What about research made by a spin-off of an university ? What about research in 
Government
983
? 
The addition of the ‘solely’ limitation to the purpose of scientific research allowed entails that the use of 
the work for any other purpose falls outside of the exception. However that could not disqualify ancillary 
acts of research such as publication of outcomes in a scientific journal or in any other publication
984
 to the 
extent that it still complies with the requirement of not being for a commercial purpose (see infra).  
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Contrary to teaching purposes, the requirement of ‘illustration’ seems not to apply to scientific 
research
985
. This is sometimes considered as uncertain by commentators
986
, as the text might receive 
different interpretation depending of its language version.  The English text (purpose of illustration for 
teaching or scientific research) grammatically indicates that illustration applies only to teaching, by want 
of the preposition ‘for’ before ‘scientific research’. It is even more clearer in the German text that says: ‘für 
die Nutzung ausschließlich zur Veranschaulichung im Unterricht oder für Zwecke der wissenschaftlichen 
Forschung’, clearly separating the two purposes. On the other hand, the French (‘à des fins exclusives 
d'illustration dans le cadre de l'enseignement ou de la recherche scientifique’) or Italian (‘finalità 
illustrativa per uso didattico o di ricerca scientifica’) versions sound as relating illustration to both teaching 
and research. In French, in order to ascertain that illustration would not apply to research, it would have 
been better to formulate the exception as follows: à des fins exclusives d’illustration dans le cadre de 
l’enseignement ou de recherche scientifique, by deleting the preposition ‘la’. 
The notion of research refers to an activity and not to an institution organised for that purpose. As a result 
any person who carries on this kind of research may benefit from the exception: professors, researchers, 
students but also practising lawyers or medical doctors when they have to write articles, as well as private 
individuals to the extent they apply scientific methods to their research
987
.  
The use of works has also to be justified by and limited to this purpose
988
. In other words, “the 
reproduction of articles on a topic that is not related to a given research topic and thus not necessary for 
carrying out that research would (…) not be justified by the purpose of research”
989
. The requirement of 
illustration is maybe not required for research, contrary to teaching, but the teleological approach that is 
implicit in the exception will limit the use of the work to what is needed to undertake the research. 
b) Beneficiaries 
The exception for education and teaching does not determine its beneficiaries that can be any institution 
providing teaching or doing research
990
, as well as individual undertaking research. We have seen that 
the definition of teaching in the Berne Convention was limited to recognised educational institutions and 
would probably preclude adult education
991
, and therefore more informal organisms carrying out 
instruction and training from its scope. But this exclusion does not result of the definition of the 
beneficiaries of the exception. In its explanation of the requirement for the teaching and research to be 
non-commercial, the recital 42 considers that the organisational structure and the means of funding of the 
establishment concerned are irrelevant. Therefore both public and private educational and research 
institutions can benefit from the exception. 
The Database Directive allows the Member States to exclude some teaching and research establishment 
from the benefit of the exception to the sui generis right, but such a rule in not contained in the 2001 
directive. 
c) Works concerned 
The directive does not limit in any way the categories of works that could be covered by the exception. 
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What has been said for unpublished works for the library exception would equally apply here: the list of 
exceptions of the article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive does not say anything about published or unpublished 
works and no rule of exclusion of unpublished works from the benefit of copyright exceptions can be 
found in the acquis communautaire. The reverse rule is not explicit either. 
That being said, the works that teachers will use to illustrate their teachings will generally be published or 
have been disclosed. That might not be always the case in research, where unpublished works can have 
a particular value in some fields (like history, art history, literature, …) and could be the subject of 
scientific investigation. However, the restriction to the exception to the sole purpose of research could 
prevent the divulgation or publication of the work without the consent of the copyright owner. 
It should be reminded that databases are subject to a similarly worded exception, at least for the 
copyright protecting the structure of the database. As to the sui generis right, the exception will be limited 
to acts of extraction of the database contents, but will not be valid for re-utilisation, which makes the 
exception rather useless (see supra).  
No exception for education or research pertains to computer programs, the applicable directive being 
silent in that regard. Yet, in computer science, software could be used to illustrate teaching of their 
language, programming or operation, as well as for experimentation and research. Computer games 
could also serve for education in the field of graphic design. For video games contain both software 
elements and graphic elements, they will be protected both by the computer program directive and by the 
directive 2001/29. To that extent, video games could maybe benefit from the exception listed in the article 
5 of the latter directive for purposes of teaching and research
992
. In addition, an exception for research 
might well not be needed for computer programs as they benefit from a specific exception “to study or test 
the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element 
of the program”, which can cover most activities of research.  
d) Authorised acts 
Article 5(3) a) of the Directive 2001/29 allows Member States to adopt an exception to the reproduction 
right provided in Article 2 and to the rights of communication to the public of works and of making 
available to the public other subject-matter provided in Article 3. The exception can also cover acts of 
distribution through the application of article 5(4) of the Directive. 
Recital 42 explicitly includes distance learning in the scope of the exception. 
e) The limitation to non-commercial purpose  
Only acts accomplished with a non-commercial purpose will benefit from the exception, as the end of the 
provision of article 5(3) a) requires that the use is contained “to the extent justified by the non-commercial 
purpose to be achieved”. This condition applies both to teaching and research activities. Recital 42 of the 
directive further specifies that ”when applying the exception or limitation for non-commercial educational 
and scientific research purposes, including distance learning, the non-commercial nature of the activity in 
question should be determined by that activity as such. The organisational structure and the means of 
funding of the establishment concerned are not the decisive factors in this respect”. The registration to a 
curriculum at a school or university can require some fee or tuition without preventing the application of 
the exception. The purpose of the teaching or research activity itself will determine whether the non-
commercial dimension is satisfied. 
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This can be understood in two different ways
993
. On one hand, the commercial nature can pertain to the 
act of use itself. For instance, copies of works to illustrate some teaching would be distributed to students 
for a fee exceeding its cost. Another interpretation would connect the commercial purpose to the activity 
of teaching or research.  Under such interpretation, supported by recital 42, a professor of a non-for profit 
university will not be eligible for the exception when she provides commercial training or does research 
for a consultation commissioned and paid by a private company. Research undertaken by a 
pharmaceutical industry, as it aims at developing commercial products, or research done by a lawyer for 
the purpose of preparing a case for a client, will also run afoul of the exception requirements. The 
principle of strict interpretation applying to exceptions to copyright and related rights would favour a 
cumulative application of both interpretations. 
The criterion of ‘commercial’ includes both direct and indirect commercial advantages
994
. Researches 
done by companies to make profits are not in the scope of the exception
995
.  Same reasoning should 
apply to university spin-offs to the extent they purport to bring on the market products or to deliver 
licences based on the research carried out by universities. The further research carried out at the stage of 
the spin-off should probably be excluded from the scope of the exception, whereas the research done by 
the university upstream would be covered.  
Some difficulty of application could arise in research for no scientific research is completely disinterested. 
Research can be done for non-commercial purposes and eventually generate some commercial products, 
the filing of a patent or result in the publication of a book that could elicit some revenue. It would be 
unreasonable to disqualify the research (involving use of protected works) that was not undertaken with a 
commercial motive for the sole reason that further to that research, some revenue or benefit has been 
extracted
996
. The nature of funding, whether private or public, should not be the sole criteria for 
determining whether a research is commercial or not. Research could be considered as non-commercial 
if the actual conducting of the research is not commercial, even when it is funded by commercial 
companies.  
The provision that the use is limited “to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be 
achieved” introduces some proportionality. It corresponds to the limitation to fair practices appearing in 
the exception of the Berne Convention. Both the scope of the use and the length of the portion of the 
work concerned would not pass muster if they exceed what is strictly necessary to illustrate teaching or to 
do research. 
f) Other conditions 
(i) Indication of the source  
In addition, the source, including the author’s name, has to be indicated. Similarly, Article 10(3) of the 
Berne Convention indicates that “mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it 
appears thereon“. The source could refer to the title of the work, its publisher and not only to the author’s 
name. This mention is mandatory unless “this turns out to be impossible”. This refers to cases of legal 
impossibility when the author remains anonym or uses a pseudonym
997
. In other cases, “the directive 
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does not indicate what efforts must be made to find the author’s name or other indication of source before 
such indication may be considered impossible”
998
. Some commentators have doubted that the cases 
where it would be impossible to cite the source of the work would be many, as the user would generally 
know where she has borrowed the work she uses to illustrate her teachings
999
. Nevertheless, in the 
hypothesis of unpublished works, supposing that the exception could apply thereto, the absence of the 
mention of the source could be accepted if it is impossible to identify the authors thanks to a reasonable 
investigation
1000
. Another interpretation would be that it could be impossible, in some cases, to mention 
the name of the author and the source of the work, when the work is used in a way that makes it difficult 
to mention the source and author’s name.  
(ii) Fair compensation 
Although the directive does not require that some remuneration is paid to the right holders, “the 
application of the three-step test (…) may result in an obligation of the Member States to provide for some 
form of fair compensation or remuneration “
1001
. In addition, Recital 36 leaves at the discretion of Member 
States to “provide for fair compensation for rightholders also when applying the optional provisions on 
exceptions or limitations which do not require such compensation”.  The education exception leads to 
compensation for rights holders in many Member States. 
In one amendment to the draft directive, the European Parliament had proposed to make the exception 
subject to the payment of fair compensation. This was accepted by the Commission but the Council 
decided not to impose a compensation and referred instead to the newly introduced recital 36
1002
.  
4. Other educational uses 
The question also arises to know whether certain teaching uses of works (public performances, 
recitations, course packs, anthologies, copies for exams…) are included in the scope of Article 5(3) a). 
We have developed supra the opinion that the making of copies for exams
1003
, of course packs, public 
performances or recitations when carried out in the course of teaching as exercises or development of 
educational activities could be covered by a broad definition of illustration of teaching. 
Concerning the making of anthologies, the answer is not so clear. Article 5(3) a) of the Infosoc directive 
seems to be flexible enough as to the extent and amount of use to consider that teaching anthologies are 
encompassed by the exception. As one scholar puts it,  “in a digital teaching context it is very difficult to 
distinguish between material that is “used in the course of the instruction” and a “teaching anthology” […] 
the all–encompassing EU solution makes sense”
1004
. Nevertheless, only teaching anthologies “that are 
used for teaching purposes and comply with the non-commercial requirement, as well as with the three-
step test (…) will qualify”
1005
. Obviously, if the anthology is made by a specialized publisher, its use by a 
teacher during a lesson could not benefit from the exception because it will conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work.  
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Anyway, if one decides that these acts are not covered by the current exception of Article 5(3) a), in any 
case, the exception of Article 5(3) o) could apply to some extent. It provides that “use in certain other 
cases of minor importance where exceptions or limitations already exist under national law, provided that 
they only concern analogue uses and do not affect the free circulation of goods and services within the 
Community, without prejudice to the other exceptions and limitations contained in this Article”. The 
limitation of the exception, also called the grand-father clause, to analogue uses would prohibit the 
making of digital anthologies or coursepacks, notably in e-learning environments. Another ground to allow 
the making of anthologies for students, if limited in scope, would be the minor reservations doctrine of the 
Berne Convention
 1006
.  
5. Implementation of the exception in the Member States 
As well as for the exception for certain acts of reproduction made by libraries, the exception of the article 
5(2) a) has been transposed in all the Member States that are analyzed by the study. But all the Member 
States have not transposed this provision in the same way, being also more detailed in the 
implementation, and sometimes more restrictive and narrower than the directive, with the result in some 
countries that distance or internet-based learning at home is not covered
1007
. The reason for these 
differences lies in the optional nature of the exception and the discretion the Member States have in the 
choice of the measures to transpose the Directive. As outlined in the Green Paper, “different treatment of 
the same act in different Member States may lead to legal uncertainty with regard to what is permitted 
under the exception, especially when teaching and research are carried out within a transnational 
framework”
1008
, whereas the objective was the harmonization of the legislations. Those differences will be 
discussed in the present section. 
a) Objectives 
(i) Illustration for teaching 
Some differences between Member States are reflected in the objectives pursued by the exception, more 
specifically as to the condition of illustration for teaching or scientific research. Some countries use 
the exact terms of the directive: it is the case for Belgium
1009
, France
1010
 (where sectorial agreements set 
out in details what must be understood by ‘illustration’), Hungary
1011
, Italy
1012
 (for use except for the 
publication on the internet with reference to ‘didactical use’), and finally Luxemburg
1013
. Some refers to 
illustration but solely in teaching, research being covered by another provision as in Germany
1014
  (for 
illustration in teaching at schools), Spain
1015
 (for the illustration of its educational activities in classrooms) 
and The Netherlands
1016
 (illustration for teaching). Finally, the condition of illustration is sometimes 
missing in national copyright laws as in Poland
1017
 (for teaching or research purposes), UK
1018
 (‘in the 
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course of instruction or of preparation for instruction’, with no foreseen change with the new version of the 
law under discussion, except that the new subsection (2) sets out what is meant by the term 
“instruction”
1019
), Italy
1020
  (for ‘didactic or scientific use’ in the case of a publication on the internet), and 
Denmark
1021
 (the provision refers to ‘educational activities’).  
It is worth coming back more specifically to the case of France, where sectorial agreements complete the 
general provision about the exception in the Copyright Act. The protocol provides a definition of what is 
meant by the notion of ‘illustration for teaching and research’: “the use of a work or an extract from work 
only to clarify or support a discussion, development or argument forming the main subject of the course of 
teachers, teaching work of pupils and students or research work”
1022
.  
The purpose of examination is also provided for in some countries: in France – development and 
dissemination of exam subjects
1023
, in the UK
1024
 – anything done for the purposes of an examination, in 
Germany
1025
, in Hungary
1026
, and in Belgium
1027
 – the free performance of a work during a public exam. In 
a Belgian analysis of the Copyright Law, the author points out that such use is included within the 
framework of school activities, and then of the article 5(3) a) of the Directive
1028
. 
(ii) Scientific research 
The implementation of the exception generally follows the directive and combines in one provision the 
objectives of teaching and research without treating them differently. Accordingly, research is included in 
the education exception in Belgium
1029
, France
1030
, Hungary
1031
, Italy
1032
, Luxemburg
1033
, and Poland
1034
. 
Generally no specific conditions are defined for research that is subject to the requirements applicable for 
the teaching objective. Germany separates the purpose of research from the purpose of teaching in two 
distinct paragraphs but the differences between the two exceptions are minimal.
1035
 
Some countries reserve a distinct treatment to uses for research purposes. For instance, Denmark allows 
the copies of works of art in scientific presentations
1036
. This rather restricts the use of copyrighted works 
for research purposes to one type of activities and one category of works and the limit with the quotation 
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exception seems rather thin
1037
. UK is another example of a clear separation between education and 
research
1038
. The. Section 29 of the Copyright, Design and Patent Act admits fair dealing with a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes of research for a non-commercial purpose, whereas 
educational uses are exempted by another provisions, from section 32 to sections 36A. Notice that this 
provision, as well as the French provision, does not include the term “scientific” used in the Directive to 
qualify the research, as the British Government considered
1039
 the insertion of this word as redundant
1040
.  
Two countries amongst those analysed for the present study, do not know any exception for research 
purposes. They are Spain
1041
 and the Netherlands
1042
. 
Interestingly, case law has sometimes had to define the notion of research contained in the exception
1043
. 
A UK decision1044 specified that in article 29, which has to be interpreted in the light of article 5(3) a of the 
directive InfoSoc, the purpose of research “must be narrowly interpreted as meaning ‘for the purposes of 
scientific research’” 1045. As regards the condition of illustration required by the European provision, the 
court held that “it is not clear whether the exception must also be interpreted as being restricted to 
illustration for … scientific research”, which led the judge to assume that the word “illustration” is linked to 
teaching but not to research1046. In the same case, the judge decided that the defendants did not 
reproduce the list of data for the purpose of scientific research but “for the forensic purpose of enabling 
themselves and others to extract data from mobile phones for use in criminal investigations”, which did 
not amount according to the decision, to scientific research1047. Another UK decision insists on the fact 
that the exception requires not only that the purpose of the act is for research but also that the purpose is 
a non-commercial one1048. The conditions are not alternative. We will come back to that decision. 
A decision of the Danish Eastern Court of Appeal, in 2000, considered that an art book/journal published 
a couple of times a year by the art museum ‘Louisiana’ was not for scientific research1049. In another 
decision1050, the same court decided that a newspaper feature article and a newspaper review were not 
equivalent to scientific research.  
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b) Beneficiaries and users 
The Directive does not reserve the application of the exception to specific beneficiaries. Sometimes, 
Member States have stated that the benefit of the exception concerns also educational or research 
establishments, or else particular individuals. Some domestic laws have even been very specific as to 
who may or may not rely on the exception. On the contrary, others followed the wording of the Directive. 
This lack of determined beneficiaries in the drafting of first, the Directive, and then in the national 
transposition laws, can be understood as an attempt to apply the exception to all educational institutions, 
which is confirmed by the text of recital 42 of the Directive, the latter referring to the notion of 
establishments concerned. Recital 34 speaks about public institutions, which is consistent with the 
requirement of realization of uses for a non-commercial purpose. 
First, States that have not included in their domestic law a specific beneficiary include Denmark, 
Italy, Luxemburg, the UK (only for the act of fair dealing with a work for the purpose of research and the 
reproduction for purposes of instruction and examination) and the Netherlands. 
Belgium limits the making available through the closed networks of the concerned institutions to ‘the 
establishments recognised or officially organised for that purpose by the public authorities’. Whereas the 
general exception for teaching in the French Intellectual Property Code do not specify its beneficiaries, 
sectoral agreements further defines the covered educational institutions, which are only those governed 
by the Ministers that have signed the agreements. As a consequence, some educational institutions 
belonging to the competence of Ministers of Culture or Agriculture are not covered by the agreements 
and in practice will not enjoy the possibilities of the general exception.  
Others Member States restrict the benefit of the exception to educational establishments or teaching 
profession: in Denmark, beneficiaries are teachers and students for the act of reproduction within 
educational activities, in Spain
1051
, teachers of regulated education. In Poland, the exception applies to 
research and educational institutions
1052
.
 
In the Hungarian law, a specific disposition enumerates the 
concerned establishments
1053
, but solely for teaching purposes, not for scientific research, as well as in 
Germany
1054
. Finally, in the UK for all acts other than reprographic reproduction and fair dealing in 
research, the beneficiaries are the educational establishments
1055
. The Section 174 of the UK Copyright 
Law gives a definition of what is meant by educational establishments. 
Some Member States also define the users that would ultimately benefit from the exception. For 
instance, in the UK, the users include a person giving or receiving instruction in the case of reproduction 
(other than reprographic)
1056
; a teacher or pupil or by any person for the purposes of instruction in the 
case of performing, playing or showing a work
1057
; the communication to the public by a person situated 
within the premises of an educational establishment of a recording of a broadcast or a copy of such a 
recording
1058
. 
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c) Works concerned 
The scope of the national implementation of Article 5(3) a) of the Directive is sometimes also limited to a 
determined subject matter and a limited quantity of the works used in the teaching.  
(i) Type of works covered 
For instance, the exception applies only to articles or works of fine art in part or in whole or short 
fragments of other works in Belgium
1059
 ; works of art and works of a descriptive nature for the use in 
scientific presentation in Denmark
1060
 ; extracts of works in France
1061
, but sectoral agreements have so 
far concerned only books, printed music, periodical publications and works of visual arts; small or limited 
parts of a work, small scale works, as well as individual articles from newspapers or periodicals in 
Germany
1062
 ; parts of a literary, musical work or film made public, or such entire works of a smaller extent 
as well as pictures of works of fine art, architectural, applied art and industrial design creations as well as 
photographic works and specific parts of published books, newspaper and periodical articles in 
Hungary
1063
 ; fragments or parts of works in Italy
1064
 ; low resolution or degraded images and music also 
in Italy
1065
, in the case of publication on the internet ; short fragments of works in Luxemburg
1066
 ; parts of 
literary, scientific or artistic work or the entire work of short drawings, paintings, works of architecture and 
sculpture, lithographs, engravings and the like, photographic works, works of applied art and industrial 
designs and models in The Netherlands
1067
 ; fragments of disseminated works in original and in 
translation in case of making copies in Poland
1068
 ; small fragments of works or isolated works of plastic or 
photographic figurative character in Spain
1069
 ; and finally, in the case of research
1070
, to literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work or, in the case of instruction
1071
, to extracts of published literary, dramatic or 
musical works or published editions as well as to a sound recording, a film or a broadcast in the UK. In 
Germany
1072
, copies in graphic data file are permitted in quantities required for the person receiving 
instruction. Concerning the provision 52a UrhG, the Court of Appeal of Stuttgart of the 4 April 2012 has 
held that an extract of 91 pages of a psychology textbook made available to students by a teacher on an 
electronic platform is not a “small part” of the textbook
1073
. This condition must be assessed in casu, from 
a quantitative point of view and in relation to the work as a whole and its content
1074
. The Court sets a 
limit of 3 pages beyond which the exception can no longer be claimed, for purposes of legal certainty. 
This long enumeration reveals that Member States tend to limit the use to extracts of works. 
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Contrariwise, the exception does not apply to works made for educational purposes in France
1075
 and, 
only in case of making available to the public of these works and reproduction for such making available, 
in Germany
1076
. Besides university manuals, Spain also excludes textbooks. The justification of the 
exclusion of such works can be explained by the need to preserve their market for exploitation that is 
primarily constituted by educational establishments and teachers.  
In addition, music scores are out of the scope of the exception in France
1077
 and in Germany “audiovisual 
works can only be used (reproduced and made available online) for teaching purposes after two years 
upon release”
1078
.  
In the UK, the provisions 35 and 36 apply only to the extent that licenses are unavailable for the activities 
covered. Schools and universities need to hold licenses for uses of copyright materials such as 
photocopying books, or recording television programs, and that does not change with the project to 
amend those articles.  
(ii) Quantity  
In Hungary, the reproduction of specific parts of a work must be done in a number corresponding to the 
number of students in class or in a number necessary for the exams. The format can also be determined: 
in Italy, the publication on the Internet of images and music is permitted only if they are degraded or in 
low resolution.  
Some limitation on the quantity of admitted copies can also result from the accommodation of the 
exception with fair practice, one criterion that can be found in the article 5(3) a) of the directive. For 
instance, the Netherlands
1079
 requires that the provision be applied in accordance with ‘what might 
reasonably be accepted under the social rules’ whereas Denmark
1080
 speaks about ‘proper usage’, 
Belgium about ‘the extent justified by the purpose’ and Luxemburg about ‘fair practice’. The notion of fair 
dealing that gives an overall frame to the exception for teaching and research in the UK
1081
 is not defined 
in the Copyright Act, but was developed progressively by the judges by their decisions that provide that 
some factors help to determine whether a use is fair
1082
.  
d) Authorized acts 
(i) Exclusive rights exempted by the exception 
All authorized acts do not apply to all works covered by the exception for teaching in the domestic laws 
for there are large variations among Member States. 
The act authorized by the directive is included under the general term of "use". Article 5(3) of the Directive 
expressly refers to Articles 3 and 4, which deal respectively with the reproduction and communication to 
the public. In addition, article 5(4) states that when the Member States may provide for an exception or 
limitation to the reproduction right under paragraph 3, they may also provide for an exception or limitation 
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to the right of distribution covered by article 4, to the extent justified by the purpose of the authorized act 
of reproduction. 
Some countries – like Poland – have literally taken the very general term of use for the sole purpose of 
illustration for teaching or scientific research of the directive to exempt uses for educational purposes. 
Such use may be interpreted as exempting any type of acts of exploitation, therefore including making 
available online and digitization. In majority though, the other Member States having decided to specify 
the authorized acts. First of all, reproduction is encompassed in all the national provisions, to a greater 
or lesser extent. Most of the time, this act of reproduction permits the digital reproduction, explicitly or not. 
For instance, in Belgium, the law draws a distinction between the reproduction on paper or any similar 
medium and the reproduction in any medium other than paper or similar medium, the latter aiming clearly 
at the reproductions under a digital format.   
Communication is referred to in Belgium
1083
, France
1084
Luxemburg
1085
, Italy
1086
 and Spain
1087
, along with 
publication in the Netherlands
1088
 and in Italy
1089
, making available to the public and transmission in 
Germany
1090
, borrowing in Hungary
1091
, summary and quotation as well as publication on the internet in 
Italy
1092
, use in Poland
1093
, distribution in Spain
1094
. In the proposal to amend the English law
1095
, the new 
version of the section 32 would cover the act of fair dealing for the purpose of instruction to allow 
“teachers to make reasonable use of copyright materials without infringing copyright”. 
Some domestic laws also mention translation : for instance, in Poland
1096
 and in the Netherlands – the 
reproduction in another language
1097
.  
(ii) The application to e-learning  
The national laws do not always clearly deal with e-learning, even if Recital 42 of the Directive explicitly 
includes distance learning in the scope of the exception.  
For instance, e-learning is seriously compromised in Hungary and in Spain, where face-to-face teaching 
seems to be the only situation to which the exception applies
1098
. The Spanish exception
1099
 is limited to 
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the classrooms where the educational activities take place. The UK goes a little bit further by allowing the 
communication by an intranet, and not an extranet, which led The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property 
to say that “the exception does not extend to situations where students are not on the premises of the 
educational establishment. That means that distance learners are at a disadvantage compared with those 
based on campus”
1100
.  
A counterexample is Belgium that, in the article 22, 4°quarter of the Copyright Act, adapts the exception 
for teaching to distance learning through the Internet. Despite the restriction of the communication “solely 
by means of closed transmission networks of the establishment”, the exception allows the transmission by 
an extranet network, as is clear from the parliamentary discussions, the goal being the limitation of the 
communication to a limited circle of identified persons, composed of teachers, students or 
researchers
1101
. In Germany, the article 52a aims at promoting the use of new technologies in education 
and research, including the e-learning development. It permits the making available online of “published 
small, limited parts of a work, small scale works, as well as individual articles from newspapers or 
periodicals” for the benefit of “the specifically limited circle of those taking part in the instruction”.
1102
 In its 
previously mentioned decision, the Court of Appeal of Stuttgart held that the condition of a making 
available to a “specifically limited circle” of students is met when access to the teaching platform is 
controlled, regardless of the large number of holders of a password
1103
. In its new version of the 
exception, the e-learning is covered by the insertion of the sentence “particularly by means of a digital 
workspace”
1104
. The general wording of the Luxemburg and Polish provision suggests that e-learning can 
equally occur in those countries under the educational copyright exception. 
More restrictive are the situations of Italy and Denmark. Italy
1105
 admits the publication on the internet, but 
in a very limited way, for the publication should be of low resolution or degraded images and music
1106
. 
This publication must be done for didactic or scientific uses, but the decree that has to delimit the scope 
of such uses does not exist yet
1107
. In Denmark, teachers and pupils are allowed to record their own 
performances of works on the condition that they are only used for educational purposes
1108
. As noticed 
by R. Xalabarder, “it is not clear whether these performances could be transmitted beyond the premises 
of the educational establishment”
1109
.  
When allowing for the exception in the frame of e-learning, the conditions applicable are generally 
determined so as to prevent dissemination of teaching material outside of the students enrolled in the 
course. For instance, Belgium requires that the communication intended for illustration of the teaching or 
the scientific research to take place by means of closed transmission networks of the establishment and 
within the scope of the normal activities of the establishment. The French exception speaks about ‘digital 
workspace’, and the sectorial agreement lists specific places where the acts can take place such as the 
representation in classroom, making available online on the establishment intranet and extranet. In Italy, 
the provision specifies that the publication is done “on the internet”
1110
. In the UK, the act covered cannot 
                                                     
 
1100
 A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, Crown, December 2006, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/gowers/, p. 47, point 
4.17. 
1101
 Doc. Parl., Chambre, sess. 2003-2004, n° 1137/008, p. 15. 
1102
 A. LUCAS-SCHLOETTER, “Lettre d’Allemagne. Qu’y a-t-il dans la "deuxième corbeille" ? La loi allemande du 26 octobre 2007 
relative au droit d’auteur dans la société de l’information”, Propr. intell., 2008, n° 28, p. 370. 
1103
 OLG Stuttgart, 04.04.2012, 4 U 171/11, GRUR 2012, 718. 
1104
 Article L122-5, e) CPI 
1105
 Article 70 of the Italian Law No. 633 of 22 April 1941 for the Protection of the Copyright and the Other Related Rights to its 
Exercise. 
1106
 Article 70, §1bis. 
1107
 G. MAZZIOTTI, Copyright and Educational Uses: the Unbearable Case of Italian Law from a European and Comparative 
Perspective, op. cit., p. 11, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19697/LAW_2011_17_Mazziotti.pdf  
1108
 Article 13. 
1109
 R. XALABARDER, Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Educational Activities, op. cit., p. 82. 
1110
 Article 70, §1bis 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 376 
 
take place outside the premises of the educational establishment
1111
. The new version of the law which is 
being discussed at the moment provides that, for sections 35 and 36, covering respectively the act of 
recording of broadcasts and the act of reprographic copying (that will change into copying and use of 
extract of works), the uses may “take place both on the premises of an educational establishment and via 
a secure distance learning networks”
1112
. The copyright material may not be “transmitted to persons 
unaffiliated with the educational establishment”. 
e) Other conditions 
In compliance with Article 5(3) a) of the Directive, the non-commercial nature of the purpose pursued is 
implemented in Belgium
1113
, Denmark
1114
, France
1115
, Germany
1116
, Hungary
1117
, Italy
1118
, Spain
1119
 the 
Netherlands
1120
, and United Kingdom
1121
 , but not in Luxembourg and Poland
1122
. 
A UK decision stresses that the fact an establishment is publicly funded “is not determinative of whether 
the use was a non-commercial purpose”
 1123
. In that specific case, the judge considered that the purpose 
of law enforcement (for use in criminal investigations) was not a non-commercial purpose
1124
. Moreover, 
according to the judge, the wording of the European provision related to “ the extent justified by the non-
commercial purpose to be achieved” has to be understood as the British notion of fair dealing
1125
. To 
appreciate the notion of fair dealing, the judge refers to three most important factors laid down in the 
decision Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd
1126
 : “(1) the degree to which the alleged infringing use 
competes with exploitation of the copyright work by the owner (…) ; (2) whether the work has been 
published or not…. ; (3) the extent of the use and the importance of what has been taken (…)”
1127
. In the 
decision mentioned, the defendants’ reproduction of the list of data competed with the exploitation of 
works by the owner, the list was unpublished and the extent of the reproduction was considerable, three 
factors that weighted against of fair dealing
1128
. In addition, another UK decision specifies the moment 
when the commercial or non-commercial nature of the research has to be taken into account: 
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“Presumably, any research which, at the time it is conducted, contemplated or intended, should be 
ultimately used for a purpose which has some commercial value will not be within the permitted act”
 1129
. 
Acknowledgment i.e. the indication of the source including the author’s name, is sometimes mentioned 
in the legal provision itself, which transposes the exception, but also sometimes provided for in a separate 
article, like in Denmark. It is not required in Poland and, in the case of publication by Internet of low 
resolution or degraded images and music, in Italy, but well in Belgium
1130
, France, Germany
1131
 the 
Netherlands
1132
, Luxemburg
1133
, Hungary
1134
, Italy
1135
, Spain
1136
 and in the UK
1137
, the latter requiring a 
sufficient acknowledgement
1138
 – most of those countries providing for this indication “except when this is 
impossible”. 
The Directive does not provide any compensation or remuneration for the educational exception, but 
allows it under recital 34. Luxemburg, Hungary for the act of borrowing, and Germany for the act of 
reproduction, do not provide for any remuneration. The Belgian copyright law requires that some 
remuneration be paid to authors and publishers of works, based on a system of statutory licences
1139
 
whereas France
1140
 requires compensation with negotiated remuneration on a flat-rate basis, the sectorial 
agreement fixing the amount of the remuneration.  
Equitable remuneration is required in Germany (statutory licence)
1141
 as in Italy for anthologies and fair 
payment in the Netherlands
1142
 where it is specified that the latter is for the author or his rightholders. In 
Denmark, a system of extend collective licence is implemented
1143
, and is applicable to the act of 
reproduction within educational activities
1144
. In the UK, in the case of recording of broadcasts by 
educational establishments, the section “does not apply if or to the extent that there is a licensing scheme 
certified for the purposes of (the) section under section 143 providing for the grant of licenses”
1145
  
In France
1146
, the recipients of the educational use are defined as the public to whom the performance or 
the reproduction is intended and made up of directly concerned pupils, students, teachers and 
researchers. In Germany
1147
, the recipients are limited to the specifically limited circle of those taking part 
in the teaching. In UK, the performance and the playing or showing of a work in the course of activities of 
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an educational establishment must take place before an audience consisting of teachers and pupils and 
other persons directly connected with the activities of the educational establishment, excluding the 
parents of pupils
1148
.  
f) Other exceptions for educational purpose 
Most countries add other exceptions benefiting educational purposes to the general provision on 
illustration of teaching, for example for the making of anthologies or for acts of uses taking place during 
exams or school events. 
Several countries have provided a specific exception for the making of teaching anthologies: it is the 
case for Belgium
1149
, Denmark, Germany
1150
, Italy
1151
, The Netherlands
1152
, Poland
1153
 and UK
1154
.  
Finally, there are provisions about use of works during school events in Belgium, Poland, Denmark
1155
, 
Hungary
1156
 and Germany
1157
. 
6. Overview of existing licensing mechanisms or collective agreements between 
stakeholders 
The exception for teaching purposes is put into practice or is completed by collective agreements or 
particular licensing mechanisms. In such cases, uses of works and other subject matter for teaching or 
research are therefore not strictly covered by an exception to copyright and related rights but pertain to 
other mechanisms. 
France is an example of an exception for teaching organized by the Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, 
whose practical organization is governed by an intricate system of collective and by-sectors 
agreements
1158
. So far, two agreements
1159
, one for written publications and visual arts and the other for 
musical and audiovisual works, define the conditions of application of the exception and extend the scope 
of the exception as delineated by the law
1160
. This extension by collective agreements has several 
consequences. First, teachers and educational institutions need to understand the articulation of the legal 
exception and of what has been further authorized for the sector concerned. Second, the agreements 
determine the remuneration to be paid in compensation of the authorized use to the effect that the 
exception will not be applied if no remuneration is organized by the agreements, either because the 
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educational establishment is not covered
1161
, or because the work that the teacher wants to use is not 
part of the repertoire administered by the CMOs that have signed the agreement
1162
. That creates an 
exception à géométrie variable depending on sectorial and limited-in-time agreements. In practice, the 
teacher needs to check the inclusion of the work she wants to use in the agreement and educational 
establishments need to report the works that have been used to the collective organisation managing the 
right to remuneration (i.e. the Centre Français pour le Droit d’Exploitation de la Copie or CFC). The recent 
Report commissioned by the French Minister of Culture to Pierre Lescure has criticised the complexity of 
such agreements and the time-consuming administrative burden and legal insecurity they engender
1163
. 
As the teaching exception in Spain does not allow for online teaching, the Centro Español de Derechos 
Reprográficos (CEDRO), i.e. the CMO active in reprography rights of authors and publishers, grants a 
license to universities and teaching institutions for the reproduction and making available (including 
online) of copyrighted works for teaching purposes – for a fee of 5 euros per student
1164
. The license is 
based on voluntary mandate of rights from authors and publishers to CEDRO. Such licensing, based on 
voluntary collective management, does not cover all members of CEDRO, some of them being reluctant 
to grant online rights to the collective society, and certainly not all authors or publishers. 
Other examples of collective mechanisms is the extended collective licensing that exists in Scandinavian 
countries (e.g. Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and constitute the ground, on the basis of the exclusive 
rights given to collective management, to authorize educational and research uses.  
Therefore, as far as uses for illustration for teaching and research are concerned, the recourse to 
collective mechanisms follows different models:  
- they put the exception into practice and organise the remuneration associated thereto (French 
model) 
- they extend the scope of the exception by adding further authorised uses (French and Spanish 
model) 
- they implement the exception of the EU directive into an extended collective licensing system 
(Scandinavian model) 
The three models might present a common issue related to the cross-border dimension of e-learning. The 
use authorised by the collective agreement or by an extended collective licensing is normally restricted to 
the national territory, which leaves intact the compliance of a European distance education project with 
other applicable laws (see infra). One could also wonder what is the representation of foreign works in the 
three models. The list of publishers having joined the French Protocol mostly includes French publishers. 
The representativeness of foreign authors in systems of extended collective licensing is also a tricky 
question
1165
. 
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C. Assessment of the exception for teaching – Issues and uncertainties 
1. Adequacy of the exception in the directive 
The exception laid down in the Article 5(3) a) of the directive is an open-ended provision: it only limits the 
exempted use to a twofold purpose, illustration for teaching and scientific research, and to non-
commercial purposes.  
By contrast to the exception for acts of reproduction by libraries that could not foresee the tremendous 
development of digital libraries, the development of e-learning was already considered by the European 
text and the exception was clearly intended not to discriminate between classroom teaching and online 
education. One recital is explicit in that regard and the preparatory work of the directive makes several 
references to new media for education. Many activities by teachers and students could enter in the ambit 
of the exception as it refers to “use” and to a notion of “illustration” for teaching that can be broadly 
construed.  
The exception is therefore adequate in itself to address the needs of education and e-learning.  
The Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy of 2008 comes to a similar conclusion and 
rather points at the often too restrictive national implementations of the exception
1166
.  
2. Restrictive national transposition 
The open-ended content of the exception for teaching left ample manoeuvre for the Member States to 
enact the conditions under which the exception could be enjoyed. Nothing prevents domestic laws to 
further define the beneficiaries, the types and quantities of works that can be used, as well as the type of 
use.  
When dealing with new digital uses, one recital of the directive requires that “the provision of such 
exceptions or limitations by Member States should, in particular, duly reflect the increased economic 
impact that such exceptions or limitations may have in the context of the new electronic environment”
1167
. 
Combined with the principles of a high level of protection of the copyright and related rights and of the 
three-step test, Member States are allowed to and should determine conditions for uses in a e-learning 
context that would limit a possible adverse impact of any educational use on the exploitation of the works 
and other subject-matter. 
This explains and justifies that Member States, when transposing the directive, have paid attention to the 
boundaries of the educational exception, particularly when the exempted use could cover the making 
available of works online. We have seen that generally such transmission of works should be limited to 
the students enrolled to the course and/or to the closed networks of the establishments.  
Some Member States have however been warier and have limited the dissemination of works used for 
illustration for teaching to the classroom or the physical premise of the school or university, which in 
practice prevents the development of e-learning programs.  
The exclusion of e-learning uses from the scope of the exception is the first concern resulting from some 
domestic laws. 
                                                     
 
1166
 Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, op. cit.,p. 17-19. 
1167
 Recital 44. 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 381 
 
A second concern comes from the complexity and diversity of the conditions imposed to the use for 
teaching in most Member States, as to the type of works or the quantity thereof that can be used. This 
complexity, that could probably be mastered by teachers accustomed to their national system, becomes 
difficult to tackle when several laws need to be complied with, due to a cross-border dimension of e-
learning that requires the application of more than one law.   
Due to such diversity, the exception for illustration for teaching cannot be said to be harmonized at the 
European level
1168
, which renders the task of developing a legally compliant offer of online education all 
the more daunting. Such a lack of harmonization is mainly exacerbated by the cross-border dimension of 
e-learning
1169
.  
3. Distance learning 
The significant differences that exist in national laws as to what educational uses and under which 
conditions they are authorised become real obstacles when the teaching occurs partially or totally on-line 
in an e-learning program or supported by e-learning tools
1170
.  To assess the difficulty, this part will first 
analyse the cross-border dimension of e-learning in different models (a.), then it will address the impact of 
this transnational exploitation on the localisation of the use, required to determine which law applies (b.), 
and finally the effect on the fair compensation system that is applied to the exception for teaching in many 
Member States (c.). 
a) The cross-border dimension of e-learning 
By definition, when some content is made available online, even in a closed network, there is no way to 
prevent it from circulating across borders. However, the cross-border dimension of e-learning will have 
different shades and degrees:  
1. E-learning as a supplementary tool offered to students enrolled in a course: Most courses 
delivered at the universities, and increasingly also at primary and secondary schools, will rely on 
additional webpages that could host supplementary materials, assignments, copies of 
presentation made by the teacher, exercises… As a principle, the cross-border dimension of the 
use that could be made of such webpages will be rather limited. Should their access be restricted 
to the students and pupils enrolled in the course
1171
, the use of copyrighted works and other 
protected subject matter in the material that is posted on the webpages will in the vast majority of 
cases take place in the territory of the educational institution, the students concerned normally 
residing in the same country. Some limited acts of access to the content from another territory 
might be from students living across the border (e.g. when the university or school is established 
in a frontier zone) or from students temporarily travelling abroad (e.g. Erasmus students or 
students studying or making their assignments when on holidays). Similarly, the teacher or 
teaching assistants in charge of the course or of the webpages might sometimes post content 
from another country than the State in which the educational institution is located. 
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The territories concerned by the possible use of protected material will be primarily the States 
where the educational institution is established and where its students live, and incidentally, the 
States from where the students might occasionally get access to the course, and the teacher 
might occasionally post some content. 
2. E-learning offered as a stand-alone educational course by one university: Many 
universities
1172
 have a distance learning program in which they offer courses to be followed wholly 
or substantially through the internet, with no required presence in a physical classroom, even for 
exams. In such a case, the physical location of students might be very diverse which might bring 
a more intense cross-border dimension
1173
, when such virtual education by universities targets 
non-local students and aims at attracting students from other countries thanks to the Internet 
media. Depending on the course, non-EU students could also form a large base of the students. 
The territories concerned by the possible use of protected material will be: the State where the 
educational institution is established, and the States in which the students accessing the course 
reside. As in the previous case, other States could incidentally be involved depending on the 
mobility of the students and of the teachers.  
3. E-learning in MOOC: MOOCs, by virtue of their openness and their intended global reach, do 
not by nature discriminate the students by their nationality or place or residence. Consequently, 
the student audience of a MOOC will be largely international, depending only on the langage in 
which the course is given. 
The territories concerned by the possible use of protected material will be the State where the 
educational institution is established, as well as an undefined number of States where the 
students follow the course.  
4. E-learning offered by a virtual organisation: e-learning modules can also originate from 
transnational collaborations between universities, that pool their teaching and technical services 
to provide a specific program targeted at students enrolled in the partner institutions or more 
broadly to students from any origin. The European Union has funded a number of initiatives from 
universities and higher education institutions to develop common e-learning offers and programs. 
They add some complexity to the cross-border dimension, as the courses might be hosted on the 
servers of different universities in different States, and teachers might intervene on the content 
from many locations, not being necessarily in the same State than the university that delivers the 
course, organises the program or hosts it on its servers.  
The territories concerned by the possible use of protected material will be: the States where the 
educational institutions collaborating to the e-learning program are established, and the States in 
which the students accessing the course reside. As in the previous cases, other States could 
incidentally be involved depending on the mobility of the students and of the teachers.  
In addition, technical features of e-learning could play a role as well. Whatever the model of the e-learning 
service, some cross-border dimension can simply result from the place where the server hosting the 
teaching material is located. When the course is provided by one university to its students, whether as an 
extra tool to face-to-face teaching, as a specific module or as a MOOC, the educational content will 
generally be hosted on the servers of the university itself, normally physically located in the same territory 
than the establishment. However, that might be otherwise if the university have recourse to dedicated 
platforms providing technical e-learning services or to cloud hosting.  
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b) Impact of the cross-border dimension on the localisation of the use 
The application of the exception for illustration for teaching shall normally be governed by the law of the 
State where the educational use, that will generally be a mix of reproduction and making available, 
occurs. Indeed, the rule of applicable law, according to the Berne Convention, is where protection is 
claimed (rule of the lex loci protectionis). It needs to be combined with the principle of territoriality of 
copyright that commands that the exceptions provided by one national law only applies to the acts of use 
occurring in its territory.  
The assessment of whether some use is a copyright or related right infringement or could be excused 
under an exception thus requires determining first the localisation of such use, hence the law under which 
the use could be confronted with the conditions of the educational exception. The reference to the 
principle of territoriality to uses of copyrighted works on-line does not automatically lead to the application 
of a multiplicity of copyright laws corresponding to all countries where the work can be accessed
1174
. 
Arguably, one could rather attempt to designate one single point where the use can be located in order to 
try and apply one single law to such use
1175
.   
This is not an easy exercise. By definition, distance learning will involve acts of reproduction and of 
making available, more rarely acts of distribution. One could refer to the report delivered to the European 
Commission in the framework of the evaluation of the directive 2001/29 on the localisation of the making 
available and of the reproduction of a copyrighted work. The options proposed by this study (location of 
the servers; location of the material act of upload, location of the centres of activities of the uploader, 
location of the exploitation) and eventually adopted by the Commission will equally define the localisation 
of the educational use and the territorial application of the exception
1176
. Yet, the purpose of such 
localisation is rather different, as it leads here at defining whether one educational use in an e-learning 
program is covered by an exception, in which country and upon what conditions. By contrast, determining 
where an act of exploitation takes place, aims at assessing where and for which territories the exploitant 
should clear copyright and require the needed authorisation by the copyright owners. If several countries 
are determined as places of exploitation, the making available of works needs to be authorised for each 
country, which could create an additional burden. In the case of exceptions, the multiplication of countries 
relevant for the use potentially covered by an exception could lead to situations where the use is not 
authorised in one country or at too restrictive conditions, which could defeat the cross-border use, even if 
legitimate in other countries.  
The four models of e-learning, depending on their degree of transnational effect, could serve to identify 
the possible localisation of the acts of use that could benefit from an exception
1177
. In each model, the 
acts of reproduction and acts of making available that could take place in the e-learning offer and process 
should be analysed separately
1178
.  
As far as reproduction is concerned, it covers mainly the uploading of the work or other subject matter 
on the e-learning platform, either as a separate material (e.g. as reading or exercise material) or included 
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as an extract or as a whole in some teaching material for illustration purposes. Some reproduction could 
also occur should the teacher need to digitize the work prior to uploading it. In interactive learning 
processes, students will also undertake acts of reproduction when uploading assignments they were 
given, or providing other students or teachers with documentation of any content illustrating the topic of 
the course.  
Other acts of reproduction by students will happen when downloading the material, printing it or even 
copying it on other devices or media. Even without downloading, consulting the material online will imply 
temporary acts of reproduction on their computers or other reading devices. The first type of copying 
(downloading or printing) will normally be covered by the private copying exception, while the latter will be 
encompassed by the temporary copying exception. Those types of copying will thus not be analysed 
further in this study. 
The making available would occur as soon as the material, including the protected works or subject 
matter, is uploaded on the e-learning platform and accessible to the students
1179
.    
After this preliminary context, one can turn now to the analysis of the four models of e-learning and to 
their outcomes from a copyright perspective: 
1. E-learning as a supplementary tool offered to students enrolled in a course:  
When uploading the content on the e-learning platform, whether by teachers or by students, the 
reproduction will normally take place in the country where the server is located, usually being 
the same than the country where the educational institution (as well as teachers and students) is 
located. Localising the server by a strictly technical approach, i.e. by looking at where the 
computers operating as servers are physically located, could lead to difficult situations in a cloud 
environment or when universities outsource the hosting of their e-learning platform. An approach 
based on the criteria of exploitation, as recommended by the study on the making available right, 
should be preferred. It would relate the use, here the reproduction, to the teaching establishment 
delivering the e-learning platform in addition to its teaching programs. Therefore, the location of 
the server should be equated to the location of the university or educational institution.  
Similar reasoning can be applied to the localisation of the making available. The study on the 
territoriality and making available right has rejected a technology-oriented approach based on the 
location of the servers on which the work is uploaded
1180
. It preferred other alternatives, such as a 
combination of the location of the material act of upload and of the centre of activities of uploader, 
or the location where the exploitation is taking place. When applied to e-learning environments, 
the first criterion leads to the application of the law of the educational establishment operating the 
e-learning platform. In our first scenario, the application of the other option, i.e. the location of the 
exploitation (that we could transform into “use” which would be more relevant for exceptions), 
achieves a similar outcome. Indeed, the place where the making available is relevant for the 
learning process and involves an exploitation of the material is the location of the establishment 
operating the e-learning platform, since the teaching establishment and the students are normally 
located in the same territory. The occasional mobility of students or teachers during the course 
should not affect that conclusion as it would be in principle very limited.   
As a result, the cross-border dimension of such model of e-learning is rather minimal as normally, 
the use of copyright works or other protected subject matter will be governed by the exception for 
illustration for teaching, as laid down by the Member State where the education institution is 
located.  
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2. E-learning offered as a standalone educational course by one university:  
This becomes more complicated when the e-learning modules target students in different 
countries and offer teaching programs not connected to traditional classrooms teachings.  The 
analysis just carried out for the act of reproduction would be similar. The copies should preferably 
be considered as made in the territory where the establishment operating the e-learning platform 
and servers is located, not where the servers are physically located. It should not matter as to 
whether the reproduction is made by teachers or students as the uploading is done on the same 
platform. 
The making available is less easy to apprehend. The theory of upload/centre of activities still 
points out to the location of the educational institutions. By contrast, when applying the criterion of 
exploitation, as suggested by the part of this study on Territoriality, the act of making available 
would be located at least where the public is targeted. An e-learning program might target 
students of several countries and potentially, all countries where the students having enrolled for 
the course are located, could be considered as places of exploitation.  
As a result, the application of the exception to the use of copyrighted works in the educational 
material proposed to students could depend on several domestic laws. This would require the 
educational institution to comply with the conditions laid down by different laws. It suffices that 
part of their students are in countries where no exception for e-learning is applicable to make 
illegitimate the use of copyrighted works for illustration of teaching.  
3. E-learning in MOOC:  
The analysis of the former scenario will apply equally to MOOC with the added difficulty that by 
definition, the open e-learning program intends to reach a global public, hence multiplying the 
countries in which the educational use should pass muster with the conditions of the applicable 
law. The openness of the MOOC process will furthermore raise difficulties in many countries 
where the exception for teaching purposes will require that the educational material comprising 
protected works remains within a closed network based on passwords or other access 
controls
1181
.  
Conversely, if one decides to apply the only law of upload and centre of activities of the 
educational institution, even for acts of making available, it could lead to some risk of location 
shopping. Universities established in countries with the broadest exception for teaching purposes 
would be privileged in the development of MOOCs in Europe.  
4. E-learning offered by a virtual organisation:  
This is the most intricate situation as not only the learners are spread over several States, but the 
responsibility of the e-learning program and its “physical” location are not bordered anymore.  
First, it has some impact on the localisation of the reproduction acts when uploading material on 
the platform. As some courses might be shared by more than one university or even several 
teachers, it blurs the connection of the applicable law to the course with the educational institution 
in charge of it. For instance, let’s imagine that some European reputed medical schools, such as 
the universities of Oxford (UK), Pierre and Marie Curie (France), Karolinska Institute (Sweden), 
Jagiellonian University (Poland), and Heidelberg University (Germany) could offer together an e-
learning program in immunology. Either each university could provide separate modules in a 
jointly organised curriculum or professors from each university could join to provide a common 
course. The course of immunotherapy would be given together by one professor from Oxford and 
one professor from Heidelberg, who are presumably considered as the biggest experts of the field 
in Europe. They would use materials from the course they give in their own university, but the 
module is designed in such a way that professors of the other partner universities could upload 
images or other content they find illustrative of the course. Therefore, teaching documentation 
that could include copyrighted materials could be uploaded by professors from different 
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universities and States and the responsibility for the course would be shared by all partners. That 
might make the technical criterion of the location of the server more relevant. But this factor could 
also be rather remote from the countries in which the course is organised, if the servers are in the 
cloud or in a non EU-country.  
For the act of making available, the difficulty is even amplified. The application of the 
upload/centre of activities would not lead to one single applicable law, but to many. It could incite 
the universities to set up a separate legal person to organise the e-learning project and to locate it 
in the most favourable State in terms of educational exception.  
Shifting then to the criterion of exploitation would raise the same issues than in the former two 
models of e-learning. It would require the compliance with the law of each country of the 
universities participating to the e-learning program and of the countries of the enrolled students.  
This long analysis reveals that the cross-border dimension of e-learning, whether minimal or massive, in 
combination with the uncertainty as to how to locate the use concerned by an exception to copyright and 
related right, potentially applies several domestic laws to educational uses occurring in distance learning, 
with no clear outcome as to the legitimacy of the use.  
It could add much complexity for universities and other institutions developing e-learning to ascertain 
whether the use of copyrighted works and other subject matter by their teachers, as well as by the 
students, is authorised or not.  
Except if a choice of one applicable law is made for the right of making available, the concurrent 
application of several national copyright laws to abide with the exception conditions will be unavoidable. A 
preferable solution might be then to further harmonize the national exceptions dealing with teaching 
purpose (see infra).  
c) Impact of the cross-border dimension on fair compensation 
A supplementary difficulty if several laws are declared to apply to educational uses on-line would be to 
determine how and where to apply the levies when required by national legislators to compensate the 
use. When the exception for illustration for teaching is conditioned by the payment of a fair compensation 
to rights holders, the debtor of such levy will generally be the educational institution.  
The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union related to private copying levies could be of 
partial help. A first principle held by the Court is that “the notion and level of fair compensation are linked 
to the harm resulting for the author from the reproduction for private use of his protected work without his 
authorisation. (…) Since the person who has caused the harm to the holder of the exclusive reproduction 
right is the person who, for his private use, reproduces a protected work without seeking prior 
authorisation from that rightholder, it is, in principle, for that person to make good the harm related to that 
copying by financing the compensation which will be paid to that rightholder”1182. Applied by analogy to 
the exception authorizing use of works for illustration for teaching, one could consider that the harm 
results for the author from the reproduction or communication to the public in the context of teaching 
without his authorisation. Therefore, the person that has carried out such acts of use should finance the 
compensation. That could be the teacher or student that reproduce or communicate the work or the 
educational institution on their behalf. This solution appears in the Belgian law that transfers the charge of 
the compensation to the schools and universities.  
A second question is the territorial application of the fair compensation. Here the analogy with the private 
copy levies might not be automatic. Indeed, the Stichting de Thuiskopie decision of the CJEU dealt with a 
cross-border situation, where the private copying occurred in one country and the importer of the blank 
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media, who was the debtor of the levy under the applicable law, was in another country. In such a 
situation, the court held that “if a Member State has introduced an exception for private copying into its 
national law and if the final users who, on a private basis, reproduce a protected work reside on its 
territory, that Member State must ensure, in accordance with its territorial competence, the effective 
recovery of the fair compensation for the harm suffered by the authors on the territory of that State”
1183
. 
Consequently, the fair compensation could be charged abroad for a harm suffered in one territory.  
Things are different in e-learning: the cross-border gap is not between the harm and the debtor of the fair 
compensation but rather in the harm itself that could happen in different countries where the educational 
material is made available. No solution is offered by European or national laws as to the determination of 
the territory on which the compensation is due. One could maybe designate the educational 
establishment in charge of the educational program as the person responsible for paying the fair 
compensation. The number of students in different countries reached by the program should then count 
for the determination of the amount of levy. That would not solve however the determination of the 
responsible person in our fourth model with a shared organization of e-learning programs, nor solve the 
public policy conundrum relating to the potential subsidy by one Member States’ taxpayers of students in 
a different Member State. 
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D. Assessment of the exception for research – Issues and uncertainties 
1. Adequacy of the exception and its national implementation 
The article 5(3) a) of the directive 2001/29 refers to scientific research as one of the purposes that the 
exempted use can pursue without explaining any further such notion or the precise scope of the 
exception. As for educational purpose, the exception is only limited by a non-commercial end, a condition 
of proportionality and the obligation to mention the source (which would be an obligation arising from 
scientific methodology as well). The acts of use should not be restricted to illustration of research. That 
makes the exception for research rather open.  
National implementations stay similarly vague, except for some countries that do not authorise 
derogations from copyright or related rights for the purpose of non-commercial research. 
Existing case law does not show any dispute as to the scope of what could be authorised by the 
exception, but rather on the boundaries between commercial and non-commercial research
1184
. This 
could indicate that the existence of an exception in the legislations of the Member States has not raised 
any particular issue or misuse, with no certainty though by lack of empirical studies.  
The only issue that could be put forward is the absence of any exception in some Member States, which 
could put researchers in those countries in a less easy situation than their foreign peers. Here again, no 
evidence has been found of the reality of such discrepancies or discrimination
1185
.  
The distinction we have drawn at the beginning of this study between the copyrighted works used as 
subject matter for research or as tools for research could help to assess the issues raised by the 
exception in the directive or its national transposition. As to the latter category, the unfolding of the open 
access mandate in scientific publications might reduce the issues faced by researchers in using scientific 
papers for their research. Following the recommendation of the European Recommendation on access to 
and preservation of scientific information of July 20121186, research institutions in the European Union are 
encouraging their researchers to publish their scientific papers resulting from publicly funded research in 
open access no later than six months after the date of publication, and twelve months for social sciences 
and humanities. A similar obligation applies to dissemination in open access of research data. This is an 
international movement also promoted by UNESCO
1187
 and OECD
1188
, and followed by many national 
research-funding organisations. When in open access, the scientific publications and datasets can be 
used rather extensively for research, with respect to the integrity and attribution of the work and with no 
commercial purposes
1189
. Therefore, the need for an exception might be less relevant.  
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2. The cross-border dimension of research 
Research increasingly endows an international character. By all means, the use of copyrighted works by 
researchers might have a cross-border dimension to a lesser or larger extent depending on the field and 
activity of the researcher. However, most acts of reproduction and use of works and other subject matter 
for research will be done by the researcher in a single territory. By contrast, non-strictly national use will 
occur when researchers communicate to or share with colleagues some material for research, or include 
works in their presentations then transmitted on-line.  
This cross-border dimension will nonetheless first depend on the legality of such acts of communication 
or transmission of works under the exception. Lacking any restriction in the exception of the directive 
itself, one could conclude that making copyrighted works available for research purposes might be 
allowed if it is strictly required for the purposes of research. In no case, the researchers could share 
copyrighted works for other purposes or to substitute to acquisition of the works they need to study. We 
will develop that point later on when discussing of what the proper scope of a research exception could 
be. 
When acts of making available are allowed, the extent of the cross-border dimension and the localisation 
of the use could follow the analysis we have done for e-learning. It could be reduced to two models:  
- the making available by one researcher or one research team from some webpage or by 
individual sending to peers: The hypothesis referred to here is the inclusion of copyrighted 
works in research development as examples, illustration or studied material (beyond the limits of 
quotation) and the making available of such scientific work to present the research, share it with 
colleagues or any other purpose justified by the research. Depending on the criterion chosen to 
localise the making available of protected subject matter, the use might be located in the country 
where the researcher or her university is located (upload criterion combined with the centre of 
activities element); in the country of the server on which the content is made available (technical 
criterion); or in the countries where the researchers receiving the sending are located 
(exploitation criterion if interpreted by the targeted public factor). 
- the sharing of content within a common project or team comprising researchers 
established in different countries: The hypothesis referred to in this second model would be 
the putting together of copyrighted works that form the basic material of some common research 
project whose researchers or teams are spread in different States. For instance a European 
research network in linguistics could work on the anglicization of languages by looking at the 
frequency of English-based terms in national newspapers and would collect and share articles for 
that purpose. It would then set up a website or file hosting service, either developed by the 
researchers themselves or using an existing (cloud-based or not) service (e.g. Scribd, Dropbox, 
Google docs or other). This multiplies the connecting factors to each country of the researchers 
and research institutes partnering in the project, especially if the hosting space is shared out on 
many servers or outsourced to a service in the cloud.  
 
As for the educational exception challenged by the cross-border development of e-learning, discrepancies 
between the treatment of research activities in domestic copyright laws would complicate the compliance 
by the scientists concerned with a possible exception.  
E. Possible options 
1. Overarching principles and weighing factors 
Exceptions and limitations of copyright and related rights are an exercise of balancing the need for a high 
protection of the authors and other rights holders, as required by the InfoSoc Directive, and the public 
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interest and the interests of the beneficiaries of exceptions. Education and research are on the agenda of 
the European Union as a key objective and have often been stated in European and international 
legislative texts as having some weight in the copyright balance.  
However the development of digital means of making available content in e-learning or collaborative 
research might tilt the balance differently. On one hand, the objective and public interest of education 
does not change when undertaken with digital technologies and on digital networks. Yet, the transmission 
of copyrighted works in the course of teaching is no more limited to the classroom but can potentially 
reach a bigger audience when disseminated on-line. Providing the students with digital copies of works to 
illustrate a class, rather than with photocopies, can also have a bigger impact on the substitution effect 
those copies might have compared to the normal acquisition of the work.  
Therefore any delimitation of the exception for education or research needs to accommodate and limit the 
impact that such uses could have on the market of the works concerned. This balancing exercise is 
already achieved in the article 5(3) a) by the limitation to illustration for teaching and the overall condition 
that the use be restricted to what is necessary to pursue the objective.  
In any case, authorising on-line use for teaching and research should not harm the exploitation of the 
works or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of copyright owners as required by the three step 
test. This will guide our following reflection. 
2. Separating education and research?  
Uses of works for teaching or for research are not similar. Using extracts of works to illustrate some 
teaching could also be done to illustrate some scientific development during a conference for instance. 
But reproduction or communication of works by researchers can go beyond a simple use for illustration. 
Yet, both objectives have been merged in one single exception in the European directive and in most 
domestic laws. The exception for scientific research does not require though a limitation to illustration and 
appears to be broader than its counterpart for teaching.  
Would the differences in scope, objectives and activities warrant a different treatment of research 
compared to teaching in the EU copyright exception? That has not been the case so far.  
Leaving aside the question of text and data mining that is a specific act of research that deserves a 
particular consideration, the question of separating the two objectives in distinct exceptions with adapted 
conditions should be raised. Some advantages or disadvantages of such a distinct treatment will be 
addressed. 
Advantage(s) 
Enacting a separate exception for research could better adapt the authorization to uses that matter to 
research for an open-ended formulation does not lead to any security, both for rights owners and for 
researchers. Some criteria or conditions could be helpful to better delineate the boundaries of what uses 
could be authorized under the exception. 
Disadvantage(s)  
The exception for scientific research is very open-ended in the acquis communautaire. Contrary to what 
happened for the teaching objective, Member States have not restricted the authorised uses for that 
purpose and have generally left the exception as open as it is in the directive (save for the countries not 
allowing any exception for research ends). The same level of legal uncertainty is hence replicated at the 
national level.  However, revising the exception for research to enact a separate provision would require 
defining its conditions and limits. It would restrict and disrupt an undefined scope that has not 
demonstrated any real issues, but remains subject to proportionality and strict interpretation. In the 
definition of its specific requirements, it could also be very difficult to determine the proper scope of an 
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exception dedicated to scientific research as the use that could be made of copyrighted works in a 
scientific process might greatly vary depending on the scientific field concerned.   
3. Revising the scope of exception for teaching purposes 
a) Keeping the status quo 
The option of revising the exception for teaching is less convincing than for the library exception as 
nothing in the current formulation of the exception needs clarification or extension to cover newly 
developed uses of relevance or public interest.  
The article 5(3) a), with the interpretation of the recital 42, gives all assurance that illustration for teaching 
can occur in the classroom or in distance learning environments. One could add that the recent case law 
of the CJEU insists on an interpretation of the exception that should guarantee, despite the principle of 
strict interpretation, that the exception remains effective and achieve its purpose
1190
. As the interpretation 
of the exception is not an issue, the text of the article 5(3) a) leaving almost no room for doubt or 
uncertainty and since e-learning is explicitly mentioned in the recitals of the directive as one of the 
objectives of the exception, revising the directive to better allow e-learning is not indispensable.  
The main advantage of this position is to not re-open the exception for teaching and risk to restrict it or 
complicate it.  
b) Adoption of an interpretative document 
It is rather the generally too restrictive transposition by Member States that has created some issues and 
prevented educational institutions to fully benefit from the breathing space that the EU lawmaker has 
created, notably or digital learning activities.  
Adopting an interpretative document or publishing guidelines could be another option for the Commission 
in order to remind to Member States the objective of the exception, and that distance learning activities 
should not be totally prohibited by the exception.  
Such a document should stress the objective of the exception and its enduring relevance for on-line 
education1191. The open nature of the exception would be preserved without the need to detail further the 
conditions applying to illustration of teaching, which bears the risk of unduly restricting the exception. 
However, as said for libraries exceptions, such interpretative document is not in the habit of the European 
Commission in the copyright field. It would not be a constraining legislative instrument to the Member 
States that could maintain their more restrictive approach
1192
. It could also come a bit late as the directive 
has been implemented years ago in many EU countries. And it would only repeat what is clearly 
stipulated in recital 42 of the directive.  
Restrictions as to the scope of the exception mainly result from national copyright laws that the Member 
States will not modify only for the sake of complying with an interpretative document, whose legitimacy to 
impose such a revision at the Member States level, would be dubious. One can also doubt that national 
courts, when applying a national exception, would make prevail an interpretative document of the 
European Commission over national legal provisions.  
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c) Modification of the exception in the directive 
A next step would be to revise the exception in the directive to better address the conditions under which 
educational uses, and particularly in an e-learning environment, could be undertaken. Revising the 
exception would limit the discretion left to the Member States due to the clear guidelines that the definition 
of the applicable requirements at the EU level would give to national legislators, and the application of the 
recent CJEU case law that stated the manoeuvre enjoyed by the Member States should not contradict the 
purpose of harmonization and the conditions of an exception laid down by the directive 2001/29
1193
.  
Should the European lawmaker decides to delimit further what uses could be authorised by an exception 
for illustration for teaching, whether by revising the text of the directive or adopting an interpretative 
document thereof.  
One should repeat the argument that could be made against the introduction of too many details and 
conditions in the exceptions of the article 5 of that directive
1194
, as it would imply to reach some political 
compromise on details rather than on the overall objective and it would result in imposing some particular 
legislative drafting style to Member States, at the detriment of the subsidiarity principle. 
d) Defining the conditions of the exception in a revision or interpretation of the 
directive 
Should the exception be revised in the Infosoc Directive, it should address the following factors in 
determining the proper scope of what teaching uses would be allowed.  
(i) The objective of the exception 
The objective of the exception, i.e. the illustration for teaching, does not raise specific issues, despite its 
lack of definite scope. It appears to be a reasonable criterion that leaves some margin of appreciation and 
is identical to the wording of the Berne Convention.  
It should be understood that teaching covers any activity related to the imparting and getting of 
knowledge in an educational environment, namely the illustration of lessons or exams by having recourse 
to works or extracts thereof as examples, demonstrations, exercises, … Illustration is based on a link 
between the lesson and the work that is used, either direct when the work is the very topic that is taught 
or more indirect when the work helps understanding the teaching.  
(ii) Beneficiaries 
The current exception in the directive does not define its beneficiaries. It is generally understood that it 
encompasses schools and universities whatever their level, source of financing, public or private 
organisation.  A broad construction including both teachers and students, thus any actor in a learning 
process, should be allowed too. The only discriminating criterion is the limitation to education carried out 
with non-commercial purposes, which is completely justified and never contested. 
There is no need to define further the beneficiaries and it would overstep on the competence of Member 
States in organising their education systems. The exclusion of adult education, that is neither explicit or 
implicit but follows from an interpretation of Berne Convention, could be addressed, as nothing would 
prevent the EU from extending the exception to such education field, with the proper limits to comply with 
the three-step test, notably a requirement of being non commercially oriented. The exception could then 
benefit not-for-profit professional education and training. 
                                                     
 
1193
 C.J.E.U., judgment of 26 April 2012, C-510/10, DR and TV2 Danmark. 
1194
 See supra. 
Copyright limitations for libraries, teaching and research uses 393 
 
(iii) Works concerned 
The directive does not limit the type or quantity of works that can be used in the context of the teaching 
exception. Member States have generally been more detailed, either to restrict the borrowings to extracts 
of works, or to exclude some categories of works such as works intended for teaching or music scores.  
The restriction to extracts is not fundamentally justified. The use of an extract or the whole work would 
depend on the type of work, the purpose and the need for illustration. For instance, making students in an 
English course listen to a song to be able to translate or understand its lyrics would not have a bigger 
impact if the whole song is played rather than some extracts. Illustrating an art history course on pop art 
by showing only extracts of paintings would not make any sense. Even for a course on film studies, 
depending on the points that a teacher wants to make, screening the two hours of Citizen Kane might be 
as justified as showing only the opening sequence.  
Limiting the use to extracts would equally reduce the exception to something that could look like the 
quotation exception.  
By contrast, the exclusion of works primarily intended for teaching could be justified by the 
application of the second step of the triple test, the absence of a conflict with the normal exploitation of 
the work
1195
. The normal exploitation of an educational manual of grammar exercises is the market of 
teachers, students and teaching institutions and allowing its reproduction and use under an exception 
would contradict the three-step test.  
Finally the exception for teaching could apply equally to databases and computer programs, that could 
constitute a topic or tool for teaching. The exception applies to databases but is limited for the sui generis 
right (see infra), but does not exist for computer programs, which is not justified. 
(iv) Authorized acts 
“Use” of copyrighted works and other subject matter is the wording employed to refer to the activities 
authorized by the exception. This arguably covers reproduction, communication, translation and 
distribution, but it has sometimes been restricted in domestic laws when transposing the directive. 
Nothing restricts the use to some environments and use within the classroom, at distance or online, 
whatever the media or technology used, would be covered. There is no need to change that broad 
formulation.  
However, should the conditions of the exceptions be defined in more detail at the European level, the use 
of works in e-learning should be framed in order to avoid an uncontrolled dissemination of works. Many 
Member States have allowed the use in e-learning upon the requirement that the making available be 
done in closed networks or solely to enrolled students. Both limiting criteria should apply. The condition 
related to the recipients of the education serves to align the limited impact of the use of a work in a 
teaching to a classroom whether physical or virtual. Only the students or pupils registered for the course 
should be able to access the material containing protected works or subject matter. This should be 
verified by a technical environment that secures the access only to those students, regardless of their 
physical locations, through passwords or other access control features. It could be required as well that 
technological measures be put in place to prevent misuse or downstream infringement of copyright in the 
content so made available to students.  
That would leave MOOCs out of the exception as their defining open dimension would not fit with such a 
requirement. Students following MOOCs sometimes need to register for the course but the access to 
teaching material is generally in open access. If teaching material used contains copyrighted works or 
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other protected subject matter, it would be available to all which would exceed a reasonable scope for the 
exception.  
(v) Not for direct or indirect commercial advantage 
The limitation of the teaching exception to acts carried out with a non-commercial purpose (and its 
proportionality exercise) should be maintained as well as the obligation to mention the source and name 
of the author. Both requirements can also be found in the exception of the article 10 of the Berne 
Convention (that refers fair practice rather than to non-commercial limitation).  
(vi) Fair compensation 
The directive only mandates the application of a fair compensation to private copying and leaves the 
matter at the discretion of Member States for other exceptions. Many countries apply a fair compensation 
scheme to the educational exception and the European Parliament had proposed, during the discussion 
of the directive, to require some fair compensation for the use for teaching.  
Fair compensation could be made mandatory by the directive itself. It would not add difficulties as the 
national systems already rely on the collection of some remuneration by the educational institutions using 
copyrighted works, by the inherent problems of collecting and enforcing the fair compensation
1196
. On the 
contrary, an intervention at the EU level could better determine the territory of perception of a levy and the 
responsible person in charge of financing it in cross-border educational uses. 
4. Revising the scope of exception for research 
We have already addressed the need or risk of revising the exception for research as it would change an 
open-ended situation for better or for worse, depending on the perspective. Only the possible conditions 
that should be considered if one decides to amend the exception will be enumerated here.  
Coming back to the activities of research that use protected content, the distinction between the use as 
subject matter for research or as tools for research could lead to different conditions.  
As said earlier, the second category that consists in using scientific papers for research might not require 
a specific treatment or exception in copyright law as the development of open access models have 
tremendously increased the possibility to access to and use scientific papers some (limited) time after 
their publication. It has the advantage of fostering the dissemination of scientific publications with the 
consent of their authors and not by a limitation of their rights. Datasets, whether protected by the sui 
generis right or not, are also concerned by this open access movements. The EU Recommendation1197 
as well as the OECD Declaration on Open Access
1198
 commend that dataset developed in publicly-funded 
research be made available in open access. 
Text and data mining will be a specific case of use of the first category as it will apply processing and 
analysis tools to a huge amount of data and content, that can be protected by copyright. A specific report 
will be dedicated to text and data mining.  
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That leaves us with the use of copyrighted works and other subject matter as material or topic of 
research. To some extent, such use will follow the exception for teaching as the researchers will include 
works they study in their scientific presentations or papers as illustrations. But other uses could also be of 
some importance for research.  
a) The objective of the exception 
The notion of scientific research is not defined in the directive and should maybe not be as there is some 
common understanding of what it refers to.  
In guidelines or interpretative document, some guidance could be given as to the application of the notion 
of non-commercial to the research activity as it would help clarify some hybrid cases, such as research 
undertaken in a university with the sponsoring by an outside firm, or that is intended to yield some 
commercial outcomes. Ancillary outcomes of the research that could elicit some revenues, such as a 
scientific publication or a paid lecture, should at least not count to qualify the research as commercial. 
The filing of a patent should not in itself ban the research made in non-commercial entities from the 
benefit of the exception. The patent is a mode of protection of the scientific invention that is not in itself a 
commercial act, only its exploitation in commercial products will be. Similarly the granting of patent 
licenses by a university does not indicate per se that the upstream research that has led to the patent was 
for commercial purposes.  
However, when a spin-off is created by a university to bring the exploitation of its patent to a commercial 
level, any research done by the spin-off could be assimilated to research carried out for a commercial 
purpose, without revising the status of the research done previously within the university itself that has 
resulted in the creation of the spin-off. 
b) Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries of the research exception are not defined in the current exception that adopts a functional 
approach based on the activity of doing research. As a result, anyone could claim the benefit of the 
exception, irrespective of her profession, training, or relation to a recognized research institute. There is 
no reason to limit the notion as it would be reasonably circumscribed by the criterion of non-commercial 
purpose. 
c) Works concerned 
We have proposed the exclusion of educational works from the exception for teaching. Should scientific 
articles, whose main market and exploitation will be the research institutions and researchers be 
excluded to a similar extent from the exception for research? Arguably no, for different reasons. First, the 
use of scientific papers will be generally authorized under the open access approach/methodology and 
practices that are spreading in the academic world. A very recent study commissioned by the EC DG 
Research estimates that 50% of the scientific papers published in 2011 in the EU, Brazil, Canada, US 
and Japan, are available in open access, which comprises the publication in open access journals or the 
making available on-line after a publication in a traditional subscription-based model
1199
. This proportion 
will probably increase as the funding sources require the outcome of research to be in open access, as it 
will be the case with Horizon 2020 program. The exception will not be necessary then. Second, an 
exception that would allow for the use of scientific papers would only authorize their reproduction or 
communication if the user has a legitimate access thereto. The exception should not be a way to get 
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access to the scientific paper by bypassing its normal acquisition by the market, at a library, or under a 
free dissemination under open access. Should the sharing of scientific papers be allowed under an 
exception, it should be strictly limited to a closed circle of researchers and to the extent it is necessary for 
the research they do in collaboration, and not only easier to get access to the papers.   
 
In research, by contrast to illustration for teaching, the exception could pertain also to unpublished 
works that could constitute significant sources for research in some fields. However no rule in the acquis 
communautaire settles this issue that depends on the copyright tradition of Member States. For the sake 
of research though, some derogation from the exclusion of the application of exceptions to unpublished or 
undisclosed works, when such a principle exists, could be done by domestic laws. It would not harm the 
legitimate interests of the copyright owners, whether the author of his heirs, if the rule is limited to 
research and not publication of the unpublished works in question. 
To enhance harmonization in the acquis, the exception could cross the different subject matters and 
apply as well to computer programs and databases. If computer programs know an exception for 
studying and testing the functioning of the program that could be equivalent to research purposes, the 
issue is important for the re-utilization of databases that is not exempted from the sui generis right. 
Research in scientific fields with an intensive use of data will manipulate datasets that could qualify as 
databases
1200
. The absence of an exception to the sui generis rights that allows for the extraction and re-
utilization solely for research purposes is detrimental to research in those fields.  
d) Authorised acts 
The case of text and data mining set aside, the use allowed for research purpose could be reproduction 
and communication, as well as distribution if required. As far as communication is concerned, particularly 
through digital networks, some limitation of the dissemination of works could follow from the general 
restriction to the extent necessary for the purpose to be achieved. When using copyrighted works as 
material for research, such material could be made available to researchers but only if it is required for 
the research undertaken in common. The exception of quotation constitutes another possibility for the 
researcher to disseminate the outcomes of her research, including some extracts or reproductions of 
works for a scientific purpose.  
e) Other conditions 
The fair compensation that is foreseen in most Member States for education generally absorbs the use 
made by the same institutions, but most notably universities, for research purposes. It is justified for the 
harm suffered by copyright owners will be similar when the work is used to illustrate a teaching or to do 
research. Therefore, if a fair compensation is mandated at the EU level, it should include uses for 
research. 
The mention of the source and name of the author should be one condition to benefit from the 
exception for research, as it is the case with the exception for illustration of teaching. This is all the more 
relevant as the mentioning of one’s source is a methodological requirement of scientific research, in all 
disciplines. 
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5. Efforts towards more harmonisation in Member States 
a) Making the exception mandatory 
A comprehensive harmonization of the exception in all Member States could be better obtained by 
making it mandatory. We have proffered three grounds for granting a mandatory nature to copyright 
exceptions under EU law:  
1° Internal Market operation: an exception should be mandatory for Member States when 
inconsistent implementation would distort and create discrepancies in the Internal Market. E-
learning reveals some fragmentation of the digital market for education due to the diverging 
exceptions in domestic laws. This would constitute a primary justification to make the exception for 
illustration for teaching mandatory. This is not the case for uses for research that has a more 
limited cross-border impact. 
2° Fundamental freedom recognised by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: when the 
exception is grounded on the need to enable the exercise of a fundamental freedom that is part of 
the EU Charter, such as the freedom of expression, the freedom to information or the freedom to 
conduct business, it can be argued that such exception should be part of the copyright framework 
in all Member States. The fundamental right to education is recognised by the article 14 of the 
Charter, but that does not mean that the enjoyment of such right would be impaired by the lack or 
insufficiency of an exception from copyright to conduct teaching.  
3° European public interest: When exceptions convey a public interest that can be declared of an 
European Union importance, namely by key policy documents of the EU, they could also require 
some uniformity in their national application. The development of e-learning and of a European 
research space could be declared as being of an European public interest, even though, contrary 
to the case of digital libraries, no such acknowledgement has been made by the European Union. 
As developed for the libraries exceptions, the accent put on development of e-learning and 
research would not necessarily mean that copyright should accommodate such a public objective 
by an exception. However, when such an exception is included in the directive and in almost all 
Member States, its European dimension could arguably promote to make it mandatory. 
A mandatory exception allowing for acts of illustration for teaching and research could either be precisely 
worded and identify all applicable requirements or could only indicate some minimal conditions in critically 
important areas while imposing a precisely defined objective. Mandating the transposition of the 
exception under already precise conditions will limit the leeway for Member States.  
The advantages and disadvantages of making an exception mandatory have already been exposed for 
the library exceptions. It would create some legal certainty as to the scope of the exception and increase 
harmonization amongst Member States that will be prevented from diverging from the exception as laid 
down in the EU directive. The interpretation of the exception and of its conditions then becomes a matter 
for the European Court of Justice that can develop an autonomous and uniform principle of copyright law. 
It also has the advantage of giving some weight to the clear intention of the European Union to develop a 
European offer of e-learning, not necessarily at the expense of the protection of copyright.  
However, the selection of exceptions to be upgraded to a mandatory status would be much disputed. It 
would also impose to Member States their policy choices in the way of achieving the objectives of the 
directive. Some harmonisation of exceptions amongst Member States by imposing the conditions and 
wording of an exception could also run counter to the national traditions and cultures of legal terminology, 
methodology and copyright. 
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b) An optional-exception with precisely defined conditions or objectives 
A less radical option would be to adopt an optional exception with precisely defined conditions (as to the 
types of works, copies, purposes, as developed above) or with a prescribed objective. The harmonization 
effect could then be supported by the CJEU decision in the TV2 Denmark case that has stated that: “(…) 
although it is open to the Member States (…) to introduce an exception (…) into their domestic law, an 
interpretation according to which Member States which, exercising that option afforded to them by 
European Union law, have introduced an exception of that kind, are free to determine, in an un-
harmonised manner, the limits thereof, (…) would be contrary to the objective of that directive (…), 
inasmuch as the limits of that exception could vary from one Member State to another and would 
therefore give rise to potential inconsistencies”
1201
. In other words, even if Member States are free to 
implement an optional exception of a European directive, they are not allowed to undermine the 
objectives of the exception in the directive and an exception should be interpreted in a way that enables 
their effectiveness and the achievement of their purpose
1202
. As a result, Member States should 
implement the exception so as to abide by the objective ascribed by the directive
1203
. When the conditions 
of the exception are detailed in the directive, the discretion left to Member States is reduced accordingly.  
Recitals of a revised directive or an interpretative document could then elaborate on the objective of the 
exception, hereby limiting a diverging application of the exception by the Member States. 
As said for the library exception, this option has the advantage that it does not impose a standard 
exception from which nothing can be changed, but only prescribes an overall objective that the domestic 
laws have to achieve. This would leave some diversity amongst the Member States, without unduly 
impeding the development of cross-border e-learning or research.  
c) Solving cross-border issues 
The previous options aim at enhancing harmonisation of exceptions amongst Member States with the 
objective of decreasing incompatibility between different laws that could apply to some cross-border use 
of copyrighted works.  
Other mechanisms could help lessen the impact of unharmonised copyright exceptions, but have not 
been put to test yet. 
The idea would be to authorise the distribution or making available of some content legitimized by an 
exception in one Member States to other countries. It would require first to designate the initiating act of 
the use that should comply with the conditions of exceptions in the territory where this use occurs, then to 
stipulate the requirements to be satisfied for leaving the use unchallenged by the other copyright laws that 
could apply to the circulation of the content. This solution could be a sort of principle of mutual 
recognition of the exception. For e-learning, it would mean that the inclusion of copyrighted works in 
some educational material (text, syllabus, textbook, powerpoint presentation, exam, …) by a teacher 
complying with the conditions of the exception in her country (or rather in the country whose law would be 
considered to apply to the initiating use), would be deemed to be legitimate in the other Member States 
where the work would be made available to students. It would in a way circumvent the normal application 
of the laws of each country where the exploitation takes place. 
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Related principles, though not identical, can be found in two legal texts, the European directive on orphan 
works and the recent WIPO Treaty of Marrakesh on the exception for visually-impaired people
1204
.  
The directive on orphan works
1205
 creates an exception allowing the making available of works by libraries 
provided that some conditions are respected. One triggering factor for this exception is that the work be 
considered as orphan after a diligent search. The directive provides that the diligent search be 
undertaken in the country of first publication of the work. Having passed the scrutiny of the diligent search 
standards in that country, the search should not be done in other Member States that should recognise 
the validity of the search carried out abroad. The mutual recognition applies amongst States as to the 
diligence of the search and prevails over different approaches in the Member States to the recognition of 
orphan work status
1206
. This designation of the country in which the search should be done has a cross-
border effect as explained in the recital 23 of the directive: “In order to foster access by the Union's 
citizens to Europe's cultural heritage, it is also necessary to ensure that orphan works which have been 
digitized and made available to the public in one Member State may also be made available to the public 
in other Member States”.  
This is slightly different from the recognition of the legitimacy of one use in a State to the effect to 
authorize further circulation or making available in other territories.  The principle of the orphan works 
directive does not set aside the application of the exception that each Member States will apply to 
libraries on their territories for making orphan works available. It only recognizes the status of the work.  
The Marrakesh Treaty deals with the distribution or making available of a copy of a work in a format 
adapted to the needs of visually-impaired people. Its article 5(1) provides that “Contracting Parties shall 
provide that if an accessible format copy is made under a limitation or exception or pursuant to operation 
of law, that accessible format copy may be distributed or made available by an authorized entity to a 
beneficiary person or an authorized entity in another Contracting Party”. This is a complex system whose 
interpretation is not clear. An agreed Statement adds that “nothing in this Treaty reduces or extends the 
scope of exclusive rights under any other treaty” and a number of safeguarding clauses ensure that once 
distributed or made available in another country, the adapted format would stay within the confines of the 
exception as decided by the Treaty and according to the article 4(a) of the Treaty, by its own domestic 
law.  
At least this solution points at the difficulty for beneficiaries of an exception to comply with multiple 
conditions applicable in different national laws and proposes some limited circulation of works compliant 
with the exception in their “country of origin”
1207
. 
A more elaborate principle of a cross-border recognition of an exception in one State might be envisaged 
at the EU level to tackle the compliance of e-learning with many systems of exceptions, as well as other 
exceptions raising a similar transnational issue. Its requirements or elements would be:  
- the designation of the country under which the scrutiny with the exception conditions should be 
done; 
- the definition of the requirements applicable for the further circulation of the content compliant 
with the exception in one country to other Member States.  
This solution would not be devoid of difficulties though, such as:  
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- A preliminary condition would be some harmonisation of the exception (going beyond the current 
state of harmonisation by the directive 2001/29) to prevent forum-shopping and the choice, by e-
learning projects, of the law that would be the more generous. The risk can be mitigated by the 
fact that educational establishments are rather stable and connected, for administrative and 
organisational reasons, to one territory; 
- the application of fair compensation schemes that would require an additional rule determining 
the place where the compensation should be paid and the people responsible for such 
compensation, while taking into account the impact of the circulation in many territories in the 
determination of the amount of compensation; 
- it could require the use of technological measures to prevent some misuse of the work due to this 
facilitated circulation. 
6. Facilitating copyright clearance and collective agreements 
Without harmonising further the exception for research and teaching, the European Union could also 
promote the recourse to collective licensing and model agreements for the uses that would not be 
covered by the exception. This option has been explained in the report on libraries but would be different 
here. When discussed for the exception of preservation by libraries, recourse to licensing and collective 
agreements aimed a filling a gap that the European lawmaker would have left if deciding not to cover 
mass-digitization by the exception.  
By contrast, the current exception for teaching or research does not exclude some uses whose coverage 
would be desirable. Therefore collective agreement would not make up for something that is missing 
under the directive exception. Adopting some collective agreement or Memorandum of Understanding in 
that field, hence appears irrelevant.  
By contrast collective agreements on the national level have been concluded to fill in the lack of an 
exception for e-learning or other educational uses. In those countries, like France or Spain, the recourse 
to collective agreements has been criticised for being incomplete or intricate to manage and the solution 
of an exception is argued for. 
That does not prevent countries with a tradition of extended collective licensing to apply this mechanism 
as a way to implement the exception for teaching and research, as it is the case in Sweden and Denmark.  
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Conclusion 
Exceptions for the benefit of libraries, teaching and research have always been high on the copyright 
agenda, as limitations with a strong public interest motive and an evolving context that merits on-going 
evaluation and revision. 
Recent policy papers of the European Union have asked whether those exceptions would need to be 
assessed and adapted to the information society and new developments of digital libraries or e-learning. 
Indeed, libraries increasingly engage in digitisation or making works available on-line either for 
consultation or for lending. Similarly, education has now embarked the digital train, as schools and 
universities provide additional digital tools to students or whole curriculums to be followed online. 
Libraries, archives, museums or educational institutions deal with copyrighted content and other protected 
subject matter on a daily basis. A significant part of the collection of libraries, archives and museums is 
composed of books, works of arts, films, broadcasts, even music or videogames. Consequently, any act 
of reproduction or making available is likely to infringe copyright or related rights if not covered by an 
exception. The case of teaching is different: teachers and students in imparting or getting knowledge will 
sometimes have recourse to literary or artistic works as examples, illustration or exercises for the 
teaching. Whether in the physical classroom or in a virtual environment, extracts of or whole works might 
be copied, distributed or made available in a way that necessarily triggers copyright questions. Research 
will also work on protected material as a topic or tool for research and acts of copying of circulation might 
ensue. 
Exceptions are traditionally granted to libraries, archives, museums, educational and research institutions. 
However the expansion of their activities on the web brings about a different impact on copyrighted 
works. The use of works is not confined within the limits of the library premises or within the classroom, 
but could be accessed on-line and potentially by a larger number of people. In some cases, one can even 
fear that libraries and educational institutions become competitors to the exploitation of works. Lending of 
e-books by libraries through downloading closely resembles to the access to digital content on digital 
books platforms. 
If the exceptions in that field undoubtedly deserve some attention, the changing scope and ambit of their 
digital uses also requires that any adaptation thereof takes into account the protection of the rights in 
interests of copyright and related rights owners. 
This study has looked at the four exceptions (or rather three exceptions and the peculiar case of public 
lending right) that are mostly relevant for libraries, archives, museums, educational and research 
institutions. They present different issues and lead to different conclusions.  
Three exceptions concern activities undertaken by libraries and similar institutions, whose mission is to 
collect, maintain, preserve and make available our cultural and scientific heritage. A fourth one is related 
to the transmission of knowledge by education or research. 
The InfoSoc Directive allows libraries to carry out certain acts of reproduction without specifying their 
purpose. It is generally understood as covering acts that aim at preservation and archiving. However the 
restriction of the exception to ‘specific’ acts of reproduction arguably excludes large-scale digitization of 
libraries’ collections. Digitization of works to ensure format-shifting is also questionable. The national 
transpositions of the limitation are equally or sometimes even more restricted, which leads to only a 
partial harmonization that could have effect on the capacity of libraries to operate on equal footing in 
European projects of digitization and transmission of cultural heritage. 
Another minor activity of libraries benefits from an exception in the InfoSoc Directive in order to authorize 
the making available of items of libraries’ collection on the premises and on dedicated terminals.  
Compared to the exception for preservation, its scope is precisely defined by the directive, which leaves 
no much leeway for Member States. National legislations have generally literally transposed that 
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exception, which leads, compared to the former situation, to a rather harmonised field in the European 
Union, except when Member States have not transposed the exception. 
The issue here is different, since the exception itself has proven to be somewhat restrictive: only the 
consultation on the premises of the library or archive and on dedicated terminals is allowed, which has 
been denounced as technologically outdated. This spatial and technical restriction seems at odds with the 
demands of libraries’ users and notably with researchers to get a remote access to some items of the 
libraries for mere consultation and research. However, any opening of remote consultation in some cases 
could bring the exception to a new level and to competition with the making available of works by the 
copyright owners themselves. 
The extension of public lending rights to the provision of digital content on-line raises a completely new 
issue. Though discussed at the time, the making available of works online for lending is not comprised in 
the definition of lending and of public lending in the Rental and Lending Directive of 1992. For that 
reason, the current pilots experiences of e-lending are based on licensing contracts between libraries and 
publishers or intermediaries that have developed dedicated platforms for lending of e-books.  
The question here is not the adaptation of a current exception or its efficiency to deliver its purpose, but 
rather the updating of a limitation of copyright to a completely new level. The impact of development of 
digital lending by libraries, under an exception, would merit some economic assessment, to substantiate 
(or not) the fear of a direct competition with the digital platforms and the nascent market of e-books. On 
the other hand, excluding new digital content from the offer of public libraries and their essential role in 
providing access to cultural items to the whole population could result in the disappearance of libraries 
altogether that have always acted as an important channel for diffusion of culture, particularly to the youth 
and the low-income population.  
Finally the exception for teaching and research appearing in the InfoSoc Directive is another example of 
an open-ended limitation that is mainly defined by its two-pronged objective: illustration of teaching or 
research. None is really defined or delimited. Contrary to the preservation exception for libraries, the 
European lawmaker had already envisaged the digital extension of educational activities and explicitly 
includes e-learning in the scope of the exception. The issue results instead of a too restrictive 
transposition and diverging conditions in the laws of Member States. The ensuing lack of harmonisation is 
particularly problematic as this exception encompasses acts of making available and has potentially a 
considerable cross-border effect. 
These four distinct limitations to copyright and related rights warrant different solutions or 
recommendations.  
The exception for specific acts of reproduction is not capable to address the major challenge of 
digitization that digital libraries face. A first choice has to be made as to whether the task of digitization, 
increasingly required from national Governments and the European Union, should be helped by an 
exception to copyright or should rather be enabled by facilitating licensing devices, based on collective 
management or not. Should the revision of the existing exception be preferred, the primary question will 
be to define the acts of preservation and archiving (or of any other purpose) that should be allowed. If 
restoration and replacement, even preventively, are already covered, should the exception extend to 
encompass reproduction for format-shifting and mass digitization? We have developed the opinion that 
such copying in digital format is in itself not impairing the normal exploitation of the works or the legitimate 
interests of copyright or related rights owners, so far as the making available is not included in the scope 
of the exception.  
The exception for on-site consultation is too narrow. A number of opinions concur on that point. Its corset 
should be loosened but up to what point? The dedicated devices could be replaced by any device 
enabling to view the content, but on condition that the work is only accessible in a protected format that 
would forbid its further copying or transmission. A more intricate question would be to enlarge the notion 
of ‘premises’ of the library, archive or museum so as to include remote consultation. If it could be 
envisaged for certain types of content and for strictly research purposes, it could not compete with 
exploitation of the works concerned by the rights owners. The dividing line might be difficult to draw. 
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Allowing public lending by online transmission of works such as e-books, music or films would in our view 
pursue the key role of libraries as providers of culture. By definition, it will be a mode of access to works 
competing with the market, as it has always been. However, some conditions and limitations should be 
imposed to e-lending to introduce similar frictions between the normal acquisition of a book and the 
access thereto through a library so as the former continues to be favoured by users. Particularly, a limited 
time of lending and number of simultaneous readers, an embargo period leaving some priority to the 
commercial release of a work, and the affixing of technological measures of protection, would guarantee 
that the offer by libraries do not hamper the development of the market for digital products, such as e-
books. 
The exception for illustration of teaching and research does not need to be revised as it is sufficiently 
adapted to the needs of e-learning and research, due to its open formulation. Nevertheless, the lack of 
harmonisation in that field should be reduced either by imposing the exception to Member States or to 
require that its objective be effectively met by the exception. By default of a comprehensive harmonisation 
as to the conditions of the exception, some attention should be given to cross-border situations of 
teaching as research, which makes it almost impossible to comply with the diversity of requirements of 
the many legislations that could be of application. 
As to research, it was generally absorbed by the general exception for teaching, even though the 
concerned uses might greatly differ from the educational context. Maybe it is time to separate both 
objectives in two distinct exceptions that different activities would deserve. 
An additional difficulty brought by the digital development is the blurring of boundaries of each exception. 
The three exceptions in favour of libraries had distinct fields of application: one for the acts of 
reproduction made for the needs of the preservation of the collection, another for the on-the-spot 
consultation of some items, and the last one for the lending of physical copies of works. The analysis of 
the three exceptions reveals some overlaps between those uses. The large-scale digitization projects 
ultimately aim at the making available of the collection, even though this last use should not be covered 
by an exception; the making available for consultation is increasingly requested to apply at distance and 
online; and the lending is shifting to cover the online transmission of digital items. The exception-by-
exception reasoning, which is the model of the InfoSoc Directive, might not be relevant anymore. Maybe it 
is time to look at different uses that some categories of users (libraries or educational institutions) or some 
objectives (access to culture and knowledge or education) would be privileged to undertake under a 
limitation of copyright. Without going as far as introducing a general provision of fair use in the European 
copyright law
1208
, the space of non-infringing uses could be defined by their objective and some general 
conditions, including a more open requirement that the use does not exceed what is necessary for its 
objective. This is a radical move that this study has not made. It could make our system of exceptions 
more fit for its purpose and understandable for users and copyright owners alike. If the requirements for 
each exception are adequate and legitimate, it would not sacrifice the high level of protection of copyright 
and related rights that the EU law has adopted. The next step would be to make mandatory some key 
exceptions that convey fundamental European public interests, such as the safeguarding of European 
cultural heritage or the development of a European research area and internal market for education. 
When those objectives are encumbered by the discrepancies resulting from diverging national 
implementations, harmonisation of exceptions, with proper conditions and restrictions, might be as 
important as harmonisation of exclusive rights that was achieved in 2001. 
 
  
                                                     
 
1208
 In that direction, see the proposal of HUGENHOLTZ (B.) and SENFTLEBEN (M. R.F.), Fair Use in Europe. In Search of Flexibilities, 
Amsterdam, 2011, http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/Fair%20Use%20Report%20PUB.pdf. An attenuated version of a fair 
use provision is also proposed by the Wittem Copyright Code drafted by European copyright academics. 
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Introduction 
In this Study we will remind the Terms of Reference of the Study on the Application of Directive 
2001/29/EC on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (the "InfoSoc Directive") (sub I), 
then briefly describe the exception for uses for the benefit of people with a disability (sub II), examine the 
national implementation of this exception in the national copyright legislations of the Member States 
under consideration (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary and Benelux) (sub 
III), identify the bottlenecks in terms of cross-border accessibility (sub IV) and finally examine some 
solutions to those bottlenecks (sub V).  Excerpts from the national copyright acts are added in an annex. 
The research for this Study has been conducted until June 2013.  
I. Terms of Reference 
Article 5(3) (b) of the InfoSoc Directive allows Member States to opt for a limitation in favour of uses for 
the benefit of people with disabilities. The use must be non-commercial and related directly to the 
disability.  
This provision has been implemented in all the Member States in many different ways. 
Some Member States have transposed the provision of the Directive word-for-word allowing a broad 
implementation (e.g. the Netherlands). Others have attached very strict conditions (in addition to the 
application of the 3-step test) to the application of this exception (e.g. France) and certain have even 
limited it to only one handicap (e.g. the UK has limited to visually impaired people). Some provide for 
remuneration to the right holders, others do not. Some Member States make a distinction between the 
persons who are entitled to perform the restricted acts and the end-beneficiaries of the exempted use. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear from national provisions whether the exception is addressed to legal 
(organisations or entities) or rather to physical persons. 
The result of this variety of implementations is that even the definitions of handicap are not consensual 
among the Member States.  
Output 5: The Study should assess not so much the variations in the definition of beneficiaries but rather 
the uses permitted and whether technological changes would warrant some update of the exception in 
particular as far as its cross border application is concerned (e.g. for the visually impaired). 
II. The exception for disabled people in the InfoSoc Directive 
The Information Society Directive provides an exception to the harmonised exclusive rights (reproduction, 
communication to the public/”making available” and distribution) in favour of disabled persons (art. 5(3) 
(b) of the InfoSoc Directive
1209
).  Such exception is indeed necessary to avoid copyright infringements:  
many acts by principle restricted under copyright are required in order to make regularly published work 
                                                     
 
1209
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Official Journal L 167 , 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019.. 
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accessible to people with various needs related to a disability.  Often the format of the work should be 
adapted (sound v. print) or its expression will be altered (e.g. Braille for the visually impaired).  These 
initiatives may imply acts of reproduction or adaptation (the right of adaptation is not harmonised under 
the InfoSoc Directive).  Furthermore, individuals with disabilities may have access to works in adapted 
formats thanks to dedicated organisations, which produce and distribute the works.  These undertakings 
may result in acts of distribution or communication to the public, both harmonised in the InfoSoc Directive. 
Any initiative to make a work accessible to people with disabilities may thus involve restricted acts of 
reproduction, communication, making available or distribution to the public.  In addition to these 
harmonised rights, the right of adaptation established under national copyright laws may be affected too.  
This means that, by principle, the prior consent of the author (or related right holder) should be acquired – 
unless an exception covers this use in the national copyright law.  
The Member States are allowed to include such exception in their national laws, to the extent that the 
outer limits set by the Information Society Directive are not exceeded.  These are expressed in art. 5(3) 
InfoSoc Dir: 
Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 
and 3 in the following cases: 
(b) uses, for the benefit of people with a disability, which are directly related to the disability and 
of a non-commercial nature, to the extent required by the specific disability; 
In addition, “where the Member States may provide for an exception or limitation to the right of 
reproduction pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, they may provide similarly for an exception or limitation to 
the right of distribution as referred to in Article 4 to the extent justified by the purpose of the authorised act 
of reproduction” (art. 5(4) InfoSoc Dir). 
Although this exception is optional (rec. 34 InfoSoc Dir), it was considered “in any case important for the 
Member States to adopt all necessary measures to facilitate access to works by persons suffering from a 
disability which constitutes an obstacle to the use of the works themselves, and to pay particular attention 
to accessible formats” (rec. 43 InfoSoc Dir). 
The InfoSoc Directive did not aspire to control all modalities or conditions of the exception.  As explained 
in the comments to the articles in the initial proposal, it was considered that the Directive should give a 
margin for exceptions, which are “not specifically addressed in the multilateral conventions, but which are 
known in a large number of Member States, such as exemptions to the benefit of certain categories of 
people (persons with disabilities) or for use of works for purposes of administrative or judicial procedures 
or for the purpose of public security. In view of their more limited economic importance, these limitations 
are deliberately not dealt with in detail in the framework of this proposal.  It only sets out minimum 
conditions of their application, and it is for the Member State to define the detailed conditions of their use, 
albeit within the limits set out by these paragraphs and this Article”
1210
.  Apart from a modification of the 
beneficiaries (infra), the wording of the exception is identical to the first proposal of the Commission.  It 
can be derived that little controversy existed among Member States regarding this limitation.   
Conditions.  The InfoSoc Directive allows national exceptions within the conditions of art. 5(3).   
Works  and other protected subject matter.  The exception is not restricted to a particular type of works 
or subject matter protected under neighbouring rights.  The Directive does not object to restricting the 
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exclusive rights for all kinds of works, such as literary works, musical works and performances, 
cinematographic works and first fixations of films,... 
Use.  The exceptions may apply to all uses, i.e. acts of reproduction or communication to the public (art. 2 
and 3 InfoSoc Dir).  In case the Member States make an exception to the reproduction right, they are free 
to provide the same exception to the distribution right (art. 5(4) InfoSoc Dir)
1211
.  
Beneficiaries.  The use is meant to benefit people with a disability.  The original proposal of 1997 
provided a more limited group of beneficiaries, i.e. the “visually-impaired or hearing impaired persons”.  
The scope of application was enlarged in the 1999 Amended Proposal
1212
.  This is in conformity with art. 
26 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union in favour of the integration of persons with 
disabilities.  The exempted acts may be performed by individuals with a disability or by other persons, for 
their benefit
1213
.   
Restrictions.  The permitted use should be directly related to the disability and should not exceed the 
use required by the specific disability.  According to Von Lewinski and Walter this condition can be 
assessed by reference to the existing market offer.  If there is an offer of works and/or other protected 
subject matter accessible to people with a disability (e.g. a “talking book”), then more initiatives can only 
be exempted under this exception to the extent that they propose an additional value to people with a 
disability, i.e. features that are not present in the already existing offer of accessible copies (e.g. when 
only an abridged version is available in an accessible form, arguably a complete version in accessible 
form has added value;  similarly a version with scientific references in accessible form may still be a use 
required by a specific disability if the existing offer consists of versions without such references)
1214
. 
Uses of a commercial nature are excluded.  Publishers that pursue an economic advantage or a profit 
from the distribution of e.g. a book in Braille format cannot benefit from the exception
1215
. 
Exceptions in the national copyright laws should be in conformity with the three-step test.  A Member 
State may impose an obligation to pay a fair compensation in order to meet the three-step test (art. 5(5) 
InfoSoc Dir).  
For clarity’s sake, it should be noted that other exceptions may be relevant for people with a disability, 
especially the exceptions for private use (art. 5(2)(b) InfoSoc Dir).  The exceptions in favour of memory 
institutions, for teaching or research may benefit to people with a disability and have been studied 
elsewhere. 
Other factors may influence the overall situation of people with a disability.  In particular, licensing 
schemes and assistive technologies could contribute a lot to improve access to works.  We will not 
analyse these issues but they should be borne in mind when considering a legislative initiative on the 
exception in favour of people with a disability. 
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III. National implementation in the countries under consideration 
In this part we will examine how the exception regarding the use to the benefit of people with a disability 
has been implemented in the national copyright legislation.  We will compare the national provisions 
regarding this exception.  We have found no court decisions and very little scholarly literature.  This 
description will allow us to describe more accurately the legal bottlenecks (in part IV). 
A. Works and other protected subject matter 
The national copyright acts of most Member States under consideration allow all types of works to be 
used in the context of the exception to the benefit of disabled people, but various additional conditions 
apply.  The exception also applies to other subject matter. 
In some Member States under consideration, the exception is applicable to all types of works or protected 
subject matter (Belgium
1216
, France
1217
, Hungary
1218
, Italy
1219
, Luxemburg
1220
, The Netherlands  In other 
Member States, the exception can only apply to “published works” (Denmark
1221
, Poland
1222
, Spain
1223
). 
The exception may be formulated in general terms to apply to all works but set out a particular regime for 
particular types of works.  In Denmark, the exception applies to all published works, except for sound 
recordings of published literary works
1224
.  The use and distribution for use of these sound recordings is 
permitted if it is done by visually impaired persons or backward readers and if a remuneration is paid to 
the author.  The Hungarian copyright act provides a similar restriction.  
Some Member States restrict the scope of the exception to the effect that it can only apply in case of a 
market failure (criterion of “commercial availability”).  Germany thus allows the exempted use for works 
(including cinematographic works) that are not available in a perceivable form yet or if the forms in which 
they are available are not suited for the individually intended purpose
1225
.  The UK provides a similar 
restriction
1226
. 
The UK explicitly lists the works to which the exception applies:  a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work or a published edition, which is not accessible to the visually impaired person
1227
.  Restrictions apply 
with regard to musical works and databases
1228
.  
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B. Restricted acts  
In some cases, works or other subject matter are available in a form that is equally accessible to people 
with a disability as to others.  A visually impaired person can enjoy a musical performance in the same 
way a person without reduced visual perception:  it is not necessary to adapt it to her specific needs.  But 
this is not always the case:  in order to access “print works”, the work should be expressed in another 
format, adapted to the visually impaired person who wants to enjoy (read or hear) it.  A hearing impaired 
person will enjoy a television show or a film to a fuller extent if the conversations are subtitled and the 
events are reflected in closed captioning.   
The process of making a work accessible to persons with disabilities requires mostly (technical) 
adaptations, reproductions, performances or communications, acts of making available and distributions 
(in case the technical conversion is done by another person or organisation).  These operations may thus 
be qualified as acts protected under copyright.  Member States exempt those restricted acts to an 
unequal extent. 
The Information Society Directive allows this exception for the rights of reproduction and communication 
to the public (including the making available right).  It cannot be assumed that the exception to the 
reproduction right implicitly extends to the distribution right (although is often considered an incidental 
prerogative to the reproduction right
1229
), but the InfoSoc Directive allows Member States to provide for an 
exception to the distribution right where the reproduction right is restricted in accordance with art. 5(2) 
and (3), “to the extent justified by the purpose of the authorised act of reproduction” (art. 5(4) InfoSoc Dir). 
Some Member States do not specify the type of use allowed under this exemption. 
The Belgian copyright act allows acts of reproduction and communication to the public including the 
making available right, as do the French, Italian, Luxemburgish, Dutch, Polish and Spanish copyright 
acts.  Hungary exempts all uses under this exception, including the reproduction and distribution of the 
work. 
The Danish act allows the “use” (read: reproduction) and “distribution” of copies of the work, except in 
relation to sound recordings of literary works or use that consists solely of sound recordings of musical 
works.  Certain government, social or non-profit actors are allowed to “produce copies” by means of 
sound or visual recording of works broadcast on the radio or television, for the use of visually 
handicapped and hearing-impaired persons (subject to the extended collective licensing provisions)
1230
.  
The Danish exception does not exempt acts of communication to the public.   
Under German law, the works may be reproduced and distributed but not communicated to the public
1231
.  
The British copyright act similarly allows the making of accessible copies, the transfer of accessible 
copies to a visually impaired person or to a person “who has lawful possession of the master copy and 
intends to transfer the accessible copy to a [visually impaired] person”
1232
.  Subsequent “dealings” outside 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(a)if the master copy is of a musical work, or part of a musical work, and the making of an accessible copy would involve recording a 
performance of the work or part of it; or 
(b)if the master copy is of a database, or part of a database, and the making of an accessible copy would infringe copyright in the 
database. 
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 SULLIVAN, “Study on copyright limitations and exceptions for the visually impaired”, 18. 
1230
 Art. 17 (4) Danish Copyright Act. 
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the scope of these conditions are considered infringements, i.e. if the accessible copy is “sold or let for 
hire or offered or exposed for sale or hire or included in a broadcast or cable programme service”
1233
. 
C. Beneficiaries  
The InfoSoc Directive mentions as the beneficiaries of this exception people with a “disability”, without 
narrowing down on the kind of disability the beneficiary should suffer or on the intensity of the disability.  
The exception is not restricted to physical handicaps so arguably people with other types of disabilities 
(cognitive, mental) could rely on it too.  Also, the Directive does not specify who is allowed to perform the 
restricted acts under this exception:  should the person with the disability herself be making the copies 
and the adaptations, is a third person allowed to do it on her behalf or even a (non-profit) organisation 
(whose activities benefit to a group of people with a disability)? 
Some Member States have taken over the open notion of the Directive (Belgium, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy
1234
, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Poland and Spain). 
The French law contains specifications in two respects:  the person who is entitled to perform the 
restricted acts and the end-beneficiary of the exempted use.  The end-beneficiaries are people with a 
motorial, physical, sensorial, mental, cognitive and/or psychological disability.  Moreover, the disability 
should amount to or exceed the rate to be determined by the “Conseil d'Etat” and be recognized by a 
specialised commission or a medical certificate
1235
.  The law itself does not restrict the scope of 
application in function of the type of handicap, but in practice the provisions are mostly applied in favour 
of visually impaired people
1236
.  The reproduction or communication to the public should be carried out by 
legal entities and institutions open to the public, such as libraries, archives, documentation centres or 
cultural multimedia centres.  These entities have to prove that they have an actual professional activity of 
conceiving, producing and communicating supports in favour of people suffering from the mentioned 
disabilities and justify it by reference to their formal purpose, their members or users, the material and 
human resources and the services they offer
1237
. 
Other Member States have defined particular types of disabilities.  
Denmark grants exceptions in favour of people with particular disabilities, in function of the subject matter 
to be used.  The exempted use of published works is reserved to the blind, visually impaired, the deaf and 
sufferers from speech impediments, as well as persons who on account of handicap are unable to read 
printed text
1238
.  The use of sound recordings of published literary works is permitted in favour of visually 
impaired persons and backward readers
1239
 and works broadcast on the radio or television may be used 
in favour of visually handicapped and hearing-impaired persons
1240
.  The Danish law does not specify 
whether the person with a disability should perform the restricted act or if another entity can do it on her 
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behalf, except for works broadcast on the radio or television, which only government or municipal 
institutions and other social or non-profit institutions may use
1241
. 
In the UK, the exception is reserved to visually impaired persons
1242
.  It covers use by the visually 
impaired person or by a third person on her behalf.  The law also contains a definition of a visually 
impaired person, i.e. a person who (a) is blind, (b) has an impairment of visual functions which cannot be 
improved by the use of corrective lenses to a level that would normally be acceptable for reading without 
a special level or kind of light, or (c) who is unable, through physical disability to hold or manipulate a 
book, or (d) who is unable through physical disability to focus or move his (or her) eyes to the extent that 
would normally be acceptable for reading
1243
.  Another section allows the provision of sub-titled copies of 
a broadcast, by a “designated body” and in favour of people who are deaf or hard of hearing, or physically 
or mentally handicapped in other ways
1244
.  The designated body is defined as a “body designated for the 
purposes of this section by order of the Secretary of State, who shall not designate a body unless he is 
satisfied that it is not established or conducted for profit”
 1245
. 
D. Purpose and additional conditions/restrictions 
The Information Society Directive allows a large exception for the benefit of people with disabilities in 
terms of subject-matter, restricted acts and beneficiaries, but it draws the outer limits of the exempted use 
in qualitative terms.  A use is permitted provided that (i) it is directly related to the disability, (ii) to the 
extent required by the specific disability and (iii) of a non-commercial nature.   
All Member States impose these conditions in some form or other. 
The Hungarian copyright act rephrases the three conditions and exempts any non-commercial use if the 
purpose of the use is to meet demands of disabled persons that are directly related to their disability and 
if it does not exceed the extent justified by the purpose
1246
.  Similarly the Italian copyright act does not 
impose any additional conditions
1247
, neither does the Dutch Act
1248
. 
The Belgian law takes over the conditions of the Directive and explicitly adds the two last steps of the 
three-step test (absence of a conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and of an unreasonable 
prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holders)
1249
.  The Luxemburgish exception is worded in a 
similar way
1250
, as is the Polish exception
1251
. 
The German law allows the reproduction of a work for non-commercial purposes if such reproduction is 
necessary to facilitate access.  It also allows the distribution exclusively to the person with the disability.  It 
is implied that the available means to access the work should be assessed in concreto:  the reproduction 
and distribution of a work are exempted to the extent that the readily available means of sensual 
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perception fail to make the work accessible
1252
.  As a general rule, the source must in all cases be clearly 
indicated
1253
.  By principle, where the use of a work is permissible under the exception, no alterations to 
the work are allowed
1254
.  However, some alterations are in any case required to make a work or other 
subject matter accessible to people with a disability.  A strict application of this rule would therefore 
undermine the very exception in favour of people with a disability
1255
, so this rule is softened to the extent 
that it is permissible to make “[alterations] to the work and its title to which the author cannot refuse his 
consent based on the principles of good faith”
1256
.  Arguably, the alterations necessary to make a work 
accessible to a person with a disability are modifications which an author cannot refuse based on the 
principles of good faith. 
The Danish law contains a more detailed expression of these conditions.  The use of the published works 
and sound recordings of published literary works must be (i) specifically intended for the end 
beneficiaries
1257
 and (ii) restricted in the sense that the work may not be altered more extensively than is 
required for the permitted use
1258
.  Copies of broadcast works may be produced by means of sound or 
visual recording on condition that the requirements concerning the extended collective licences are met 
and the recording is used for the purpose of activities covered by the extended collective agreement
1259
.  
In addition, the Danish Act requires that the source be mentioned in case of public use. 
The French exception in favour of people with a disability repeats the condition that the use should be 
restricted to what is required by the (nature of the) specific disability and two steps of the three-step test 
(i.e. absence of a conflict with the normal exploitation of the work of any unreasonable prejudice to the 
legitimate interests of the right holders).  In addition, the exception is explicitly restricted to the purpose of 
a strictly private consultation of the work by persons suffering a disability. 
The Spanish exception requires in addition to the conditions in the Directive that the work be used 
“through a media or procedure that is adapted to the corresponding disability”
1260
. 
Under the UK Act, only non-commercial use is allowed and it is specified that, if a sum is charged for the 
accessible copy, then it must not exceed the cost of making and supplying the copy
1261
.  In addition, the 
visually impaired person is only entitled to use the work under this exception if she has lawful possession 
or lawful use of a copy, which is not accessible to her because of the impairment and if she makes an 
accessible copy of the master copy for her personal use.  The market situation must be taken into 
account for the application of the exception in the sense that it does not apply if “copies of the copyright 
work are commercially available, by or with the authority of the copyright owner, in a form that is 
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accessible to the individual who wishes to benefit from the exception”
1262
.  Furthermore, the law excludes 
certain uses from this exception.  Firstly, a visually impaired person cannot rely on this exception to make 
an “accessible copy” of a musical work (or part of it), if this would involve recording a performance of the 
work or part of it
1263
.  It can be understood that a performance of a musical work is used in the same way 
by people with and without visually impairment.  Finally, the accessible copy must be accompanied by a 
statement that it is made under the section providing the exception and by a sufficient 
acknowledgement
1264
.  
The UK Act regulates the making of multiple copies for visually impaired persons in a separate 
section
1265
.  The copying of a commercially published literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or a 
commercially published edition is not an infringement if it is done by an “approved body”, under the same 
conditions mutatis mutandis as the making of a single accessible copy for personal use
1266
.  An “approved 
body” is defined as “an educational establishment or a body that is not conducted for profit”
1267
.  Third 
parties are thus allowed to make multiple copies to the benefit of individuals with an impairment, but 
additional conditions apply to ensure that the effects of this exception do not exceed what the legislator 
had in mind.  Firstly, an education establishment, acting as an approved body, must ensure that the 
copies will be used only for its educational purposes
1268
.  Secondly, if an approved body continues to hold 
an accessible copy (made this exception) when it would no longer be entitled to make or supply such a 
copy, the copy is to be treated as an infringing copy
1269
.  Finally, copy protection must be applied to the 
copies made under this exception, if the master copy is in copy-protected electronic form
1270
.  The 
subsequent distribution of a copy made under this exception may turn into an infringement
1271
. 
Compensation.  Some Member States foresee a payment to the right holders, to compensate them for 
the use exempted under this exception (regardless of the exception for private use).  This is the case in 
Denmark (for sound recordings of published literary works and broadcast works
1272
), Germany (except for 
individual copies) and in The Netherlands.  In Italy, no remuneration is due but this may be imposed by 
Ministerial Decree.  
Override by contract.  The question whether the exception can be overridden by contract has fairly little 
importance with regard to works in tangible copies:  it is not very common for the right holder and the user 
to conclude a contract over the use of such object, e.g. a book or a DVD.  The increasing access via 
electronic databases, however, has outlined this issue more clearly
1273
.  Such exploitation of works gives 
right holders the opportunity to impose certain conditions regarding the use of protected works, thus 
accessed.  Users are thus asked to waive the benefit of a legal exception by contract, upon which access 
to the work is conditional. Member States are tolerant to different degrees towards such practices, which 
increases the divergences between national copyright laws.   
The Computer Programs Directive and the Databases Directive contain a specific provision (respectively 
art.8 and art.15) stressing the mandatory character of the limitations and exceptions listed in those 
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directives. The InfoSoc Directive does not preclude that the right holders impose a prohibition for the user 
to use a work in conformity with an exception
1274
, including the exception in favour of people with a 
disability
1275
.   
GUIBAULT reminds us that in a second reading of the Proposal for the InfoSoc Directive, an amendment 
was tabled for the introduction of an art. 5(6) dedicated to the imperative character of the limitations and 
exceptions
1276
. However, this amendment was rejected by the Commission. Consequently, the imperative 
or default character of the limitations has to be determined at the national level.  
The Belgian Copyright Act declares the imperative character of exceptions, including the one under 
consideration
1277
.  By principle, the application of the exceptions cannot be overridden by contract.  
However, an exception to this priority of the exceptions to contractual agreements is made for works 
made available on demand on agreed contractual terms.  This means that any exception may be set 
aside with regard to works made available on demand
1278
. 
In the UK, by contrast, it is permitted to restrict acts that are exempted under an exception
1279
. 
For the other Member States under consideration, no provisions regarding the relationship between the 
exception and contracts have been found. This is a cause of uncertainty.  
Technological Protection Measures (TPMs).  Technical measures are legally protected under the 
Information Society Directive (art. 6).  These may however conflict with uses exempted under art. 5 
InfoSoc Directive.  For example, an e-book on a tangible support may be protected by a TPM so it is 
technically not possible to make a digital copy, while such copy is commonly required to make a copy that 
is accessible to persons with a disability (e.g. a Braille version or an audio book).  For this reason, the 
European legislator has obliged the Member States to safeguard the benefit of certain exceptions (in the 
absence of voluntary measures taken by right holders, including agreements between right holders and 
other parties concerned) (art. 6(4) InfoSoc Dir).  Among these guaranteed exceptions is the provision to 
the benefit of people with a disability (art. 5(3)(b) InfoSoc Dir):  Member States are thus required to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that right holders make available to the beneficiary of the national 
exception “the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit 
from that exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or 
subject-matter concerned” (art. 6(4) InfoSoc Dir).   
However, this guarantee does not apply when the works or other subject-matter are “made available to 
the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access them from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them”.  This means that, in certain circumstances, when a work 
or other subject matter is made available on demand (in the sense of art. 3 InfoSoc Dir), the beneficiary of 
an exception cannot force the right holder to take the necessary measures so she can benefit from this 
exception.  For example, when the e-book is not distributed on a DVD but via an online platform, the 
beneficiary could not rely on the safeguard in art. 6(4) InfoSoc Dir.  This effect depends on the 
interpretation of the ambiguous phrase “made available to the public on agreed contractual terms”
1280
.  
                                                     
 
1274
 L. GUIBAULT, “Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation: The Case of the Limitations on Copyright under Directive 
2001/29/EC”, JIPITEC, 2010/2 (55) 59.  S. DUSOLLIER, Droit d’auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l’univers numérique, Larcier, 
2005, 502-503. 
1275
 SULLIVAN, “Study on copyright limitations and exceptions for the visually impaired”, 44, par. 2.11.  See also C. TAN, “Moving 
towards a more inclusive copyright regime for the visually impaired”, SAcLJ 2012/24 (433) 437.  
1276
 GUIBAULT, “Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation”, 59. 
1277
 Art. 23bis Belgian Copyright Act. 
1278
 Critical :  DUSOLLIER, Droit d’auteur et protectin des oeuvres dans l’univers numérique, 504. 
1279
 Art. 28(1) UK Copyright Act. 
1280
 DUSSOLIER explains how this phrase could reassure some right holders that the guarantee of these exceptions would not 
undermine their business model, e.g. by allowing access to a work despite the TPMs to make a private copy whereas the end-user 
Uses for the benefit of people with a disability  427 
 
 
 
Where such “contractual terms” are “agreed upon” and the TPMs prevail over the exception, she would 
find herself subject to contractual negotiations with the right holder, who may grant or refuse a licence or 
impose other conditions such as the payment of a fee or territorial restrictions. 
This regime is reflected in the Belgian, German, Hungarian and Luxemburgish Copyright Acts. 
In Denmark, the Copyright License Tribunal may, upon request, order a right holder to make the 
necessary means available to a user, to the effect that she can benefit from the exception.  If the right 
holder does not comply with the order within 4 weeks from the decision of the Tribunal, the user is entitled 
to circumvent the effective technological measure
1281
. 
The French copyright provisions also contain a more detailed regime
1282
.  A High Authority (“la Haute 
Autorité”) is established to regulate the interaction between DRMs and exceptions, with recourse to the 
courts if necessary.  More specifically, the legal entity or establishment benefiting from the exception may 
address the High Authority with regard to any dispute relating to the transmission of printed texts in a 
digital format.  Furthermore, the exception in favour of people with a disability provides that the 
recognised organisations, catering for the people with a disability, are entitled to request the digital file 
that was used for the publication of the work, which should then be transferred to a designated institution.  
This institution will then conserve this digital file and make it available to the recognised organisations in 
an open standard, while guaranteeing the confidential nature of the file and while securing access to the 
file
1283
.   
In Italy, the right holders are obliged to adopt proper solutions, also by means of specific agreements with 
the associations representing beneficiaries, in order to allow the exercise of the exceptions on 
beneficiaries’ specific request.  The condition is that the beneficiaries have lawful possession of the 
copies of the work or of the protected subject-matter or have lawfully accessed them.  This provision does 
however not apply to works made available on demand on agreed contractual terms. 
The Luxemburgish Act allows, in case of non-compliance by the right holder, the end beneficiaries or a 
group/ association representing their interests to launch an injunction procedure against the right holder in 
order to cease the application of the technical measures impeding the end beneficiary to profit/ benefit 
from the exception.  In the Netherlands, compliance may be ensured by a government order. 
In the UK, the benefit of the exception can be pursued by a complaint to the Secretary of State who can 
order the copyright owner to make available a means of carrying out the permitted acts. Failure to comply 
with the order may give rise to an action before the courts
1284
.  
No specific provision was found in the Polish or Spanish Copyright Acts. 
Overall there is uncertainty as to whether the technological protection measures actually form an obstacle 
to the acts allowed under the exception, to the detriment of the beneficiaries
1285
.  Moreover, several 
States have provided that where the right holder does not take voluntary measures to allow the use of the 
work or other subject matter, the beneficiary can take legal action against the right holder.   The courts 
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can then impose measures that should allow the beneficiary to benefit from the exception.  Given the high 
costs of court proceedings, the uncertain outcome and the possibly long duration of the litigation, it is 
uncertain how effective this judicial guarantee of the exception in favour of people with a disability is in 
practice
1286
. 
E. Conclusions 
The exception in favour of people with a disability has been implemented in the copyright legislations of 
all Member States under consideration in this Study but the scope of application differs from one Member 
State to the other
1287
.  The most important divergences exist on the exempted restricted acts (exclusive 
rights), the condition of “commercial (non)availability”, the beneficiaries (strict conditions) and additional 
conditions (such as remuneration rights). 
IV. Bottlenecks  
The limitations to the exclusive rights in the InfoSoc Directive have been studied in the 2007 IViR 
report
1288
.  The study found that the exception had been implemented in the copyright laws of all Member 
States but that diverging conditions of application had been set out and different addressees of the 
exception (individuals or organisations).  It was concluded that “these divergences in the national 
legislation are not likely to be conducive to the development of viable business models aimed at the 
production and distribution of digital content that can cater to the needs of the physically impaired, for 
neither the rights owners nor the beneficiaries know where they stand regarding the boundaries set by 
this limitation.  The emphasis should be on the non-commercial nature of the activity – and on its 
compliance with the “three-step test” – rather than on the status of the person or entity carrying it out”
1289
.  
In the framework of the current Study, it is impossible to assess precisely to which extent the lack of 
complete harmonisation presents an actual problem.  The accessibility of works to people with a disability 
can at least partially be achieved by means of appropriate licensing and (digital) technologies that assist 
the person with a disability
1290
.  A complete overview of the legal and technical means available to 
overcome a certain disability exceeds the scope of the current Study.  In the absence of this information, 
we cannot determine whether it is necessary or desirable to further modify (and if so, in due proportion) 
the exception in favour of people with a disability. 
In this section we will examine the main bottlenecks in view of the priorities stated in the Terms of 
Reference (supra, sub I).  We will analyse how the cross-border accessibility of the works is complicated 
for persons with a disability, given the differences in the national copyright provisions.  A first bottlenecks 
is found with regard to the cross-border distribution of tangible copies.  A second bottleneck concerns the 
cross-border online access to works for people with a disability.  Possible solutions will be examined in 
the final section (sub V). 
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A. Cross-border accessibility 
An important question is whether the exception in favour of people with a disability in the Information 
Society Directive and in the national copyright laws allows sharing accessible versions of a work or other 
subject matter within the European Union.   
The stakes are obvious:  people with an interest in a particular work may be residing in several Member 
States (e.g. language groups spread over several countries) and want access to a work or other subject 
matter provided in another Member State.  According to PAPADOPOULOU, “[how] the individual 
provisions on exceptions for the benefit of print disabled that have been found in national copyright laws 
might work when accessible copies move between different countries is very important matter for print 
disabled and those organizations assisting them”
1291
.  The circumstance that an exception has only 
national effect has economic consequences to the extent that economies of scale are more difficult to 
achieve (cost/benefit per copy).  The advantages could be important in large language groups, which 
count a proportionally large number of people with disabilities.  Due to the territorial nature of copyright, 
legal obstacles may prevent interested parties from sharing copies or access to adapted works
1292
.  A 
cross-border initiative may in some cases raise an issue of private international law, in other cases 
several national copyright laws will apply in a cumulative way. 
Works and other subject matter can be distributed in a tangible form or in an intangible form.  Depending 
on the form of distribution, different legal issues arise.   
Tangible copies, such as texts in Braille format, produced in accordance with the copyright exception in 
one Member State, could be distributed and exported to other Member States where interest in these 
particular copies exists.  The legal issue is then whether the distribution right forms an obstacle to the 
cross-border transportation of such copy.  This issue will be analysed under section 1. 
Intangible versions of an accessible work can be shared via information networks, such as the Internet.  
The legal issue in that case is whether the right of communication to the public, including the making 
available right
1293
, prevents that an accessible version of a work is shared among interested parties in 
several Member States.  This will be analysed under section 2. 
1. Distribution of tangible copies 
Material copies.  All examined copyright laws allow reproductions and the distribution of copies that are 
accessible to people with a disability; there seems to be no particular obstacle pertaining to the restricted 
acts necessary to produce and circulate accessible copies of a work.  There may be differences between 
the national laws, but these differences entail no particular problems as long as the accessible copy is 
made and distributed on the national territory of one Member State.   
Complications occur when people with a disability or their organisations want to share copies across the 
borders of Member States.  In some cases, the national exceptions are subject to similar conditions
1294
.  
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The question is then whether a copy in an accessible format, produced and circulated in accordance with 
the national exception of one Member State, can be transported to a beneficiary in another Member 
State, where the same exception (with the same conditions) applies.  In other cases, important 
differences exist on the conditions that determine the scope of application of the exceptions:  some 
Member States (such as the UK or France) impose detailed conditions thus reducing the scope of the 
exception, compared to less strict legislations.  Furthermore, some Member States grant a remuneration 
to the right holder whose rights have been restricted by the exception.   
For example, a blind organisation in Belgium produces Braille copies of a novel in French, which 
could be interesting not only to French speaking persons in Belgium but also to those in France 
or Luxemburg.  The Luxemburgish law provides an exception under the same conditions as the 
Belgian law.  The French law imposes strict criteria, in particular with regard to the person with 
the disability (visual impairment of a certain degree or medical certificate) and the organisation 
authorised to produce the accessible copies
1295
.  These restrictions to the French exception could 
be circumvented or undermined by the import of accessible copies produced and circulated under 
the Belgian copyright act.  Similarly, German language versions of the work could be produced 
under the Belgian exception, which does not grant a right to equitable remuneration, and brought 
to Germany, where such remuneration right does exist.   
Right holders may wonder whether they can undertake any action against the arrival of accessible copies, 
produced under the  more lenient exception of another Member State. 
Distribution right.  Firstly, it should be assessed whether the “export” of a copy to another Member State 
(resp. the “import” from another Member State) should be regarded as an act of distribution in the sense 
of art. 4 InfoSoc Directive.  The Information Society Directive does not provide a specific importation 
right
1296
.  However, the distribution right protects “acts which entail, and only acts which entail, a transfer 
of the ownership of that object”
1297
 and the offer of such transfer of ownership
1298
.  In Donner, the CJEU 
decided that the distribution to the public is “characterised by a series of acts going, at the very least, from 
the conclusion of a contract of sale to the performance thereof by delivery to a member of the public”
1299
.  
Whenever an (adapted) work is offered for sale, be it in another Member State, the right of distribution 
should be considered.  This right being an exclusive right, those acts should either be authorised by the 
right holder or be covered by an exception or limitation.  These acts could take place in several Member 
States (Donner, par. 26). 
Exhaustion.  The distribution right is restricted by the principle of exhaustion (art. 4(2) InfoSoc Dir).  It 
could thus be examined whether a copy, legitimately produced and circulated in one Member State under 
an exception in its copyright legislation, can be brought to other Member States without the renewed 
consent of the right holder, by virtue of the principle of exhaustion
1300
.  Following the exhaustion principle, 
the distribution right is consumed within the internal market and a “specific copy may be further distributed 
within the whole Community (EU/EEA) even if the right of distribution is held by other right holders in 
other Member States”
 1301
.  If this principle applied, then accessible copies legitimately produced and 
distributed in one Member State could be further distributed to beneficiaries in other Member States.  This 
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exhaustion rule aims at reconciling copyright protection with the free movement of goods and can be read 
against the background of the CJEU’s decisions in this field
1302
. 
The principle of exhaustion is however subject to conditions, which are not likely to be met in the case 
under consideration.  The right holder can no longer exercise her distribution right with respect to copies, 
where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by her or with 
her consent (art. 4(2) InfoSoc Dir).  The distribution right is exhausted if two conditions are fulfilled:  (i) the 
original of a work or copies must have been placed on the market by the rightholder or with her consent 
and (ii) they must have been placed on the market in the Community (Laserdisken, par. 21)
1303
.  The 
Directive makes the exhaustion of the distribution right explicitly conditional upon the consent of the right 
holder:  only if the right holder has transferred the ownership of a particular copy (or this has been done 
with her consent), she is precluded from further exercising her distribution right.  
This condition rules out that the distribution right be exhausted on grounds of an exception, when – by 
definition – the right holder has not authorised the reproduction or distribution of her work. 
Moreover, it seems that the exceptions in art. 5 InfoSoc Directive cannot extend the scope of the 
exhaustion rule.  The CJEU indicated in Laserdisken that the exceptions are independent of the 
exhaustion rule (in case regarding the effect of the limitations).  Answering the question whether the 
Member States are free to restrict the distribution right by a principle of international exhaustion, the Court 
added in Laserdisken that the Information Society Directive does not grant such margin.  The Court came 
to this conclusion based on the wording of art. 4(2) and recital 28 of the Directive.  In addition, it found 
support in art. 5 of the InfoSoc Directive and it observed that “nothing in that article indicates that the 
exceptions or limitations authorised might relate to the rule of exhaustion laid down in Article 4(2) of 
Directive 2001/29 and, therefore, allow Member States to derogate from that rule” (Laserdisken, par. 25).  
None of the exceptions may thus be relied upon to extend the effect of the exhaustion rule and to restrict 
the right holders’ control after an authorised first sale outside the European Union.   
The pivotal position of the right holder’s consent is confirmed, once more, in case the first sale of a copy 
takes place in a country where the exclusive rights of the copyright holder are not recognised.  Such first 
sale does not lead to exhaustion of the distribution right, more generally “this applies in any case when no 
consent is given”
1304,1305
. 
The conclusion is that the distribution right is not exhausted by the legitimate reproduction and distribution 
under the exception in favour of people with a disability in one Member State
1306
.  When a copy in 
accessible format is transported to another Member State, it should be verified whether an act of 
distribution to the public can be found and where it takes place.  By principle, the right holder is entitled to 
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exercise her distribution right in the Member State of destination
1307
, unless an equivalent exception 
applies under the copyright law of that Member State.  
Disability exception.  If the cross-border circulation of legitimate accessible copies involves acts of 
distribution and if the exhaustion rule does not apply, then it should be verified where this act of 
distribution takes place and whether this act of distribution of an accessible copy (made in conformity with 
the law of another Member State) can be exempted under the applicable exception in favour of disabled 
persons.    As PAPADOPOULOU rightly points out, “[what] provision is appropriate regarding distribution 
of accessible copies made abroad, where a country does not provide for international exhaustion of rights 
should be considered very carefully.  It would be necessary, for instance, to decide to what extent a 
provision in copyright law should permit accessible copies made in another country to be circulated, even 
on a not-for-profit basis, and even where they benefit print disabled, but where there are no copies in 
normal circulation within the country”
1308
.  In the Marrakesh Treaty, the issues of cross-border exchange 
and importation of accessible format copies have explicitly been dealt with (art. 5-6 Marrakesh Treaty).  
Such provisions are lacking the copyright acquis communautaire. 
Based on the InfoSoc Directive, as interpreted by the CJEU, an answer to this question of cross-border 
transfer of accessible copies (within the EU) can be sought.  Firstly, the making of a copy in an accessible 
format will entail acts of reproduction and, most likely, adaptation.  These acts take place in one Member 
State and it should be verified whether the production of the accessible copy complies with the exception 
in favour of people with a disability there
1309
.  When the accessible copy is circulated within the same 
Member State and beyond, it should be verified whether an act of distribution to the public takes place in 
another Member State.   
The CJEU has stated in Donner that an act of distribution is performed in the Member State where the 
public is addressed via advertisement, where it has access to a specific delivery system and payment 
method and thus is enabled to receive delivery of copies of works protected by copyright in that same 
Member State (Donner, par. 30)
1310
.  The national courts should examine whether the trader targeted the 
members of the public residing in the Member State where an act of “distribution to the public” was 
carried out (Donner, par. 28).  If it is found that an act of distribution takes place in the Member State to 
which the accessible copy is transported, then it should be verified whether this act of distribution to the 
public is exempted under the national exception in favour of people with a disability.  
Effect.  This means that an organisation intending to distribute accessible copies in several Member 
States must abide by the copyright laws of all Member States where the public is targeted.  It should 
verify whether its initiative meets the legal conditions of the national exceptions and, where it does, 
whether additional obligations arise (e.g. payment of a remuneration).  Given the existing disparity 
between the national exceptions in favour of people with a disability, many impediments exist to the 
cross-border sharing of accessible format copies.  
This will hardly affect the individual person with a disability, making an accessible copy for her own 
benefit or having another individual do this on her behalf.  By contrast, organisations that work on a larger 
scale may be restricted in their functioning, especially if they have international ambitions. 
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For example, a blind organisation in Belgium produces Braille copies of a novel in French, which 
could be of interest to French-speakers in Belgium and in Luxemburg.  The Belgian and 
Luxemburgish copyright acts provide an exception in similar terms
1311
.  An accessible copy made 
in Belgium should meet the conditions of the exception under Belgian law, as should the 
distribution on the Belgian market.  For the “export” of accessible copies to persons with a 
disability in Luxemburg, it should be verified which restricted acts take place in Belgium and/or in 
Luxemburg.  The accessible copies are made in Belgium and should comply with the Belgian 
exception.  The cross-border transfer of accessible copies can arguably be qualified as an act of 
distribution, taking place in Luxemburg.  Consequently, it should be verified whether the act of 
distribution taking place in Luxemburg complies with the exception in favour of people with a 
disability in the Luxemburgish Copyright Act.  It can be expected that this is the case, provided 
that the exception also limits the distribution right and that the copy meets the other conditions 
(the same as in the Belgian copyright act), i.e. it is directly related to disability, it has no 
commercial nature and it does not exceed the extent required for the disability at stake.   
The same conclusion may be reached if the blind organisation in Belgium sends accessible 
copies of a work to beneficiaries in The Netherlands.  It should then take into account however 
that compensation is due under the Dutch exception.  Arguably, the Belgian organisation and/or 
the beneficiary have the obligation to pay this fee since the effects of the exception are indeed felt 
on Dutch territory
1312
. 
It is even more complicated where an act of distribution is found in a Member State with more 
stringent conditions, such as France.  The French exception in favour of people with a disability 
indeed requires that the person be recognised as a person with a disability and that the 
establishment or legal entity performing the restricted acts be on a list, composed by an 
administrative authority.  Such conditions are more difficult to meet for organisations in other 
Member States. 
A different level of protection (with stricter conditions in one Member State than in the other) may lead to 
the following scenarios
1313
: 
- The organisation restricts its activity to the territory of the Member State where it is established; 
- No cross border activity is possible (e.g. because the organisation has not quality to act 
on behalf of a beneficiary of the exception in the Member State of destination);  
- Cross-border activity is possible provided that the more restrictive conditions are 
respected;  the conditions may de facto lead to the abstention of the organisation (e.g. 
national formalities such as an administrative recognition of the organisation in France); 
- The organisation offers its services in several Member States by abiding by the strictest 
exceptions among them.   
- If the strictest rules are respected, then the activity will meet the legal requirements in 
other Member States (qui peut le plus peut le moins) – supposing that no other 
contraction exists between the national exceptions.   
- The effect may be that in the Member States with more lenient conditions, the exception 
will be under-used, e.g. because a part of the beneficiaries is not served or because 
works are not made accessible in all forms permitted under that national law.  
Alternatively the organisations have to implement variable regimes depending on the 
national territory they are serving. 
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Summary.  Where tangible copies in accessible format circulate between the Member States, it must be 
verified whether an act of distribution takes place.  If such copy has been produced and is distributed 
under the national exception in favour of people with a disability of one Member State, the distribution 
right is not exhausted (absent a transfer of ownership with the right holder’s consent).  In case of cross-
border circulation, acts of distribution may take place in several Member States.  It should then be 
examined for each act of distribution whether it meets the conditions of the exception in favour of people 
with a disability in the Member State where it takes place (cf. localisation criteria in Donner).  Generally 
the cross-border transfer of a copy is not hampered if the exceptions in the Member State of production 
and in the Member State of destination cover the acts of reproduction (adaptation) and distribution to the 
public and if similar conditions apply.  Where the Member State of destination provides a more restrictive 
exception, the distribution of the accessible copy is exempted only if it meets those stricter conditions 
(e.g. payment of a fee or a levy, beneficiaries or intermediaries subject to national recognition).  This may 
make the distribution to the public in another Member State significantly more difficult in practice, or even 
impossible. 
2. Access online 
Our current digital environment offers more opportunities to access information, including protected 
works, across borders.  Books, magazines and newspapers are for example offered in formats accessible 
to people with a visual impairment (talking books or in a mark-up language compatible with reading 
software).   
For example, the Bibliothèque Numérique Francophone Accessible (BNFA) offers digital books in 
various formats
1314
:  audio books and digital text books in an encrypted format (encrypted PDF or 
the Daisy standard, the decryption device permitting to verify whether the user is an actual 
beneficiary of the exception).  BNFA offers its services in France and in Switzerland and it is 
mentioned on its website that the provisions of the French resp. Swiss Copyright Act should be 
complied with
1315
.  Similarly, in the Netherlands, Dedicon makes a number of textual works 
available
1316
 in spoken form or in XML, which can be read by means of an XML reader
1317
.  It is 
mentioned that anyone with a reading disability can make an account (it is not mentioned that this 
possibility is restricted to people residing in The Netherlands). 
Such services are not per se restricted to the territory of one country but could benefit to people residing 
in different Member States (e.g. expats and nationals abroad or people within the EU speaking the same 
language).  This raises the question whether acts of reproduction, communication to the public or making 
available to the public are made and whether EU-wide services can be offered without acquiring the right 
holders’ consent. 
Communication and making available to the public.  Any online service, offering works and other 
subject-matter in an accessible format, should be analysed in order to establish which restricted acts take 
place.  It can be imagined that a work or other subject matter is reproduced and altered in order to adapt 
it to the needs of persons with a certain disability (reproduction and adaptation).  An accessible copy may 
be made available online in the form of streaming or offered for download.  Such online offer will entail 
acts of communication to the public and/or making available to the public.  The end-user who consults the 
accessible copy will make a reproduction.  In case of streaming this is most likely a temporary 
reproduction that may be exempted under the exception for temporary acts of reproduction (art. 5(1) 
                                                     
 
1314
 http://www.bnfa.fr/.  
1315
 http://www.bnfa.fr/cgi-bin/koha/pages.pl?pageID=E1a.  
1316
 http://www.dedicon.nl/home.  
1317
 http://grenzelooslezen.dedicon.nl/hoewerkthet.  
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InfoSoc Dir)
1318
.  A download by the end-user will result in a reproduction that should comply itself with 
the conditions of the exception in favour of people with a disability. 
Similar conditions.  While it is fairly straightforward that the production of the accessible copy should 
meet the conditions of the exception in the Member State where it is made and that the end-user’s 
reproduction should comply with the exception in the Member State where the end-user performs the 
download or receives the streaming
1319
, this is not the case for the online offer of the accessible copies.  
An interested organisation that is willing to transmit an accessible copy to any person with a disability 
outside its Member State may be performing acts of communication or making available to the public in 
other Member States
1320
.  
Divergent conditions.  To the extent that the mere accessibility of a work may amount to a distinct act of 
making available to the public
1321
 or communication to the public, the EU-wide use should be covered by 
either the right holders’ consent or an exception in each Member State
1322
.  The rights of communication 
to the public and making available to the public are indeed not exhausted by the communication with the 
right holder’s consent in one Member State (art. 3(3) InfoSoc Dir). 
Given the current state of implementation of the exception under consideration, it is practically excluded 
to offer a multi-territorial EU-wide online service to the benefit of people with a certain category of 
disabilities under the exception.  Several Member States do not allow the communication to the public 
under the exception in favour of people with a disability (Denmark, Germany, UK).   
For example, a Belgian organisation assisting visually impaired people is allowed under Belgian 
copyright law to offer services online and to make available spoken versions of books.  The 
spoken books can be offered to the German speaking beneficiaries accessing the service from 
the Belgian territory.  To the extent that an act of making available to the public is found in 
Germany, the organisation cannot rely on this exception under German law (which does not 
exempt acts of communication to the public) but it must acquire the right holders’ authorisation. 
An interested organisation could then restrict its offer to beneficiaries residing in Member States where 
the exception tolerates the communication or making available to the public of accessible copies.  It 
should always be verified whether the conditions are met in the Member State of destination (i.e. where 
the beneficiary person with a disability is when she accesses the copy).  This does not entail too many 
complications when the exceptions in the Member States exempt acts of communication to the public and 
making available to the public under similar circumstances. 
For example, the Belgian organisation offers accessible copies to beneficiaries in Belgium in 
conformity with the conditions in the Belgian copyright act (i.e. it verifies that it only transmits the 
copies to people with a disability, the copies are adapted, relate directly to the disability, are of a 
non-commercial nature and do not exceed what is required by the specific disability).  It also 
transmits such copies to beneficiaries in Luxemburg. To the extent that it thus performs an act of 
communication or making available to the public in Luxemburg, it must be complied with the 
exception in the Luxemburgish copyright act. The exceptions in the Belgian and Luxemburgish 
laws allow acts of communication and making available to the public under similar conditions, 
hence the right holder cannot prohibit the offer to beneficiaries in Luxemburg on these grounds.  
Furthermore, the Luxemburgish exception exempts the reproduction of the accessible copy 
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hence the download at the beneficiary’s end can take place without the right holder’s consent as 
well. 
Other Member States do allow a restriction of the communication right under this exception but under 
different conditions (some distinctly stricter than others). 
This complicates the matter.  For example, an interest group in Belgium may have adapted a 
novel to the needs of visually impaired people in the form of an audio book and have made it 
available via its website (which may restrict access to the work to its members so it can verify that 
only people with this disability can download it).  Such use may be in conformity with the legal 
conditions of the Belgian legislation, which merely requires that the acts of reproduction and 
communication be directly related to the disability, be of a non-commercial nature and not exceed 
the extent required by the specific disability.  There are no specific (formal) requirements as to the 
person with the disability or the organisation that may produce the accessible copy. 
To the extent that the work is accessible in France, a distinct act of communication or making 
available to the public may be found in France.  Consequently, the French copyright act should 
be respected and the use must be authorised or exempted under French law.  Furthermore, the 
download of the work results in a reproduction, made in France and therefore governed by 
French law as well.  The French law contains more specific requirements regarding the 
beneficiary person and the establishment or legal entity reproducing and communicating the 
accessible copy to the beneficiaries.  Whether this actually restricts the cross-border accessibility 
of the works also depends on the interpretation and application of the criteria in practice
1323
. 
Options.  Whenever the national copyright laws of the Member States, where an organisation intends to 
be active, set different conditions, the organisation should adapt its offer to comply with the applicable 
law.  It has several options:   
- It may offer distinct services for each national territory, in conformity with the conditions of the 
national exception.   
- It may rather decide to offer its services only to the people staying on the territory of one Member 
State, most likely the one where it has its establishment and where it is familiar with the 
applicable legislation, or the Member State where the most lenient exception is provided.   
- It may offer a multi-territorial service, in conformity with the conditions of the strictest exception 
(assuming thus that the conditions of the more lenient exception will automatically be respected).   
- Finally it may see itself compelled to acquire the right holder’s consent for certain territories.   
 
TPMs and overriding the exception by contract.  The cross-border access to online sources with 
accessible materials is further complicated by the diverging regimes for technological protection 
measures and the possibility to override any limitations in favour of people with a disability by contract. 
As far as the contractual overrideability is concerned, it has been mentioned that few Member States 
have included an express provision in their copyright laws dealing with this issue.  Where it is permissible 
to exclude the application of an exception by contract on a national basis, the beneficiaries of the 
exception may find their position weakened by the contractual practices of the right holders.  This tension 
between the exception and the possibility to override it by contract may have cross-border effects.  
Imagine a situation where two Member States provide similar exceptions in favour of people with a 
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disability and that would allow a beneficiary in one Member State accessing works made available under 
the exception in the other Member State.  The one Member State (A) allows the right holder to discard the 
exception by contract, the other Member State (B) does not.  A beneficiary Member State B thus enjoys 
the exception, despite the right holder’s objections, and an interested organisation can make the work 
accessible to beneficiaries in Member State B.  In Member State A, the right holder can discard the 
exception.  The beneficiaries in Member State A can still have access to accessible copies originating in 
Member State B (to the extent that the other conditions are met).  Inversely, where the right holder has 
used her possibility to contractually exclude the application of this exception in Member State A, 
beneficiaries in Member States A and B will have to negotiate a licence with the right holder.   
All Member States are obliged to safeguard the application of the exception against TPMs (art. 6(4) 
InfoSoc Dir).  Each Member State can implement a procedure to be followed to achieve this.  However, 
TPMs cannot be discarded when the works or other subject-matter were made available to the public “on 
agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at 
a time individually chosen by them”.  Since it is common for on demand available works to be protected 
by TPMs and to be governed by a licence (including standard terms and conditions), the right holder 
could maintain the technical protection to the detriment of the beneficiaries of the exception.  The 
beneficiary will not be able to use the work or subject matter thus made available in order to perform (or 
have others perform) the acts of reproduction, communication to the public (including making available) 
and distribution permitted under the exception.  This means that the beneficiary (or another person on her 
behalf) will have to negotiate a licence with the right holder, who may impose additional conditions (such 
as payment of a fee or territorial restrictions to the online access).  The priority given to TPMs and 
contractual practice is unlikely to increase the use people with a disability can make of a work or the 
cross-border accessibility.   
Summary.  Where an accessible copy is communicated or made available to the public in other Member 
States than the one where offer originates from, it must be verified whether the exception in favour of 
disabled people in those other Member States exempts such act of communication or making available 
and whether the conditions of the exception are met.  Given the disparities in the national laws (some 
Member States providing no exception to the right of communication or making available to the public), an 
EU-wide service offering access to accessible copies in each and every Member State is excluded under 
the exception.  Where Member States do provide an exception to the right of communication and making 
available to the public, it must be verified whether any particular service complies with the exception in 
the Member States where such acts of communication and making available to the public are found.  The 
disparity between the Member States’ exceptions is likely to discourage the cross-border online access to 
accessible copies. 
Cross-border access to adapted works and other subject matter is even less likely to be stimulated where 
the Member States allow that the exception be overridden by contract.  The contractual exclusion of an 
exception may have effects on beneficiaries in the same and in other Member States (who are required to 
negotiate a licence).  Inversely, where the exception cannot be ruled out by contract, the accessible 
copies may be created and made accessible in one Member State and in other Member States (where 
the accessible work is made available but no contractual control can be exerted).  The imperative 
character of the exception may be lost in case the work is made available on demand, on agreed 
contractual terms. 
The legal protection of technical protection measures may be also impede the cross-border availability of 
an accessible copy.  This effect of TPMs may be mitigated to safeguard the benefit of certain exceptions.  
This safeguard is however itself diminished where a work or other subject matter is made available on 
demand, on agreed contractual terms.  In that case, the beneficiaries, their interest groups or 
intermediary organisations may be compelled to negotiate a licence subject to conditions (such as the 
payment of a fee or territorial restrictions). 
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V. Possible solutions 
The disparities in the national exceptions may create obstacles to the cross-border sharing of tangible 
copies or intangible copies and services, accessible to people with a disability.  The Rapport LESCURE 
states that it affects the circulation of works in an adapted format
1324
. GUIBAULT even considers that 
these disparities might lead to some kind of discrimination between the EU citizens. She explains that 
“the diversity of ways that this limitation has been transposed in the Member States is bound to give rise 
to differences in treatment between citizens of different countries, which could be contrary to the principle 
of non-discrimination laid down in the EC Treaty”
1325
.The current principle of exhaustion cannot overcome 
the national differences and neither can the current state of harmonisation of the exception. 
There are several options to deal with the current situation. 
Do nothing.  It is not self-evident that a legislative intervention is necessary.  As has been demonstrated 
in the previous section, there are many disparities in the implementation of the exception in the national 
copyright laws.  In theory this situation would suggest that the offer of accessible works is negatively 
affected.  This should however be verified in an empirical study, all the more since the Commission has 
taken an initiative to facilitate the voluntary cooperation between right holders and “trusted intermediaries” 
and thus increase the offer of accessible works.   
In 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding was adopted between the EU Stakeholders on access to 
people with print disabilities
1326
, following the communication on Copyright in the Knowledge 
Economy
1327
. The purpose was to increase the number of accessible works, for people with a “print 
disability”.  This objective is pursued by supporting the publishers’ effort of producing content in an 
accessible form, but also by creating a network of “Trusted Intermediaries”, which should be able to 
create accessible content and ensure the controlled distribution of accessible copies of works, when 
these are commercially available, to persons with a print disability.  TIs must have the trust of 
representatives of both persons with a print disability and rightholders and be specifically accredited at 
national level.  There should be a TI in every Member State.  
The Memorandum was signed by several stakeholders (Federation of European Publishers, European 
Blind Union, European Writers Council, European Dyslexia Association, International Federation of 
Reproduction Rights Organisations and International Association of Scientific, Technical and Medical 
Publishers).  The Memorandum contains a number of definitions (a “person with a print disability” (as the 
end-user), the right holder, Trusted Intermediary).   
The stakeholders, with the support of the European Commission, are currently working on the practical 
implementation of the commitments set out in the MoU. For this purpose the parties have established the 
“European Network of Trusted Intermediaries” (ETIN). This is a Brussels-based network representing 
both trusted intermediary organisations and rights holders. It aims to have pan-European coverage. The 
ETIN has agreed a model licence/agreement for the cross-border transmission of accessible copies of 
works. This model licence/agreement is put forward as a basis for arrangements between potential TIs 
and right holders at national level. 
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We have no information on the effects of this ETIN initiative but they should be considered when 
assessing the need to intervene on the exception in favour of people with a disability.  It may lead to an 
increased availability of accessible works and make a legislative intervention redundant.  
Alternative options.  To the extent that an intervention is necessary or desirable, the national 
divergences could be solved in various ways. It should be remarked that this may be a delicate matter, 
since the exception touches upon other policy domains, which are not harmonised at the European level 
(social integration policy, equality and non-discrimination or social security laws).  Member States may 
want to integrate this in a broader policy regarding people with disabilities.  Nevertheless, the cross-
border mobility of accessible copies may be pursued in various ways.   
Firstly, there is the solution in the WIPO Marrakesh Treaty on limitations and exceptions for visually 
impaired persons/persons with print disabilities.  Secondly, the exception in favour of people with a 
disability could be harmonised in a more stringent way.  Thirdly, the exhaustion rule could be extended to 
copies produced under a national exception in favour of disabled people.  Finally, alternative solutions 
could be found in common European law (e.g. principle of mutual recognition).  We will focus on the first 
two possibilities, leaving aside the third and the fourth since these are likely to have wider implications for 
other rights or exceptions than the one under consideration
1328
.   
WIPO Marrakesh Treaty.  The Marrakesh Treaty should already address a number of the cross-border 
issues
1329,1330
.  According to PAPADOPOULOU, “the most important feature of this proposed treaty 
though is that it aspires to legalize the cross-border exchange and the sharing of the legally made 
collections under copyright exceptions.  Specifically it permits the export to another country of any version 
of the work or copies of the work that any person or organisation in one country is entitled to possess or 
make under the treaty proposal, and the import of that version of a work or copies of the work under the 
provisions of the treaty proposal in the other country”
 1331
.  
The treaty defines the beneficiary of the exception as a person who (a) is blind, (b) has a visual 
impairment or a perceptual or reading disability which cannot be improved to give visual function 
substantially equivalent to that of a person who has no such impairment or disability and so is unable to 
read printed works to substantially the same degree as a person without an impairment or disability or (c) 
is otherwise unable, through physical disability, to hold or manipulate a book or to focus or move the eyes 
to the extent that would be normally acceptable for reading (art. 3 Marrakesh Treaty).  In this respect the 
draft treaty is narrower than the Information Society Directive, which benefits people with a disability 
without determining the type of disability.   
It also provides a definition of “authorised entities”, i.e. entities that are authorized or recognized by the 
government to provide education, instructional training, adaptive reading or information access to 
beneficiary persons on a non-profit basis (art. 2(c) Marrakesh Treaty).  This includes government 
institutions or non-profit organizations that provide the same services to beneficiary persons as one of its 
primary activities or institutional obligations. 
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As far as the restricted acts are concerned, the contracting parties are required to provide a limitation to 
the rights of reproduction
1332
, distribution, making available to the public
1333
 as defined in the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, in order “to facilitate the availability of works in accessible format copies for beneficiary 
persons” and allow the changes required to make the work accessible in the alternative format (art. 4 
Marrakesh Treaty).  The contracting parties are allowed (but not obliged) to provide a limitation of the 
right of public performance.  The notion of “accessible format copies” is defined in article 1(b) of the 
treaty, as “a copy of a work in an alternative manner or form which gives a beneficiary person access to 
the work, including to permit the person to have access as feasibly and comfortably as a person without 
visual impairment or other print disability.  The accessible format copy is used exclusively by beneficiary 
persons and it must respect the integrity of the original work, taking due consideration of the changes 
needed to make the work accessible in the alternative format and of the accessibility needs of the 
beneficiary persons” (without specifying whether these copies are tangible or intangible or digital copies).   
The Marrakesh Treaty proposes two clauses that would comply with the international obligations under 
that Treaty, outlining the conditions on which the “authorised entities” and the beneficiary persons may 
use the work under this exception (art. 4(2) MarrakeshTreaty).  The contracting states have some 
freedom regarding the way the exception is implemented (Art. 4(3) Marrakesh Treaty).  Moreover, they 
are free to restrict the application of the exception to works which, in the particular accessible format, 
cannot be obtained commercially under reasonable terms for beneficiary persons in that market (art. 4(4) 
Marrakesh Treaty) and to make the exceptions subject to a remuneration (art. 4(5) Marrakesh Treaty). 
Cross-border exchange.  The Treaty contains particular provisions dealing with the cross-border 
exchange of accessible format copies (article 5, 6, 9 Marrakesh Treaty).  It is provided that “Contracting 
Parties shall provide that if an accessible format copy is made under a limitation or exception or pursuant 
to operation of law, that accessible format copy may be distributed or made available by an authorized 
entity to a beneficiary person or an authorized entity in another Contracting Party” (art. 5(1) Marrakesh 
Treaty).  It then provides two examples of provisions that would comply with the international obligation 
under the Treaty (art. 5(2) Marrakesh Treaty).  An authorised entity is thus allowed to distribute an 
accessible format copy or to make it available to beneficiary persons in another contracting state, even by 
the intermediary of another authorised entity in another contracting state.  The authorised entities have 
more legal certainty that their activities will be tolerated in the contracting states of destination.  
Complementing this provision, the Marrakesh Treaty also regulates the importation of accessible format 
copies:  “to the extent that the national law of a Contracting Party would permit a beneficiary person, 
someone acting on his or her behalf, or an authorized entity, to make an accessible format copy of a 
work, the national law of that Contracting Party shall also permit them to import an accessible format copy 
for the benefit of beneficiary persons, without the authorization of the rightholder” (art. 6 Marrakesh 
Treaty).  This would mean that the right holders cannot prevent the import of accessible format copies to 
the extent that the national law permits a beneficiary, someone on her behalf or an authorised entity to 
make an accessible format copy.  It is not specified that the accessible format copy should be imported 
from a state party to the Marrakesh Treaty.  It is not clear whether “import” only concerns tangible copies 
of a work or extends to the making available of digital copies. 
In addition, a less compelling provision encourages contracting states to facilitate the voluntary sharing of 
information so authorised entities can identify each other (art. 9 Marrakesh Treaty). 
The Marrakesh Treaty also contains some obligations concerning technological measures.  Contracting 
Parties are bound to take “appropriate measures” to ensure that their legal protection against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures does not prevent beneficiary persons from enjoying the 
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Uses for the benefit of people with a disability  441 
 
 
 
limitations and exceptions provided for in the Treaty (art. 7 Marrakesh Treaty)  An article on the 
relationship between the exception and contracts has been deleted (Art. G, Draft Treaty in the version of 
23 November 2012, SSR/25/2
1334
). 
Similar provisions could be envisaged at the European level.  The solution under the Marrakesh Treaty 
makes it mandatory to provide an exception in favour of people with a visual impairment and it determines 
the protected acts must be curtailed (reproduction, distribution, making available to the public) or may be 
limited (public performance).  The contracting states have a margin to impose conditions or to modulate 
the exception in their national law (commercial availability, remuneration).   
The Directive could make the existing exception mandatory
1335
 and restrict the right to control the 
distribution, the communication and making available to the public between Member States of the 
European Union (i.e. across the borders of the Member State where the copy was produced in conformity 
with the national exception, towards another Member State).  In order to ensure the cross-border 
exchange of accessible format copies within the EU, it could be explicitly provided that the production of 
an accessible copy in one Member State entails that this copy may be distributed, communicated or 
made available to the public in any other Member State (even if this Member State of destination provides 
a stricter exception in its copyright law).  This provision should suffice to indicate that both “import” and 
“export” sides of the distribution are thus covered.  This cross-border availability may entail that the more 
lenient exception of one Member State has extra-territorial effects in other Member States, where the 
stricter exception in the Member State of “destination” (where the extra-territorial effects are felt) cannot 
be invoked to oppose it.   
This leaves an issue in case of an offer for download of an accessible format copy.  The beneficiary in the 
Member State of destination makes another reproduction in the Member State of destination, which in 
principle is subject to the exception in that Member State (not in the Member State where the download 
originates).  Any provision permitting the making available of accessible copies for download should make 
sure the consequent reproduction at the beneficiary’s end is not subject to the right holder’s consent. 
The Member States could still make the exception subject to different conditions, but the right holders 
would not be able to rely on “their” (stricter) national exception to prohibit an import of an accessible copy 
that meets the conditions in another Member State (at least not in every case). 
For example, a blind organisation in Member State A could produce accessible format copies in 
under the exception in the copyright act of Member State A and could distribute these copies 
within Member State A or make these accessible copies available online.  If a beneficiary person 
in Member State B wants to receive an accessible copy on a material support or in digital form, 
the organisation has to verify whether this person qualifies by reference to the exception in 
Member State A, regardless of the stricter or more lenient exception in Member State B. 
In this construction, the exception of one Member State has effects in another Member State.  It 
will matter to determine how this Member State should be designated:  should this be the 
Member State where the accessible format copy was adapted and/or reproduced?  Or should it 
be the Member State where the blind organisation is established and has its principal activities?   
The Marrakesh Treaty does not determine how the exception should relate to technical protection 
measures (and their legal protection), nor does it require the contracting states to treat the exception with 
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priority over contractual arrangement.  In principle the European Union remains free to keep its 
preferential treatment of the right holder over the beneficiary in case the work or other subject matter is 
made available on demand and on agreed contractual terms.  Where a work or other subject matter is 
available on demand “on agreed contractual terms”, the exception could be overruled by contract and the 
TPMs must not yield for the use in favour of the beneficiary.  This priority would affect the efficiency of this 
exception and make the production and distribution of accessible content subject to the right holders’ 
consent (whereas the digital, networked environment in theory allows protected matter to be more 
available to people with a disability, given the lower costs to adapt the matter to their needs and to 
distribute it to them).  In that case nothing would prevent a right holder from granting a licence only for a 
particular territory, thus undermining the efforts to enhance the cross-border exchange within the EU of 
accessible copies. 
More compelling harmonisation.  The national divergences can be explained by a lack of concrete 
guidelines in the Information Society Directive for Member States to follow in determining the scope and 
conditions of the exceptions
1336
.  If it is verified that the current divergences unduly impede the cross-
border accessibility to accessible works or the functioning of the internal market, then a more stringent 
exception could be considered.  In order to be fully effective, several points should be taken care of. 
Firstly, the exception in favour of people with a disability should be made mandatory in order to 
safeguard this exception in the future or in the legislation of new Member States.  An exception of this 
kind was found in the legislation of all Member States under consideration in the current Study.  It has not 
been verified for the other Member States.   
Secondly, the exploitation rights restricted under the exception should be listed in a way that leaves the 
Member States no margin.  Currently the Member States are free to decide whether the exception applies 
to the rights of reproduction and/or communication to the public (including the making available right) 
and/or distribution.  In order to allow the creation and production of accessible format of works, the 
reproduction right should be restricted as should the adaptation right, keeping in mind though that the 
adaptation right is not harmonised in the Information Society Directive.  The cross-border accessibility 
should be addressed through the restriction of the right of communication to the public including making 
available to the public, to the extent required to ensure online services, and the distribution right.  In the 
current state, the Information Society Directive leaves it up to the Member States whether they extend the 
exceptions to the reproduction right to the distribution right (art. 5(4) InfoSoc Dir).  This could be changed 
in order to limit distribution right as well, relevant for the import resp. export of accessible copies.   
Thirdly, the beneficiaries of the exception could be more clearly stated.  It is undisputed that the 
individual with a disability is the end-user of the copy or service.  There is no uniformity in the national 
laws concerning the disability (visual impairments v others) or the exact description of the disability.  In 
scholarly literature and at the international level, most attention has been paid to the blind and the visually 
impaired (sensu lato), which could indicate that people with other disabilities find means to access 
content outside copyright. As far as other actors are concerned, it could be explicitly stated that the 
exception also applies when the restricted acts are performed by individuals acting on behalf of the 
individual with a disability or interest organisations and intermediary entities.  These intermediaries could 
be required to meet certain standards (verification of beneficiaries, “due care” in restricted use, privacy of 
beneficiaries).  It should be taken into account that in its current form the Information Society exempts 
only uses of a non-commercial nature.  
Fourthly, the effect of additional conditions should be assessed.  As has been demonstrated supra, the 
Member States make very different exceptions in favour of people with a disability.  It is not within the 
scope of this study to express an opinion of which additional conditions (by reference to the Directive) 
should be maintained or discarded.  Regard should be had for the requirements in the Information Society 
that the exempted uses should bear a direct relation to the disability, should be of a non-commercial 
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nature and are permitted only to the extent required by the specific disability.  Furthermore, the three-step 
test can be relied upon to control the impact on the exploitation of the works and the prejudice of the right 
holders.  In this strand it may be considered to explicitly add the condition proposed in the Marrakesh 
Treaty that the limitation only applies to works or other subject matter which cannot be obtained 
commercially in a particular accessible format, under terms reasonable for beneficiary persons in that 
market (as is already the case in some Member States).  Inversely, it could be considered to impose an 
obligation upon the right holders (such as publishers) to make the work or other subject matter available 
in a form which would facilitate the task of (trusted) intermediaries of producing an accessible version of 
the work (e.g. France).  The effect should be assessed of the obligation, in some Member States but not 
in others, to pay remuneration for the copies that are produced and distributed under this exception (in 
particular where it should be paid and by whom).   
Some Member States have merely taken over the conditions in the current exception in favour of people 
with a disability, without imposing additional conditions.  Even if this solution were generalised to all 
Member States, attention should also be paid to concrete practices within the borders of this exception, 
which may have some restricting effect.  The end beneficiaries could be asked to provide proof regarding 
their disability (or its degree), e.g. by means of a medical certificate.  Interest organisations or right 
holders may be inclined to require a medical certificate from their own Member State, to warrant certainty 
concerning the actual disability or the authenticity of the certificate.  Such national medical proof may be 
hard to come by so this requirement may restrict the cross-border accessibility.  On the other hand 
Member States (and right holders) may demand that the interest organisations or “intermediaries” obtain 
some national (administrative) recognition before their actions on behalf of the final beneficiaries are 
exempted under the national exception.  Consequently, an organisation should apply for such recognition 
in each Member State where it wants to deploy activities.  Depending on the complexity of the national 
procedures this may have an off-putting effect.  These corollaries may be softened by some sort of 
“mutual recognition”
1337
, perhaps through a network of intermediaries like the network of Trusted 
Intermediaries proposed in the existing Memorandum of Understanding (taking into account that the 
Trusted Intermediaries may be required to meet certain qualities – supra).  An object distributed or a 
service offered by such intermediary in one Member State in conformity with the national exception 
should then be able to circulate within the EU.   
Finally, a stand could be taken regarding the imperative (unwaivable) nature of this exception.  This 
would state the priority to be given to the exception in favour of people with a disability over contractual 
terms for any online service.  Similarly the protection of TPMs could be adjusted in order to safeguard the 
benefit of this exception (even in case of an online service), by extending the safeguard to “works or other 
subject-matter made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of 
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them” (cf. art. 6(4) par. 4 
InfoSoc Dir). 
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Introduction 
This Study is the first part of our report on User-Generated-Content (“UGC”).  It concentrates on a 
description of the issues at stake, of the existing case-law, on the impact of UGC on exclusive rights, on 
the applicability of existing exceptions and on legal arguments which could be relevant, from within (or, 
sometimes, from outside) copyright, in order to allow UGC works to stay immune from copyright 
infringement proceedings. 
This first part will be followed by a second one, in which we will list the various possibilities which the 
Commission could think of, should there be a need to promote UGC as a means of expression which 
should be encouraged to proliferate on the Web.   
Apart from the analysis which we will do through these two parts of the Study, we think it would be useful 
that the Commission obtains the results of an economic/market analysis: through our lenses indeed, we 
could identify a number of issues, little case law and (in the second part) a number of possible solutions.  
But we could not identify, at least in any exhaustive or objective manner, the existence and/or 
consequences of a possible “chilling effect” of the existing legal framework on UGC projects which, due to 
this (existing or not) chilling effect, never materialised.  This “hidden part of the iceberg”, if it exists, could 
only be examined via an economic/market analysis and via interviews
1338
; this was not part of our 
mission. 
Terms of reference  
For the sake of clarity, it is important that the main elements of the terms of reference (the “Terms of 
Reference” or “the ToRs”) of our Study be explained from the beginning. 
This Study takes place in an assessment exercise which the European Commission (“the Commission”) 
asked our firm to do in 2013, on the basis of article 12 of the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society (“the InfoSoc Directive” or “the Directive”). 
At the request of the Commission, we divided our analysis in two parts:  
- first, a description of the “as is” situation (what rules apply to UGC ? are they adequate? is there 
case-law on UGC? how do commentators analyse the UGC phenomenon?) – this will be the 
subject-matter of this first part; 
- in a second part, we will deal with the “to be” situation and analyse the need (or not) for the 
Commission to intervene on UGC and, if a need exists, how best the Commission could 
intervene.  Obviously, we will list a number of possible options, ranging from “suggesting a 
specific UGC exception”, to... doing nothing. 
  
                                                     
 
1338  We will mention other economic studies or market studies which were made by others, but they either date back to quite 
some time ago, or dealt with UGC in a more general sense, including all forms of UGC (which is not what our report is about – see 
infra for the notion of UGC which we will rely upon). 
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The general purpose of the Study commissioned to our firm on UGC is “to assess the extent to which the 
implementation of the Directive is appropriate to the economic and technological realities of digital 
markets and evaluate whether and, if so, to what extent, further harmonisation in some areas of copyright 
is needed in order to enable the EU to capitalize on the opportunities of a digital single market”.  As 
Internet and digital technology are rapidly changing the way in which works and other protected subject 
matter are produced, distributed and used, many of these changes could not be reflected nor sometimes 
even envisaged in the report that was undertaken in 2006
1339
.  Moreover, as recalled by the Terms of 
Reference, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) and national courts have rendered 
numerous decisions since then – not on all issues which are the subject matter of our Study, though, as 
we shall see. 
Differently from some of the other reports we were asked to prepare for the Commission, the present 
Study does not deal with an exception which already exists, as such, in the Directive, but covers “User-
Generated-Content” (“UGC”) (as will be defined later).  The Commission was of the opinion that some key 
limitations and exceptions needed to be reassessed (see ToRs, p. 3) but considered, in the line of 
previous Commission documents which we will list further, that UGC also deserved consideration in the 
reassessment exercise of the Directive.  The Commission therefore did not want to limit the exercise to 
examining exceptions which were already provided for by the Directive but wanted to also examine the 
need for possible new exceptions, like one which would deal with UGC. 
I. Subject matter  
As noted by the Terms of Reference (p. 5), “the fast development of social networking and social media 
sites which rely on the creation and upload/distribution of online content by end-users raises a certain 
number of questions in terms of copyright.  These new applications enable users to generate new content 
and new practices for media and artistic expressions have emerged”.  While some stakeholders argue in 
favour of a new exception to cover such UGC, others argue for increased flexibility and clarity of the 
already existing exceptions of the closed list of the Directive, together with the application of the 3-step 
test (Directive, art. 5(5)), not only to facilitate UGC but also to facilitate the emergence of new business 
models for commercial users; others take the view that licensing schemes should be the preferred option 
and insist that such schemes are increasingly available. 
In conformity with the ToRs, we will assess the scope which might already exist in the Directive’s list of 
exceptions for non-commercial UGC.  We will examine whether much case-law exists on these issues, 
and whether courts have resorted to exceptions from the Directive.  We will also examine, in the 
hypothesis that one (or several) exceptions do provide scope for UGC, whether the Member States 
implemented these exceptions in a consistent and similar way or whether the implementation has led to 
varying solutions, with the consequence that the user is not offered a uniform/harmonized playing field 
when seeking to communicate UGC via the Web. 
As suggested by the ToRs, we will also examine whether courts found flexibility outside of copyright (and 
outside of the closed list of exceptions of the Directive) to allow UGC uses for which copyright legislation 
(i.e. mainly the InfoSoc Directive) has not provided the necessary scope and/or exceptions.  Should only 
little case law exist, we will then look at alternatives which we (i.e. the authors of this report on UGC) or 
other legal commentators have thought of, as possible alternatives to provide space for UGC (should the 
need be proven), while no explicit exception exists for it in the InfoSoc Directive.  As invited by the ToRs, 
we will also examine (in the second part of our report) whether legal arguments inspired from a kind of 
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“fair use “ exception in the US-style could be a solution to allow some UGC uses which could not be 
justified on the basis of the InfoSoc Directive (or other extra-copyright defences already available in the 
EU) but which one might reasonably expect should be allowed. 
Other legal aspects than those related to copyright may be important for UGC but are not part of this 
Study.  One may think of infringements to other IP rights such as trademarks, registered designs, new 
rules on orphan works, of consumer law protection (and the fair/unfair character of some of the contract 
terms and conditions of certain content-sharing platform or social networks), of privacy issues, of 
defamation law issues, of rules on harmful content, on the liability of UGC platforms (even though we may 
need to allude to that issue), of audiovisual and media law issues, of market practices of platforms, of 
rules on publicity, of the protection of minors, etc.  Some of these issues  are more and more relevant, 
some are losing in importance; we shall not examine them here in any detail: they are not part of the 
ToRs. 
Our Study concentrates, as asked for by the ToRs, on non-commercial UGC.  Obvious examples of 
commercial UGC would be examples where a firm develops a UGC work, on the basis of pre-existing 
works and makes it available on the Web for commercial purposes.  This is not part of what we will 
analyze (and there does not seem to be any good reason to think of any exception for this type of use, 
without even mentioning the fact that such exception would probably run contrary to the three-steps-test). 
The commercial/non-commercial criterion seems however sometimes hard to draw, as most UGC 
generated by individuals is non commercial to start with (see infra: most users are not interested in 
making money out of their “creations”).  However, a UGC video-clip might start as an obvious non-
commercial endeavor yet become very popular, generate a lot of visits on the platform on which it is 
hosted and thus potentially generate substantial advertising revenues.  Systems which have been 
progressively put in place (see infra about “monetizing agreements”) however do provide for a share of 
these advertising revenues between the platform and the rightholder (holder on the copyright on the pre-
existing work on the basis of which the UGC was later created), but they do not foresee any revenue for 
the UGC generating individual.  Furthermore, the commercial v. non-commercial character is, for most 
issues in copyright and for most exclusive rights, not a relevant criterion to decide whether a licence is 
needed (even if it may have an impact on the amount of fees which the licensor will ask or on the amount 
of damages which a court would impose on the infringer) and the distinction will thus hardly ever be a 
trigger to decide about whether a specific act falls within the scope of an exclusive right or not.  We 
therefore did not see it as a very useful criterion to investigate and, , we did not use it as a relevant 
criterion.   This is all the more true that (1) what might be non-commercial at the beginning might later 
become “commercial” (and generate revenues) and (2) what one and the same use might be non-
commercial for one party (i.e. the individual user) but commercial for other parties (i.e. the platform, if the 
UGC in question generates a lots of visits on the platform and therefore advertising revenues, and also 
the rightholders together with the platform if a monetization agreement is in place and the advertising 
revenues are shared between the platform and the rightholders).  Inversely, the public v. private 
character of a use is often relevant to decide whether an act is infringing upon exclusive rights of an 
author (private reproduction v. non-private reproduction; communication to a public v. communication to a 
private group of individuals). 
The purpose and subject matter of this Study is thus to examine the need (yes or no?) of a new UGC 
exception which would be added to the closed list of the Directive, whether it may prove more appropriate 
to suggest alternative routes or whether no initiative is needed, from the Commission’s side, regarding 
UGC. 
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II. Definition(s) of UGC 
There are various definitions of UGC and no official one
1340
. 
We need to be clear, at the outset of this Study, that what we will consider as UGC (and what we will deal 
with in our Study) are cases where a pre-existing work is taken by a user as a starting point for his/her 
own expression.   It means that we limit the examination to the situations where there is a pre-existing 
work and where such work will be modified in one way or another to then be made available online. 
As a consequence, we exclude from our Study the two following scenario: 
- What we will call “the creation from scratch case”, i.e. the case where a user creates a new 
work “from scratch”, without relying on a pre-existing work.  One could argue that all authors and, 
by the same token, all “users”, rely to a certain extent on pre-existing works to create their own.  
This is almost always true.  But, under copyright terms and principles, it is a truism to say that 
“ideas are not protected” so that they can be reused by others
1341
.  So, authors almost never 
really start “from scratch” because they are always somehow inspired by the work of 
contemporary or ancient authors or artists.  Copyright does not prohibit that and has always 
accepted as a fact that authors could and did find inspiration in the work of others
1342
.  In such 
cases, one should not talk about “User-Generated-Content” but “Author-Created-Content” or 
“User-Authored Content”
1343
.   
In such case of a creation from scratch, the author enjoys all the exclusive rights which copyright 
provides for, including the right to prohibit the reproduction of his work and its communication to 
the public or making available on the Internet.  It is not the purpose of this Study to suggest that, 
as from now, authors should be deprived of such exclusive rights or granted new exclusive rights.  
The emergence of the internet does not change the equation in that respect and one could hardly 
understand why authors would have a right to e.g. prohibit the communication of their work on TV 
while they would not have the same right for the Web.  Apart from being very technology-specific, 
such idea has no justification and would amount to abolishing copyright on the internet as such.  
This is not what this Study is about. 
- What we will call the “mere upload case”, i.e. the case where a user merely distributes on the 
internet (by uploading and sharing it) pre-existing works without having intervened in any way on 
the work; some called this “User-Copied Content”
1344
. It is not the object of this Study to examine 
whether it would make sense to give such users a right to upload on the Internet any work which 
pre-exists and, concurrently, to create a new exception whereby uploading protected content on 
the internet would escape the exclusive rights of the authors.  Here also, this would basically 
                                                     
 
1340 Because of the variety of definitions of UGC (or UCC – for User Created Content), obtaining or comparing existing economic 
or market data is very difficult because the studies available do not always cover the same reality.  For a recent (if 2008 can still be 
said to be recent in this area?) and in a very detailed economic and market analysis of the UGC phenomenon, see IDATE, TNO & 
IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, p. 27 to 174.  See also the OECD 
Report, OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User Created Content, 
12 April 2007, p. 16. 
1341 As stated by Desbois, « les idées sont de libre parcours » : « ideas are free as the air » (our translation). 
1342In US law, the « idea/expression » dichotomy is a well-know expression to explain that ideas may be reused and that a 
copyright issue would only arise where not only ideas but part of the expression of a previous work was also reused. 
1343 D. Gervais, « The Tangled Web of UGC : Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content », Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law, 2009, p.858. 
1344 D. Gervais, « The Tangled Web of UGC : Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content », Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law, 2009, p.859. 
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amount to saying that copyright does not apply on the internet.  This is not what this Study is 
about either... 
 
So, what interests us are situations where a “user” (therefrom the expression “User-Generated-Content”) 
relies on a pre-existing work, “arranges” 
1345
 it, and then uploads it on a website or web platform of some 
kind.  
Examples of UGC are numerous on the Internet.  Even if it usually assimilated with the appearance of 
platforms such as YouTube, DailyMotion, Flickr, MYspace, Facebook and all the others...., one may 
observe that back in the 1990s already, even if the technical interfaces of the online environment were 
not as colourful and audiovisual as they are today, the fundamental ingredients which reshuffled the 
production and distribution of creative works were already there: the means of producing and 
communicating content to the masses became available at low cost to every user connected to the 
Internet
1346
.  But even if “User Created Content as such is not a new phenomenon”
1347
, “the differences 
lies in the scale, economic potential and impact on traditional supply chains of modern user created 
content”.
1348
  Facebook and YouTube are sites devoted to UGC and are amongst the most visited 
websites on the internet, yet some legal scholars consider that “current copyright law leaves little or no 
room for sharing ‘user-generated content that builds upon pre-existing works”
1349
; at least, copyright has, 
up to now, not provided for a specific UGC exception. 
There are borderline cases between the “mere upload” and the case where the user did generate 
something or modified something to the pre-existing work.  For example, the intervention by the user may 
be rather minimal if he merely uploads the lyrics of a song after having recorded them in a video clip of 
which the images are pre-existing images of another video.  In such case, the only thing which the user 
arguably has done is associating a number of seconds of music with a number of seconds of video 
images.  Yet, this may raise specific concerns, in addition to the “mere copying” of sounds or of images.  
The association of pre-existing sounds with pre-existing images may raise issues of moral rights, if such 
association may cause a prejudice to the author of either the sound or of the images; it can sometimes 
also be rather creative (and thus give rise to copyright protection as such).  We consider such example 
not to be a case of mere copying and uploading (but rather to be part of UGC). 
On the other hand, when a user merely changes a file (be it a musical file, a video file or any other sort of 
file) from one technical format into another, it is then in our view a pure “format-shifting” action and we 
would consider this as a mere copying case (thus falling outside of the scope of this Study).  When doing 
so, the user does not add any value or change anything to the contents of an existing work; he does not 
“generate” anything, in our view and for the sake of this Study at least. 
Types of UGC are many, whether in the field of text, novel and poetry, in photo and images, in music and 
audio, in citizen journalism, educational content, games, virtual content, etc. 
To each type of UGC correspond different platforms or distribution models, some being very popular, 
some being more “confidential” and used only by a little group of amateurs: blogs, wikis, podcasting, 
                                                     
 
1345 We say « arrange » to remain neutral at this stage.  From a legal point of view, different qualifications might apply.   
1346 N. ELKIN-KOREN, « User-Generated Platforms”, in Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Rights, Rochelle 
Dreyfuss et al., Oxford University Press, 2010. 
1347 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, p. 13. 
1348 Idem. 
1349 P.B. Hugenholtz & Dr. M.R.F. Sentftleben, Fair Use in Europe.  In Search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam, November 2011 
(available via www.ssrn.com), p. 10. 
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social network sites, virtual worlds, content and file sharing sites, the most know of all being probably the 
video sharing site YouTube
1350
. 
UGC is often described as content created by amateurs
1351
.  For example, the OECD Report on UGC 
from 2007 defines UGC as “(i) content made publicly available over the Internet, (ii) which reflects a 
certain amount of creative effort, and (iii) which is created outside of professional routines and practices”
 
1352
.  By referring to “a certain amount of creative effort”, the OECD definition might be putting the 
threshold too high if one wishes to grasp the major part of UGC.  Even without much “creative effort”, a 
user might be generating UGC, just by adding parts (created by others) to existing parts (also created by 
others), or just by taking part out of a pre-existing work, or also by creating an association between two 
pre-existing works (and even these can lead to rather creative results). 
One may observe that content which is created outside professional routines and practices is not 
necessarily amateur content if, by “amateur” one intends to refer to works of rather low levels of originality 
and low quality: UGC may indeed be produced by professionals outside the scope of their employment 
agreement
1353
.  However, it is true that most of UGC is indeed produced by amateurs, private individuals 
spending time “outside of professional routines and practices”.     
A phenomenon may be observed, of professionals putting their works on UGC platforms but, then, in 
most cases, the works will most often be created “from scratch” (as we excluded this category from our 
Study).  Amateurs are more likely to rely on pre-existing works for the sake of facility and/or lack of own 
talent.  However, it may be that the distinction between amateur and professional, or between 
professional and non-professional is blurring
1354
, which may be a reason of concern for the press, for 
instance. 
Most user-created content activity is undertaken without the expectation of remuneration or profit
1355
, 
even if in some cases professional photographers, graphic designers free-lance journalists and similar 
professional categories providing pictures, news video, articles or other content have started to face 
competition from freely-provided amateur-created content
1356
.  Some of the many reasons why users 
generate and distribute content include
1357
: advertising, analysis and commentary, contribution to human 
knowledge (Wikipedia), criticism and review, entertainment, education/support, malicious intent, news 
reporting, photo sharing, political campaigning, protest, social networking, vigilantism... 
The concept of UGC we are relying on for the sake of this Study, somewhat different from the definition 
suggested by the OECD, concentrates, as explained before, on cases where a user will rely on one or 
                                                     
 
1350 For a systematic description of the different types of UGC, of the types of content and of platforms, see OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE 
(2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User Created Content, 12 April 2007, p. 16 et s.; see 
also the classifications suggested by IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, 
SMART, 2007/2008. 
1351 S. HETCHER, « User-Generated Confusion : the Legal and Business Implications of Web 2.0”, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L, 
863, 871 (2008), as quoted by N. ELKIN-KOREN, op. cit., p. 12. 
1352 OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User Created Content, 12 
April 2007, p. 4. 
1353 N. ELKIN-KOREN, « User-Generated Platforms”, in Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Rights, Rochelle et 
al., Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 13.  The author gives as examples open source software projects which evolve in high quality 
software, or pictures taken by a professional photographer and then posted on Flickr. 
1354 N. ELKIN-KOREN, « User-Generated Platforms”, in Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Rights, Rochelle et 
al., Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 14. 
1355 OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User Created Content, 12 
April 2007, p. 4. 
1356 OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User Created Content, 12 
April 2007, p. 5. 
1357 For examples of each of these activities, cf. C. GEORGE & J. SCERRI, “Web 2.0. and User-Generated Content : legal 
challenges in the new frontier”, Journal of Information, Law and Technology, 2007, p. 4 et s. 
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several pre-existing works to “change something to it/them” before uploading the resulting work on the 
Internet (we describe this operation in a voluntarily neutral legal way); the threshold could thus sometimes 
be lower than “a certain amount of creative effort” as in the OECD proposed definition.   
Our notion of UGC, for the sake of this Study differs from the one given by the consortium IDATE-TNO-
IVIR Report of 2008
1358
.  In that other study commissioned by the European Commission, UCC (User-
Created-Content) covered content made available not only on the Internet (like for the OECD Study) but 
included content made available through any telecommunication network and platform; we limit our 
analysis to the Internet.   
We therefore concentrate our analysis on content made available on the internet by a user who modified 
a pre-existing work before uploading it; it must however be understood that such modification does not 
require a creative effort and may result from merely adding, subtracting or associating some pre-existing 
content with other pre-existing content. 
UGC certainly has empowered (or has at least given greater power than before to) two new actors in the 
realm of copyright, apart from the rightholders who have long been there: on one hand, the users, who 
have also been there from the beginning of the history of copyright but who had remained up until not so 
long ago almost unnoticed (actually, users became copyright actors when they acquired the means of 
mass individual copying, first through the audio recorder and then through video recording devices); and 
on the other hand, the platforms, which have become new major (if not yet the most important) actors and 
stakeholders in copyright law.  Another important phenomenon is that it has transformed the role of users, 
from passive readers to active commentators and critics, from coach potatoes to active taggers… and it 
has given users a tremendous tool of potential influence : their work used to remain largely private, it can 
now in a second be made available worldwide.  These changes will have an impact on society which the 
scope of this Study is too narrow to examine. 
III. Some available figures  
There are a few surveys publicly available on the specific concept of UGC
1359
and one must already note, 
that most available data does not concern UGC as such, but usually encompasses broader uses of the 
Internet from which only speculation can be drawn on the specific question of UGC.  
Furthermore, the concept of UGC in these surveys is either referred as "user-created content" or "user-
generated content" or "amateur content", etc., or is analysed as being part of a larger concept which 
could be the one of "Web 2.0" or the "Internet 2.0", the "participative web", "the social Internet" or the 
"social media platforms" in a very broad sense. Consequently, when data are available, they cannot be 
compared easily since they cover various realities
1360
. 
In order to undertake a rigorous analysis of the question, the definition adopted for the purpose of this 
legal study , as explained above, excludes content created “from scratch” by amateurs as well as the 
mere upload  of other’s works by Internet users – whatever the form of such upload. For understandable 
reasons, it is quite difficult to gather quantitative data covering UGC as defined here, because it would 
require an investigation of each individual work to determine whether it is a transformative use by a user 
of existing copyrighted works, or something else.  
                                                     
 
1358 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, 14. 
1359 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, p. 29.  See 
also the OECD Report, OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User 
Created Content, 12 April 2007, p. 183. 
1360 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, op cit., p. 29 
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A market analysis published by IVIR and IDATE in 2008 already pointed out the difficulties inherent to the 
gathering of relevant data on User Generated content
1361
.  
The study also showed that a limited percentage of Internet users (10%-13%) could be qualified as 
“creators”
1362
, although the study suggests that such numbers are increasing over time.  
Citing an American study conducted in 2006, the IDATE surveys indicates that 18% of Internet users 
have taken material found online and remixed into a new creation
1363
; such kind of use matches quite 
closely our definition of UGC. 
Another study concerning bloggers suggests that only 15% of bloggers receive additional revenue from 
their blog, and a tiny 2% consider their blog as their primary source of income
1364
.  
Different studies show that content creators represent a small proportion of internet users; however, this 
proportion is increasing over time and is significantly higher in the youngest groups of the population. 
However, it does not necessarily mean that the same conclusions may be drawn concerning UGC as 
defined in this Study. The availability and intensive use by teenagers of mobile phone’s cameras to create 
and share content, for instance, is pointed out as one of the factors explaining the rise of “user created 
content” by these groups of the population. It does not mean, however, that phone cameras are used to 
create and share works that incorporate or mix existing materials, which constitutes the heart of “UGC” as 
defined in this Study (such activities would rather be the creation of new works – when a threshold of 
sufficient creativity is reached).  
An interesting study commissioned by Creative Commons
1365
 primarily focused on clarifying the notion of 
“non-commercial” and its understanding by internet users and creators, gives certain quantitative data 
about uses of online creation and sharing of works. The study found out that Photos are the most 
common type of work used, whereas almost half of all users have also used video or film, texts or writing, 
games, songs or music, and images.  Concerning the type of uses of works made on the internet, the 
study explains that “Content users also use online content in a variety of ways. 70% have downloaded 
content just for themselves, while 46% have shared what they downloaded with others. 49% have posted 
or uploaded content created by others to a blog or website. Others say they have made new works using 
others’ content by incorporating it (13%), or changing or altering it (8%). 8% say they have remixed or 
mashed up content.” The underlined sentence is quite interesting for the current Study. Although it does 
not completely match our definition of UGC, the aggregation of incorporating, altering, remixing and 
mashing up existing content approaches the concept of UGC taken for the purpose of this Study.  
We could not find quantitative data concerning the perception of legal aspects of UGC, as defined in this 
Study, by the creators of such content. A specific market analysis should be undertaken to determine 
whether there is a strong attention for copyright issues by users creating and disseminating content on 
the Internet.  
Data concerning actions undertaken by copyright holders against User Generated Content is also hard to 
find and the few data available does not distinguish between actions against copyrighted content “merely 
                                                     
 
1361 idem., p. 29-30 
1362 Which means people publishing a blog or a website, uploading videos or audio they made or writing and publishing articles ; 
this notion of “creators” could therefore not be assimilated to the notion of creators of UGC as defined in this study 
1363 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, op cit., p. 86. 
1364 TECHNORATI, State of the Blogosphere, 2008, cited by IDATE,TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative 
Information Society, op cit., p. 107.  Since 2008, it is possible however that these figures have evolved. 
1365 Creative Commons Corporation, Defining “Noncommercial”. A Study of How the Online Population Understands 
“Noncommercial Use”, September 2009, available online at http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Defining_Noncommercial.  The 
percentages add up strangely to more than 100 %, probably because many cases qualify for different categories. 
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uploaded” on the web platforms and copyrighted content transformed by users, which is primarily 
considered in the present Study.  
IV. The Commission’s position on UGC 
In the Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy
1366
, the Commission considered the issues 
related to UGC. 
The Commission’s view in that Green Paper may be summarized by the following extracts from the Green 
Paper:  
- “The Directive does not currently contain an exception which would allow the use of existing 
copyright protected content for creating new or derivative works. The obligation to clear rights 
before any transformative content can be made available can be perceived as a barrier to 
innovation in that it blocks new, potentially valuable works from being disseminated.  However, 
before any exception for transformative works can be introduced, one would need to carefully 
determine the conditions under which a transformative use would be allowed, so as not to conflict 
with the economic interests of the rightholders of the original work”. 
- “Under the Berne convention, a transformative use would be prima facie covered by the 
reproduction right and the right of adaptation. An exception to these rights would have to pass the 
three-step test. In particular, it would have to be more precise and refer to a specific policy 
justification or types of justified uses. It would also have to be limited to short takings (short 
passages, excluding particularly distinctive takings), therefore not infringing the right of 
adaptation”. 
- “Under the Directive, certain exceptions potentially provide some measure of flexibility in relation 
to free uses of works. Other than the previously mentioned exceptions, article 5(3)(d) allows 
quotations "for purposes such as criticism or review". Criticism and review are therefore only 
examples of possible justifications for quotations. This implies that article 5 (3)(d) can be given a 
broad scope, although the quotation must be limited to "the extent required by the specific 
purpose", and in accordance with "fair practice". The "specific purpose" of the commentary need 
not be the analysis of the work itself. However, a degree of taking which is fair in a commentary 
on that particular work may become unfair practice if it is for the purpose of commenting on a 
wider issue.  Another exception allowing some measure of flexibility is article 5(3)(k) of the 
Directive which exempts uses "for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche".   Although 
these uses are not defined, they allow users to reuse elements of previous works for their own 
creative or transformative purpose”. 
The Commission then called for comments on the two following questions:  
-   (24) Should there be more precise rules regarding what acts end users can or cannot do 
when making use of materials protected by copyright? 
-  (25) Should an exception for user-created content be introduced into the Directive? 
The answers to this consultation were made available on the Commission’s website, but apparently no 
summary was made (or at least was made available) of the answers received.  We did not review all the 
responses to the Green Paper but a significant part thereof and our analysis is that the answers could be 
categorized as follows: 
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- Representatives of rightholders in their vast majority considered that no new rules were 
necessary and that no new exception was necessary.  In their view, the existing exceptions and 
the growing number of existing standard licensing schemes (including open access licences and 
Creative Commons licences) provide sufficient flexibility to cover UGC.  In their view, when 
rightholders are asked to grant permission, they do so at reasonable conditions.  UGC was able 
to flourish in the present legal environment; an exception would benefit commercial intermediaries 
(such as YouTube), which is not acceptable.  A UGC exception would probably be contrary to the 
3-steps-test and would undermine the growing – and, to many, desirable – trend of monetization 
of content; 
- Some civil rights organizations and, in general, intermediaries (platforms, access providers, etc.) 
called for a U.S. style “fair use” approach or, as an intermediate solution, for an exception for 
transformative works, stating that a UGC exception would greatly encourage users’ self-
expression, creativity and access to knowledge.  Others asked that the directive be clarified and 
that the exceptions of article 5.3.d (quotation) and article 5.3.k (caricature and parody) explicitly 
cover UGC; some pointed out that a UGC exception would increase the credibility and 
acceptance of copyright by users and by society at large; 
- Several respondents (representing various stakeholders) admitted that more guidance would be 
useful for users, both on what was allowed and what was prohibited. 
 
In its Communication of 19 October 2009 on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy
1367
, which followed the 
Green Paper, the Commission concluded that the consultation initiated by the Green Paper showed that 
“most of the stakeholders consider that it is too early to regulate UCC” and announced that the 
Commission would further investigate the specific needs of non-professionals that rely on protected works 
to create their own works and further consult on solutions for easier, more affordable and user-friendly 
rights clearance for amateur users. 
In its Communication of 24 May 2011 “on a Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights Boosting 
creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and 
services in Europe”, the Commission returned to the issue of UGC and stated the following: 
- “specific attention will be given to possible approaches to deal with so called user-created or 
user-generated content (UGC).  In line with its overall approach, the Commission advocates 
responsible use while ensuring that users enjoy the full benefits of new interactive online services 
“; 
- “There is a growing realisation that solutions are needed to make it easier and affordable for end-
users to use third-party copyright protected content in their own works. Users who integrate 
copyright-protected materials in their own creations which are uploaded on the internet must have 
recourse to a simple and efficient permissions system. This is particularly pertinent in the case of 
"amateur" users whose UGC is created for non-commercial purposes and yet who face 
infringement proceedings if they upload material without the right holders' consent. The time has 
come to build on the strength of copyright to act as a broker between rights holders and users of 
content in a responsible way. The Commission will explore the issue further, including via 
contacts with all interested parties notably in the context of the above mentioned dialogue with 
stakeholders, in order to strike a balance between the rights of content creators and the need to 
take account of new forms of expression”. 
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The Commission further announced its position in its recent Communication of December 18, 2012 on 
Content in the Digital Single Market
1368
, as follows: 
(ii) User-generated content and licensing for small-scale users of protected material 
- “The Commission's objective is to foster transparency and ensure that end-users have greater 
clarity on legitimate and non-legitimate uses of protected material, and easier access to legitimate 
solutions. Content generated by users themselves is often covered by some form of licensing by 
rights holders, in partnership with certain platforms. However the scale and coverage of such 
licences is not transparent to the end user. Furthermore, such arrangements create rights and 
obligations for the contractual partners, but do not necessarily provide legal certainty to the end-
users. In parallel, small-scale users of content, such as small companies who wish to use some 
images or music in their websites, struggle to identify how to acquire licences for low value uses 
of protected content. 
- This work strand should identify the extent to which user-generated content is licensed to relevant 
platforms, and identify how to ensure that end-users are informed about what is legal and illicit 
use on the internet.    
- It should seek to ensure that end users benefit from easier access to, and greater clarity on what 
are the legitimate and non legitimate uses of protected material. To that effect, it should identify 
the range and extent of "one-click" licensing initiatives in the EU, deliver solutions to extend the 
development and interconnection of such initiatives and explore the appropriateness of licensing 
or appropriate terms – e.g. the possibility of free licenses”. 
 
Even if we shall not deal with liability of operators on the Internet, one should finally also mention the 
Commission’s work in the context of the revision of the e-Commerce directive
1369
.  It is worth mentioning 
that, in this context, the “notice and take down” procedures are one of the topics of the consultation by the 
Commission (we will come back to this later). 
V. Which exclusive rights are at stake ? 
UGC involves altogether (1) the reproduction right, (2) the communication to the public right (except 
where the UGC work is only made available to a limited group of friends or relations), including the right 
to make available and (3) the adaptation right. 
A. The reproduction right 
UGC as we understand it in this Study involves the reproduction right.  The reproduction right is indeed 
defined in the InfoSoc Directive in a very broad and encompassing manner (article 2) as: 
“the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any 
means and in any form, in whole or in part” (for authors, of their works; for performers, of fixations of their 
first performances, etc.).   
The reproduction right is recognized by all the treaties on copyright and related rights; it is not necessary 
to elaborate on the importance of this right and on its strong relationship with the adaptation right 
1370
.   
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1370 See on this, M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended 
consequences in the light of the international norms on copyright and related rights”  (23 October 2010), available at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31, p. 2. 
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According to a number of commentators, the very wide definition given by the InfoSoc Directive implies 
that “the right of reproduction covers virtually any use of a work or other subject matter, even where 
similar acts of use in the analogue world (such as receiving television signal or reading a book) would fall 
well outside the scope of what intellectual property aims to protect”
1371
; without going further on this 
controversy, one must at the same time remember that a (compulsory) exception has been provided for 
by the InfoSoc Directive for technical acts of reproduction (article 5.1. of the Directive). It is therefore clear 
that the reproduction right is involved in UGC as we understand it
1372
.  There will always be at least a 
“reproduction in part” in any User Generated Content since the user will start from a pre-existing work to 
generate a new/modified version of said work.  The Infopaq I decision of the CJEU reinforces this 
analysis, in confirming that copying eleven words in a sentence (more precisely in the title of a newspaper 
article) may amount to a “reproduction in part”. 
This implies that, in every situation where the pre-existing work is a work (still) protected by copyright, an 
authorization covering the user’s activities will be necessary, unless an exception to the reproduction right 
applies.  Apart from the exceptions, there may arguably be some notion of “de minimis”: copyring and 
remixing (etc) very small amounts may not always suffice to engage either the reproduction or the 
adaptation rights
1373
. 
B. The communication to the public right, including the right to make available  
Uploading UGC on a Web platform on site, whether for commercial purposes or not, amounts clearly to 
communication such UGC to the public and/or making such UGC available in the sense of article 3 of the 
InfoSoc Directive which defines communication to the public as follows: 
“the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or 
wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of 
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them”, 
(For authors, of their works – see article 3.1.; for performers, of the first fixations of their performances – 
see article 3.2.; etc.).  
It is therefore clear that making UGC available on a website or a platform amounts to communicating it to 
the public and/or making it available to the public in such a way that members of the public may access 
them from a place and at a moment individually chosen by them
1374
. 
Consequently, doing so requires (as for the reproduction right) that, in every situation where the pre-
existing work is a work (still) protected by copyright, an authorization covering the user’s activities will be 
necessary, unless an exception applies
1375
.  This would be the case if the communication only takes in a 
family circle, but in most cases, the UGC will be uploaded on a platform and thus be made available to 
“the public” and not just to a family circle. 
                                                     
 
1371 See, for instance, IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 
2007/2008, p. 187 and the references mentioned there. 
1372 In the same sense, M. Ficsor, op. cit., p. 2. 
1373 On the “de minimis” argument, see infra in this report.   
1374 In this sense, M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended 
consequences in the light of the international norms on copyright and related rights”  (23 October 2010), available at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31, p. 8. 
1375 In this sense, IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, 
p. 187. 
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C. The right of adaptation 
The Berne Convention provides for an exclusive right for authors to authorize adaptations of their works.  
Article 12 of the Berne Convention (under the title “Right of Adaptation, Arrangement and Other 
Alteration”) defines such right in a rather broad manner as follows: 
“Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, 
arrangements and other alterations of their works.” 
The Berne Convention does not explicitly authorize Member States to provide for exceptions to the 
adaptation right but it is generally recognized that they may provide for an exception for parodies and 
caricatures, which are then to be considered as “excused adaptations”
1376
. 
Contrary to the reproduction right and the public communication right, the adaptation right has not been 
harmonized by the InfoSoc Directive.  Such right has only been harmonized in the Software Directive and 
in the Database Directive. 
The Software Directive, under article 4 (b) defines it very broadly as follows: 
“(b) the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program and the 
reproduction of the results thereof, without prejudice to the rights of the person who alters the program”. 
The Database Directive, under article 5 (b) defines it also very broadly as follows: 
“(b) translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration” 
and the Database Directive further grants to the authors of databases the following exclusive right under 
article 5 (e): 
“ (e) any reproduction, distribution, communication, display or performance to the public of the results of 
the acts referred to in (b).” 
Except for computer programs and databases, it may therefore be argued (but this is not agreed by all) 
that the adaptation right is not part of the acquis communautaire on copyright
1377
.  However, since all 
Member States of the EU are also Members of the Berne Convention, they all provide for such an 
exclusive adaptation right for the authors, even if such right has not been harmonized
1378
.  Whether the 
adaptation right (for works) and the fact that it is arguably not part of the acquis could serve as valid 
grounds to introduce a UGC exception will be analyzed in the second part of our Study, devoted to 
possible solutions for UGC. 
                                                     
 
1376 S. Ricketson & J. Ginsburg, International copyright and Neighboring Rights, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 483-484, as 
quoted by M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended consequences 
in the light of the international norms on copyright and related rights” (23 October 2010), available at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31, p. 5. 
1377 P.B. Hugenholtz & R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe.  In search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam, November 2011, p.2, and p. 26; 
M. Sentftleben, Quotations, Parody and Fair Use, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125021, p. 384 
et s.; Response of IVIR to the Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, p. 6. 
1378 The WIPO Treaty does not explicitly deal with the adaptation right; in its article 1, it simply states that “Contracting Parties shall 
comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention” (which thus includes article 12 of the Berne Convention on the adaptation 
right, as  does the TRIPS Agreement (article 9.1.) when referring also to the obligation of the Members to comply with Articles 1 
through 21 of the Berne Convention (thereby also including article 12 on the adaptation right). 
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UGC as we understand it in this Study clearly involves the adaptation right, every time the pre-existing 
work is a copyright protected work, since the user will, in some way, arrange the work or modify it
1379
.  
Remixes, mash-ups, samplings, etc. all amount to an adaptation of the underlying work, except that there 
may be some notion of “de minimis”: copyring and remixing (etc) very small amounts may not always 
suffice to engage either the reproduction or the adaptation rights.  
Consequently, for creating UGC, an authorization covering the user’s activities will be necessary, unless 
an exception to the adaptation right applies
1380
.  An example given by M. Ficsor (and which is a typical 
UGC case) is the case where a musical work is the object of an audiovisual adaptation (making a 
recording of a member of a family dancing on the sound recording of the performance of a musical work): 
“For such acts – unless covered by an exception – the authorization of the author of the original work is 
needed, irrespective of whether his right is characterized as right of adaptation or right of 
reproduction”
1381
.  Unless the use of such adaptation only takes place in a family circle, the authorization 
of the rightholder is required. 
This raises questions regarding UGC.  Some of the difficulties of the approach are that the scope of the 
adaptation right as such has given rise to less analysis by commentators, that the delineation between 
the reproduction right and the adaptation right on one hand and the dividing line between the adaptation 
right and the moral right of integrity are sometimes hard to draw, and that, contrary to other exclusive 
rights, no clear guidance exists as to which exceptions could be provided to the adaptation right by 
national legislators. 
As a summary – and we think that most commentators will agree with it and that this will not give rise to 
much debates - UGC falls under the scope of altogether the reproduction right, the public 
communication/making available right and the (not harmonized) adaptation right.  So, unless an exception 
can be invoked, a licence from the rightholder(s) is necessary
1382
 when the UGC relies in copying parts of 
pre-existing works and is communicated to the public. 
VI. Which moral rights are at stake? 
There are few international provisions aiming at harmonizing moral rights. Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention, article 5 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996 and article 5 of the 
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (adopted in 2012) provide a minimal ground of moral rights 
for, respectively, authors and performers, while the other WIPO copyright treaty, the TRIPS and the 
European directives on copyright exclude moral rights from their scope. As moral rights are clearly out of 
the current scope of the EU legal instruments analyzed in this Study, we will not grant extensive attention 
to this question.  
 
A first remark worth making is the lack of harmonization of moral rights. The Berne Convention sets out a 
minimal standard of moral rights which includes the right of attribution and the right of an author to object 
derogatory action in relation to its work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.  The 
                                                     
 
1379 In the same sense, M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended 
consequences in the light of the international norms on copyright and related rights”  (23 October 2010), available at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31, p. 3. 
1380 See in this sense, IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 
2007/2008, p.188. 
1381 M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended consequences in the 
light of the international norms on copyright and related rights” (23 October 2010), available at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31, p. 7. 
1382 In the same sense, IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 
2007/2008, p.196. 
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implementation of these rights may vary across the countries and, furthermore, certain countries 
recognise additional moral rights (for instance, the “droit de repentir” in France).  
One could, however, find some traces of the right of attribution in directive 2001/29.  The benefit of the 
exceptions for illustration of teaching and scientific research (art. 5.3.a), for reproduction by the press (art. 
3.3.c), for quotation (art.3.3.d) and for the use of political speeches (art.3.3.f) is only granted if the source, 
including the author’s name, is indicated by the user of the works
1383
.  The Court has recently emphasized 
the notion of “indication of the source”
1384
 in relation to the exception of quotation, as well as it provided its 
own interpretation of certain material aspects of this condition. One could therefore argue, even if the 
Court did not state it explicitly, that indication of the source, in the field of the copyright directive, is an 
autonomous concept of EU law, which must receive uniform interpretation across the Member States.  
We are certainly not claiming here that such condition constitutes some “stealth harmonization” of the 
moral right of attribution. However, although moral rights stay clearly outside the scope of the directive, 
the condition of attribution in certain exceptions seems to overlap the moral right concerned. 
Consequently, and given the lack of harmonization of the moral rights in general and the right of 
attribution in particular, one could argue that the condition of acknowledgement of the source constitutes, 
as a matter of fact, a uniform implementation of the right of attribution in the field of these exceptions.  
For this Study on User Generated Content, it can therefore be sustained that the right of attribution does 
not constitute an additional legal issue to take into account insofar as such UGC is covered by an 
exception which requires indication of the source. The exception of quotation, in particular, may be 
invoked in several cases of UGC (see infra) and its conditions include in practice the right of attribution. 
The issue of the moral right of attribution remains, however, concerning User Generated Content which 
may be covered by other exceptions (existing or to be added in the future). For instance, the directive 
does not require the indication of the source in the exception of parody (probably because in a parody the 
source is well know – or the parody risks to remain unnoticed). In this regard, various interpretations may 
arise across the Member States and the moral right of attribution could possibly interfere with the 
reproduction and/or the communication to the public of works covered by such exceptions. Authors have 
furthermore pointed out the practical difficulties of indicating the source of the original work in the context 
of a parody of said work, without creating any misleading impression that the original author created or 
approved such parody
1385
.  
The moral right of integrity (the right to object derogatory action) is regularly cited as a potential obstacle 
to the enjoyment of exceptions and limitations to copyright
1386
. Indeed, the interpretation of the scope of 
this right receives various interpretations across different states. While the USA have taken a minimalistic 
approach, countries like France give a more substantial content to the right of integrity. For instance, the 
disassociation of the words and music of a sound recording so that it could be used for karaoke has been 
found to infringe the author’s right of integrity in France
1387
 , which would arguably not be the cases in 
countries where an artist would need to establish that such use of its work was prejudicial to his or her 
honour or reputation. 
                                                     
 
1383 It is on the basis of this reasoning that S. Ricketson and J. Ginsburg infer an attribution right in the Berne Convention. 
1384 CJUE, 1 December 2011, C-145-10, Painer 
1385 M. Sainsbury, “Parody, satire, honour and reputation: The interplay between economic and moral rights”, AIPJ, 2007, p. 149, 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1980392  
1386 M. Sainsbury, “Parody, satire, honour and reputation”, op. cit ; M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian 
Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended consequences in the light of the international norms on copyright and related rights” (23 
October 2010), available at http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31 ; Robert C. Bird and Lucille M. Ponte,  
“Protecting moral rights in the United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and opportunities under the U.K.’s new 
performances regulations”, Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 24:213, 2006, p. 214.  Yet one may notice that France 
has both a strong right of integrity and an exception of parody, so that this “obstacle” may be overstated. 
1387 See Editions Zagora c SDRM, CA Paris, 4 ch, 29 May 2002 (2002) 194 RIDA 325. 
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The moral right of integrity may therefore, in certain cases and probably more in certain countries than in 
others, constitute an obstacle to the enjoyment of actual or potential exceptions allowing the creation and 
the communication to the public of UGC based on copyrighted materials.  
VII. Which exceptions from the InfoSoc Directive are relevant? 
The Terms of Reference do invite us to examine which exceptions from the closed list of the InfoSoc 
Directive may be relevant for UGC and
1388
 mention: quotation for purposes such as criticism or review, 
incidental inclusion, and the caricature, parody and pastiche exception.   
The applicability (or not) of existing exceptions to UGC is probably, with the issues related to the liability 
of content-sharing platforms, the most debated issue when discussing the legal rules applicable to UGC. 
To begin with, one should mention that the InfoSoc Directive does not provide for an exception for UGC 
as such; this is quite understandable as UGC was far from being as ubiquitous in 2001 than it is now, but 
this is why one must look at the other exceptions in order to see which one(s), if any, may be relevant for 
UGC. 
The case for a specific UGC exception is supported by some.  We will discuss it in the second part of our 
Study, together with the other solutions which we think could be put in place, if the need to support the 
development of UGC was established. 
We will describe hereafter why the applicability of existing exceptions to UGC is partly unclear and 
cannot, at least in their current formulation and implementation in the Member States, serve, if they are 
not adapted, as a sufficient ground to sufficiently insulate UGC from copyright claims
1389
. 
A. Quotation for criticism or review 
1. General presentation 
Article 5.3.d of the InfoSoc Directive allows Member States to provide for an exception or a limitation to 
the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3 (i.e. the reproduction right and the public communication right) in 
the following case: 
“(d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work or other 
subject-matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public, that, unless this turns out to 
be impossible, the source, including the author's name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance 
with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose”. 
The formulation of this exception is partly broad (“such as criticism or review”) and partly rather narrow, as 
it is accompanied by many conditions (“provided that “, with four conditions attached which must be 
understood as cumulative).  The exception is optional for Member States, which are free to implement it 
or not (subject to what the Court has stated in this regard in the Painer case – see elsewhere in this 
Study).  
                                                     
 
1388 Private copying is out of scope of this study and is at first sight of little relevance, to at least the great majority of UGC publicly 
(i.e. not “privately”) available on the Web. 
1389 In the same sense, note by S. Dusollier, “The relations between copyright law and consumers’ rights from a European 
perspective”, for the European Parliament, DG for Internal policies, November 2010, p. 15. 
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The quotation exception was already proposed by the Commission in its draft directive (which was 
suggesting a shorter list of eight optional exceptions), as follows: 
“ (d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work or other 
subject matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public, that the source is indicated, 
and that their use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose;” 
The drafting changed only slightly during the legislative process, on the issue of the mention of the 
author’s name (and not only “the source”), whenever that was possible.  This is an indication that the 
exception did not cause too much controversy. 
It may be useful to remember that this exception for quotation is explicitly allowed by the Berne 
Convention, which states as follows: 
“Article 10 Certain Free Uses of Works: 1. Quotations;  (...) 3. Indication of source and author 
(1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made available 
to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed 
that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of 
press summaries. 
(...) 
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this Article, mention 
shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon.” 
How has this optional exception been implemented by the Member States? 
Without going into detail on this implementation (which would fall outside the scope of this Study), one 
should mention the following when analysing the implementation of the right of quotation in the Member 
States
1390
. 
2.  Implementation of the exception in the Member States: 
In light of the Painer decision of the CJUE, it seems to us rather clear that some implementation 
legislations and/or interpretations prevailing in certain Member States may need to be revisited, as the 
Court in that decision has brought some light on certain issues yet casted some doubts about some 
others. 
Austria: quotations have long been allowed by the Copyright Act, so that no amendment was brought to 
it when implementing the Directive. 
Belgium: quotations are allowed from works which have been lawfully published, for the purposes of 
criticism, debate, review, education or in scientific works, in conformity with fair professional uses and 
insofar as justified by the purpose, with mention of the source and of the name of the author, unless this 
proves impossible.  Quotations in political propaganda or meant mainly for commercial purposes are not 
                                                     
 
1390 The following summary is based on the following reports: Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National 
Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011; Institute for 
Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007. 
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allowed.  Quotations must be a part of a wider work and cannot just be used as teasers or to attract the 
public’s attention
1391
.   
Bulgaria: the quotation exception has been extended, to cover not only works in printed form but also 
works already communicated to the public, “that is, those that have been communicated on radio and 
TV”
1392
.  One may expect that this also covers works communicated to the public via the internet but this 
does not seem to be obvious.  There is a court case going on about whether the repeated broadcasting of 
TV blunders in a TV talk show fits within the exception (particularly because the TV blunder is shown 
more than once, to make it sound even funnier). 
Cyprus: the quotation right (in Article 7.2.6. of the Copyright Act) seems to be included in a broader 
exception covering “carrying out of acts in good faith for the purpose of research, private use, critical 
review or reporting on current events on condition that the author’s name is acknowledged if such is 
made in public”
1393
.  It seems to us that the text does not follow very strictly the quotation exception as 
provided for the InfoSoc Directive.  The purposes are not restricted to criticism or review but must not 
conflict with honest practice. 
Czech Republic: the quotation rights seem to be broader than allowed by the Directive.  It already 
existed before implementation of the Directive but article 31 (1) (b) of the Copyright Act also allows the 
use, to a justified extent, in an own individual work, of excerpts from works of other authors which have 
been made public.  Article 31 (1) (a) allows short quotations, in accordance with general interests, but not 
just for the purposes explicitly listed in the quotation exception of the Directive but also for other purposes 
(such as artistic or humorous).  Article 31 (1) (b) allows for substantial quotations e.g. small works in their 
entirety), but then only for critique or review related to the work or for the purpose of scientific or technical 
work
1394
.  There is no indication that the source must have been lawfully made available
1395
. 
Denmark: Section 22 of the Danish Copyright Act provides that a person may quote from a work which 
has been made public in accordance with proper usage and to the extent required for the purpose
1396
. 
Estonia: Article 19 of their Copyright Act authorizes summaries and quotations from a work that has 
been lawfully made available to the public, provided that its extent does not exceed that justified by the 
purpose and the idea of the work as a whole which is being summarized or quoted is conveyed 
correctly
1397
. 
                                                     
 
1391 M.C. Janssens, in La loi belge sur le droit d’auteur, Commentaire par article, Hommage à Jan Corbet, Larcier, ed. F. Brison & 
H. Vanhees, 3rd ed., p. 139.  See in Belgium the Copiepresse v. Google case, where the Court of appeal of Brussels denied the 
application of quotation to GoogleNews. 
1392 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Bulgaria by V. Sokolov, p. 110). 
1393 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Cyprus by A. Demetriades), p. 128; Institute for Information Law (IVIR), 
Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 142. 
1394 For a more detailed presentation of the intricate Czech system on quotations, see Copyright in the information society – A 
Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 
(chapter on Czech Republic by L. Pressburgerova & J. Tajbr), p. 144 and 145. 
1395 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 152. 
1396 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Denmark by P. Schonning), p. 168;  Institute for Information Law (IVIR), 
Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 162. 
1397 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Estonia by V. Naslund), p. 180. 
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Finland: according to Article 22 of the Copyright Act, a work made public may be quoted, in accordance 
with proper usage to the extent necessary for the purpose; according to Article 25.1, works of art made 
public may be reproduced in pictorial form in material connection with the text in a critical or scientific 
presentation
1398
.  Article 25.1. therefore allows more than just a quotation (i.e. a copy of a part of a work) 
but a reproduction of the whole work (yet is limited to published works of art). 
France: Article L. 122.5.3. of the Code on Intellectual Property allows, for works which have been 
lawfully divulged, analyses and short quotations justified by the character of the work in which the 
quotation must be incorporated, being criticism, debate, education, scientific or informational.  This clearly 
means that quotations must remain short and can only be made in the context of a wider work 
incorporating them
1399
. Because quotations must be short, it is often understood that it does not apply to 
works of visual arts (a quotation of which can hardly be “short”)
1400
.  There is however some case law 
which accepts that the exception also applies to works of visual arts or to musical ones, the sole limitation 
being than that the quotation remains short.  
Germany: the quotation right already existed and is included in Section 51 (“Quotations”) of the 
Copyright Act
1401
, which provides that “reproduction, distribution and communication to the public shall be 
permitted, to the extent justified by the purpose, where 
1. individual works are included after their publication in an independent scientific work to 
illustrate its contents; 
2. passages from a work are quoted after its publication in an independent work of language; 
3. individual passages from a published musical work are quoted in an independent musical 
work”
1402
. 
According to Section 63, the source must in all cases be clearly acknowledged, except if it proves 
impossible.  
Greece: Greek law already provided for a quotation exception and it was not changed when the 
legislator implemented the InfoSoc Directive
1403
.  The wording talks about “short extracts” of a lawfully 
published work for the purpose of providing support for a case advanced by the person making the 
quotation or a critique of the position of the author (of the work being quoted); this is allowed provided it is 
compatible with fair practice and limited to what is necessary.  The name of the author must be 
mentioned if it was mentioned on the work being quoted
1404
. 
                                                     
 
1398 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Finland by K. Harenko), p. 191. 
1399 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on France by P. Kamina), p. 213. 
1400 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 213. 
1401 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Germany by M. Schaefer), p. 223. 
1402 The translation is from WIPO. 
1403 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 248. 
1404 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Greece by E. Vagena), p. 242. 
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Hungary: Article 34.1. of the Copyright Act implements the quotation right in accordance with the text of 
the InfoSoc Directive
1405
.  Quotations are permitted provided that the source is indicated, that the extent 
of the quotation is justified by the nature and purpose of the use of the work quoted and that it does not 
modify the quoted work
1406
.  Expert opinion 22/2009 of the Hungarian Copyright Expert Board 
emphasized that in case the translator adds a quote from a former translation of the work into his new 
translation, but modifies the cited segment to “fit it into” the new translation (whilst she refers to this fact in 
a footnote), one cannot speak about a legal quotation, since the Copyright Act protects only those users 
who do not modify the original work. 
Ireland : Section 51 of the Copyright Act allows the use of a work for criticism or review, on condition 
that the dealing is a “fair dealing” (see more explanation on this hereafter) and with acknowledgment of 
the source.  This is considered as coming very close to the text of the InfoSoc Directive
1407
.  Section 52.4 
of the Copyright Act further provides for a general exception for “quotations and extracts”, provided 
acknowledgment of the source and provided that this does not prejudice the interests of the copyright 
owner.  This last condition has not yet been examined by Irish Courts; commentators tend to assimilate 
this to the condition that the use be a “fair dealing”.
1408
  “Fair dealing” is traditionally available for three 
distinct types of uses: research or private study, criticism or review and for reporting current events.  
Defining what fair dealing is proves difficult, as illustrated by Lord Denning in the landmark case of 
Hubbard & Anor v Vosper & Anor: “It is impossible to define what is ‘fair dealing’.  It must be a question of 
degree.  You must consider first the number and extent of the quotations and extracts.  Are they together 
too many and too long to be fair?  Then you must consider the use made of them.  If they are used as a 
basis for comment, criticism or review, that may be fair dealing.  If they are used to convey the same 
information as the author, for a rival purpose, that may be unfair.  Next, you must consider the 
proportions.  To take long extracts and attach short comments may be unfair.  But, short extracts and 
long comments may be fair.  Other considerations may come to mind also.  But, after all is said and done, 
it must be a matter of impression”
1409
. 
Italy: The abridgment, quotation or reproduction of fragments or parts of a work or their communication to 
the public for purposes of criticism or discussion are exempted from copyright within the limits of such 
purposes.  Quotations may also be made for teaching or research, but they must then have the sole 
purpose of illustration, with no commercial intent (this latter condition has been introduced when 
implementing the Copyright Directive and did not exist under the former Copyright Act)
1410
. This means 
that, as a general rule, quotations of copyrighted works having no connection to a specific discussion, to 
                                                     
 
1405 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Hungary by M. Ficsor), p. 264. 
1406 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 261.  For an example on quotation and sampling, see the expert opinion 33/2004 of the Hungarian 
Copyright Expert Board. In that case, the experts had to express their opinion on two sound recordings (SR); generally due to 
looping the original SR in the second SR, approximately 50% of the second SR was based upon the first SR. The expert opinion 
concluded that this amount exceeds the limit of quotation. No evidence was submitted in respect of the designation of the author, 
that is, whether the cover of the CD (of the second SR) referred to the original SR or not. 
1407 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Ireland, by L. Scales, p. 287. 
1408 Idem.   
1409 Lord Denning as quoted by L. Scales, op. cit., p. 286. 
1410 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Italy, by S. Ercolani), p. 309.  The Italian Supreme Court has made it clear 
that quotations should be limited to parts of works, so as not to expropriate the authors of their rights of exploitation; S. Ercolani, 
eod. loco, p. 309; Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 
2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country 
reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 289. 
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criticism, or to an educational session, as in the case of anthologies or reproductions with purely 
illustrative purposes, are not considered legitimate without proper authorization.
1411
  
Latvia: Quotations of fragments of works are allowed by Section 19.1. of the Copyright Act, for 
informational purposes, which must be interpreted as only for the purposes of scientific, research, 
polemical or critical purposes, to the extent justified by such purpose
1412
. 
Lithuania: the quotation exception appears to narrow the wording of the exception in the InfoSoc 
Directive, as it only allows the reproduction of “relatively short passages” of works, in the form of a 
quotation in another work, in conformity with fair practice and limited to what is necessary for the 
purpose
1413
.  The author and source must be indicated. 
Luxembourg: short quotations (and their translations) are allowed if justified by the critical, 
polemical, pedagogical, scientific or informative character of the work in which the quotation is 
incorporated.  Quotations must further be made in accordance with fair practice, not pursue a profitable 
aim, be required by a specific purpose and not adversely affect the work or its exploitation.  It was 
envisaged to enlarge the exception to “quotations” rather than to “short quotations” but this was rejected.  
A decision by the Luxembourg Court of appeal decided that seven quotations from a book of 300 pages 
fulfilled this condition
1414
.  Commentators agree that the “short” character is a matter of case-by-case 
evaluation, taking into account both the quotation and the overall size of the work from which the 
quotation is made
1415
. 
Malta: according to Article 9.k of the Copyright Act, which basically follows the wording of the InfoSoc 
Directive, quotations as excluded from the scope of the exclusive rights by the following provision: 
“the reproduction, translation, distribution or communication to the public of quotations for purposes such 
as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work or other subject-matter which has already been 
lawfully made available to the public, as long as, unless this is impossible, the source, including the 
author’s name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent 
required by the specific purposes”
1416
. 
The Netherlands: exceptions to copyright have long been a favorite topic of debate amongst scholars in 
the Netherlands.  Before the Directive was adopted, the Dutch Supreme Court (in the Dior/Evora case) 
had accepted that exceptions to copyright could, to some extent, be applied by analogy, on the basis of a 
                                                     
 
1411 See Court of Milan, 05/10/1993, Il Diritto di Autore, 1994, p. 603.  See also G. Mazziotti, “Copyright and educational uses: the 
unbearable case of Italian law from a European and comparative perspective”, European University Institute, working paper, 
available at: 
 http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19697/LAW_2011_17_Mazziotti.pdf. 
1412 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Latvia, by J. Bordans & I. Veiksa), p. 329. 
1413 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Lithuania, by G. Ramanauskas), p. 352.  Institute for Information Law 
(IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, 
p. 316. 
1414 Cour d’appel de Luxembourg, 28 February 1913, Pas., VIII, p. 439. 
1415 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Luxembourg, by K. Manhaeve & Th. Schiltz), p. 368 ; Institute for 
Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 326. 
1416 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Malta, by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro), p. 384 et s.  Institute for Information 
Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, 
p. 338. 
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weighing of the interests of rightholders against the social or economic interests of others or of society as 
a whole.  After the adoption of the Directive, opinions continued to diverge as to whether an application by 
analogy was still possible.  And when implementing the Directive, the Dutch legislator tried to give “the 
implementation law a strong accent of a liberal legislative operation, striving at an open system of 
copyright with space for, in a certain emphasis on, freedom of information”
1417
.  The quotation right, 
which already existed, was broadened on the occasion of the implementation of the InfoSoc Directive.  
Even before the implementation of the Directive, the quotation right was applied in a rather permissive 
way
1418
; it did i.a. not have to be short or small.  A whole work could be reproduced (e.g. photographs), 
even if this was debated in the legal doctrine.  At least, an accepted limit to the right of quotation is that it 
may not essentially prejudice the interests in the exploitation of the work
1419
.  A quotation is permissible in 
an advertisement, for criticism or in a scientific treatise, but also in a publication for a comparable 
purpose.  The other conditions of the InfoSoc Directive have also been reflected in the text.  Further, 
moral rights of the author must be respected
1420
.  It was also stated that the fact that some exceptions 
were not taken over from the catalogue list could not lead to an interpretation “a contrario” 
1421
(which may 
be hard to resist). 
Poland: According to Article 29.1. of the Copyright Act, quotations from disseminated works or copying of 
minor works in their entirety are allowed in works constituting an independent whole, to the extent 
justified by explanation, critical analysis, instruction or requirements of a specific type of art form
1422
.  The 
source must be indicated, whenever possible. 
Portugal: Article 75.2 (g) allows quotations to support one’s own ideas or for the purposes of criticism, 
discussion or education, to the extent justified by the purpose in question (the latter condition being added 
to the pre-existing legislation on the right of quotation, when implementing the InfoSoc Directive)
1423
.  
There is no explicit requirement that the source, including the author’s name, be indicated
1424
. 
Romania: Article 33.1 (b) of the Copyright Act allows “the use of brief quotations from a work for the 
purpose of an analysis, commentary or criticism, or for illustration, to the extent justified by the use 
thereof” if the work was already disclosed to the public and provided that such uses conform to proper 
practice, are not at variance with the normal exploitation of the work and are not prejudicial to the author 
or to the owners of the exploitation rights “
1425
. 
                                                     
 
1417 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Netherlands by A. Quaedvlieg), p. 398.  See also on the history of the 
implementation of the InfoSoc Directive and the debates which surrounded it, FIPR, Implementing the EU InfoSoc Directive, 2004, 
p. 101. 
1418 Idem, p. 415.  
1419 See the recent case law cited by A. Quaedvlieg, eod. loco, p. 416. 
1420 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 356. 
1421 FIPR, Implementing the EU InfoSoc Directive, p. 100 
1422 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 385 (where the author of the report adds that the provision fulfils the requirements of the Directive). 
1423 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Portugal by P. Akester), p. 446. 
1424 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 395. 
1425 The translation is from WIPO.  See also, Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the 
European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Romania by M. Voican), p. 
465. 
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Slovak Republic: Section 25 of the Copyright Act provides that quotations of a short part of a 
disclosed work in another work is allowed only for purposes of review or criticism of a disclosed work 
or for teaching, scientific, research or artistic purposes.  The quotation must be in compliance with 
customary practice and limited to what is necessary.  It shall mention the name of the author and the title 
of the work as well as its source
1426
. 
Slovenia: According to Article 51 of the Copyright Ac, it shall be permissible to make quotations of 
parts of a disclosed work and of single disclosed, photographs, works of fine arts, architecture, applied 
art, industrial design and cartography, provided it is necessary for the purpose of illustration, 
argumentation or referral.  The source and authorship of the work must be indicated, if the latter is 
indicated on the work used
1427
. 
Spain: According to Article 32 of the Copyright Act, fragments of written, sound or audiovisual works or 
isolated plastic, photographic, figurative or analogous works may be included in another original work 
for the purposes of teaching or research if the following conditions are met : the source work has been 
published; it is included for citation or for analysis, commentary or critical judgment; it is included with a 
citation of the source and the name of the author; it is only included to the extent justified by the purposes 
of teaching or research
1428
.   
In principle, literary, audiovisual or musical works cannot be "quoted" in full (only photographs and, in 
general, works of visual art could be so). However, courts are ready to allow the quotation of full literary 
works as long as this is “justified by the purpose of the inclusion.” 
1429
 
Usually, the language “by way of quotation or for analysis, comment or critical assessment," has been 
interpreted broadly by courts
1430
. As indicate, quotations may only be made “for teaching or research 
purposes” and “to the extent justified by the purpose of the inclusion.” In Spanish law, the quotation 
limitation has always been restricted only to purposes of teaching and research. It should be noted that 
despite the fact that Act 23/2006 introduced a specific exception for teaching purposes, the quotation 
exception remains restricted to teaching and research purposes.  As a result, courts feel compelled to 
grant a rather flexible and broad construction of these two concepts, as long as the specific use is made 
“to the extent justified by the purpose of the inclusion” 
1431
 and within the parameters of art. 40bis TRLPI 
(that is, it does not prejudice either the author or the normal exploitation of the quoted work)
1432
.  
                                                     
 
1426 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Slovak Republic by S. Olsovsky), p. 491. 
1427 The translation is from WIPO.  See also, Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the 
European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Slovenia, by M. Trampuz), p. 
499 et s. 
1428 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Spain by M. Garcia Leon), p. 520; FIPR, Implementing the EU InfoSoc 
Directive, 2004, p. 115 (about the draft legislation implementing the InfoSoc Directive).  For some case-law, see AP Barcelona 
(sec.15) October 31, 2002 [Barcanova] Westlaw.ES JUR2004/54771; AP Madrid (sec.14) December 23, 2003 [Fundación 
Santamaría] Westlaw.ES JUR2004/90140. 
1429 See AP Sevilla (sec. 6) October 30, 2003 [Apuntes] Westlaw.ES AC2003/1828: the making of teaching compilations 
(reproducing full literary works) is covered under art.32(1) TRLPI. 
1430 See AP Barcelona (sec.15) October 31, 2002 [Barcanova] Westlaw.ES JUR2004/54771: allowing (as a quotation) the 
unauthorized and free reproduction of works of visual art to “illustrate” school books, the court interpreted ‘by way of quotation’ as 
independent from analyzing, commenting or criticizing the quoted work: a quotation may be allowed simply to “illustrate, 
complement, show or facilitate the explanation contained in the textbook,” as long as it is done ‘to the extent justified by the 
purpose.” 
1431 See AP Sevilla (sec. 6) October 30, 2003 [Apuntes] Westlaw.ES AC2003/1828: the making of teaching compilations (also 
reproducing full literary works) is covered under art.32(1) TRLPI, because the scope of the reproduction is justified by the teaching 
purpose. The justification of the quotation may also be examined taking into account the “contextual importance of the quoted parts”: 
see AP Valencia (sec.9) January 3, 2007 [Contrato de seguro] Westlaw.ES AC2007/1252; the “substantial and important“ nature of 
the quoted parts: see AP La Coruña (sec.5) March 23, 1999 [Autonomia y Heteronomía Moral] Westlaw.ES AC1999/1570; or the 
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This limitation does not formally exclude commercial purposes, which means that they are perfectly 
allowed under it as long as they are kept within the scope of art.40bis TRLPI
1433
.   
Sweden: our understanding (but this being said with some precaution as we could not verify it with all 
certainly) is that the exception is more or less identical as the one from the Directive. 
United Kingdom: when implementing the InfoSoc Directive, the UK adopted a rather conservative 
approach by choosing to retain its existing exceptions and limitations and only amending them whenever 
required by the InfoSoc Directive.  Under Article 30.1 of the Copyright legislation (whose title is : 
“Criticism, review and news reporting”), it is stated that ”fair dealing with a work for the purpose of 
criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any 
copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided 
that the work has been made available to the public”.  The latter condition was added to the pre-existing 
legislation to comply with the InfoSoc Directive, even if it steered some debate due to the fact that this 
was seen by some as restricting freedom of expression
1434
. 
3.  General observations on the quotation exception 
As general comments on the overall picture concerning the implementation of the quotation exception, 
one may mention the following: 
- As indicated earlier, the initial text of the draft directive from the Commission already provided for 
an exception for quotation and the text thereof did not change much during the legislative 
process, which is an indication that the principle of such exception was not very controversial;  
- This is probably why all Member States either already had or have introduced such exception 
when implementing the Copyright Directive.  So, the exception exists in all Member States (be it 
added that it is somewhat uncertain in Bulgaria that the text applies to the Internet).  It means that 
the exception did not have to be made compulsory for it to be adopted in all Member States 
(without prejudice however to the right of a Member State to, in the future, eliminate such 
exception from its list – this seems highly unlikely). 
However, some countries enlarged the pre-existing exception while others added new conditions to it.  
And a closer look at the various legislations indicates that: 
- Only in 2 Member States (Belgium and Portugal) has it been made clear that exceptions could 
not be waived by contract (within however the limits deriving from the InfoSoc Directive). In the 
Danish Copyright Act, it has not been made clear, and in the Danish legal literature, it is disputed 
whether exceptions can be waived by contract or not; 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
amount of quoted material, in relation to the resulting work: see AP Ciudad Real (sec.1) March 2, 2001 [Unión Eléctrica Fenosa] 
Westlaw.ES JUR2001/149833 (nine pages of copied material–within a 19-page brochure–giving no credit to the author of the 
quoted work, is not exempted as a quotation). 
1432 See AP Barcelona (sec.15) October 31, 2002 [Barcanova] Westlaw.ES JUR2004/54771: confirming that the use of works of 
visual art to “illustrate” school books was exempted as a quotation because these were used for teaching.  As expressly stated by 
the court, the only quotations that are not covered by art.32(1) TRLPI are those which are not done for teaching or research 
purposes, or which do not fulfill the other requirements (fragments or isolated works of art, extent justified by the purpose, etc), or 
which cause an unjustified prejudice to the author or damage the normal exploitation of the quoted works (ex art.40bis TRLPI). 
1433 See AP Barcelona (sec.15) October 31, 2002 [Barcanova] Westlaw.ES JUR2004/54771: “the quotation [of works of visual art 
in school books] may indeed cause some prejudice, but it cannot be deemed unjustified and, because from its context, it does not 
prevent a normal exploitation of the works reproduced”; the court confirmed that the use was exempted as a quotation “regardless of 
the fact that the textbooks are being sold and the publisher has a clear for profit intent.” See also AP Madrid (sec.14) December 23, 
2003 [Fundación Santamaría] Westlaw.ES JUR2004/90140: commercial textbooks (used in official teaching programs) can benefit 
from the quotation exception. 
1434 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the United Kingdom by T. Aplin), p. 572. 
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- “Quotation” is often considered as meaning than only parts (or “small parts” of a work may be 
reproduced but this is not always the case and some countries (the Netherlands) are more liberal 
than others (France, Luxembourg), while in Ireland, it is debatable whether the size of the 
quotation matters or not ;  
- It is sometimes recalled that the intellectual legacy of the pre-existing work must be respected  
and reflected in a recognizable way (Estonia, Belgium
1435
), but not all Member States require that 
condition; 
- Some Member States (Belgium, Italy) prohibit quotations for commercial purposes; in some 
Member States, the quotation may not prejudice the commercial exploitation of the work or 
otherwise cause a prejudice to the author, in some other Member States, such condition is not 
mentioned or not existing. 
4.  Case-law of the Court of Justice 
One should remember that the Court of Justice, in its Painer decision
1436
, gave two (or maybe only one 
actually) additional explanations on the conditions of application of the quotation exception which will 
entail changes to some Member States’ legislation or case-law, i.e.:  
The first question was : “ Is Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 …, in the light of Article 5(5) of that 
directive, to be interpreted as meaning that its application is not precluded where a press report quoting a 
work or other protected matter is not a literary work protected by copyright?”  Even if it relates to a press 
report in this particular case, the question is relevant for all UGC materials quoting pre-existing works. 
The Court of Justice answered to this first question as follows: 
“130    In that regard, it is appropriate to note at the outset that Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 
2001/29 sets out a series of conditions for its application which do not include a requirement 
that a work or other protected subject-matter must be quoted as part of a literary work 
protected by copyright.(…) 
132    As regards the context surrounding Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29, it is important 
to note that, as stated in recital 31 in the preamble to that directive, a ‘fair balance’ must be 
safeguarded between, on the one hand, the rights and interests of authors, and, on the 
other, the rights of users of protected subject-matter. 
133    It is also important to note that while the conditions set out in Article 5(3)(d) of 
Directive 2001/29 must, according to the Court’s case-law referred to in paragraph 109 of 
the present judgment, be interpreted strictly, since that provision is a derogation from the 
general rule established by that directive, the fact remains that the interpretation of those 
conditions must also enable the effectiveness of the exception thereby established to be 
safeguarded and its purpose to be observed (see, to that effect, Football Association 
Premier League and Others, paragraphs 162 and 163). 
134    Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 is intended to strike a fair balance between the 
right to freedom of expression of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and the 
reproduction right conferred on authors. 
                                                     
 
1435 M.C. Janssens, in La loi belge sur le droit d’auteur, Commentaire par article, Hommage à Jan Corbet, Larcier, ed. F. Brison & 
H. Vanhees, 3rd ed., p. 139. 
1436 Case C-145/10 (Third Chamber), 1 December 2011, (Eva-Maria Painer); V. Dahan & Ch. Bouffier, « Arrêt Painer du 1er 
décembre 2011 : la CJUE poursuit son oeuvre d’harmonisation du droit d’auteur », Revue Lamy Droit de l’immatériel, March 2012, 
n° 80, p. 14 et s. 
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135    That fair balance is struck, in this case, by favouring the exercise of the users’ 
right to freedom of expression over the interest of the author in being able to prevent 
the reproduction of extracts from his work which has already been lawfully made available to 
the public, whilst ensuring that the author has the right, in principle, to have his name 
indicated. (emphasis added) 
136    From those two opposing points of view, the issue of whether the quotation is made as 
part of a work protected by copyright or, on the other hand, as part of a subject-matter not 
protected by copyright, is irrelevant. 
137    In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to question 2(a) is that 
Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29, read in the light of Article 5(5) of that directive, must be 
interpreted as not precluding its application where a press report quoting a work or other 
protected subject-matter is not a literary work protected by copyright. 
If applied to UGC, it clearly means that the UGC (quoting a pre-existing work) must not even qualify as “a 
work” protected by copyright for the quotation exception to be applicable.  The copyright protected status 
of UGC (quoting a pre-existing work) does therefore not play as a condition to allow a quotation.  
Consequently, all UGC can benefit from the exception, provided the other conditions to the quotation right 
are met. 
The second question relevant for our analysis read as follows:  
“138    By question 2(b), the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 5(3)(d) of 
Directive 2001/29, read in the light of Article 5(5) of that directive, must be interpreted as 
precluding its application where the name of the author or performer of the work or other 
protected subject-matter quoted is not indicated”. 
The answer was as follows: 
“139    The provisions of Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 establish the obligation of 
principle that, for quotations, the source, including the author’s name, unless that turns out to 
be impossible, be indicated, it being understood that the work or other protected subject-
matter quoted has already been lawfully made available to the public.(…) 
149    In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to question 2(b) is that 
Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29, read in the light of Article 5(5) of that directive, must be 
interpreted as meaning that its application is subject to the obligation to indicate the source, 
including the name of the author or performer, of the work or other protected subject-matter 
quoted. However, if, in applying Article 5(3)(e)
1437
 of Directive 2001/29, that name was not 
indicated, that obligation must be regarded as having been fulfilled if the source alone is 
indicated.” 
This second answer does not add much to the text of the directive, which it basically confirms, i.e. the 
name of the author or performer and the source must be mentioned unless this proves impossible. 
In practice, one must admit that for many UGC works, this condition is not respected and, in many 
instances, the source and the name of the author or performer is not mentioned, even when this would 
have been possible.  This is probably due to a lack of information by users ignoring this legal condition, 
                                                     
 
1437 Article 5.3.(e) reads as follows: “(e) use for the purposes of public security or to ensure the proper performance or reporting of 
administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings”. 
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but also to the fact that rightholders do not yet sufficiently rely on the “rights management information 
systems”, as encouraged by article 7 of the InfoSoc Directive (even if one must remember that recourse 
to such rights management information is obviously not a pre-condition to copyright protection). 
More generally, if a certain percentage of UGC works do contain quotations of pre-existing works, it does 
not appear to us that this is the case for most UGC works.  Harmonizing the conditions more precisely 
would facilitate the authors of some UGC works but will not, as such, provide “the solution” to UGC in 
general if  there was to be a need  to facilitate its dissemination on the Web.   
Despite this, some have tried to come up with a text which would harmonize the situation in Europe, by 
adopting a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Interpretation of the Right of Quotation, in May 
2012.   Such MoUs, if adopted by many stakeholders, may help in giving greater clarity to users, even 
though our impression, in this case, is that the draft MoU goes too far in allowing quotations; a detailed 
analysis is out of the scope of this report
1438
. 
We will not yet suggest here what our own recommendations would be regarding quotations, as the 
Commission asked us to divide the “as is” part of our work from the “to be” part (which will come after this 
first part). 
B. Caricature, parody and pastiche 
1. General presentation 
The Copyright Directive, under article 5.3.(k) allows Member States to provide for an exception for 
caricature as follows: 
“(k) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche”. 
The Berne Convention and the other international treaties on copyright do not provide for an exception for 
such purpose, so that one may and should fall back on the general three-steps-test provision to justify the 
existence of such exception in many States and verify its limits
1439
.   In some countries, notably in the 
U.S.
1440
, it is through case-law that such exception has been admitted. 
It will in this regard be interesting to see the answers which the EUCJ will give to the questions which 
have just recently been referred to her regarding parody by the Brussels Court of appeal
1441
.  
                                                     
 
1438 The text of the MoU is available here : http://a2knetwork.org/quotation.  It was mainly prepared by M. Senftleben (Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam).  It contains interesting proposals but at the same times goes too far on some other issues. 
1439 M. Ficsor, “Comments on the UGC provisions in the Canadian Bill C-32: potential dangers for unintended consequences in the 
light of the international norms on copyright and related rights”  (23 October 2010), available at 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=31, p. 10. 
1440 See the US Supreme Court Decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 US 596 (1994) and the later decisions on such 
exception. 
1441 The Court of appeal of Brussels, in its arrest dd 8 April, 2013 (Deckmyn v Vandersteen en Vrijheidsfonds VZW v. 
Vandersteen) raises the following questions to the EUCJ (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Brussel 
(Belgium) lodged on 17 April 2013 — Johan Deckmyn, Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others, (Case C-201/13) 
(2013/C 189/11): 
1. Is the concept of ‘parody’ an independent concept in European Union law?  
2. If so, must a parody satisfy the following conditions or conform to the following characteristics:  
— the display of an original character of its own (originality);  
— and such that the parody cannot reasonably be ascribed to the author of the original work;  
— be designed to provoke humour or to mock, regardless of whether any criticism thereby expressed applies to the original work or 
to something or someone else;  
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2. Analysis in the Member States 
We shall hereafter describe how this exception has been implemented in the Member States. 
Austria: the parody exception was not introduced in the Copyright Act when implementing the 
Directive
1442
.  However, some commentators consider that “the freedom to make caricatures is 
safeguarded under general principles of copyright law and will seldom amount to a reproduction or 
adaptation”
1443
; in our view, it may be difficult, for many caricatures or parodies, to sustain that they do not 
amount to a reproduction (considering the wide definition of such term by the Copyright Directive) or to an 
adaptation, so that this conclusion may, in our view, be over-optimistic on the existence of a right of 
caricature. 
Belgium: The caricature exception already existed since the first Belgian Copyright Act of 1886 and 
was maintained in the Copyright Act, provided that it must take into account honest practices.  There is 
no difference between caricature, parody or pastiche and no limitation regarding the importance of the 
taking from the pre-existing work or regarding the type of work which may be parodied.  Case-law has 
however often interpreted the exception narrowly and requires the following cumulative conditions: the 
parody must itself be original, have a purpose of criticism, be somewhat humorous and may not cause 
confusion with the pre-existing work. It is sometimes further required that the parody not have a 
commercial purpose and not have as its main or sole purpose to cause prejudice to the pre-existing work.  
The parody may not overrule the moral right of integrity (the honour or reputation of the author may not be 
damaged) and article 10 of the EDHR may not be invoked to allow infringements to the moral right of 
integrity.  The weighing of these different principles is described as a difficult exercice
1444
. 
Bulgaria: the parody exception was not introduced when implementing the Copyright Directive
1445
, for 
fear of abuses of such exception.  There seems to be no case-law on caricature in Bulgaria. 
Cyprus: the parody exception has not been introduced
1446
.  However, such limitations are recognized 
under the non-statutory limitations of freedom of communication or press as they are safeguarded by the 
Constitution
1447
. 
Czech Republic: the parody exception does not seem to have been introduced
1448
 
Denmark: the parody exception was not introduced when implementing the Copyright Directive
1449
.  
However, caricatures will often be deemed new and independent works of art under Section 4 (2) of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
— mention the source of the parodied work?  
3. Must a work satisfy any other conditions or conform to other characteristics in order to be capable of being labelled as a parody? 
1442 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Austria by F. Philapitsch), p. 73. 
1443 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 113. 
1444 M.C. Janssens, in La loi belge sur le droit d’auteur, Commentaire par article, Hommage à Jan Corbet, Larcier, ed. F. Brison & 
H. Vanhees, 3rd ed., p. 168. 
1445 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Bulgaria by V. Sokolov), p. 111. 
1446 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Cyprus by A. Demetriades), p. 128.  
1447 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p.  143. 
1448 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Czech Republic by L. Pressburgerova & J. Tajbr), p. 156. 
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Copyright Act and thus fall outside of the copyright protection of the pre-existing work
1450
.  It remains to be 
seen, in our view, if this is consistent with the existence of an autonomous adaptation right as provided for 
by the Berne Convention. 
Estonia:  a parody may be made of a lawfully published work, to the extent justified by such 
purpose, which must be scientific, educational or informational
1451
. 
Finland: the caricature exception was not introduced explicitly when implementing the Copyright 
Directive (contrary to most exceptions of the catalogue), but it is admitted that parodies may be made, on 
the basis that ideas may not be protected, and with this limit that the parody may not be an adaptation of 
the pre-existing work (in which case it requires a licence)
1452
.  Some commentators add that parody is 
recognised as a general principle of Finnish copyright law
1453
; this may, however, seem insufficient as a 
system to ensure transparency and clarity for users.   
France: the caricature exception already existed before the Copyright Directive and the text was not 
changed upon implementation of said Directive; caricatures must however comply “with the laws of the 
genre” (which gave rise to numerous court decisions)  
1454
.   
Germany: the caricature exception existed prior to the Copyright Directive
1455
.  It is sometimes 
considered that this is not even a limitation to copyright but presupposes that caricatures do not constitute 
reproductions or adaptations 
1456
 (an opinion about which one may have his doubts for many cases of 
caricature). 
Greece: the parody exception does not exist as such under Greek law and was not introduced when 
implementing the Copyright Directive
1457
.  In theory, some commentators consider that it would fall under 
the freedom of communication or of the press, but there does not seem to exist any case-law confirming 
or infirming such view
1458
. 
Hungary: even though no explicit provision exists under the Copyright Act, legal literature and practice 
accept the exception provided that the use must correspond to the conditions of the quotation exception 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
1449 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Denmark by P. Schonning), p. 168. 
1450 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 163. 
1451 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Estonia by V. Naslund), p. 180. 
1452 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Finland by K. Harenko), p. 191.  
1453 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 197. 
1454 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on France by P. Kamina), p. 214. 
1455 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Germany by M. Schaefer), 223.  
1456 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 230. 
1457 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Greece by E. Vagena), p. 243. 
1458 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 250. 
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or (yet this view is not shared by all, all the more so if one considers that exceptions must be interpreted 
narrowly)
1459
 consist in a humoristic-critical imitation of a given author’s style
1460
.  The expert opinion 
16/2008 of the Hungarian Copyright Expert Board had to discuss whether a secondary television 
advertisement is a use (adaptation) of a pre-existing ad. The defendant argued that the latter ad was a 
parody. The Board discussed the question of parody on a theoretical level and after that – based upon 
the facts of the case – said that even though the Hungarian Copyright Act does not have any expressed 
provision on parody, works that are built upon pre-existing materials, but where the original work 
disappears (and becomes invisible, undistinguishable) in the latter one, one cannot talk about a 
permissible use.  
Ireland: apart from the fair dealing exception which can be invoked in regard of quotations for criticism or 
review, or for the reporting of current events, there is no explicit provision on caricature in the 
Copyright Act; this relying on the fair dealing exception requires however that the extent of the borrowing 
from the pre-existing work may not be greater than what is strictly necessary for the purpose
1461
. 
Italy: the caricature exception was not taken over when implementing the Copyright Directive; 
however, there is consistent case-law stating that caricature and parody are allowed on the basis of 
Article 21 of the Constitution that enshrines the fundamental right of freedom of expression
1462
.  It is 
generally considered that caricatures have the purpose of twisting or overturning the original meaning of 
the work, thus arriving at expressing essentially different concepts
1463
.  When this happens, “the link with 
the original work and the parody adaptation is definitively cut artistically, logically and legally”
1464 
; it does 
not seem to us that this will always be the case.  Parodies which would fulfill the conditions of quotations 
and thus not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work would apparently be acceptable
1465
. As 
recalled in the text, considering the non-existence of an express parody exception under Italian law, 
courts have relied on the principle of freedom of expression (Art. 21 Constitution) and on the provision 
of Art. 4 of the Italian Copyright Act, which allows courts to recognize the autonomous character of 
parodies (as derivative works) and to shield them from claims coming from the author of the original work.  
For such creations the follow-on author does not need to obtain the authorization of the author of the 
original work (i.e., the work that the follow-on author makes fun of). The Italian case law is so well 
developed in this respect that the legislator did not feel the necessity to introduce the parody exception 
into the Copyright Act at the time of the transposition of the 2001 Directive into Italian law.  
                                                     
 
1459 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 262, where no reference is made to such possibility. 
1460 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Hungary by M. Ficsor), p. 265. 
1461 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Ireland by L. Scales), p. 288; Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on 
the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 278. 
1462 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Italy by  S. Ercolani), p. 316. 
1463 See for instance Court of Naples, 15.02.2000 – or Court of Bologna, 21.10.1991, which found lawful the unauthorized use of 
drawings protected by copyright in the creation of satirical comics. In this context the parodist was found to use the distinctive 
elements of the original creations in order to twist or overturn the original meaning, modifying also the shape of graphical elements 
through new and original additions that radically altered the semantics of the original work.   
1464 Idem. 
1465 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 291.  In the same sense, FIPR, Implementing the EU InfoSoc Directive, 2004, p. 88. 
User Generated Content (UGC)  479 
 
 
 
Latvia: the caricature exception does exist under copyright
1466
. 
Lithuania: the caricature exception is similar to the provision of the Copyright Directive
1467
.  
Luxembourg: the Copyright Act allows caricatures aimed at mocking the parodied work provided that 
they are in accordance with fair practice and that they only use elements strictly necessary for the parody 
and do not disparage the work. It is worth noting that the initial intention of the legislator to allow any 
parody or caricature without any further condition was not retained
1468
.  Commentators insist that the 
purpose must be to “make fun” of the parodied work
1469
. 
Malta: the pre-existing exception for parody was kept when implementing the Copyright Directive
1470
. 
The Netherlands: as explained above, the discussions on exceptions to be introduced were rather strong 
in the Netherlands.  The implementation of the Copyright Directive was the occasion to introduce the 
caricature exception under Dutch law, an exception which had been the subject of many debates for 
years.  Debates do continue as to whether the exceptions have necessarily to be interpreted narrowly and 
how they must be combined with the three-steps-test
1471
.  Before this explicit exception, it had always 
been accepted that parodies were permissible, in particular since a decision by the Supreme Court in 
1984; courts then referred to the Directive even before it was adopted (because the previous case-law 
was somewhat restrictive).  The initial bill did not add any condition to the text of the Copyright Directive; 
however, the final text introduced the requirement that the caricature be made in accordance with 
what is reasonably permitted according to the rules of social intercourse (or the normal rules of 
social custom – depending on the translation).  Commentators debated about the meaning of such 
additional proviso, some sustaining that it was a redundant reformulation of the three-step test; others 
argued otherwise.  The District Court of Amsterdam dealt with the parody exception in the light of the 
freedom of expression of Article 10 ECHR, following some commentary on this
1472
.  Discussions amongst 
commentators as to the extent and conditions of the parody exception have, not really surprisingly, been 
very lively in Dutch doctrine.   
                                                     
 
1466 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Latvia by J. Bordans & I.Veiksa), p. 330. 
1467 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Lithuania by G. Ramanauskas), p. 352; Institute for Information Law (IVIR), 
Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 318. 
1468 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Luxembourg by K. Manhaeve & Th. Schiltz), p. 370. 
1469 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 327. 
1470 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 339. 
1471 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on The Netherlands by  A. Quaedvlieg), p. 395 and  p. 418. 
1472 See e.g. M. de Cock Buning, “De parodie exceptie nader beschouwd”, in W. Grosheide, 1996, quoted in Copyright in the 
information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on The Netherlands by  A. Quaedvlieg), p. 395 and  p. 418. The Netherlands by  A. 
Quaedvlieg), p. 419.   
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Poland: although it was stated that freedom of speech was to be one of the guiding principles of the 
implementation of the Copyright Directive
1473
, we fail to see that the caricature exception has in fact 
been introduced. 
Portugal: the caricature exception was not implemented in the Copyright Act, “to avoid confusion with 
other exceptions”
1474
.  Some commentators consider that it is allowed as a free use in general, being a 
use merely inspired by an existing work
1475
. 
Romania: although the comment we read does not list article 5.3.(k) of the Copyright Directive (allowing 
the caricature exception) amongst the exceptions which were not taken over by the Romanian 
implementation legislation, we fail to see the article which allows it and the commentator does not 
mention it
1476
.  It apparently fits within the quotation exception but must be justified by a specific type of an 
art form (which is to us difficult to interpret)
1477
. 
Slovak Republic : the Copyright Act does not contain a caricature exception
1478
. 
Slovenia
1479
: exceptions are mandatory and may not be overridden by contracts; on the other hand, free 
access to information does not allow courts to create new exceptions outside those which are explicitly 
provided for in the Copyright Act.  Hardly any case-law exists on exceptions.  We have yet to find the 
provision on caricature if it indeed exists.  
Spain: a pre-existing exception was part of the Copyright Act and was not modified when 
implementing the Copyright Directive. It is considered that parodies are neither reproductions nor 
derivative works, on the basis of article 39 of the Copyright Act (an opinion about which one may have 
some doubts, in our view).  A parodied author may however object to the parody if it causes confusion 
with the pre-existing work
1480
. 
Art. 39 TRLPI declares that the parody of a previously disclosed work will not be considered as an 
unauthorized adaptation as long as there is no risk of confusion with the original work and no damage is 
caused to the original work or to its author.  This limitation is directly justified by the fundamental right to 
                                                     
 
1473Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Poland by W. Dziomdziora), p. 428. 
1474 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Portugal by P. Akester), p. 447, referring to the Nota Justificativa, e) 15 (h) 
of the Gabinete do Direito de Autor. 
1475 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 396 (referring to article 2 (1) n of the Copyright Act. 
1476 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Romania by M. Voican), p. 467. 
1477 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 386. 
1478 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Slovak Republic by S. Olsovsky), p. 493. 
1479 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Slovenia by M. Trampuz). 
1480 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 424. 
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freedom of speech in art. 20 of the Spanish Constitution. However, in practice, it seems that it tends to 
cover rather spurious uses
1481
.   
Sweden: there is no parody exception in the law but it is accepted that general principles of law, 
confirmed on this by case-law, lead to the conclusion that parodies are not infringing the rights of the 
authors.  In a case in 2005 the Supreme Court considered a parody to be an independent work and 
therefore not infringing upon the pre-existing work
1482
. 
United Kingdom: as is well known, the parody exception does not exist as such under UK law
1483
.  
The Gowers Review suggested introducing it; so did the Heargreaves review
1484
, but this has not been 
done so far.  Following the Gowers Review, the UK Intellectual Property Office suggested its introduction 
but then changed its mind.  The fair dealing exception however is probably already covering acts of 
parody
1485
, even if some commentators consider that “UK courts are traditionally reluctant to accept 
parodies as non-infringing”
1486
. 
3.  General observations on parodies, caricatures and pastiches 
It appears in a number of countries that the parody exception was not implemented explicitly yet is often 
(but not in all countries) considered as covered by the freedom of expression or by general principles of 
law.  The Copyright Directive does not state that, when Member States wish to introduce or retain a pre-
existing exception, such should be made explicitly in the copyright legislation, yet one shall easily admit 
that a combination of explicit exceptions, often to be considered as having to be implemented narrowly, 
co-existing with implicit exceptions only to be found in the case-law or in the legal doctrine or in 
constitutional principles renders the task of the lawyers, legal advisers, let alone small enterprises or 
private individuals, more difficult and that this result does lack the transparency which one would be 
entitled to expect.   
The chilling effect thereof is hard to assess because one would need, by definition, to gather information 
about intents or projects which did not materialize due to e.g. fears from users or caricaturists, but it 
seems logical to consider that the unharmonized situation renders projects more risky to assess a priori 
and may stifle users who would otherwise engage in UGC pieces of work.  
                                                     
 
1481 See the ruling by the AP Madrid (sec.13) February 2, 2000 [La Parodia Nacional] Westlaw.ES AC2000/848: the use of musical 
works with different lyrics created by participants in an entertainment TV program was deemed exempted as a parody because “it 
was meant for fun,” not as a commercial exploitation of the work; this ruling was heavily criticized by scholars. Instead, see AP 
Barcelona (sec.15) October 10, 2003 [El jueves] Westlaw.ES AC2003/1895 and AP Barcelona (sec.15)  April 24, 2002 [MGM logo] 
Westlaw.ES JUR2004/14049, which denied that the so called “weapon parody” (when the work is used to make a parody of 
something or someone unrelated to it) is exempted by this limitation.  See also M. Sol Muntañola, El régimen jurídico de la parodia, 
Marcial Pons, Madrid (2005). 
1482 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 434. 
1483 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the United Kingdom by T. Aplin), p. 573 and 574. 
1484 I. Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity, A review of intellectual property and growth, 2011, p. 4 (i.a.). The author mentions the 
example of homemade parody “Newport State of Mind” (based upon Empire State of Mind, a hit song by the American rapper Jay-
Z). The parody, achieved great success when posted on YouTube in 2010, but resulted in action by the right owners to exercise 
their rights under UK copyright law to have it removed from the internet. 
1485 For an analysis of the parody exception under UK legislation, see the references quoted by T. Aplin, in Copyright in the 
information society, op. cit., p. 574. 
1486 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 446.  See also IFPR, Implementing the EU InfoSoc Directive, 2004, p. 122. 
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The BEUC (European Consumer Organisation), about the parody exception
 1487
: 
- Observes that it has been implemented differently across the Member States (which we indeed 
illustrated above); 
- Considers that “there is no evidence that a parody may result in lost sales of the original due to 
confusion between the original work and a parody”
1488
; 
- Narrates the story of a caricature about Volkswagen uploaded on YouTube by Greenpeace, 
removed after a notice-and-take-down request by Volkswagen and then put back by YouTube 
which apparently considered that the issue had to be considered under US law in which this 
specific case would be permitted under the fair use doctrine
1489
; the video is still visible on 
YouTube at the moment.  This example cannot really be considered as decisive for UGC and for 
the purposes of our analysis: it does not concern UGC (i.e. works made by individuals) and the 
caricature was finally admitted and reloaded on YouTube, so that the exception played its role.  
Arguably, it might even be considered as a counter-example. 
 
In the second part of our part, we will discuss whether some solutions, if needed, for the promotion of 
UGC could be found around the parody exception. 
C. Incidental inclusion 
1.  General presentation 
The Copyright Directive allows Member States to introduce an exception under article 5.3. (i) for the 
“incidental inclusion of a work or other subject-matter in other material”.  This exception should not be 
confused with the exception of article 5.1. for “temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2, 
which are transient or incidental”. 
The recitals of the Directive do not give further explanation on the scope of such exception. 
As with parodies and caricatures, the Berne Convention and the other international treaties on 
copyright do not provide for an exception for such purpose, so that one may and should fall back on the 
general three-steps-test provision to justify the existence of such exception and verify its limits.  
There is, to our knowledge, neither case-law from the Court of Justice on this exception nor any 
prejudicial question presently pending
1490
.  
The incidental inclusion exception, as mentioned by the Terms of Reference of our Study, may provide 
relief to certain cases of UGC, such as the examples often referred to of private video of weddings or 
other private or family events where some music may be heard in the background and where the fact 
that the video is made available on a publicly available platform makes it subject to possible claims for 
infringement under copyright or neighbouring rights.  “Incidental” does not equal “in the background” 
but rather refers to “accidental” or “unintentional” takings and thus to situations in which the purpose of 
the user was not to capture the sounds or the images at stake but where such capture happened at the 
occasion of the recording of another element which was the real subject matter of the 
recording/creation by the user. 
As noted by a recent US report
1491
, “there are likely many incidental uses occurring in today’s 
technology –and media- saturated society, and in many instances they will not attract the attention of 
                                                     
 
1487 BEUC, « EU InfoSoc Directive – a glance at exceptions & limitations – the need for revision », available on their website, p. 6. 
1488 One may observe however that, from a legal point of view, this criterion is not really relevant.  It is relevant only from a policy 
point of view. 
1489 Idem. 
1490 There is however US case-law on this issue.   
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the copyright holders or will not be challenged.  However, there is enough documentation of chilling 
effects to indicate a need for the additional certainty that adding incidental uses to the preamble could 
provide”.  While not giving examples of such documentation on chilling effects in the report
1492
 (yet 
referring to the existence of “a somewhat limited set of case law only”)
1493
, the author suggests to add 
“incidental use” to the preamble of Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code (which is the 
provision dealing with fair use).  The preamble actually only lists (in a non-exhaustive manner) 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research) as grounds to justify a fair use 
exception under US law (provided that the other conditions of Section 107 are met); the author of the 
report argues that adding “incidental use” to this non-exhaustive list would avoid some aggressive 
actions taken by rightholders against users who incidentally included copyright protection works in a 
video footage or in another personal work.   Such incidental and often unintentional inclusions should, 
he said, be considered as de minimis (“too trifling a use to even be considered an infringement”)
1494
. 
Interestingly, the report adds that if rightholders will not often initiate lawsuits against such uses, they 
may have recourse to the more simple remedy of a notice-and-take-down sent to the intermediary 
platform
1495
, or that automatic filtering systems which do not distinguish fair uses from infringements 
will automatically remove the video footage from the platform while it was actually not infringing
1496
.  
Finally, one should not forget that even the most well-known platforms have no duty to accept uploads 
from users and that there is no such thing as a “right to upload” which a user could invoke vis-à-vis an 
individual platform to oblige the platform to accept its work (whether original, mere copy or UGC as we 
understand it in this Study). 
2.  Analysis in the Member States 
When examining how this exception was implemented in the Member States, the situation may be 
described as follows: 
Austria: the exception was not included when implementing the Copyright Directive
1497
. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
1491 J.M. Urban, Copyright Reform Act, prepared on behalf of Public Knowledge, Report 1, “Updating Fair Use for Innovators and 
Creators in the Digital Age: Two Targeted Reforms, BerkeleyLaw, University of California, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public 
Policy Clinic, February 13, 2010, p. 12. 
1492 And indeed, we could not find much of such evidence of a real “chilling effect” either. 
1493 Idem, p. 13. 
1494 Idem, p. 13.  According to (our discussion with) Prof. Ginsburg, adding incidental use to Section 107 of the preamble 
accomplishes nothing because the list is merely illustrative, has never played a determinative role in the analysis and because there 
is already a longstanding caselaw on incidental use as de minimis or fair use. 
1495 The Lenz v. Universal Music Corp case, discussed further in this report is often cited as an example of the abuse of notice-
and-take-down procedures by rightholders in the US; whether it is a good example of such situation of incidental inclusion being 
sued by rightholders is not unanimously agreed by all commentators. 
1496 The author of the report gives the following examples of a chilling effect situation:  
- see posting of Fred von Lohmann to Deeplinks Blog, YouTube’s January Fair Use Massacre, 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/01/youtubes-january-fair-use-massacre (Feb. 3, 2009) (describing how, following a dispute 
between YouTube and Warner Music, YouTube’s Content ID filtering system removed many user videos that used Warner’s music 
without distinguishing fair from infringing uses); 
- documentary filmmakers of American University’s Center for Social Media apparently show that documentarians have been 
increasingly afraid of filming due to increased demands for permission fees and a lack of certainty around fair use defenses; see 
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE 
CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 26 (2004), available at 
 http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf .  A filmmaker commented (in a somewhat caricatured 
manner): “It’s like saying I can’t film the clouds” (report cited, p. 14).  
1497 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Austria, by F. Philapitsch), p. 73; Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study 
on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 92. 
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Belgium: an exception already existed for the reproduction and communication to the public of works 
exposed in public places when the goal of the reproduction or communication is not the work itself – 
which is a mix of the incidental inclusion exception and of the exception allowed by article 5.3 (h) of the 
Copyright Directive.  It mainly covers paintings or buildings but arguably not music for instance, since 
music is not “exposed” in public places.  It is thus of limited uses for UGC. 
Bulgaria: the exception was not introduced in the law because it was feared that such formulation 
would provide grounds for a wide interpretation and lead to abuses
1498
. 
Cyprus: the exception pre-existed and was kept in the implementing legislation.  However, it only 
concerns artistic works and their inclusion in films and emissions; the definition of film is however rather 
broad and could arguably be interpreted as covering video footages
1499
. 
Czech Republic: the exception has been introduced in the Copyright Act
1500
. 
Denmark: the exception was only partly adopted, as it only covers reproductions of subordinate 
importance of works of art in newspapers, and in periodicals, film, radio or television as part of reporting 
current events; this will certainly not always be applicable to UGC materials
1501
. 
Estonia: the incidental inclusion exception was as such not introduced in the law.  A provision inspired 
from the exception of article 5.3 (h) (architectural works or sculptures in public places) may provide some 
relief, but in a limited number of UGC cases only
1502
. 
Finland: the Copyright Act, which has adopted almost all exceptions from the Copyright Directive, 
already provided for an exception for the incidental inclusion of works; the formulation of the 
exception, even if slightly different from the Copyright Directive, was not modified
1503
. 
France: the law does not provide for an incidental inclusion exception.   However, courts do accept 
to apply such exception (thus, a judicial exception) in specific cases
1504
.  Relating to the free reproduction 
or communication of works located in a public place, there has been numerous case law and especially 
decisions of the Cour de cassation.  
                                                     
 
1498 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Bulgaria, by V. Sokolov), p. 111. 
1499 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p.143. 
1500 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Czech Republic, by L. Pressburgerova & J. Tajbr), p. 146; Institute for 
Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 92. 
1501 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p.163; Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European 
Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Denmark, by P. Schonning, p. 168. 
1502 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Estonia, by V. Naslund), p. 177. 
1503 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Finland, by K. Harenko), p. 191; Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study 
on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, Final report, February 2007, p. 197. 
1504 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on France, by P. Kamina, p. 213. 
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Two isolated decisions (in 2001) were dealing with a judicial exception for incidental inclusion as such
1505
. 
The Cour de Cassation also affirmed the existence of such a limitation in the sense of the Info Soc 
Directive in its decision of 12 may 2011
1506
. 
Germany: a similar exception already existed and was not modified
1507
.  It permits such inclusion of 
works if it proves unavoidable (which is not exactly the wording of the Copyright Directive)
1508
. 
Greece: the legislator decided not to introduce the incidental inclusion exception when implementing 
the Copyright Directive
1509
. 
Hungary: the exception was not introduced in the legislation.  However, even though such case has 
not yet been dealt with by case-law, “it is probable that, in certain obvious cases, the use of works and 
objects of related rights in a way that it does not have real relevance from the viewpoint of the exploitation 
of these rights – and is thus incidental – could be regarded as permitted on the basis of the “de minimis” 
principle (according to which very small (“minimal”) takings are so unsubstantial that they do not infringe 
the exclusive rights of the rightholder, which also means that courts should not be called upon to issue 
injunctions or award damages for such insignificant acts)   ”
1510
.  Also, the exception of article 5.3. (h) of 
the Copyright Directive may be of some limited relief, for some UGC works. 
Ireland: Section 52 of the Copyright Act allows for the incidental inclusion of works or performances 
provided that such inclusion does not result in unreasonable prejudice to the copyright owner
1511
. 
Italy: the exception was not transposed when implementing the Copyright Directive
1512
. 
Latvia: the exception was not transposed when implementing the Copyright Directive
1513
. 
Lithuania: the exception was not transposed, even if an exception exists for the reproduction of public 
works of architecture and sculptures made to be located permanently in public places, and when the 
reproduction is not main subject of representation and not done for direct or indirect economic advantage 
(article 28 of the Copyright Law 
                                                     
 
1505 For more details on that point, see the study of the Max Planck Institute on “Balancing Copyright – A survey of National 
Approach” (Reto Hilty and Sylvie Nerisson Ed. , MIP Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol. 18, Springer, 2012), 
and the French report by Sylvie Nerisson (p. 387-429). 
1506 “Etre et Avoir”, R.T.D.Com. 2011, p. 553, obs. Pollaud-Dulian. 
1507 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Germany, by M. Schaefer) p. 223. 
1508 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 229. 
1509 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Greece, by E. Vagena), by 243. 
1510 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Hungary, by M. Ficsor), p. 265. 
1511 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Ireland, by L. Scales), p. 288. 
1512 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Italy, by S. Ercolani), p. 316. 
1513 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Latvia, by J. Bordans & I. Veiksa), p. 330. 
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Luxembourg: the exception was not introduced; however, a provision inspired from the exception of 
article 5.3 (h) (architectural works or sculptures in public places) may provide some relief, but in a limited 
number of UGC cases only
1514
. 
Malta: the exception pre-existed the Copyright Directive and was not modified, even if the wording 
is slightly different
1515
. 
The Netherlands: the incidental inclusion exception was added, after quite some controversies, for 
fear that it might be interpreted as “accidental” or “unintentional” and that its contours were vague.  Some 
case-law does exist.  A study commissioned by the Ministry of Justice in 2007 concluded that this 
exception was of little value to Dutch copyright (we could not verify if the added value for UGC was part of 
the issues analyzed by the report)
1516
. 
Poland : it does not seem that the exception has been introduced under Polish law
1517
. 
Portugal: the exception was added to the text by the Parliament, even if it had not been proposed by 
the Bill submitted by the Government
1518
. 
Romania: the exception was not taken over in the Copyright Act when implementing the Copyright 
Directive
1519
. 
Slovak Republic: the exception was not taken over in the Copyright Act when implementing the 
Copyright Directive
1520
. 
Slovenia: it does not seem that the exception was introduced
1521
. 
Spain: the exception was not introduced
1522
.  What is however allowed is the dissemination of works 
capable of being seen or heard in connection with news reporting (which must be the purpose of the 
dissemination)
1523
. 
                                                     
 
1514 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Luxembourg, by K. Manhaeve & Th. Schiltz), p. 369. 
1515 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 339. 
1516 A summary of this report is available at http://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/de-minimis-regelingen-in-het-auteursrecht-
haalbaar-en-wenselijk.aspx ; Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, 
edited by B. Lindner & T. Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Netherlands, by A. Quaedvlieg), p. 417.  See 
also, Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 357. 
1517 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (chapter on Poland, by W. Z. Dziomdziora, p. 427. 
1518 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Portugal, by P. Akester), p. 447. 
1519 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Romania, by M. Voican), p. 467. 
1520 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the Slovak Republic, by S. Olsovsky), p. 493. 
1521 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Slovenia, by M. Trampuz), p. 508. 
1522 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on Spain, by M.G. Leon), p. 516. 
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Sweden: a new provision (broader in scope than the pre-existing one) was added, allowing for the 
inclusion in a film, a television programme or a picture of a copy of a work of fine arts if the exploitation is 
of minor importance
1524
. 
United Kingdom: the incidental inclusion exists under Section 31 CDPA, no amendment has been 
made to the text 
1525
. 
3.  General observations on the incidental use exception: 
This exception may provide some relief to UGC works yet there are many limits to its utility: 
- It is not implemented at all in some Member States :  
o Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, did not implement the exception; 
o Finland, Germany, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal,  Sweden and the United 
Kingdom did; 
o France accepts it in court decisions but the law does not mention the exception; the same 
seems to more or less apply in Hungary; 
- Its inclusion via article 5.3. (h) limits in many countries its scope of application to architectural 
works and sculptures (fine arts mainly) but can hardly be said to apply to music and “remix” for 
instance (Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg). 
- Sometimes, the purpose of the inclusion must be for reporting on current events (Denmark, 
Spain). 
The overall picture is thus of a rather disharmonized situation, providing little certainty and difficult 
implementation schemes for pan-European UGC works.   
We will discuss in the second part of our Study whether some relief for UGC works could usefully be 
found in the adaptation of this exception. 
VIII. Overview of some recent case law on UGC 
A. Relevant case law of the EUCJ 
There is no case law of the EUCJ concerning cases of UGC. However, its case law in the field of 
copyright has been quite prolific in the last few years. The present section aims at determining whether 
the findings of the Court can provide useful clues in order to clarify the current legal status of UGC under 
European Law.  
1. The interpretation of the exceptions 
We have already examined in this Study the exceptions to copyright that may the most likely be 
applicable to the creation and publication of User Generated Content.  Without entering here into the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
1523 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 424. 
1524 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Part II, Country reports, G. Westkamp, 
Final report, February 2007, p. 434. 
1525 Copyright in the information society – A Guide to National Implementation of the European Directive, edited by B. Lindner & T. 
Shapiro, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011 (Chapter on the United Kingdom, by T. Aplin), p. 572. 
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details of each individual exception, this section explains the general principles set out by the EUCJ for 
the interpretation of the exceptions in general.  
A first well-established principle is the strict interpretation of exceptions. The reasons behind this 
principle were recalled by the Court, i.a. in the Painer
1526
 decision:  
- the principal purpose of Directive 2001/29 is to establish a high level of protection for, in 
particular, authors, which is crucial to intellectual creation and this purpose may not be 
compromised by the national implementation of exceptions; 
- the exceptions must comply with the need for legal certainty for authors with regard to the 
protection of their works; 
- the exceptions derogate from the general principle established by directive 2001/29, namely the 
requirement of authorisation from the copyright holder for any reproduction of a protected work 
and must, according to settled case-law, be interpreted strictly; 
- the three-step test provides additional requirements, with which exceptions must comply.  
 
A strict application of this principle led the Court to set out, in Painer, that the exception for public security 
could only be invoked by national authorities in charge of the security and not by newspapers on their 
own account. The Court provides its own interpretation of the directive, even if the wording of the 
exception does not expressly address the circumstances in which the interests of public security can be 
invoked with a view to the use of a protected work. 
In Infopaq International
1527
, in Football Association Premier League Ltd
1528
, and in Karen Murphy v. Media 
Protection Services Ltd
1529
, the EUCJ reiterated this principle of a strict interpretation in relation to the 
transient reproduction exemption.  
These recent cases nonetheless saw the Court somehow mitigating the principle of strict interpretation by 
recognising the need to enable the effectiveness of the exception. Following a teleological approach, 
the Court verified whether the proposed interpretation of the exceptions complied with their purpose and 
did not hinder their effectiveness in this regard. For instance, according to the Court, the purpose of the 
transient reproduction exception is to allow and ensure the development and operation of new 
technologies while safeguarding a fair balance between the rights and interests of right holders and users 
of the protected works. The interpretation of the conditions of the exceptions should help preserve the 
effectiveness of the exception and respect its purpose
1530
. 
In the Painer decision, the Court seemed to move one step beyond and made a balance of interests 
between the exclusive rights of the authors and the interests protected by the purpose of an exception.  
The Court held that the exception of quotation was “intended to strike a fair balance between the right to 
freedom of expression of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and the reproduction right 
conferred on authors” and that in such case, “the fair balance is struck by favouring the exercise of the 
users’ right to freedom of expression over the interest of the author in being able to prevent the 
                                                     
 
1526 Judgement of the Court of 1st December 2011, in Case C‑145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, Axel Springer 
AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co KG, Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg Expedition der 
Kölnischen Zeitung GmbH & Co KG. 
1527 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 16 July 2009, C-5/08, §56. 
1528 Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v. QC Leisure, David Richardson, AV 
Station plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen (C-403/08), 
§62.  
1529 Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08), 4 October 2011. 
1530 Football Association Premier League, §133. 
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reproduction of extracts from his work which has already been lawfully made available to the public, whilst 
ensuring that the author has the right, in principle, to have his name indicated”
1531
.  
Based on these considerations, the Court refused the application of an additional requirement going 
beyond the conditions set out by the text of the directive to qualify for the exception of quotation, i.e. the 
Court did not require that the quotation be part of a “work”
1532
.  
It is unclear whether this reasoning is only an application of the Court’s recently-established requirement 
to ensure the effectiveness of exceptions, or if the Court made a special treatment for those of the 
exceptions which are useful for the putting into practice of fundamental rights. Interestingly, in the latter 
case, one could imagine that the Court will hold a similar reasoning in future cases involving the 
exception of caricature and parody, the purpose of which being clearly the exercise of the freedom of 
expression, just like the exception of quotation.  
2. The margin enjoyed by the Member States in the implementation and the 
interpretation of the exceptions 
Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2001/29 set out an “exhaustive enumeration of exceptions and limitations to 
the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the public”
1533
. This list of exceptions is closed 
and optional for the Member States, apart from the exception for certain acts of temporary reproduction 
which is mandatory.  
Furthermore, the wording of most exceptions is relatively vague and it has been argued that they 
constitute prototypes for national lawmaking rather than precisely circumscribed exceptions with no 
inherent flexibility
1534
. Many exceptions use broad concepts for which no definition is provided and most of 
the time the conditions to benefit from the exceptions are not precisely set out. The combination of the 
optional character of the exception and the inherent flexibility of their wording led to different national 
implementation strategies across the Member States
1535
. We have already examined in this Study the 
differences in the implementation of three exceptions in the Member States. 
The margin enjoyed by the Member States in implementing the exceptions is however limited by the 
principle of strict interpretation (as arguably mitigated by the EUCJ in the Painer decision), explained in 
the previous section, and by the three-step test set out by the directive. Member States must therefore 
restrain from broadening the scope of the exceptions while implementing them. 
The optional character of the exceptions led therefore to the usual interpretation according to which 
Member States would be free to specify the limits of the exceptions. If the Member States are allowed not 
to implement certain exceptions while not being allowed to broaden their scope, it seems quite logical to 
allow the Member States to limit the scope of the exceptions and/or to specify additional conditions for 
their application.  
                                                     
 
1531 Painer, §134-135. 
1532 On another note, one might nonetheless query how this interpretation favors “expression” if the communication in which the 
quotation appears is not itself expressive (of anything other than the quotation).  Does this suggest that the EUCJ’s concept of 
“expression” embraces the mere reiteration of others’ expressions?  Some U.S. commentators (e.g., Rebecca Tushnet), do argue 
that repeating others’ expressions without adding any expression of one’s own nonetheless constitutes “freedom of expression,” but 
the US Supreme Court has so far not found such contentions convincing.  See e.g., Eldred v Ashcroft (“freedom of speech” primarily 
means “freedom to make one’s own speech”, not to repeat the speech of others). 
1533 Recital 32 of directive 2001/29 
1534 M. Senftleben, “Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use”, AMI/Tijndschrift voor auteurs-, 
media en informatierecht, 2003, p.10.  
1535 B. Hugenholtz and M. Senftleben, “Fair use in Europe. In search of flexibilities” 
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The Court recalled, in Painer: “the provisions of Directive 2001/29 do not expressly address the 
circumstances in which the interests of public security can be invoked with a view to the use of a 
protected work, meaning that the Member States which decide to enact such an exception enjoy a broad 
discretion in that respect. 
In fact, such a discretion is, first, in accordance with the idea that each Member State is best placed to 
determine, in accordance with its national needs, the requirements of public security, in the light of 
historical, legal, economic or social considerations specific to it. 
Secondly, that discretion is consistent with the Court’s case-law to the effect that, in the absence of 
sufficiently precise criteria in a directive to delimit the obligations thereunder, it is for the Member States to 
determine, in their own territory, what are the most relevant criteria for ensuring compliance with that 
directive.”
1536
 
However, outside the context of public security, different principles set out by the recent case-law seem to 
limit significantly the “broad discretion” recognized by the Court to the Member States. 
First, the exceptions must be implemented while bearing in mind the need for harmonization. The Court 
considers that exceptions should be implemented according to the objectives of the Directive 2001/29, 
which includes ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted as a result of Member 
States’ different legislations. In the Padawan case
1537
 concerning private copying, the Court held that 
“The European Union legislature’s aim of achieving the most uniform interpretation possible of Directive 
2001/29 is apparent in particular from recital 32 in the preamble thereto, which calls on the Member 
States to arrive at a coherent application of the exceptions to and limitations on reproduction rights, with 
the aim of ensuring a functioning internal market”
1538
. As a consequence, the Member State are not free 
to set out the boundaries of the notion of “fair compensation”: “An interpretation according to which 
Member States which have introduced an identical exception of that kind, provided for by European Union 
law and including, […] the concept of ‘fair compensation’ as an essential element, are free to determine 
the limits in an inconsistent and un-harmonised manner which may vary from one Member State to 
another, would be incompatible with the objective of that directive”
1539
. The Court held a similar reasoning 
in DR et TV2 Danmark
1540
.  
Then, the Court emphasized the need to enable the effectiveness of the exception in a certain number 
of recent cases including Infopaq, Premier League and Painer. Therefore, even if Member States are free 
to implement an optional exception of a European directive, they are not allowed to undermine the 
objectives of the exception in the directive while implementing it. In Painer, the Court seemed to consider 
that the need to enable the effectiveness of the exception of quotation opposed adding any other 
conditions to its application than those explicitly mentioned in the text of the directive. The Court 
considered that the exception strikes “a fair balance between the right of freedom of expression of users 
of a work […] and the reproduction right conferred on authors”, which balance is “struck by favouring the 
exercise of the users’ right to freedom of expression over the interest of the author”
 1541
. The room for 
freedom in national implementation is therefore completely undermined in this case.  
As we indicated above, it is unclear whether the Court tended to consider the text of the exception as 
“self-sufficient” and preventing additional limitations and conditions imposed by the Member States only 
                                                     
 
1536 Painer, §101-103. 
1537 Judgement of the Court of 21 October 2010, in Case C‑467/08, Padawan SL v.  Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
España (SGAE). 
1538 Padawan, §35.  
1539 Padawan, §36. 
1540 CJUE., 26 avril 2012, DR et TV2 Danmark, C-510/10, §36. 
1541 Painer, §134-135 
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because the exception at stake involved fundamental rights (freedom of expression) or if the Court could 
hold a similar reasoning in cases concerning exceptions covering other purposes – yet for this Study and 
the three exceptions under examination, this question is not decisive.  
In any case, this case-law questions to a certain extent the optional character of the exceptions 
themselves. It seems indeed hard for a Member State to choose not to implement an exception that is 
specifically designed and balanced, according to the Court, to enforce the freedom of expression of users 
of copyright protected material.  
These principles must be combined with the recent tendency of the EUCJ to harmonize various 
concepts of the Directive 2001/29 that the Directive did not seek to define precisely. Although the Court 
held in the Sena case of 2003
1542
 that the concept of equitable remuneration had an autonomous 
meaning, it specified that “the Court's role, in the context of a dispute brought before it, can only be to call 
upon the Member States to ensure the greatest possible adherence throughout the territory of the 
Community to the concept of equitable remuneration” and the Court consequently declined to provide the 
appropriate criteria to determine the material content of the notion, leaving this task to the Member 
States.  
In more recent cases, the need for a uniform application of the European Law to give an autonomous 
meaning to the concepts used by European instruments, unless they contain explicit references to 
national laws, was frequently highlighted and used by the Court to provide its own interpretation of the 
material content of various concepts. In the field of copyright, the Court gave its own autonomous 
interpretation of, amongst others, the concepts of fair compensation
1543
, of reproduction and originality
1544
 
, of communication to the public
1545
. 
It is therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions on the margin of freedom enjoyed by the Member 
States’ legislators in the implementation of the exceptions, and by the national courts in their 
interpretation. A too broad interpretation would run counter to the principle of strict interpretation and the 
three-step test. A too narrow interpretation would threaten the effectiveness that must be given to the 
exceptions. Adding conditions to benefit from the exceptions may jeopardize the objective of 
harmonization in the internal market and may be contrary to the balance of interests that the text of the 
directive intended to make without saying so.  Finally, the EUCJ may suddenly discover an autonomous 
meaning to the concepts used in the broad wording of article 5 of the Directive and provide its own 
interpretation of their material content. 
B. National case law on UGC 
We could only identify two cases dealing specifically with UGC, both taking place in the USA. We also 
included in this section the presentation of two cases concerning sampling; although the facts concerned 
professionals and not “Users” in the sense used in this Study, the reasoning followed by the courts with 
regard to sampling is worth noting because many pieces of UGC make comparable uses of copyrighted 
works.  
                                                     
 
1542 CJUE, 6 February 2003, C-245/00, Sena 
1543 Padawan. 
1544 CJUE, 16 July 2009, C-5/08, Infopaq. 
1545 CJUE, 7 December 2006, C-306/05, SGAE v. Rafaeles and  CJUE, 15 March 2012, C-135/10, Società Consortile Fonografici 
(SCF) v Marco Del Corso. 
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1. Lenz v. Universal1546 
The facts giving rise to this US case are extremely simple and very illustrative of common uses of the 
Internet for publishing UGC.  On February 7, 2007, Stephanie Lenz videotaped her young child in her 
family’s kitchen.  The song “Let’s Go Crazy” by the artist known as “Prince” played in the background.  
During the video, Lenz’s son is shown walking with the aid of a push-toy and “dancing” to the song.  Lenz 
can be heard asking “what do you think of the music?”  On February 8, 2007, Lenz uploaded the twenty-
nine second video to YouTube.com (“YouTube”), a popular Internet video hosting site.  She titled the 
video “Let’s Go Crazy #1.” 
Universal is a well-known music publishing company which manages the copyrights for the singer Prince. 
On June 4, 2007, apparently on Prince’s insistence
1547
, Universal sent a Takedown Notice to YouTube, in 
order to have Lenz’s video taken offline. On the same day, YouTube sent Lenz an email notifying her that 
it had removed her “Let’s Go Crazy #1” video in response to Universal’s accusation of copyright 
infringement.  
Lenz sent YouTube a DMCA counter-notice on June 27, 2007.  That counter-notice asserted that the 
video constituted fair use of “Let’s Go Crazy.”  YouTube restored the video to its site in mid-July 2007; the 
video was therefore down for approximately six weeks. Furthermore, Lenz filed an action against 
Universal in July 2007. Lenz claimed that Universal’s Takedown Notice was a “notification of claimed 
infringement” pursuant to the DMCA, but that it constituted a knowing, material misrepresentation that her 
video infringed Prince’s copyright, and that she incurred damages as a result of YouTube’s removal of her 
video from its site. 
The elements of facts submitted to the Court showed that Universal’s employees in charge of sending 
takedown notice to YouTube only verify whether uploaded videos contains significant use of a 
copyrighted composition, if the song is recognizable, if it is in a significant portion of the video or is the 
focus of the video. They do not, however, consider specifically the possibility that the concerned videos 
make fair use of copyrighted works before issuing a takedown notice. 
The Court held that, in order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with “a good faith belief 
that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, 
or the law,” the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright.  
Universal argued that although a thorough analysis of fair use had not been made by its employees, they 
considered whether Lenz’s video made “significant use” of Prince’s song and whether the song was the 
“focus” of the video, which are relevant factors under the fair use doctrine.  
The Court disagreed that it was sufficient for a copyright holder to consider facts that might be relevant to 
a fair use analysis without making any effort to evaluate the significance of such facts in the context of the 
doctrine itself.  Because the question of whether something constitutes fair use is a “legal judgment,” 
proper consideration of the doctrine must include at least some analysis of the legal import of the facts.  
The Court concluded that at minimum, a copyright owner must make at least an initial assessment as to 
whether the fair use doctrine applies to the use in question in order to make a good faith representation 
that the use is not “authorized by law.” 
                                                     
 
1546 Stephanie Lenz v. Universal Music Corporation, Universal Music Publishing, INC and Universal Music Publishing Group, Order 
of January 24, 2013 denying cross-motions for summary judgement, US District Court for the northern district of California, San 
Jose division, Case N°5:07-cv-03783-JF ; available on the website of the Electronic Frontier Foundation: 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/LenzOrderDenyingMSJs.pdf  
1547 Prince was apparently offended by the trivializing of his music.  In other words, although the U.S. court did not so understand 
it, Lenz is to a large extent a moral rights case.   The facts suggest that without Prince’s insistence, Universal would not have sent 
the take-down notice.  In a sense, acknowledgment of the source (“Let’s Go Crazy”) made things worse than if no such mention had 
been added, because it seems clear that Prince did not want to be associated with the Cute Baby video.  
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The Court further decided that Mrs Lenz could not demonstrate that Universal “wilfully blinded itself” to 
the potential application of the fair use doctrine and, on the other hand, that Universal could not establish 
that Mrs Lenz had not suffered any damage. As a consequence, the Court refused to issue a summary 
judgment which would have closed the case. The litigation will therefore likely continue to the next step, 
probably a trial before a jury.  Even if sometimes presented as an “incidental inclusion” case, it is more of 
a remix case: the music playing in the background was not there “incidentally” during the video shooting – 
see Lenz’ calling attention to the music on the sound track of the video 
2. Warner Bros. and J. K. Rowling v. RDR Books1548 
In the so-called “Lexicon” case, the legality of an encyclopaedia based upon the famous “Harry Potter” 
series of novels written by J.K. Rowling was challenged.   Strictly speaking, this case is not as such a 
UGC case, except a contrario, since J.K. Rowling had not opposed a (UGC) fan fiction website but did 
oppose to the publishing of a book based on this website. 
The Lexicon was born from the efforts of an American librarian and faithful Harry Potter fan named 
Steven Vander Ark. After he read the second tome of the Harry Potter series, Vander Ark created a 
website devoted to cataloguing every character, item, spell, and fact of the Harry Potter world, with 
comprehensive examples and references to the novels and to side materials including other books and 
interviews of J.K. Rowling. Vander Ark and the community of Harry Potter fans continued to enrich the 
Lexicon website as the following tomes of the series were published. The website was very successful 
and attracted impressive numbers of visitors. In June 2004, J.K. Rowling herself awarded the site her 
“J.K. Rowling Fan Site Award” and said in an interview that she occasionally referred to the website rather 
than to her own books in order to check a fact or a reference.  
However, she changed her initial good feelings quite drastically when Steven Vander Ark was convinced 
by a publishing company, RDR Books, to release and commercialize the Lexicon in a printed form, after 
RDR Books had guaranteed that such publication would not infringe J.K. Rowling’s copyright and 
accepted to bear all defence costs in case of legal actions.  
After unsuccessful attempts to reach an amicable settlement, J.K. Rowling and Warner Bros, the owner of 
copyright in the Harry Potter movies and video games, initiated legal proceedings in 2007 in order to 
obtain an injunctive order against the commercialization of the Lexicon.  
The court verified first whether the Lexicon was found to infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights, and then 
examined if the defendants could invoke fair use defence to justify their use of J.K. Rowling’s original 
materials, including mainly the “Harry Potter” series and two other books, “Quidditch Through the Ages” 
and “Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them”.  
The first alleged copyright infringements were acts of unauthorized copying. The defendants did not 
dispute the actual copying of fragments of J.K. Rowling’s books, but according to U.S. Law, the Court had 
to verify further whether such copying was “quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient” to conclude to the 
existence of “substantial similarity” between the original and the later works. The Court found that the 
Lexicon contained a substantial amount of verbatim or slightly paraphrased extracts of the original books.  
The description of fictional facts created by J.K. Rowling and summaries of key events and scenes 
extracted from the books were also considered as substantial copies: “Notwithstanding the dissimilarity in 
the overall structure of the Lexicon and the original works, some of the Lexicon entries contain summaries 
of certain scenes or key events in the Harry Potter series, as stated in the Findings of Fact. These 
passages, in effect, retell small portions of the novels, though without the same dramatic effect. In 
                                                     
 
1548 Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. and J. K. Rowling vs. RDR Books (575 F.Supp.2d 513), decision of September 8, 2008 of 
the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, available at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Lexicon%20Order.pdf ; also see comments of A. J. Sanders, “J.K. Rowling and The Lexicon: 
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. and J.K. Rowling v. RDR Books, et al.”, EIPR, 2009, p. 45. 
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addition, the entries for Harry Potter and Lord Voldemort give a skeleton of the major plot elements of the 
Harry Potter series, again without the same dramatic effect or structure. Together these portions of the 
Lexicon support a finding of substantial similarity”
1549
.  
The Court concluded therefore to the existence of a copy prohibited by copyright; the fact that such 
elements were primarily used in their “factual capacity”, to report information and where to find it was 
found important to examine the question of fair use at a later stage, but not to assess the existence of a 
copy
1550
.  
Interestingly, the Court examined then whether the Lexicon could also be qualified as a “derivative work” 
of J.K. Rowling’s original books. As in the Berne Convention, the right of reproduction and the right of 
adaptation (the right to create derivative works) are recognized as separate prerogatives in the U.S. 
Copyright law. The Court reminded that a work is not derivative simply because it is “based upon” the 
preexisting works; the statutory language seeks to protect works that are “recast, transformed, or 
adapted” into another medium, mode, language, or revised version, while still representing the “original 
work of authorship.” J.K. Rowling and Warner Bros argued that the Lexicon was a derivative work, 
because it contained a substantial amount of material from the original books. The Court did not follow 
their position and ruled that “More importantly, although the Lexicon “contain[s] a substantial amount of 
material” from the Harry Potter works, the material is not merely “transformed from one medium to 
another,” […]. By condensing, synthesizing, and reorganizing the preexisting material in an A-to-Z 
reference guide, the Lexicon does not recast the material in another medium to retell the story of Harry 
Potter, but instead gives the copyrighted material another purpose. That purpose is to give the reader a 
ready understanding of individual elements in the elaborate world of Harry Potter that appear in 
voluminous and diverse sources. As a result, the Lexicon no longer “represents [the] original work[s] of 
authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under these circumstances, and because the Lexicon does not fall under 
any example of derivative works listed in the statute, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Lexicon is a 
derivative work.”
1551
 
The Court finally had to examine whether the acts of copying made by the defendants could be justified 
under the fair use defence. A fair use analysis implies the evaluation of four criteria: (1) the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. The evaluation of these factors is an “open-ended and context-sensitive 
inquiry” as the Court recalled ; they all must be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright, i.e. ‘promoting the Progress of Science and Useful Arts
1552
. 
As the Court balanced the fair use criteria against each other, in a very detailed analysis, it asserted that 
in its function a reference guide to a series like the “Harry Potter” novels can qualify as fair use. However, 
the Court ultimately decided that in the present case, the amount and substantiality of the portion of the 
original works used in the Lexicon exceeded what is necessary for its intended purpose of serving as a 
reference guide. The fair use defence was therefore not allowed.  
Interestingly, the commercial nature of the secondary exploitation (the publication of the Lexicon) was not 
found to be an important criterion; it only weighted slightly against a finding of fair use. The Court granted 
more importance to the “Market Harm” factor, which requires examining whether the publication of the 
Lexicon was likely to affect the potential market for or value of the original copyrighted work, including the 
                                                     
 
1549 Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. and J. K. Rowling vs. RDR Books, page 37. 
1550 That ruling was consistent with prior authority in the circuit rejecting the contention that summarizing “fictional facts” was 
merely reproducing unprotectable “information” about the works; see “Twin Peaks” and “Seinfeld Aptitude Test” cases. 
1551 Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. and J. K. Rowling vs. RDR Books, page 40 
1552 Idem, page 42 
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current and potential market for derivative works. The Court found that the publication of the Lexicon was 
not likely to have an impact on the market value of the “Harry Potter” novels because it serves a different 
and complementary purpose. Publishing the Lexicon would however more likely impair the sales of two 
other of J.K. Rowling’s books, “Quidditch Through the Ages” and “Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find 
Them”, the purpose of which being partly similar to the Lexicon’s.  
Although the Court considered the Lexicon as infringing J.K. Rowling’s copyright, it made very clear that 
“reference works that share the Lexicon’s purpose of aiding readers of literature generally should be 
encouraged rather than stifled”
1553
. The decision relied on the circumstances of the case but is not to be 
interpreted broadly against this type of transformative use
1554
. Vander Ark and RDR Books themselves 
chose to re-write a new version of the Lexicon in order to comply with the legal issues highlighted by the 
decision. 
For this Study concerning UGC, the most remarkable teaching of the Lexicon decision is – somewhat 
paradoxically - the deafening silence surrounding User Generated Content, especially UGC published on 
the Internet as such. As we explained in the introduction of this section, the Lexicon content was based 
upon the website of Steven Vander Ark, the extent of which going even beyond the content selected to 
make a printed version. Throughout the decision, a question is left completely unanswered: what about 
the legality of the website version of the Lexicon? The reason of this silence is easily explained: the 
Plaintiffs chose to act only against the publishing of a printed version of the Lexicon, but had no problem 
with the existence of the website, which J.K. Rowling even supported. The judge did not have to answer a 
question that was not asked by the parties. From a legal point of view, however, it is hard to know 
whether the reasoning of the Court would have been different when examining whether the Lexicon 
website was infringing J.K. Rowling’s copyright; one may think that this would probably have been the 
case,  because many of the most “transformative” aspects of the website were Internet-specific, e.g., links 
to other sites. 
At least, this case illustrates that some copyright owners, like J.K. Rowling, decide not to act against User 
Generated Content published on the internet but may change their mind when it comes to professional 
exploitation of such content under traditionally marketed forms, like printed books
1555
.   
3. Side cases concerning sampling 
Although not explicitly dealing with UGC, there is a lot of case law on music sampling, which pre-existed 
UGC and lead to quite some opposition by music publishers and record labels
1556
.   
In the US case Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films
1557
, Bridgeport and Westbound claimed to 
own the musical composition and sound recording copyrights in “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” (“Get Off”) 
by George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics. Samples of this song were included in the rap song “100 
Miles and Runnin’” (“100 Miles”), which was itself included in the sound track of the movie I Got the Hook 
Up (Hook Up), published by Dimension Films. Bridgeport claimed that such use of portions of the song 
“Get Off” were copyright infringements.  
                                                     
 
1553 Idem, page 66 
1554 In fact, the court did not find Van der Ark’s use (as a print book, as opposed to the website) sufficiently “transformative” to 
escape the accusation of copyright infringement. 
1555 For a fuller discussion of the practice of forebearance against individual site operators, see Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 617 (2008); also E. Lee, “Warming up to User-Generated Content”, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116671. 
1556 See generally Peter di Cola and Kembrew McLeod, Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling (2011 
1557 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, decision of September 7, 2004 of the United States Court of Appeal for the sixth 
circuit, case N° 02-6521 and 03-5738, available online at http://fsnews.findlaw.com/cases/6th/04a0297p.html  
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More specifically, the recording “Get Off” opens with a three-note combination solo guitar “riff” that lasts 
four seconds. The recording “100 Miles” contains a sample from that guitar solo, i.e. a two-second sample 
from the guitar solo was copied, the pitch was lowered, and the copied piece was “looped” and extended 
to 16 beats. This sample appears in the sound recording “100 Miles” in five places and each looped 
segment lasts approximately 7 seconds. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of first instance, which had found the sampling not in violation 
of copyright law, and ruled that the sampling was infringing copyright. The Court highlighted that an owner 
of the copyright on a sound recording had exclusive right to duplicate the work, even in parts, and found 
no applicable statutory limitation of this right. There is no “de minimis” rule, according to the court, when it 
comes to sampling of sound recordings fixed on a medium, as opposed to small parts of musical 
compositions, because it is a physical taking rather than an intellectual one. In its decision, the court 
wrote a remarked statement: "Get a license or do not sample. We do not see this as stifling creativity in 
any significant way." 
It is however worth noting that the fair use defence was not invoked by the defendants, nor analysed by 
the Court of Appeal
1558
. Arguably, fair use defence would be at stake in future cases involving sampling, 
especially when user generated content produced by amateurs is concerned.  
The US case-law seems however not consistent on the question of digital sampling. As  a commentator 
noted, “In digital sampling cases, the U.S. courts have utilized divergent legal tests with opposite 
outcomes with findings of liability and per se infringement in some cases to exceptions to liability under 
fair use  and de minimis  in other disputes”
1559
. 
The German case Metall Auf Metall
1560
, also known as the Kraftwerk decision, concerned a very similar 
case of music sampling. The court held that the quality or quantity of sampled material is irrelevant in the 
determination of whether there has been an infringement of a party’s exclusive right to reproduce and 
distribute their sound recording. It also ultimately held that if it is proven that any part of a protected sound 
recording has been copied without permission, then infringement has occurred.  
It must however be noted that the decision is only based on the neighbouring rights that a music producer 
owns on a sound recording, and not on copyright on the musical composition. Copyright on the 
composition had been invoked by Kraftwerk before the lower court, which considered that examining this 
issue was not relevant for the solution of the dispute.  The Supreme Court did not have to re-examine the 
issue, for procedural reasons.  
This being said, the Court examined whether sampling could be justified under the German exception of 
“free use”
1561
, which was found to be applicable to both copyright and neighbouring rights. The Supreme 
                                                     
 
1558 The Bridgeport decision has been widely criticized; it is not clear that it represents the law in any Circuit other than the 6th 
Circuit. 
1559 Robert C. Bird and Lucille M. Ponte,  “Protecting moral rights in the United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and 
opportunities under the U.K.’s new performances regulations”, Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 24:213, 2006, p. 
214  
1560 Kraftwerk, et al. v. Moses Pelham, et al., Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court no. I ZR 112/06 dated November 20, 
2008 ; English translation of the decision and comments by N. Conley and T. Braegelmann can be found in Journal of Copyright 
Society of the U.S.A, 2009, p. 1017-1037 ; electronic version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504982  
1561 « Free use » is the literal translation of the German exception of “Freie Benutzung”, set out in section 24, paragraph 1, of the 
UrhG [German copyright act] which allows, in a nutshell, the publication and exploitation of independent work created by the free 
use of another person’s work.  For more information, see 2007 Queen Mary study p.45 : 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/infosoc-study-annex_en.pdf 
Caricature, Parody and Pastiche: 
“The Copyright Acts in Austria, Germany and Portugal contain a general ‘free use’ clause that is not restricted to the uses mentioned 
in Article 5(3)(k). In Germany, for instance, the ‘free use’ clause does not exempt certain uses but reflects a general principle in that 
certain derivative or transformative works will not infringe. In this respect, the free use clause represents not a limitation but 
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Court did not definitely settle this issue in the Kraftwerk case, because not all relevant information was 
present in the decision of the lower court to determine whether the exception was applicable. The Court 
seemed however to indicate that, with regard to neighbouring rights, the exception should not be invoked 
by someone who is able to record its own version of the borrowed sounds, rather than copying samples 
of existing recordings. This rather narrow interpretation of the exception of “Free use” in the field of 
neighbouring rights may have a chilling effect on sampling in general, as the Court did not explain how to 
determine whether the users of samples “could have produced the appropriated rhythm sequence 
themselves”.  
One must note however that both the Bridgeport and the Kraftwerk cases are related to professional 
musicians (NWA and Sabrina Setluer, respectively) – and the same holds true for the book version of the 
Harry Potter Lexicon mentioned above, published by a professional publisher - so that the analogy with 
UGC is debatable (also, both of the uses occurred before the emergence of the Web 2.0)
1562
. 
To our knowledge, apart from the Lenz case, there appears to be no court case assessing the implication 
of fair use (or, in Europe, of existing copyright exceptions) to UGC. 
IX. A chilling effect of the actual legal framework? 
It has quite often been said that the divergences in the existing exceptions, together with the absence of a 
specific exception for UGC, has a chilling effect on the development of UGC.  Such assessment is hard to 
make as, by definition, UGC projects which have been so “chilled” as to not come into existence, have 
been abandoned, maybe forgotten and there may not be many candidates UGC creators still willing or 
still around to tell the rest of the world about their failed experience.  So, it is an economic study or a 
market survey but not a legal study which could provide trustful data on this.  A legal report as this one 
can review the case-law, the articles published on these topics (some of which assert but do not 
demonstrate a chilling effect) but it was not in the scope of our Study to try and find UGC projects which 
did not materialize due to a “chilling effect” coming from the actual legal framework; by doing so, one 
must admit that the legal study might only see the visible part of the iceberg – if an invisible part exists (or 
if, instead of an iceberg, UGC is more of an ice floe). 
At the outset, one may observe that if there is a chilling effect, it is obviously not as great as to prevent 
the development of UGC, when one sees the tremendous development thereof.  So, if there is a chilling 
effect, it probably only plays a role on a small part of projects; however, maybe those projects would have 
been very beneficial and interesting if they had materialized.  As we illustrate elsewhere in this Study, if 
there may be a chilling effect to the present legal framework, there is at the same time an obvious “wait 
and see” approach from the rightholders, which some commentators, by opposition to the “chilling” effect, 
have referred to as the “warming up to UGC” effect
1563
, in addition to (or especially in light of) the growing 
phenomenon of monetization arrangements (see infra). 
We have found the following testimonials and figures on this so-called chilling effect, but the veracity 
thereof is not always easy to verify: 
- Two websites do exist, which lists examples of UGC works which have taken down after a notice 
of take-down sent to the platform by the rightholders while the UGC work was arguably not illegal, 
as well as reports and analysis of actions undertaken by different stakeholder arguably either in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
reiterates a general principle. The general requirement is that a certain distance to the original must be kept, in the sense that the 
protected expression in the original work used in a derivative work has been used as inspiration only”. 
1562For some “almost UGC sampling”, see: http://thru-you.com/#/videos/3/. Kutiman created some videos based upon YouTube 
videos of absolutely “amateur” (not in quality, though) musicians. Kutiman however is a professional DJ. 
1563 E. Lee, “Warming up to User-Generated Content”, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116671 
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favour or against free speech on the Internet: see www.chillingeffects.org and 
www.youtomb.com. Although these kind of sites do not provide quantitative data over alleged 
“chilling effect”, they give interesting examples thereof.  
- According to some commentators, many ISPs will quickly shut down an allegedly infringing 
website, even if the claim of the purported right holder is completely bogus
1564
.  If only advised by 
rightholders as to what they should do, ISPs and platforms risk indeed practicing a pro-active self-
censorship, thereby depriving users from any form of due process.  Without analyzing this much 
further, let us mention that this issue is one of the issues mentioned in the reassessment of the e-
commerce directive, with a public consultation being launched on how notice-and-take-down 
procedures are applied and should be improved, i.a. to guarantee more respect for the rules of 
due process and the right to be heard
1565
 (see also infra on this issue). 
- See also the other examples of chilling effects mentioned elsewhere in this Study. 
 
One should observe however, that most if not all examples of chilling effects are to be found in the United 
States.  Their judiciary system presents significant differences from most European judiciary systems, not 
the least regarding the costs of hiring a lawyer to defend one’s case but also the high risk of statutory 
damages which defendants to a copyright claim may be exposed to and which, more than other factors 
probably, do play a high role in chilling some projects.   The US report mentioned above, apart from 
suggesting to add “incidental use” in the non-exhaustive preamble of Section 107 on Fair Use in the US 
also suggests reforming the system of statutory damages, which seems like a reasonable proposal (but 
on which we shall not insist here as it does not concern the EU Member States proceedings in court)
1566
. 
Apart from the possible chilling effect of the legal framework, other legal and non-legal drivers and 
obstacles of UGC have been described in the literature such as
1567
: 
- For drivers: technological drivers such as the availability across Europe of broadband internet 
access (specifically for the upload), of easy-to-use tools and of mobile broadband internet 
access
1568
; economic drivers such as affordable broadband pricing and a growing user 
engagement
1569
; socio-cultural drivers: self-expression and social interaction seem to be more 
important in UGC than making money; skills and media literacy are improving, particularly with 
the younger generations becoming major actors of UGC; legal and policy drivers: in the report 
of 2007/2008, the policy and legal settings were not considered as important drivers for the 
development of UGC
1570
, some interviewees arguing that policy makers might have contributed 
positively by refraining from a timely and strict enforcement of European directives and rules on 
copyright, privacy, data use and consumer protection: “the absence of a clear stand of EUR 
                                                     
 
1564 P.B. Hugenholtz, Codes of conduct and copyright enforcement in cyberspace, IVIR, Research Paper n° 2012-35, p. 317.  The 
author mentions the real-life experiment called the “Liberty” experiment, <http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/liberty.pdf> and the ‘Multatuli 
project’ <www.bof.nl/docs/researchpaperSANE.pdf>. 
1565  See the Commission’s document: Ensure the transparency, effectiveness, proportionality and fundamental rights compliance 
of notice-and-action procedures  
(cf http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_markt_007_notice_and_takedown_procedures_en.pdf) 
1566 J.M. Urban, Copyright Reform Act, prepared on behalf of Public Knowledge, Report 1, “Updating Fair Use for Innovators and 
Creators in the Digital Age: Two Targeted Reforms”, Berkeley Law, University of California, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public 
Policy Clinic, February 13, 2010, p. 27 et s. 
1567 For a detailed description of these obstacles and drivers, see IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a 
participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, p. 143 et s. 
1568 IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, p. 
147.  This remark was made in 2007/2008 ; in the meantime, the situation has evolved in the right direction. 
1569 Same remark as above. 
1570 IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, p. 
154. 
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policy makers on these issues created the room for start-ups to experiment and grow 
quickly”
1571
…  Again, these remarks date from 2007/2008; in the meantime, the landscape of 
UGC has evolved quite a lot; 
- For obstacles: on technological obstacles, the report noted a lack of interoperability and 
standardization, a lack of broadband internet availability and of mobile broadband internet, low 
upload capacity of broadband internet and the lack of availability of equipment that can be used 
for producing UGC
1572
.  Regarding economic obstacles, the report noted i.a. the high costs of 
fixed and mobile broadband internet, no viable revenue models, lack of original and high-quality 
content, lack of critical mass, difficulties to monitor the large amounts of content
1573
.  The report 
also noted social-cultural obstacles (lack of skills and media literacy, digital divide, bad 
experiences of users vis-à-vis viruses, spams, hacking, lack of privacy, etc.); again, such findings 
dated from 2007/2008 and should be reassessed by an economic/market study. 
- The legal obstacles which were identified then concerned i.a. copyright.  The uncertainty of the 
applicable rules and the risk of legal proceedings which users cannot afford to defend against do 
apparently chill certain UGC projects 
1574
;  the report quoted the following interviewee: “Copyright 
is not harmonized between countries and media types. UCC is all about collaboration across 
borders.  When platform providers are not sure if content is legal or not, most of the time they 
chose to shut the content down”
1575
.  Lack of privacy, presence of harmful content, lack of 
security seemed then to also “chill” some projects.  Divergences in national media policies were 
also mentioned as a potential legal obstacle in some cases
1576
. 
 
As a final note on this “chilling effect”, to the extent there is one (?), one may wonder if it comes from 
“copyright” per se, or rather from disuniformity.   If the real problem is a lack of uniformity, that calls for a 
different solution (harmonization “à droit constant” – i.e. without substantially changing the existing rules) 
than if the problem primarily derives from inadaptability of substantive copyright rules – which would then 
require changes to these substantive rules. 
X. The solutions proposed by the stakeholders 
The rightholders have not waited for the legal context of UGC to be clarified by the legislator in order to 
propose/test some solutions.  They have, as is explained elsewhere in this Study, only very rarely 
resorted to courts to combat UGC, but they have tried to propose various solutions. 
As has been interestingly described by a legal commentator
1577
, the rightholders began by (and to a 
certain extent continue to) adopting a “wait and see” approach vis-à-vis UGC.  One must admit, when 
analyzing the present situation, that they have let it develop and grow without trying – or at least without 
aggressively trying – to combat it.  Practices by users have developed in a gray area of copyright, in the 
absence of statutory provisions and of decisive case-law, and rightholders have first tacitly tolerated them 
                                                     
 
1571 Idem. 
1572 IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, 
p.155.  Again, these remarks date from 2007/2008; a new economic analysis should either confirm or infirm such findings. 
1573 IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, p. 
157.  A new economic analysis should either confirm or infirm such findings. 
1574 IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, 
p.165. 
1575 IVIR, TNO, IDATE, User-Created-Content : Supporting a participative Information Society, Final Report, Smart 2007/2008, p. 
165. 
1576 Idem, p. 167. 
1577 E. Lee, “Warming up to User-Generated Content”, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116671. 
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and then progressively accepted and eventually licensed such practices
1578
.  This is all the more so that 
UGC “is often noncommercial – although this line is getting fuzzier with the growth of symbiotic 
relationships between commercial entities and individuals engaged in commercial pursuits”
1579
.  Major 
copyright holders, such as Viacom, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), CBS, NBC 
Universal or Warner Brothers Entertainment are reported to have expressed supportive views regarding 
mash-ups in UGC
1580
.  A number of them have actively encouraged users to make mashup videos on 
their websites and sometimes even on third-party websites, hold contests for user-generated 
mashups
1581
. 
Progressively, the rightholders have signed agreements with intermediaries such as video-sharing 
platforms. 
Well-known examples include the “Principles for User Generated Content Services”, so-called “UGC 
Principles”
1582
: 
Under these Principles (which take the form of a sort of memorandum of understanding), a list of 
signatories (being on one hand content owners and on the other “services providing user-uploaded and 
user-generated audio and video content, i.e. UGC platforms)
1583
 have ratified a number of principles.  
Copyright owners and UGC services “recognize that they share several important objectives: (1) the 
elimination of infringing content on UGC Services, (2) the encouragement of uploads of wholly original 
and authorized user-generated audio and video content, (3) the accommodation of fair use of copyrighted 
content on UGC Services, and (4) the protection of legitimate interests of user privacy”.  To achieve those 
objectives: 
- The signatories have put in place an identification technology for pre-identified copyright 
protected materials;  “Copyright Owners and UGC Services should cooperate to ensure that the 
Identification Technology is implemented in a manner that effectively balances legitimate interests 
in (1) blocking infringing user-uploaded content, (2) allowing wholly original and authorized 
uploads, and (3) accommodating fair use”; 
- A notice and take down procedure is put in place, relying on the identification technology, so that 
all contents which matches the reference materials of pre-identified content will automatically be 
blocked; “UGC Services may, at their option, utilize manual (human) review of all user-uploaded 
audio and video content in lieu of, or in addition to, use of Identification Technology, if feasible 
and if such review is as effective as Identification Technology in achieving the goal of eliminating 
infringing content”; 
- “Copyright Owners should provide Reference Material only with respect to content for which they 
believe in good faith that they have the appropriate rights to do so, and should update rights 
information as reasonable to keep it accurate”; 
- To avoid blocking by error, “Copyright Owners and UGC Services should cooperate in developing 
reasonable procedures for promptly addressing conflicting claims with respect to Reference 
                                                     
 
1578 Idem, p. 1461.  The author describes in detail the “informal copyright practices” which developed in the field of UGC and have 
been tolerated by rightholders. 
1579 Idem, p. 1503. 
1580 Idem, p. 1516. 
1581 Idem, p. 1518. 
1582 A copy of these may be found at http://www.ugcprinciples.com.  The process of arriving at this agreement is described in Alan 
N. Braverman and Terri Southwick, “The User-Generated Content Principles: The Motivation, Process, Results and Lessons 
Learned”, 32 Colum. J. L. & the Arts 471 (2009). 
1583 The list of signatories include CBS Corporation, Dailymotion, Disney, Fox Entertainment Group, Microsoft, Myspace.com, NBC 
Universal, Sony Pictures, Viacom.  It is however noteworthy that they have not (or not yet?) been ratified by YouTube nor by some 
major UGC players. 
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Material and user claims that content that was blocked by the Filtering Process was not infringing 
or was blocked in error”; 
- Signatories should work together to identify sites that are clearly dedicated to, and predominantly 
used for, the dissemination of infringing content or the facilitation of such dissemination: “Upon 
determination by a UGC Service that a site is so dedicated and used, the UGC Service should 
remove or block the links to such sites”; 
- “When sending notices and making claims of infringement, Copyright Owners should 
accommodate fair use”
1584
; 
- A “notice-and-put-back procedure” is also put in place: “When UGC Services remove content 
pursuant to a notice of infringement, the UGC Service should (a) do so expeditiously, (b) take 
reasonable steps to notify the person who uploaded the content, and (c) promptly after receipt of 
an effective counter-notification provide a copy of the counter-notification to the person who 
provided the original notice, and, at its option, replace the content if authorized by applicable law 
or agreement with the Copyright Owner”; 
- Some data retention principles are also included in the Principles; 
- When confronted with repeated infringements by a same user, signatories have agreed a user-
service termination policy: “UGC Services should use reasonable efforts to track infringing 
uploads of copyrighted content by the same user and should use such information in the 
reasonable implementation of a repeat infringer termination policy. UGC Services should use 
reasonable efforts to prevent a terminated user from uploading audio and/or video content 
following termination, such as blocking re-use of verified email addresses”; 
- Outside of the United States, “UGC Services and Copyright Owners should follow these 
Principles to the extent that doing so would not contravene the law of the applicable foreign 
jurisdiction”. 
 
The Principles have been criticized by some as not having been negotiated with representatives of users 
and as not giving enough place to the users.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) drafted an 
alternative proposal for the protection of fair use, which aims at safeguarding the fair use exception vis-à-
vis the automatic filtering robots, via different mechanisms 
1585
; to our knowledge, these EFF Principles 
have not been endorsed (yet?) by any major player or stakeholder in the UGC sphere. 
Another well-known system comes from YouTube, which has not ratified these principles but instead 
developed its own policy for dealing with copyright infringement claims, called Content ID (formerly 
“Claim Your Content” policy); such policy illustrates the “monetization phenomenon” of UGC.   It is an 
automated process by which rightholders can submit materials they wish to protect to YouTube, who then 
encodes it into a unique hash file, against which user-uploaded videos are compared.  If the content to be 
uploaded matches, the rightholder can
1586
 : 
- Ask YouTube to reject it entirely; 
- Allow it to stay up (perhaps for advertisement and public exposure purposes); 
- Or alternately monetize it by placing ads next to it, with the rightholder sharing in the revenue with 
YouTube. 
 
                                                     
 
1584 The manner by which such evaluation should take place is not further described. 
1585 See EFF, Fair Use Principle for User Generated Video Content, available at https://www.eff.org/pages/fair-use-principles-user-
generated-video-content  
1586 For a description, see e.g. L. Edwards, “Role and responsibility of Internet intermediaries in the field of copyright and related 
rights”, Report for WIPO, available at : 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf  
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The system combines conventional notice-and-take down with a degree of pre-emptive filtering, plus an 
option for revenue-sharing between platform and rightholder.  YouTube is quoted as having said, in 
September 2011 (we could not find more recent figures) that, at that time, 15.000 “partners” (content 
owners, including major record labels and producers) had concluded monetization agreements with 
YouTube, that this had led to 3 billion YouTube visits being monetized, and that, as a result, small 
producers (hundreds of partners) are making more than 100.000 US dollars per year
1587
.  Apparently, this 
solution is chosen in 90 % of copyright claims expressed by rightholders
1588
.  All of the major labels in the 
music industry have struck partnership deals with YouTube
1589
, even if the response of the music industry 
vis-à-vis e.g. synchronization of music in user-generated videos was far less enthusiast (perhaps for 
moral rights concerns?)
1590
.  Creative Commons established a sampling licence template. As noted by a 
commentator, it would be naive to think that rightholders had purely altruistic motives in allowing UGC: 
they see it as a channel to discover new talents, as a way to create buzz around their copyrighted works 
and, more important maybe, as a source of income via these monetizing agreements
1591
. 
Apart from the UGC Principles and this system from YouTube, other systems exist.  Audible Magic’s 
system Copysense for instance, yet this system offers comparison with millions of hashed copyright 
works but not monetization as an option and was initially designed to combat P2P file-sharing
1592
.  
Audible Magic’s compliance and filtering solutions aim at eliminating risks of copyright infringement by 
using an automated copyright recognition (ACR) system. Copyright owners, such as music labels and 
movie and TV studios may register the content they want protected directly with Audible Magic. This 
content is included in their Global Rights Registry that contains (according to Audible Magic’s website) 
more than 12 million fingerprints, and represents over 900,000 hours of copyrighted songs, movies, 
television shows, and other video content
1593
.  
These monetizing mechanisms do have their drawbacks: 
- rightholders embracing systems like Content ID “allow the music hosting or streaming site a 
revenue stream from what might be seen as acquiescence in hosting or making available of 
infringing works”
1594
; this drawback has been highlighted by rightholders in the context of the 
Public Consultation by the Commission on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal 
Market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC); the 
summary of the results of this Consultation indicates that rightholders complained about the trend 
                                                     
 
1587 Figures given by P.L. Andrade for Google at a workshop co-organized by WIPO and the Internet Society at the UN Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), on 29 September 2011, in Nairobi, Kenya – see minutes of such workshop. 
1588 The Official Google Blog, Making money on YouTube with Content ID, Aug. 27, 2008, available at 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/making-money-on-youtube-with-content-id.html; IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-
Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, p. 27 to 174.  See also the OECD Report, OECD, 
DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: User Created Content, 12 April 2007, p. 
102; Aaron Schwabach, February 2012, “User-generated Humorous Subtitles and Copyright”, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=aaron_schwabach, p. 22. 
1589 E. Lee, “Warming up to User-Generated Content”, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116671, 
p. 1519. 
1590 Idem, p. 1519. 
1591 Idem, p. 1522. 
1592 For a list of partners (which includes Dailymotion, Myspace, Facebook), see: 
 http://www.audiblemagic.com/customers-contentid.php  
1593 See for more information: http://audiblemagic.com/solutions-maincompliance.php  
1594 L. Edwards, “Role and responsibility of Internet intermediaries in the field of copyright and related rights”, Report for WIPO, 
available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf, p. 67. 
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towards the “monetization” of NTD (notice and take down) procedures, “which could be 
characterized as the development of a “notice-and-revenue-share” procedure”
1595
. 
- for users, an issue may be whether such systems provide built-in systems to allow uploaders to 
benefit from copyright exceptions like fair dealing, parody or quotation
1596
.  The difficulty is real, 
for how does one teach a robot to recognize a parody or a fair use
1597
?...  Another concern is that 
the monetization mechanisms, based on notice-and-take down and filtering procedures, do not 
involve users sufficiently and do not allow them sufficient rights to object to a blocking.  “All 
filtering techniques involve a level of unintentional blocking of legal content (“overblocking”) and 
of unwitting admission of illegal content (“underblocking”)
1598
.  In the Roadmap concerning the 
“Initiative on a clean and open Internet: procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content 
hosted by online intermediaries” (June 2012), DG MARKT indicated that it could take an initiative 
and, amongst the problems which the initiative might address, mentioned “instances of conflicts 
[of NTD procedures] with fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression (…)”
1599
.  One of 
the main policy objectives of this initiative could be “to ensure the transparency, effectiveness, 
proportionality and fundamental rights compliance of Notice & Action procedures”.  Such 
fundamental rights include in particular the freedom of speech and the right to fair process
1600
. 
 
Another type of licence which must be mentioned, as they offer solutions for UGC are the Creative 
Common (CC) Licences, which, depending on the CC licence chosen, offers the possibility for users to 
adapt the work and redistribute it
1601
.  This will typically be the case for 
1602
: 
                                                     
 
1595 See the Summary of the results of the Public Consultation by the Commission on the future of electronic commerce in the 
Internal Market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 12. 
1596  L. Edwards, “Role and responsibility of Internet intermediaries in the field of copyright and related rights”, Report for WIPO, 
available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf, p. 67.  The author mentions a 
famous example, where a video on fair use and remix culture by Internet guru Lawrence Lessig was rejected by YouTube’s 
automated system, because it contained a short clip of background audio which had not been authorized by the rightholder.  
However, Content ID now provides for a counter-notice (or notice-and-put-back) procedure allowing an uploader whose video was 
rejected to ask for a manual reconsideration of the blocking.  In this case, Lessig used it and his video presentation was put back by 
YouTube.   
1597 For a possible answer, see Jane C. Ginsburg, “Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future 
Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs”, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 577 (2008): “Teaching” a filter to recognize a 
parody may not be an obvious proposition -- indeed the difficulties of teaching the fair use doctrine to human law students might 
make one less than sanguine about teaching a computer to recognize fair uses -- and “manual review” by copyright owners and/or 
internet services may be necessary. But one can imagine increasing levels of sophistication of filters, to recognize, for example, 
when the uploaded content matched by the “identification technology” to a copyrighted work consists entirely of the copyrighted 
content, or instead is composed of excerpts interwoven with truly user-generated content (or at least to content that does not match 
to the content which the filter identifies). For example, the byte equivalent of the apocryphal “250 word” threshold for permissible 
unauthorized quotations might be programmed into the filter; similarly, the filter might distinguish between overall quantity of content 
matched between the user-generated upload and a copyrighted work (or works), but might let pass matches that are not in 
sequence and therefore might more likely be parodies or remixes.  The prospect of automated fair use might after all not prove as 
preposterous as first impression suggests; at least an automated process might isolate the universe of uploads requiring manual 
review by identifying postings that are clearly infringing (complete or near-correspondence to a work on the filter’s black list), and 
postings that are clearly non infringing (no correspondence, or a sub-threshold quantity or sequence correspondence to a work on 
the black list)”. 
1598 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation by the Commission on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal 
Market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 13. 
1599 Roadmap, Initiative on a clean and open Internet: procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content hosted by online 
intermediaries” (June 2012), DG MARKT, p. 1. 
1600 Idem, p. 2. 
1601 It is worth to mention that YouTube offers CC licenses for uploaders. 
1602 See http://creativecommons.org/licenses  
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- the Attribution (CC-BY) : it allows users to adapt the pre-existing work and communicate it to the 
public, provided only that the name of the initial author be mentioned.   
- The Attribution Share-Alike licence (CC-BY-SA): users may adapt the work and redistribute it, 
provided that they mention the name of the initial author(s) and that they accept that the modified 
work is distributed under the same licence, i.e. that other users may also in turn adapt the work, 
etc. (with a so-called “copyleft effect” similar to the one which is familiar to some open source 
software). 
- The Attribution Share-Alike Non Commercial (CC-BY-NC-SA): users may adapt the work and 
redistribute it, provided that they mention the name of the initial author(s), that they accept that 
the modified work is distributed under the same licence, i.e. that other users may also in turn 
adapt the work, etc. (with a so-called “copyleft effect” similar to the one which is familiar to some 
open source software), but with one additional limitation, being that the use by the users may not 
be commercial. 
An important criterion of Creative Commons licence is the commercial or non-commercial further use of 
the work, since some licences are granted on the condition that no commercial use is made of the work 
(which may however – depending of the licence – be arranged, remixed, uploaded, etc.).  The Creative 
Commons consortium has tried to define what “commercial” should be understood as meaning; the report 
is not entirely clear and the borderlines between commercial and non-commercial proved hard to draw. 
On the other hand, the two licences CC ND (ND for “No Derivatives”) would not be of use for UGC as we 
understand it in our Study, since they do not allow users to modify the pre-existing work (which is a pre-
condition for a UGC work as we defined it). 
XI. Which other arguments do courts or commentators rely on to allow 
UGC? 
As explained, we could not identify case-law in Europe authorizing (or prohibiting) UGC as such.    
Commentators are prolific about the importance of UGC, UGC itself is developing at great speed; a big 
part of it is either “created from scratch” or “mere uploading of pre-existing content”.  Yet there appears to 
be no case-law yet, whereby a court would have either authorized a use by e.g. allowing an extensive 
interpretation of an existing exception, or issued an injunction against a user by applying strictly the 
copyright principles. 
However, it is logical to raise the question, as it is put in the Terms of Reference of this Study, as to 
whether other arguments than those based on copyright were relied or could be relied upon to allow UGC 
(if counsel to plaintiffs or defendants use their creativity and imagination).  One indeed may observe as a 
general trend in copyright law (which we had already described in 1997) 
1603
 that courts have, mostly 
since the development of digital technologies, had more than in the past, recourse to arguments outside 
of copyright in copyright disputes.  Competition law may have been one of the first ones, but other 
arguments have flourished over the years, from consumer law, to privacy, to contract law (and unfair 
terms legislation), etc.   
Before describing what those arguments found outside of copyright could be, one may raise the following 
question: does it make a difference whether the argument is found outside of copyright or by relying on an 
exception explicitly provided for by copyright legislation?  The answer is not an easy one.  While it is clear 
that any reasoning based on the “internal exceptions” of copyright must respect the three-step test, it is in 
                                                     
 
1603 On this development of copyright law, see i.a. A. Strowel & J.P. Triaille, Le droit d’auteur, du logiciel au multimedia, droit belge, 
droit européen, droit comparé, Kluwer/Bruylant, Brussels, 1996, p. 303, p. 470. 
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our view not so clear that this is also the case when an argument is found outside of copyright, yet 
authoritative commentators do not share our doubts
1604
. 
The following arguments/legal grounds could be or have been put forward by commentators to support 
the need of a UGC exception or to allow a reasoning which would lead to tolerating UGC in cases where 
it should, upon a strict application of copyright dogma’s, have succumbed to an injunction proceeding: 
A.  Freedom of expression1605 
The idea is that the Web 2.0 is characterized by a wider access by all to all kinds of information and by 
the possibility for all to express their opinions and made them known to the rest of the world. 
More generally, conflicts between the copyright and the freedom of expression are not new.  They are 
partly solved by existing principles of copyright such as: the non-protection of ideas, principles, mere facts 
or data, the originality requirement (leaving out some types of works outside of copyright), the “substantial 
part” infringement analysis in common law jurisdictions such as the UK
1606
, the right of quotation, the right 
to make caricatures and the exception in case of incidental inclusion.  But in the last years, conflicts 
between copyright principles and the freedom of expression principle seems to have multiplied
1607
.   Apart 
from the Germania 3 decision (commented further) by the German Supreme Court, one should mention 
the Church of Scientology v. Dataweb case by the Court of appeal of The Hague
1608
, opposing the 
Church of Scientology and a former member who had disclosed long extracts of texts by Ron Hubbard; 
the Court of appeal recognizes the existence of a copyright infringement but, after a long reasoning 
(partly inspired from a US style “fair use” examination), considered that “in certain exceptional cases” 
copyright has to give way to the principle of freedom of expression.  The factual circumstances played an 
important role, i.a. the secret practices of the Church of Scientology which the court considered as 
running against democratic values.   
Needless to say that only a very small portion of UGC materials could benefit from such a favourable and 
“exceptional” treatment. 
                                                     
 
1604 In the decisions which will be mentioned hereafter, it is noticeable (and logic, in our view) that none (to our knowledge at least) 
worried about the compatibility of their reasoning with the three-step test.  This important question may not be examined in detail in 
this report.  According to (a discussion with) Jane Ginsburg, the author of this report must clarify that Professor Ginsburg does not 
share his doubts and considers that for purposes of implementing Berne/TRIPs/WCT/WPPT minimum rights, the treaties are 
agnostic about how the rights are labelled, including whether the rights are formally “copyright” or the same result is achieved under 
some other label.  In her view, what counts is whether the level of protection is achieved and it is this approach which enabled the 
US to claim that it was in conformity with art. 6bis, because, though the US have almost no moral rights in the Copyright  Act,  they 
claimed to have equivalent protection through other sources of law, including trademarks, defamation and tort law.   In Professor 
Ginsburg’s opinion, one might argue that limitations on the scope of copyright rights follow the same logic: it does not matter 
whether the limitation is “internal” to copyright or external, the question is what effect it achieves.  If it reduces the scope of 
protection, then the reduction should be consistent with the three-step test.  Her view is shared by Sam Ricketson, and also by 
Michael Ficsor (see http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/data/documents/documents/0/e/b/0eb32b716fcaa400dd4cf398256e3fa8.doc)  
1605 On this topic, see A. Strowel & F. Tulkens (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Regards francophones, d’Europe et 
d’ailleurs, Larcier, Brussels, 2006 ; A. Strowel & F. Tulkens, « Freedom of expression and copyright under civil law : of balance, 
adaptation and access », in J. Griffiths & U. Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech, Comparative and international 
analyses, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 296 et s.; P.B. Hugenholtz, “Copyright and freedom of expression in Europe”, in N. 
Elkin-Koren & N.W. Netanel (eds), The Commodification of Information, 2002, p. 239 et s. 
1606 Yet the fate of such argument is uncertain in the aftermath of the Infopaq decision of the EUCJ. 
1607 See the numerous decisions commented in A. Strowel & F. Tulkens (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Regards 
francophones, d’Europe et d’ailleurs, Larcier, Brussels, 2006, which would deserve more consideration, if this would not lead us 
outside the limits of this report. 
1608 Gerechtshof’s Gravenhage, 4 september 2003, Computerrecht, 2003/6, p . 357; Auteurs & Media, 2004/1, p.44 (with a note by 
A. Strowel & G. Gathem).  The Church of Scientology appealed before the Dutch Supreme Court but thereafter resigned from its 
legal action. 
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In the U.S., a landmark case is the Supreme Court decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft
1609
, where copyright and 
First Amendment (freedom of speech) principles were debated.  In the opinion of the Court delivered by 
Justice Ginsburg, one may read that “the First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make–or 
decline to make–one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other 
people’s speeches.  To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in 
free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them”.   Justice Ginsburg adds in her opinion: 
“We recognize that the D. C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically immune 
from challenges under the First Amendment.” (…) But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary”.  This 
illustrates that copyright may, in certain situations (yet not in the Eldred v. Ashcroft case), be limited by 
considerations deriving from the freedom of expression principle; since the Court accepts that copyright is 
not “categorically immune” from claims based on freedom of expression. 
One shall recognize in any case that cases giving priority to the principle of freedom of expression over 
copyright remain limited in number and to exceptional circumstances
1610
. 
Partly along with the freedom of information, the freedom of the press has been mentioned by some 
commentators to justify a UGC exception
1611
.  This suggests that users acting outside of their professional 
activities be considered as journalists and may invoke the protection (which may vary from one State to 
another) granted to journalists or the press. 
Some have expressed their opposition against this view (that copyright should give way to freedom of 
expression in the following terms: “The mere reason that a derivative work is created and made available 
and that therefore it should be free in order to guarantee the freedom of expression is hardly an 
acceptable reason alone since Article 12 and 14 (1) of the Berne Convention provide for an exclusive 
right of adaptation which ‘by definition’ covers the creation of derivative works.  It would create a clear 
conflict with the Berne Convention (the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT) if a national law provided for free 
adaptation or other free alteration of a work consisting in the creation of a new –derivative- work on the 
basis of the consideration that allowing free creation of derivative works is justified for guaranteeing 
freedom of expression”
1612
.  M. Ficsor adds that the mere absence of a commercial purpose does not in 
itself suffices for such UGC exception to become acceptable under the international treaties and the 
three-steps-test and considers that such exception would run contrary to the right of reproduction, the 
right of adaptation and the right of making available.  One can certainly agree to this view to the extent 
that the idea could not be that freedom of expression in itself should in all circumstances prevail over the 
application of copyright (and by the way we found no authoritative commentator arguing so far). 
In June 2012, the ICC issued a Policy Statement on “the Freedom of expression and the free flow of 
information on the Internet”, wherein one could read the following: 
“Business strongly supports the freedom of expression and free flow of information in a manner that 
respects the rights of others and the rule of law.  (…) ICC recognises the principle that all the rights that 
people have offline, including but not limited to the freedom of expression, must also be equally protected 
online.  Limitations to those rights that protect the rights of others and the rule of law that exist offline do 
also exist online. For example, limitations to address and deter illegal content such as child pornography 
or theft of intellectual property are legitimate in accordance with Article 29 of the UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and wholly appropriate.” 
                                                     
 
1609 ELDRED V. ASHCROFT (01-618) 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 239 F.3d 372, affirmed. 
1610 S. Dusollier, “The relations between copyright law and consumers’ rights from a European perspective”, for the European 
Parliament, DG for Internal policies, November 2010, p. 13. 
1611 E. Lee, “Warming up to User-Generated Content”, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116671, p. 1505. 
1612 Ficsor, p. 15. 
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On the balance between freedom of expression and copyright, it may worth recalling a general (and 
undisputed) principle of copyright, which provides that copyright only protects expressions but not ideas 
(which remain free to circulate)
1613
. 
B.  The freedom of trade and of competition 
Even if such position has not been taken over explicitly in many court decisions, it may be worth 
mentioning that some commentators insist on the idea that the governing principle of our market 
economies is (in Europe, probably mainly since the end of the 18
th
 century and the abolition of  privileges 
by the French Revolution) the principle of freedom of trade and of competition and that, in such context, 
intellectual property rights regimes are as many monopolies, which, because they constitute monopolies, 
should be interpreted restrictively.  The consequences thereof is that the main principle should remain the 
“freedom to copy” others and, for exceptions to copyright, that exceptions to copyright should not 
necessarily be interpreted restrictively since they are “exceptions to an exception”. 
The freedom “to conduct a business”, enshrined in the article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, was also taken into account by the EUCJ in a slightly different context, concerning 
the measures that can be imposed to a private company (namely, an Internet Services Provider) in order 
to prevent copyright infringements. In Scarlet
1614
 and Netlog
1615
, the Court emphasized the need to strike 
a fair balance between the protection of Intellectual Property rights and the freedom to conduct a 
business. Consequently, an injunction made to an ISP “to install a complicated, costly, permanent 
computer system at its own expense” to ensure the respect of intellectual-property rights was found a 
serious infringement to its right to conduct a business and contrary to the above-mentioned balance of 
interests.  
C.  The balance of interests 
Whereas courts in droit d’auteur countries have usually considered exclusive rights as property rights 
proper and exceptions as having to be interpreted narrowly (and have recently been comforted in this by 
the CJUE in its Infopaq decision), the US copyright system is often described as having a more utilitarian 
function (with the US Constitution describing its role as “to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts”).  Such utilitarian function is reflected in the US fair use exception, which does introduce flexibility in 
the exceptions but at the same time increases the unpredictability of the outcome of copyright lawsuits.   
The idea that copyright should be based on a balance (to be made by courts) between the interests of 
authors, of users and of society as a whole has gained in importance and weight, including in droit 
d’auteur countries
1616
.  The recent proposal by the Wittem Project of a European Copyright Code also 
embraces this idea in its preamble
1617
.   
The dichotomy between droit d’auteur and copyright traditions on this should however not be 
overestimated.  On the protection of architectural works, for instance, the French Supreme Court 
                                                     
 
1613 As stated by Desbois, « les idées sont de libre parcours » : « ideas are free as the air » (our translation).  In US law, the 
« idea/expression » dichotomy is a well-know concept to explain that ideas may be reused and that a copyright issue would only 
arise where not only ideas but part of the expression of a previous work was also reused 
1614 EUCJ, 24 November 2011, C-70/10, Sabam v. Scarlet 
1615 EUCJ, 16 February 2012, C-360/10, Sabam v. Netlog 
1616 See for instance the Dutch Supreme Court Decision in the Dior v. Evora case, 20 october 1995, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 
682, as commented by B. Hugenholtz & Dr. M.R.F. Sentftleben, Fair Use in Europe.  In Search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam, 
November 2011 (available via www.ssrn.com), p. 10. 
1617 See European Copyright Code, by the Wittem Project, p. 11. 
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mentioned the need to find a balance between the interests of the proprietor (and user) of the building 
and the rights of the architect (author)and applied a sort of proportionality test
1618
. 
An interesting case in this respect is the Germania 3 decision by the German Supreme Court : in that 
decision, the Court said, about quotations made in a play and which were not respecting the limits put by 
copyright law, that the quotation right has to be interpreted broadly, in the light of the freedom of artistic 
expression embedded in Article 5.3. of the German Constitution and that copyright exemptions should 
reflect a balancing of relevant interests
1619
. 
In Austria, the Supreme Court also held in a decision of 12 June 2001 that copyright could not be invoked 
against the freedom of expression of a person who was considering that she was the victim of a press 
campaign, and in a decision of 20 May 2001, that a report in a newspaper about the contents of a political 
report in another newspaper could not be prohibited on the basis of copyright
1620
. 
However, one must admit that such decisions, like the ones referring to the freedom of expression, are 
taken in very specific circumstances and that, even in cases of balances of interests, countries like 
Germany, the Netherlands or Austria where the Supreme Courts have sometimes given priority to the 
principle of freedom of expression over copyright, there are decisions from the same Supreme Courts 
going in the opposite directions
1621
.  It is therefore very delicate on such an issue to give an exhaustive 
and non-ideological view. 
As a reminder, we could not find decisive case-law on UGC where these issues would have been 
debated and where courts would have given clear, let alone consistent, guidelines about how to make 
such balance of interests between the interests of rightholders, of users and of society as a whole. 
D.  The ratio legis of the exception 
When looking at arguments within copyright, in droit d’auteur countries, authoritative commentators are 
often rather reluctant to embrace the idea that judges should be allowed some flexibility in interpreting 
exceptions or in having recourse to arguments outside of copyright.  A. Lucas however interestingly 
suggested the following: ”Does this mean that the judge loses any power of appreciation ?  Obviously not.  
First of all, it is his duty to implement the exceptions in accordance with their spirit, by granting them their 
full scope, without systematically tipping the balance in favour of the rightholder, under the pretext of a 
principle of strict interpretation (…).  One could even, without however generalizing the reasoning by 
analogy, as the Dutch Supreme Court has done (in Dior v. Evora), admit that the judge rely on the ratio 
legis to adapt a legal exception to a new technical environment, as the German Supreme Court has 
(carefully) done
1622
”. 
1623
 
                                                     
 
1618 A. Lucas, « Actualités du droit d’auteur  en France (2007/2011) », Auteurs & Media, 2012, 1, p. 37. 
1619 German Supreme Court, Germania 3 Gespentster am toten Mann, 29 June 2000, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 
(ZUM), 2000, p. 867. 
1620 OGH, 12 June 2001, Medienprofessor, GRUR int. 2002, p. 341 ; and OGH, 20 May 2003, Medien und Recht, 2003, p. 387.  
Both decisions are cited by Prof. A. Lucas as illustrating cases where copyright had to give way to the principle of freedom of 
expression; see A. Lucas, “Droit d’auteur, liberté d’expression et ‘droit du public à l’information’ (libres propos sur deux arrêts des 
Cours de cassation belge et française)” in A. Strowel & F. Tulkens (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Regards 
francophones, d’Europe et d’ailleurs, Larcier, Brussels, 2006, p. 127. 
1621 See the court decisions mentioned by A. Lucas, “Droit d’auteur, liberté d’expression et ‘droit du public à l’information’ (libres 
propos sur deux arrêts des Cours de cassation belge et française)” in A. Strowel & F. Tulkens (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté 
d’expression, Regards francophones, d’Europe et d’ailleurs, Larcier, Brussels, 2006, p. 128. 
1622 In its decision of 11 July 2002, Elektronische Pressespiegel, GRUR Int., 2002, p. 963. 
1623 A. Lucas, “Droit d’auteur, liberté d’expression et ‘droit du public à l’information’ (libres propos sur deux arrêts des Cours de 
cassation belge et française)” in A. Strowel & F. Tulkens (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Regards francophones, 
d’Europe et d’ailleurs, Larcier, Brussels, 2006, p. 138 and 139 (our translation). 
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This opinion is all the more interesting in view of the recent jurisprudence of the CJUE, which indeed 
seems to consider that Member States, when implementing one of the exceptions of the closed list of the 
InfoSoc Directive, must do so while duly taking into account the purpose of the exception. 
This argument, even though not yet tested in court, could provide for interesting arguments in assessing 
whether a UGC material can pass muster and prosper without have to undergo injunction orders. 
E.  Misuse of copyright 
The theory of misuse of copyright (in common law countries) or of abuse of copyright (in civil law 
countries) may also be thought of as an argument to which a court could have regard in a UGC case 
opposing a rightholder and a user.  Such theories “may on occasion offer users of copyright works a 
measure of comfort, [but] these doctrines remain controversial in theory and are rarely applied by the 
courts in practice”
1624
.  According to this theory, a right may not be used (invoked) in an abusive manner, 
e.g. in a manner which is contrary to the legislator’s intention when the legislator created this right.  
Copyright should not be allowed to be used in a manner which is contrary to its purpose, “in particular if it 
is being invoked to prevent the freedom of expression or the free circulation of opinions”
1625
.   According 
to A. Lucas, this theory is to be preferred to the recourse to arguments which are external to copyright, 
such as to fundamental rights the contours of which are often uncertain.
1626
 
In Spain, the Supreme Court took a decision going in this direction, in its ruling on the „Google cache“ 
case (or also known as „Megakini“)
1627
, dealing with the functioning of the Google search engine and its 
cache service. After accepting that none of the statutory limitations listed in the Spanish Copyright statute 
(TRLPI) exempted the unauthorized use of fragments of the contents of a personal website through the 
Google search engine and cache copy service, the Supreme Court concludes against infringement, 
based on the grounds that the three-step-test (in art.40bis TRLPI) is to be read not only in a negative 
manner but also in a positive sense so as to take into account that intellectual property –as any other kind 
of property– is limited in nature and must endure any ius usus innocui (harmless uses done by third 
parties) and must abide to the general principles of the law, such as good faith and prohibition of an 
abusive exercise of rights (ex art.7 Spanish Civil Code).   
Again, let us mention that such argument can be thought of in relation to UGC (against “abusive” 
recourse to copyright by rightholders to obtain a “takedown” of a UGC work from a website or platform) 
but has not actually been tested in any case court, to our knowledge. 
F.  Implied consent 
A decision by the German Supreme Court in the Google thumbnails case is another example where a 
court tried to find arguments (and flexibility) outside of copyright and, in that case, decided in favour of 
Google that, despite the fact that the right of quotation did not allow it, Google’s use of thumbnails “was 
not unlawful because the copyright owner had consented implicitly to the use of her material in the image 
                                                     
 
1624 B. Hugenholtz & Dr. M.R.F. Sentftleben, Fair Use in Europe.  In Search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam, November 2011 (available 
via www.ssrn.com), p. 12; C. Caron, “Abuse of Rights and Author’s Rights”, 176, RIDA, 2, 4 (1998). 
1625 A. Lucas, “Droit d’auteur, liberté d’expression et ‘droit du public à l’information’ (libres propos sur deux arrêts des Cours de 
cassation belge et française)” in A. Strowel & F. Tulkens (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Regards francophones, 
d’Europe et d’ailleurs, Larcier, Brussels, 2006, p. 140. 
1626 Idem, p. 141. 
1627 STS 172/2012, 03.04.2014; for a comment, see Raquel Xalabarder, “Spanish Supreme Court rules in favour of Google search 
engine… and a flexible reading of copyright statutes? “, 3 (2012) JIPITEC, available at http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-3-2-
2012/3445  
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search service by making her works available online without employing technical means to block the 
automatic indexing and displaying of online content by search engines”
1628
. 
A quite similar decision may also be found in France, with the decision by the Paris Court of Appeal in the 
Google thumbnails case dd. 26 January 2011
1629
.  In this decision judges took also into account the fact 
that no means had been used to prevent the automatic indexing. 
XII. Preliminary conclusions 
As asked by the Commission, we have not discussed, in this first part of our Study on UGC, the possible 
solutions which the Commission could think of, should it conclude there is a problem   and that it requires 
introducing some kind of “UGC-friendly” provision into copyright. 
We will do this in a second part of our Study.  
But this does not prevent us from drawing some preliminary conclusions at the end of this first part of our 
Study. UGC has grown exponentially in the last few years.  A major part of UGC which may be found on 
the internet requires in principle a prior licence from the rightholders (whether it be for the reproduction 
right, the adaptation right or the right of making available).  The exceptions which exist presently in 
copyright law and can be relevant (parody, quotation, incidental use) could only be invoked for a relatively 
small number of UGC materials; and the legal arguments which could be found outside of copyright would 
provide relief in an even smaller number of UGC cases.  Some said that the European legal framework 
“leaves a lot of uncertainties for the parties concerned”
1630
; on the other hand, when analyzing concrete 
UGC cases and wondering whether there is a potential copyright infringement, there are, in our opinion, 
much more instances where the answer may clearly be “yes” than cases where the answer will be “no” or 
will be uncertain. 
Yet, there is very little (if any) case-law and apparently not much opposition from rightholders.   
It proved, as we have seen, very hard to find cases, as the Commission had asked us to investigate, 
where UGC should have been accepted by courts while it has not been, or even cases where UGC cases 
were rightfully rejected. 
The obvious lack of opposition (at least via court proceedings) by rightholders may have various reasons: 
they may consider that such use does not cause them any noticeable harm (at least, not of such 
importance to justify court proceedings), or that it increases their reputation and public exposure.  Also, 
the lack of opposition may be explained by the fact that, in many cases, a monetization agreement has 
been concluded between the rightholder and the platform. It seems that rightholders adopt a sort of “wait 
& see” approach or generally do not mind the UGC uses.  The difference of attitude of rightholders vis-à-
vis UGC and vis-à-vis peer-to-peer is obvious. But this general tolerance by rightholders might be 
temporary (no-one can predict whether the “wait and see” approach will continue to prevail or whether the 
monetization solutions will continue to prove attractive); also, it does not protect users against a possible 
more aggressive attitude by a more pro-active rightholder (for whatever reason).  
In the second part of our Study, we will assess which initiative the Commission could take and whether 
any initiative is needed at all from the Commission in the field of UGC.
                                                     
 
1628 BGH, 29 April 2010, case I ZR 69/08, p. 14-15 (the quotation is here from B. Hugenholtz & Dr. M.R.F. Sentftleben, Fair Use in 
Europe.  In Search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam, November 2011 (available via www.ssrn.com), p. 12 and p. 16. 
1629 On this decision, see notably A. Lucas, obs., Prop. Intell. , avr.  2011, p. 201-203. 
1630 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, p. 27 to 174.  
See also the OECD Report, OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: 
User Created Content, 12 April 2007, p. 183. 
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Introduction 
This report is the second part of a report on User-Generated-Content (“UGC”).  The first part has been 
included in this report, just before this second part. 
The first part concentrated on a description of the issues at stake, of the existing case-law, on the impact 
of UGC on exclusive rights, on the applicability of existing exceptions and on legal arguments which could 
be relevant, outside (or, sometimes, inside) of copyright in relation to UGC. 
In this second part, we will list the various possibilities which the Commission could consider, if the need 
to act in this area is established.  
As already indicated in the first part of the report, apart from the analysis which we did through these two 
parts of the report, we think it would be useful that the Commission obtains the results of an 
economic/market analysis: through our “legal lenses” indeed, we could identify a number of issues, little 
case law and (in this second part) a number of initiatives which are theoretically possible.  But we could 
not identify, at least in any exhaustive or objective manner, a significant “chilling effect” of the existing 
legal framework on UGC projects, or the possible consequences of such an effect which, due to this 
(existing or not) chilling effect, possibly never materialised.  Neither were we able to assess the effects 
that a change in the existing legal framework would have on issues such as the current licensing 
arrangements between rights holders and platforms (except of course that if, for instance, a UGC 
exception was adopted, some of the existing licensing schemes would become unnecessary).This 
“hidden part of the iceberg”, if it exists, could only be examined via an economic/market analysis and via 
interviews
1632
; this was not part of our mission. 
Terms of reference  
For the sake of clarity, it is important that the main elements of the terms of reference (the “Terms of 
Reference”) of our report be explained from the beginning. 
This report takes place in an assessment exercise which the European Commission (“the Commission”) 
asked our firm to do in 2013, on the basis of article 12 of the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
                                                     
 
1632
  We did mention in the first part of the report other economic studies or market studies which were made by others, but they 
either date back to quite some time ago, or dealt with UGC in a more general sense, including all forms of UGC (which is not what 
our report is about – see hereafter for the notion of UGC which we will rely upon).   
See First Part of our report, pages 8 and 9, where we define what this report understands as “UGC”: 
“We need to be clear, at the outset of this report, that what we will consider as UGC (and what we will deal with in our report) are 
cases where a pre-existing work is taken by a user as a starting point for his/her own expression.   It means that we limit the 
examination to the situations where there is a pre-existing work and where such work will be modified in one way or another to then 
be made available online. 
As a consequence, we exclude from our report the two following scenario: 
What we will call “the creation from scratch case”, i.e. the case where a user creates a new work “from scratch”, without relying on 
a pre-existing work.  (...) 
What we will call the “mere upload case”, i.e. the case where a user merely distributes on the internet (by uploading it) pre-existing 
works without having intervened in any way on the work; some called this “User-Copied Content”.  
So, what will interests us are situations where a “user” (therefrom the expression “User-Generated-Content”) relies on a pre-existing 
work, “arranges” it, and then uploads it on a website or web platform of some kind.” 
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Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society (“the InfoSoc Directive” or “the Directive”). 
At the request of the Commission, we divided our analysis in two parts:  
- first, a description of the “as is” situation (what rules apply to UGC ? are they adequate? is there 
case-law on UGC? how do commentators analyse the UGC phenomenon?) – this has been the 
subject-matter of this first report; 
- in this second part, we will now deal with the “could be” situation and analyse the need (or not) 
(from the point of view of providing a predictable legal framework) or not for the Commission to 
intervene on UGC and, if a need exists, how best the Commission could intervene.  We will list a 
number of possible options, ranging from “suggesting a specific UGC exception”, to... doing 
nothing. 
The general purpose of the Study commissioned to our firm (which materialises in a series of separate 
reports, this one on UGC being only one of them) is “to assess the extent to which the implementation of 
the Directive is appropriate to the economic and technological realities of digital markets and evaluate 
whether and, if so, to what extent, further harmonisation in some areas of copyright is needed in order to 
enable the EU to capitalize on the opportunities of a digital single market”.  As Internet and digital 
technology are rapidly changing the way in which works and other protected subject matter are produced, 
distributed and used, many of these changes could not be reflected nor sometimes even envisaged in the 
report that was undertaken in 2006
1633
.   
The Commission was of the opinion that some key limitations and exceptions needed to be reassessed 
but considered, in line with previous Commission documents which we listed in our first report, that UGC 
also deserved consideration in the reassessment exercise of the Directive.  The Commission therefore 
did not want to limit the exercise to examining exceptions which were already provided for by the 
Directive but wanted to also examine the need for possible new exceptions, such as one which would 
deal with UGC. 
I. Subject matter  
As noted by the Terms of Reference (p. 5), “the fast development of social networking and social media 
sites which rely on the creation and upload/distribution of online content by end-users raises a certain 
number of questions in terms of copyright.  These new applications enable users to generate new content 
and new practices for media and artistic expressions have emerged”.   
As noted in the first part of our report, while some stakeholders argue in favour of a new exception to 
cover such UGC, others argue for increased flexibility and clarity of the already existing exceptions of the 
closed list of the Directive, together with the application of the 3-step test (Directive, art. 5(5)), not only to 
facilitate UGC but also to facilitate the emergence of new business models for commercial users. Others 
take the view that licensing schemes should be the preferred option and insist that such schemes are 
increasingly available, and point to the legal certainty provided by existing arrangements covering use 
and re-use on major platforms
1634
. Concerns as to consequences of a UGC exception not only on 
licencing practices but also in terms of the normal exploitation of copyright protected content are also 
                                                     
 
1633
 Report by the Institute for Information Law (IVIR), Study on the implementation and effect in Member States’ laws of Directive 
2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Parts I & II, February 
2007. 
1634
 See however, infra, in this report: the existing arrangements and available licensing schemes more often deal with “mere 
upload” cases, but not with cases where the user adapts or in some way changes a pre-existing work, and often do not deal with 
cases where the user could invoke the existence of a quotation exception or of a parody exception.   
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often raised, the argument being made that the only beneficiaries of an exception would be the 
commercial operators running the platforms used to upload and communicate UGC. 
In the first part of our report, after describing what we understand by UGC in the report, we presented 
some available figures and gave a brief summary of the EU Commission’s position on UGC (as reflected 
in various Commission documents and communications).  We then described the extent to which the 
exclusive rights (both economic rights and moral rights) of copyright were concerned/affected by UGC.  
We then analysed the exceptions from the Directive which were relevant for UGC, i.e. the quotation 
exception, the exception relating to use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche and the 
incidental inclusion exception and described the way in which these exceptions had been (or not) 
implemented in the Member States.  We then mentioned the recent case-law of the EUCJ which could be 
relevant for our report and a few (rare) decisions which dealt explicitly with UGC cases.  We tried to see if 
a so-called “chilling effect” of the copyright law on UGC could be evidenced and we described some of 
the licensing mechanisms which stakeholders have put in place to license/authorize UGC uses.  Finally, 
we described the arguments outside of copyright which judges or commentators sometimes invoke to 
authorize UGC in cases where copyright might not grant such freedom of use, before drawing preliminary 
conclusions.  As mentioned in the first part of our report, we do not consider here other legislation than 
copyright, even if some may have an importance on UGC (like defamation law, consumer law, liability 
issues, etc.). 
As invited by the Terms of Reference, we will also examine (in the second part of our report) whether 
legal arguments inspired from a kind of “fair use “ exception in the US-style could be a solution to allow 
some UGC uses which could not be justified on the basis of the InfoSoc Directive but which one might 
reasonably expect should be allowed. 
We concentrate our analysis on non-commercial UGC, yet recognizing (as explained in the first part of 
our report) that it may be hard to draw a line between commercial and non-commercial UGC.  This being 
said, the commercial/non-commercial character of an act is in most copyright cases of little relevance
1635
, 
by opposition to the public v. private character of a use.    
To describe it very briefly, the purpose and subject matter of our report is to examine from the point of 
view of the adequacy (certainty, clarity, predictability) of the legal framework the need (yes or no?) of a 
new UGC exception which would be added to the closed list of the InfoSoc Directive, whether it may 
prove more appropriate to suggest alternative routes or whether no initiative is needed, from the 
Commission’s side, regarding UGC. 
We will hereafter analyse the various routes which the Commission, in our view, could theoretically follow.  
For each of them, we will try to describe the advantages and disadvantages which each such route may 
present.  
We will distinguish between the actions which could take place within the current legal framework, i.e. 
without making any changes to the existing texts and to the Directive, and the actions which would 
involve changes to the existing legislation and/or to the Directive. 
II. Possible actions within the existing framework 
The following initiatives would not involve any changes to the existing legislative framework.   
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 This must be nuanced concerning the second and third step of the 3 step test and concerning the fair use analysis. 
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A. Not taking any initiative 
If we make a list of the possible options which exist, “not taking any initiative” is one of them.  This option 
could be justified on the grounds that rightholders seem generally to tolerate UGC, that UGC is already 
flourishing (and therefore does not need any specific Commission action) and that there are already 
various mechanisms put in place by stakeholders (i.e. mainly content-sharing platforms but increasingly 
also micro licensing possibilities) to deal with UGC and to contribute to a revenue-creating stream for 
rightholders which provide users with legal certainty with respect to the re-use of protected content
1636
.    
Advantage(s) 
The legal framework is starting to deliver case law on which UGC cases can be assessed. In sectors such 
as music, contractual practice is increasingly providing legal certainty that the re-use (posting) of pre-
existing works on those platforms with which agreements have been reached, is legitimate.  “Doing 
nothing” would not destabilise the emerging market.  This would also avoid the risk of increased litigation 
to "test the limits" of any new exception and the disruption of existing licensing solutions. 
Disadvantage(s) 
While we could not identify a significant “chilling effect” of the legal framework, there are uncertainties 
which could be clarified and differences in the laws of Member States which would gain from being 
harmonised (see other options infra).    Not doing anything would not clear these uncertainties nor solve 
the fact that the legal situation is not harmonised amongst all Member States.   
B. Facilitating MoUs or other arrangements between stakeholders  
Without changing the legislative framework, the Commission could decide to continue to encourage a 
dialogue between the various stakeholders concerned.   There could be various results to such a 
dialogue. 
The first pre-requisite would be for the parties to agree as to what the problem is, including the definition 
of UGC (as distinct from mere upload). Once agreement is found, then the Commission could have a role 
in facilitating a dialogue in which consumer representatives would act as a sounding board for initiatives 
by stakeholders and distributors to improve the user environment with respect to UGC.  
In fact, this dialogue is what the Commission has launched via its “Licences for Europe” initiative.  It is 
uncertain at the time when this report was written whether such initiative will lead to concrete results and 
whether it will allow an objective and sufficiently comprehensive view regarding the market and the 
situation of UGC. 
Several MoUs have already been concluded in the field of copyright, such as the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Key Principles on the Digitisation and Making Available of Out-of-Commerce 
Works or the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on access to works by people with print disabilities.   
This indicates that MoUs may provide for some additional comfort in certain sectors. It is noted, however, 
that in these instances, the signatories consisted of a finite list of organizations and their members, which 
had the power and governance structures to approve and implement the undertakings. It is difficult to see 
how this could be the case for parties other than rights holders and distributors.  
One point would deserve to be further investigated. While a number  existing monetizing arrangements 
cover both upload and transformative use (on the basis of automated content recognition), it has been 
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highlighted by the Rapport Lescure submitted in May 2013
1637
 that the arrangements concluded between 
some collective rights organizations and content-sharing platforms, do not always cover transformative 
UGC but often only “mere upload” cases.  These arrangements should thus be improved to take into 
account the transformative UGC cases (and not be limited to mere-upload cases).  Absent such revision, 
the transformative UGC cases (which correspond to the definition of UGC for this report) would not be 
covered by such arrangements; consequently, users would be left with the option of either relying on 
existing exceptions (with the problems which this causes and which we identify in this report) or obtaining 
the rightholder’s permission, which for many users would certainly appear as a significant obstacle. 
Advantage(s) 
A possible MoU between rightholders and distributors on its coverage, help in increasing transparency 
and awareness.  The advantage of such dialogue encouraged by the Commission is that it is based on a 
voluntary arrangement stemming from the parties concerned, that it may lead to concrete results in less 
time than what a change to the legislative regime would imply and that it may also be more flexible going 
forward, as an MoU could be revised to account for new developments more quickly and easily than a 
directive could be amended and adopted. 
Disadvantage(s) 
At the same time, it has the disadvantages which are commonly attributed to such voluntary initiatives, 
such as the fact that the solutions may only be regarded as legitimate if they are the result of negotiations 
in which all parties concerned were duly represented and if their legitimate interests were taken into 
consideration.  Also, the non-binding character of such voluntary mechanisms may mean that their 
endorsement is not guaranteed by non-signatories and that contradicting behaviours may continue to 
exist (even if there may be pressure on would-be outliers to play by the MoU because their non 
cooperation compromises the effectiveness of the MoU for everyone else). 
C. Adopting an interpretative document (such as a Commission Communication) 
Instead of waiting for the Court to further harmonize the exceptions to copyright set out by the Directive, 
piece by piece, somewhat haphazardly as the cases come up, the Commission could choose to draft and 
publish its own interpretative guidelines, not only on existing exceptions but possibly also on the freedom 
which users have, based on general copyright principles, to re-use pre-existing content and create UGC 
works. 
The Commission has already taken such initiatives in the past and in various fields, in order to clarify the 
scope and the meaning of the European legislation (cf. infra).   
In the field of copyright, WIPO has also published its interpretative guide to the Berne Convention. This 
guide was drafted by civil servants of WIPO, in order to clarify the provisions of the Berne Convention. 
The EUCJ has already referred to this guide, even if it is not legally binding, while interpreting the 
provisions of the Berne Convention in copyright cases.  
Guidelines aim at clarifying the commented instruments, in the light of the available case-law, and at 
providing the author’s or institution’s view about their interpretation.  They should,  ideally, clearly specify 
that they do not provide an authentic interpretation of the commented instrument. Indeed, when EU 
directives are concerned, the CJEU has the exclusive power to give such authentic interpretation.  
The first part of this Study showed important uncertainties concerning the legal status of UGC and the 
application of existing exceptions thereto. Discrepancies between national legislations, uncertainties 
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User Generated Content (UGC)  518 
 
 
 
concerning the territorial reach of UGC publishing on the internet, discussions about the level of 
harmonization reached by the Directive or uncertain material significance of some exceptions were the 
most important elements put forward.  
A number of proposals examined further in this second part aim at reducing these uncertainties by 
modifying the Directive in several respects. 
However, it may be argued that legislative action is not necessary and that such clarification might as well 
take place under the current legal framework. We are of opinion that the recent case-law of the EUCJ 
may lay the foundation for a more harmonized, flexible and “UGC-friendly” interpretation by the national 
courts of the exceptions set out by the Directive
1638
: 
- More harmonization. This is one of the findings coming out of the analysis of the Court’s recent 
case-law on copyright. The use of various interpretative methods
1639
 has led the Court to broaden 
the domain harmonized by the Directive and to reduce accordingly the margin of implementation 
enjoyed by the Member States. The Court has given its own autonomous interpretation of various 
concepts, even where the legislator in the InfoSoc Directive had clearly chosen to leave them to 
the discretion of Member States. In other cases, though, and quite contrary to the tendency just 
mentioned, the Court left the material content of certain concepts to the appreciation of national 
courts, without indicating clearly which concepts are eligible for an autonomous interpretation and 
which are not.  A Commission’s interpretative document may help in understanding the CJEU’s 
case-law and its impact on UGC.     
- Less margin of appreciation for the Member States. This is a logical consequence of the 
growing harmonization. The Court has recalled that exceptions must be implemented while 
bearing in mind the needs for harmonization and that inconsistent and un-harmonised national 
implementation by Member States of the same (optional) exception would be incompatible with 
the objectives of the Directive. The CJEU found itself providing its interpretation of (parts of) the 
material content of certain exceptions. It opposed Member States who added conditions to those 
explicitly mentioned in the text of the Directive in their national implementations of an exception 
(quotation). Even the optional character of the exceptions, although explicitly mentioned in the 
directive, could now arguably sometimes be challenged since the Court considered the exception 
of quotation as striking “a fair balance between the right of freedom of expression of users of a 
work […] and the reproduction right conferred on authors”, which balance is “struck by favouring 
the exercise of the users’ right to freedom of expression over the interest of the author”
1640
.  If the 
exception of quotation strikes a balance between copyright and freedom of expression, which is 
protected by various international instruments such as the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, it seems hard to defend that Member States are completely free to 
implement it in their national law or not.  And what the Court said about quotation could, on the 
basis of the exact same reasoning, be transposed to parody, even if this exception is less 
straightforward and does have a basis in the Berne Convention itself.  
- “User-friendly” interpretation of the exceptions. The exceptions derogate from the general 
principle established by directive 2001/29, namely the establishment of a high level of protection 
for the authors and the requirement of authorisation from the copyright holder for any 
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  For a more detailed analysis about the Court’s case-law, see the first part of this report. 
1639
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reproduction. According to the Court, these principles may not be compromised by the national 
implementation of exceptions, which must therefore be interpreted strictly. Although the Court has 
not abandoned this principle of strict interpretation, which is still recalled in most of the cases, the 
recent case-law showed a slight shift of position in favour of the beneficiaries of the exception. 
The Court has affirmed the need to enable the effectiveness of the exceptions and, following a 
teleological approach, has verified whether the proposed interpretation of an exception complied 
with its purpose and did not hinder its effectiveness. In addition, the Court occasionally has 
weighted the balance of interests between the exclusive rights of the authors and the interests 
protected by the purpose of an exception and has found this balance striking in favour of the 
freedom of expression of the users of a work who benefit from the exception of quotation.  
On one hand, the state of the affairs depicted here above is rather positive with respect to UGC (even if 
the CJEU never had to deal with UGC cases as such). The trend towards harmonization makes 
publication of content on the Internet simpler, as it reduces the need to take into account national 
particularities. The principle of “effective” interpretation of the exception and the balance of interests that 
should be made between the interests of the authors and the purposes protected by the exceptions, 
favours the inclusion into the scope of certain exceptions (quotation, incidental inclusion, parody) of a 
large number of UGC cases. These principles may justify, if one is to follow the reasoning of the EUCJ, a 
limitation to the freedom of the Member States to differ from the wording used in the directive, by e.g. 
adding conditions to benefit from the exceptions or by limiting the scope thereof. 
On the other hand, these positive trends lack legal security and certainty. The Court pronounces itself 
only when and to the extent that questions are submitted to its jurisdiction. The principles described 
above are not much more than clues for solving questions that have not been examined yet; they do not 
always draw clear and consistent interpretative guidelines which may be as such used for all existing 
exceptions.  
Therefore, instead of waiting for the Court to further harmonize the exceptions to copyright set out by the 
Directive, piece after piece, somewhat haphazardly as the cases come up, the Commission could choose 
to draft and publish its own interpretative guidelines.    
As explained in the first part of our report, none of the exceptions taken separately could cover the great 
majority of UGC works; only by considering several exceptions does one cover, in our view, the majority 
of UGC (as we defined it).  An interpretative document should thus, in order to be useful, deal with each 
of these (three) exceptions.  
The Commission has already taken such initiatives in the past and in various fields, in order to clarify the 
scope and the meaning of the European legislation; see for instance the Guidelines on the interpretation 
of key provisions of Directive 2008/98/EC on waste published in June 2012
1641
, the Commission 
Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject 
to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives of 2006
1642
 and the Commission Interpretative 
Communication on certain aspects of the provisions on televised advertising in the "Television without 
frontiers" Directive, published in 2004
1643
. 
Advantage(s) 
In this type of document, the Commission would have the opportunity to emphasize the findings of the 
CJEU summarized here above about the exceptions to copyright.  The document could also provide the 
Commission’s views about a certain number of open questions. For instance (which is a personal view of 
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the authors of this report, given as an example only), the Commission could defend the view that 
exceptions protecting fundamental rights of the users of copyrighted works already provide sufficient 
flexibility (see Painer) and should thus be implemented by the Member States according to the wording of 
the directive, without adding further restrictions or conditions. This could apply to the exceptions of 
quotation and of parody, which arguably aim at enforcing the freedom of expression.   
The Commission could, on the other hand, also provide its own interpretation of (currently) not 
harmonized concepts, such as “quotation”, “parody”, etc. , give indications or even its own view on the 
numerous questions which are mentioned in this report, and list (non exhaustively) the points on which 
Member States may still continue to diverge (based e.g. on the subsidiarity principle) in their 
implementation of the Directive.  
Such approach combines the advantages of avoiding the lengthy and tricky legislative process required to 
modify the Directive, and the advantages of doing something in favour of a more consistent 
harmonization of copyright without waiting for the Court to do so, piece by piece, depending on the 
questions submitted to its jurisdiction. 
Important arguments exist today in favour of a more harmonized and “user-friendly” interpretation of 
copyright exceptions, without need to modify the current legal framework. The Commission may take this 
opportunity to promote such interpretation by releasing a non-binding, but somewhat authoritative 
document. 
For consistency reasons, it may make sense that the Commission defines its position somewhat ex ante, 
for the benefit of informing the market and the users at large rather than case-by-case, as and when a 
prejudicial question comes up.  After an internal consultation exercise between the different DGs of the 
Commission, such Interpretative Communication on UGC (and more generally on the exceptions to the 
Directive or, even if not for all because this may prove too difficult, for those for which the exercise 
appears to be doable), such document could prove an interesting compromise between the present and, 
in certain instances, uncertain situation and a legislative adventure opening the Pandora’s box of 
exceptions...  Thus, if the Commission decided that there was a need to do so, a more flexible and “UGC-
friendly” interpretation of the existing copyright exceptions than currently appears to be the case in some 
Member States, could be suggested. This could prove useful when a case comes up before a Member 
State’s court. 
Disadvantage(s) 
An interpretative, “soft-law” instrument certainly has downsides.  Its legitimacy may sometimes be 
questioned as it arises neither from the legislator who has been democratically elected nor from the Court 
of Justice which is entrusted by the EU Treaties to interpret the Directives, but by experts or civil servants 
of an administration (as in the case of WIPO or of the Interpretative Communications from the 
Commission).  It is indeed so that the Commission, while being the guardian of the acquis, does not have 
as its mission to give official interpretations of the directives, but at the same time, the Commission is 
always invited to give its own views when a prejudicial question is brought before the Court of Justice.   
One should still not forget that the Commission’s own view of the effect of Community legislation, while it 
may be of interest and may have some weight, is clearly not binding on the Court, as recalled by 
Advocate General (par. 45) in the case C-306/05, SGAE v Rafael Hotels, AG Sharpston. Neither would 
such a Communication be binding on the Member States with respect to their implementation of the 
acquis. 
D. Encourage education and information initiatives 
Some commentators have indicated that, as far as UGC is concerned, users in general do not know well 
what they may and may not do under national copyright law.  It is not surprising as even experienced 
scholars may agree that it is difficult to explain easily what may or may not be done in that context.  
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However, as the need for education and information initiatives has already been mentioned more 
generally regarding copyright and the need to respect copyright principles, in the society’s interest, the 
same may hold true regarding UGC : even if we could not find strong evidence regarding a possible 
“chilling effect” of the actual legal framework, some users (if they try to understand what the legal situation 
is) certainly wonder what they may do and may hesitate in engaging in UGC initiatives due to the lack of 
clarity of the legal regime  and to the lack of harmonization between Member States.   
One could think of initiatives which could be taken to give indications to users in general about what they 
may do with pre-existing works with which they want to make a parody, for instance.  The difficulty of such 
initiative is that, given the fact that the situation is not harmonized in all Member States (about parody, for 
instance, and the conditions to respect for a parody to be legitimate), the guidance could hardly be clear-
cut and simple.  But some guidance directed to users would still be useful – be it to refer on certain issues 
to national legislations.  Such education initiatives could probably not be managed by the Commission but 
might be delegated to external parties, possibly in concert with the Member States.  Education initiatives 
might also be combined with an MoU in the sense that if an understanding (in an MoU) worked out, its 
terms could be publicized. 
Advantage(s) 
The need for more information in the general public about what copyright is about, why it is beneficial to 
the society at large and not only to rightholders or producers, etc. has already been mentioned on 
different occasions by interested parties.  Copyright as a mean to encourage creativity is more often 
questioned than in the past and its legitimacy is regularly put into question.  This may come from the fact 
that the public is not sufficiently informed about how copyright works.  Information campaigns are, up to 
now, mainly undertaken at the initiative of anti-counterfeiting associations.  Maybe it would make sense to 
ensure that users (the public at large) be better informed about the existence of exceptions, such as 
parody, quotation, etc., which give them quite some room to engage into UGC initiatives.  Arguably, such 
messages should not be brought by anti-counterfeiting associations but by other associations (such as 
consumer organizations, the education systems (schools) in the Member States, or civil rights 
organizations). 
Such initiatives, taken together with education initiatives regarding copyright in general would at the same 
time (1) assist in explaining in particular to the younger generations what copyright is about and how/why 
it remains beneficial to the society at large by encouraging creativity through the rewarding of authors and 
(2) help in demonstrating that the existence of copyright, as being a system combining exclusive rights 
but also exceptions, does not prohibit each and every use of the works and is not just “something which 
makes producers rich” and, i.a. via the parody exception, allows everyone to create parodies of existing 
works and upload them on the internet without running the risk of being sued by the rightholders. 
This type of initiative, about copyright in general and including UGC in its scope, would help in preserving 
copyright and ameliorate its understanding and endorsement by the younger generations. 
Disadvantage(s) 
One of the disadvantages is that, in order for such campaigns to be sufficiently viewed, it may require an 
important budget and its efficiency is not guaranteed as it would rely on the openness of users and their 
readiness to listen to such message, which they might not want to hear.  Another one – but this is more 
an obstacle than a disadvantage – is that it may at this stage prove complicated to convey a simple and 
straightforward message on UGC, considering the uncertainties which at the moment still prevail when 
one looks at the situation for the whole territory of the European Union (given the lack of a clear definition 
of the problem and of harmonization in the field of exceptions). 
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III. Possible actions requiring changes to the existing framework 
We will hereafter list initiatives which the Commission might take on UGC but which imply making 
changes to the existing legislation.  We will mention changes to copyright legislation (the Information 
Society Directive), but also make reference to another directive, being the e-Commerce Directive.   
A. Adapting and harmonizing the content of existing exceptions 
As has been illustrated in the first part of our report, the relevant exceptions from the Information Society 
Directive are not harmonized at EU level.   This means that, for a user who wishes to engage in a UGC 
project on the Internet and who first wants to assess what his risks are in terms of possible copyright 
infringement, such user should verify what the situation is in all Member States.  As a result of such 
examination, if the user does not want to take any risk, he should (1) either adapt the message he wishes 
to convey to the rules prevailing in each country or (2), if he wants to only make one UGC work, align his 
initiative with, for each exception being examined, the most restrictive one, i.e. the most restrictive regime 
regarding quotation, the most restrictive one regarding parody and (3) the most restrictive one regarding 
incidental inclusion.   
For the sake of completeness, one should add that such affirmation (as contained in the previous 
paragraph) only holds true in cases where no licences were available, allowing the user to make such 
UGC out of pre-existing works.  In this regard, one should mention that various platforms provide that, 
when a user initially uploads an original work, he accepts that such work may be adapted, copied, 
parodied, etc.  This may also be the case for works which were initially distributed under a Creative 
Commons licence (if the licence chosen by the creator is not a “No Derivative” licence). 
We have no statistical figures regarding the number of users who hesitated in/abandoned the creation of 
a UGC work, and a layman’s observation of the Internet and of the Internet content-sharing platforms 
such as YouTube tends to indicate that many users did not hesitate at all and maybe did not even 
consider the question as to whether the UGC they uploaded (i.e., apart from “mere uploads”, mainly 
parodies) required the rightholder’s consent.  However, it makes sense to consider that a harmonised 
situation in regard of the exceptions which are relevant for UGC (i.e., as explained in the first part of our 
report, quotation, parody and the exception for incidental inclusion), together with education and 
information initiatives/campaigns, would provide greater certainty to users and creators involved in UGC 
activities   
All three exceptions at EU level have as their purpose to provide the right balance between the 
fundamental freedoms of right to property on the one hand and freedom of expression on the other.  
Freedom of expression is also the basis of some other exceptions from the InfoSoc Directive. 
It is a fundamental right shared by all Member States, signatories to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which provides in its article 10 
(Freedom of expression): 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”  (emphasis 
in bold added). 
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The EU Parliament, the Council and the EU Commission have also adopted in 2000 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which provides in its article 11 (Freedom of expression and 
information): 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers” (emphasis in bold added). 
One might therefore hope that Member States are eventually able to agree on what should be acceptable 
under the three exceptions under consideration and how to harmonize them further. Without 
underestimating the difficulty of such exercise, considering that an analysis of the case-law is difficult for it 
is always very much a case-by-case solution to a specific situation where factual circumstances play an 
important role,  and while not forgetting that the right to property (including to intellectual property) is also 
protected by the ECHR and the Charter, one cannot in our view deny the interest which a greater 
harmonization of exceptions would present (and this holds true not only for UGC).   As in all harmonizing 
efforts, the way to the solution may neither be straightforward nor obvious but could, in our view, be tried. 
Some commentators have argued that the Directive as such, without changing it, already allowed 
sufficient leeway for the Member States to promote UGC if they so wished.  Some invoked the fact that 
the adaptation right was not part of the Directive to say that UGC could be introduced (and allowed) via 
this route (subject of course to the three-step test)
1644
.  Others stated that the Directive allowed also 
sufficient leeway in the definition of some of the exceptions to introduce UGC via a modification, not by an 
amended Directive (which would take too much time) but by amending the national implementing 
legislation regarding the existing exceptions in order to allow UGC with more certainty than is now the 
case; this is i.a. advocated in by the Dutch Copyright Commission, which suggests to adapt the quotation 
exception to further allow UGC
1645
; the Dutch Copyright Commission is of the opinion that the parody 
exception would probably, when interpreted by the CJEU, receive a too narrow interpretation to 
sufficiently shelter UGC (due mainly to the humoristic or satiric requirement of parody in many Member 
States).  It will in this regard be interesting to see the answers which the CJEU will give to the questions 
which have just recently been referred to her regarding parody by the Brussels Court of appeal
1646
. 
One could draw a further argument from the words of both articles quoted above which we highlighted in 
bold (“and regardless of frontiers”), to be found similarly in both texts, as a reason to ensure that freedom 
to receive and impart information should be safeguarded in a uniform manner throughout all Member 
States.  This implies that the exceptions to copyright which have as their main purpose to  enable  such 
freedom of expression should be interpreted and applied in a harmonized manner, so that the freedom of 
expression (to distribute or to receive information) not be restricted more in one country than in another. 
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 See, in favour of a broadening of the quotation right (more than of the parody exception) in order to further allow UGC, the Dutch 
report of the Copyright Commission (Commissie Auteursrecht), dd. 21 March 2012, available at 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/intellectueel-eigendom/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2012/10/30/advies-een-
flexibele-regeling-voor-user-generated-content.html  
1646
 The Court of appeal of Brussels, in its arrest dd 8 April, 2013 (Deckmyn v Vandersteen en Vrijheidsfonds VZW v. 
Vandersteen) raises the following questions to the EUCJ (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Brussel 
(Belgium) lodged on 17 April 2013 — Johan Deckmyn, Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others, (Case C-201/13) 
(2013/C 189/11): 
1. Is the concept of ‘parody’ an independent concept in European Union law?  
2. If so, must a parody satisfy the following conditions or conform to the following characteristics:  
— the display of an original character of its own (originality);  
— and such that the parody cannot reasonably be ascribed to the author of the original work;  
— be designed to provoke humour or to mock, regardless of whether any criticism thereby expressed applies to the 
original work or to something or someone else;  
— mention the source of the parodied work?  
3. Must a work satisfy any other conditions or conform to other characteristics in order to be capable of being labelled as a 
parody? 
User Generated Content (UGC)  524 
 
 
 
This pleads for a uniform interpretation and application of the exceptions we have highlighted as relevant 
to UGC, being quotation, parody and incidental inclusion. The Commission might find it opportune to 
express such opinion in the “interpretative document” discussed above. 
Going one step further, this might also suggest some changes to the Information Society Directive to the 
effect that these exceptions be harmonized in more detail, so as to leave less margin of discretion to 
legislators and courts in the Member States and to ensure that, on the contrary, the exceptions be given a 
uniform interpretation (in the same way as the articles on freedom of expression of the ECHR and of the 
Charter should normally receive a uniform interpretation throughout the Union).  
Consequently, the Commission could propose amendments to the Information Society Directive to the 
effect that the exceptions regarding parody and pastiche, the exception regarding quotation and the 
exception regarding incidental inclusion be further specified so that their implementation in the legislation 
of the Member States would not leave  such Member States with any (or hardly any) margin of 
interpretation.  One could argue that this is contrary to the philosophy of harmonization through directives, 
but the EUCJ has already expressed the view that the wording of an exception in the Information Society 
Directive, even though the list was optional, could not be interpreted and implemented in a different way 
than in the way the text of the Directive had been intended
1647
.  So, such initiative from the Commission 
could find some comfort in some case-law of the EUCJ.  
When adopting either the interpretative document suggested above or drafting changes to the Information 
Society Directive, the Commission could seize the opportunity to indicate clearly to what extent these 
exceptions are relevant for UGC.  This would greatly clarify the situation for all stakeholders concerned. 
One difficulty of such exercise (i.e. further harmonizing these three exceptions) stems from the fact that, 
in the Information Society Directive, the adaptation right has not been harmonized and, a fortiori, that 
exceptions to the adaptation right have not been provided
1648
.   This leaves the Commission with two 
options: 
- Either take the route of harmonizing the adaptation right, but this may prove very difficult in the 
actual situation and raise a list of additional questions flowing from the intention to harmonize the 
adaptation right; 
- Or provide, in the amended text of the Directive, that exceptions are to be interpreted as 
exceptions to all exclusive rights which may exist (which means, also to the adaptation right) and 
which would be contrary to the exercise of such exceptions: without harmonizing the adaptation 
right, this would result in ensuring that the exceptions will be applied despite the further 
subsistence of the adaptation right outside the realm of the Directive.  This may not be a very 
elegant solution and the drafting of such provision may not be easy but the fact that the 
adaptation right is not harmonized does not per se constitute, we think, an insurmountable 
obstacle to this exercise.     
It is unquestionable that by harmonizing these three exceptions and even making them compulsory, one 
would still not cover all UGC cases, but our view is that it would cover the greatest part of it, and at the 
same time the most interesting part of UGC in terms of freedom of expression and added-value to the 
society at large and to the exchange of ideas and development of culture.   Arguably, if parodies are, 
under certain conditions, allowed, if quotations are, under certain conditions, allowed, and if incidental 
inclusions are held not to be infringing copyright, then we tend to think that the most valuable UGC works 
(again, in terms of freedom of expression, expression of new ideas and contribution to the exchange of 
ideas and the development of culture) will be safe-harbored.    If a small part of UGC falls through the 
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safety net of these three exceptions, it may well be that it is because it is not really worth protecting.  In 
such cases, it is more than probable anyway that neither the author of the UGC work has any hope of 
deriving revenue from it nor the rightholder has any intention to devote efforts and spend costs to engage 
in legal proceedings and obtain a “take down” or damages: the result is that such valueless works will 
hang out and stay on the Net, but in a general sphere of disinterest from everybody.  As stated, “de 
minimis non curat praetor…”.  
It goes beyond the scope of this report to draft the texts for such revised exceptions but several issues 
will have to be considered if the Commission wishes to propose a new wording for these three exceptions 
: 
- Regarding quotations: for which (exhaustive?) purposes are they allowed?  Should they be 
short (whatever “short” means) or sometimes possible for a whole work (such as a pictorial work)?  
Should they be allowed for all kinds of works, including newspaper articles or press summaries? Should 
they only be allowed if inserted in a work or be allowed to exist on their own? May they be made for 
commercial purposes also?  What would mean a reference to conformity with “fair practice”?  Should they 
always (at least when feasible) mention the source (author and/or work)? Are they allowed for political 
propaganda?  Should they be limited to what is strictly necessary?  Should they only be allowed for works 
made publicly available with the author’s consent?  Should they be in conformity with “fair practice” or “fair 
professional uses” or not conflict with “honest practices” (whatever these words may mean)? Are 
translations of (short?) quotations allowed? 
The initial proposal by the Commission in the draft Directive was not altered substantially during the 
legislative process, so that one may infer that a rather broad consensus exists amongst the Member 
States, but “the devil is often in the details” and if the proclaimed idea is to render the exception more 
precise and compulsory, divergences may reappear on a surface which seemed rather calm. 
Also, most Member States already had a quotation exception of some kind even before the adoption of 
the Information Society Directive, so that the idea of making such exception compulsory should not spur 
revolution amongst the Member States. 
We know that the EUCJ answered a number of questions regarding quotations in its Painer decision, yet 
some questions remain unanswered. 
The Lescure report , submitted to the French President on May 13, 2013, suggests for, French law, and in 
order to accommodate the non-commercial UGC uses, to study the possibility to envisage a broadening 
of the quotation exception so as to cover, while staying within the limits of quotation exception of the 
Copyright Directive, non-commercial “creative or transformative” purposes (while recognizing that the 
“transformative purpose” would require further analysis) ; the “non-commercial” character would mean 
that uploading giving rise to advertising revenues and arrangements giving rising to the sharing of 
advertising revenues would not be covered
1649
.  
- Regarding parody: as the Berne Convention does not provide for such exceptions, we have 
illustrated in the first part of our report that some countries have traditionally accepted it, be it via case-law 
or via an explicit exception in their copyright legislation, and that some have not.  Questions which would 
have to be examined include the following: should one make a difference between parody, caricature or 
pastiche?   Should the exception respect “honest trade practices” or “social customs” (whatever these 
terms may mean)?  May they borrow much or only as little as is strictly necessary from the pre-existing 
work?  Should they have as their main (or sole) purpose to mock the author, or the work?  Or may 
parodies have as their purpose to convey commercial or political (electoral) messages?  May they cause 
prejudice to the reputation or honour of the author and thereby infringe upon the moral right of integrity of 
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the author?  Should they necessarily be humorous?  Should they avoid all possible confusion with the 
initial work or all possible risk that the parody be seen as originating from the author of the initial work 
(some authors like to practice self-parody)?   
As mentioned above, the CJEU has very recently received a request for a preliminary ruling by the 
Brussels Court of appeal and will thus have the occasion to answer several questions put to it  regarding 
the notion of parody. 
Fuelling this idea to further promote the parody exception is the very recent report by the IPO in the UK, 
which, on the basis of an apparently  large empirical study , illustrates that the existence of parodies in 
the UK (even though not explicitly allowed by legislation) has apparently no demonstrable impact on the 
exploitation of the work, neither negatively nor positively.  The study concludes that correlation between 
the success of the work and the number of existing parodies (without concluding decisively about the 
causal relationship – yet one may suspect that the more successful the work, the more parodies it will 
inspire); it illustrates that, even for the works (the study is limited to music video clips on YouTube in 
2011) which have been most parodied, the proportion of views of the parodied version remains 
insignificant in comparison with the number of views of the original, thereby reinforcing the idea of the 
report that allowing parody would have no detrimental impact on existing works, might on the contrary 
have a (little) positive impact and in any case, in a society of free expression and free speech, should be 
explicitly allowed by the law. 
Very recently, the UK Government has announced its intention to introduce an explicit parody exception 
(due to be introduced in October 2013)
1650
.  
It was recognized, in the consultation conducted by the UK Government, that there is a growing trend for 
user-generated, often non-commercial, parody content on YouTube and similar websites. 
The UK Government announced its intent to legislate to allow limited copying on a fair dealing basis for 
parody, caricature and pastiche, while leaving the existing moral rights regime unchanged. The following 
extracts from the report are worth reproducing here:  
“It (the Government) considers that this permitted act will provide economic and cultural benefits by 
removing unnecessary restrictions on the activity of some creators, reducing administrative costs, and 
encouraging creators, without causing any significant economic harm to holders of rights in the parodied 
content. The requirement that any parody use of a work be ‘fair dealing’ is an additional restriction which 
ensures that the exception is not misused, and will preclude the copying of entire works where such 
taking would not be considered fair (for example if such works are already licensable for a fee). The 
existing moral rights regime will be maintained unchanged, so that creators will be protected from 
damage to their reputation or image through the use of works for parody.  
In addition to the benefits to parodists outlined above, of allowing easier production of parody works, 
there are compelling social and cultural benefits such as the development of free speech and the 
fostering of creative talent. The wider public would also benefit from increased legal clarity and 
opportunities for freedom of expression when creating parody for non-commercial reasons. The 
Government agrees with the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee that genuine political and 
satirical comment should be protected. “ 
A difficulty when wanting to further harmonize parody is that the adaptation right is not as such 
harmonized and remains outside the scope of the Directive (unlike for computer programs and 
databases).  Yet one can probably rely on the very broad definition of the reproduction right, covering 
many kinds of reproductions (“direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and 
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in any form, in whole or in part” – see article 2 of the Directive).   Here again, the absence of 
harmonization of the adaptation right, as well as the fact that moral rights are not harmonized, can create 
difficulties but we this does not as such make it impossible, we think, to intervene somewhat further in the 
harmonization of the parody exception
1651
. 
- Regarding the incidental inclusion: as the Berne Convention does not impose such exception 
either, one has to look at what the Member States did when implementing (or not) the exception.  The 
questions which would gain from being clarified, in the absence of any case-law from the EUCJ on this, 
from the users’ perspective and for more legal certainty, include the following: what does “incidental” 
actually mean?  Does it mean “in the background” (of a wedding dance party video, for instance) or rather 
“accidental”, or “unintentional”, i.e. “accessory to the recording of another event, the latter being the main 
subject matter of the including work”?  Does it imply that the recording be of a lower quality than that of 
the original (which, with the advance of technology, is less and less likely to be the case)?  Does it cover 
all types of works, or only architectural ones?  At the exclusion maybe of musical ones and of 
performances?  Is it only allowed if its inclusion is in practice unavoidable when recording the main 
event/work?  Can it only take place when reporting current events? 
It has been shown in the first part of the report that many countries did not introduce this exception in their 
legislation, leading in principle judges in these countries to conclude that such exception does not exist 
and that there is infringement – safe for the possibility to rely on other arguments outside of copyright 
(see first part of our report). 
Advantage(s) 
In our view, harmonizing the content of these three exceptions would give a clearer picture on the 
situation prevailing in the European Union.  The present (not harmonized) situation is not easy to deal 
with if a UGC creator wishes to comply with all applicable rules.  It would also facilitate education and 
information campaigns on the legal rules applying to UGC.  Even if no substantial evidence could be 
gathered regarding a possible chilling effect of such legal framework, it is only logical to consider that a 
harmonized regime on these three exceptions will make the situation clearer for UGC users who wish to 
comply with the rules. 
Disadvantage(s) 
We cannot immediately think of many disadvantages.  Obviously, harmonizing the Member States 
legislation on these exceptions may not be devoid of difficulties, for some Member States may be very 
reluctant to accept it.  Yet this is a “difficulty”, not as such a “disadvantage”. 
B. Adapting the characteristics of existing exceptions 
Another possible route, which may accompany the first one mentioned above, would be to bring changes 
to the characteristics of the exceptions (i.e. to their legal status).  We will discuss two possibilities: making 
them compulsory rather than facultative for Member States; and making them unwaivable for the 
parties to a contract. 
1. Making the three exceptions compulsory? 
It has been criticized by many (the fact is well known and does not even require that we bring evidence of 
such criticism by referring to a list of legal scholars and to scholarly literature) that the exceptions were 
optional and that their adoption was left to the discretion of the Member States’ legislators.  It is 
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noteworthy that the facultative character of the exceptions was proposed as from the first proposal by the 
Commission of a text for the Directive, so that this is not a concession which was made during the 
legislative process.   
However, the result is what it is, i.e. a very disharmonized picture, with every country having made its 
shopping-list in the catalogue.  If one considers that it is important that exceptions which originate not so 
much from market failure but from the necessity to safeguard fundamental rights or freedoms, such as the 
right of expression, a logical consequence would be to make a second change to the mechanism 
provided for by the list of exceptions and decide that some exceptions should be made mandatory, like it 
is the case now for the exception of article 5.1. of the Directive, so that Member States would be obliged 
to adopt them and in the more precise wording which the Commission, in accordance with our previous 
recommendation, would have suggested. 
We do not think that the proportionality principle or the subsidiarity principle per se justify that each 
exception in the catalogue list remains optional for the Member States.   Directives are per se instruments 
which leave some discretion to the Member States as to the means to be put in place to reach the 
objectives of the directive; but that obviously does not mean that a directive should always only include 
“optional” lists.  Quite on the contrary, if the Member States are left free to decide the means to reach the 
objectives, they are nevertheless under an obligation to meet the objectives of the directive.  Making the 
exceptions mandatory would only align the regime of the Directive with the regime of the greatest majority 
of harmonizing directives. 
Advantage(s) 
We are here dealing with the idea of making some of the exceptions mandatory and it should be made 
clear from the outset that our observations do not necessarily hold true for all exceptions and that a 
differentiated treatment of the exceptions in the list may be justified.  For the exceptions under 
consideration, if the exceptions, via an amendment to the Directive, would be made compulsory for the 
Member States, it would facilitate the verification  that a normally prudent UGC creator should do (yet 
probably does not often do) before uploading its UGC work on an international platform, without having to 
wonder about “where what is permitted and where not”, where parody may be commercial and where not, 
where incidental inclusions include musical works or not, etc.   
Disadvantage(s) 
A difficulty (more than a “disadvantage”) of this option is that it implies modifying the Copyright Directive, 
which may not be easy (despite our observation made earlier that Member States should in principle be 
sharing rather similar views regarding the proper balance between exclusive rights, exceptions and 
freedom of expression).   Also, finding such proper balance and put in down in articles of a future directive 
may not be easy.   
Another disadvantage is that it will impose new rules on Member States which, for instance, did not have 
an explicit parody exception in their legislation.  This may lead to resistance.  However, as indicated, all 
Member States ratified the most important declarations and charters on freedom of expression.  One 
should hope that the times are now ripe for a common approach, via the Union, on these issues which 
combine copyright (all Member States having ratified the main international Conventions and adopted 
many harmonization directives) and freedom of expression (where the same observation may be made).  
Optimism should lead one to think that a compromise should be reachable on the wording of compulsory 
exceptions, yet this is obviously hard for anybody to predict.  
2. Making the three exceptions imperative/unwaivable ? 
Finally, if the purpose is that the exceptions can always be relied upon by users, even when they are first 
invited to accept standard clickwrap terms and conditions, then a further logical step would be to decide 
that such exceptions be made “imperative” (as so called in civil law countries), or in other words 
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unwaivable by contract (we are dealing here with the situation where there is a contract (usually, standard 
clickwrap terms and conditions) between the user and the rightholder/publisher (or platform)
1652
.  The 
same reasoning may be held for the quotation exception and for the parody exception but probably not for 
the incidental inclusion exception (since there is, in that case, almost by definition, no possible contractual 
link between the user and the rightholder whose work has been incidentally reused).  Making some of the 
exceptions unwaivable by contract, particularly those which exist not due to some sort of market failure 
but result from freedom of expression considerations, may make sense.   
The consequences thereof certainly deserve further study.  Some  countries like Belgium have already 
provided that copyright exceptions were unwaivable by contract; it does not seem that this has led to 
dramatic consequences for rightholders.   In consumer law legislation, many provisions protecting the 
weaker party have been made unwaivable
1653
; it would seem to us that there are comparable reasons to 
adopt similar mechanisms in copyright law, for certain exceptions at least.   
If one is of the opinion that making an exception unwaivable is too far-reaching a method or too simplistic, 
an alternative could be to distinguish between adhesion contracts and contracts that are negotiated (one 
could may be add: “at arm’s length”): exceptions would only be unwaivable in adhesion contracts and not 
in negotiated contracts. 
By suggesting this however, we are not suggesting that all exceptions to copyright should be made 
mandatory
1654
.  Some have clearly stated that a case-by-case (exception-by-exception) analysis should 
be made, before deciding, for each exception, whether it should be made unwaivable or not
1655
. 
Advantage(s) 
Clearly, the main advantage is that the most powerful party in the negotiation (in most cases, the the 
publisher) will not be able to require waiver of the exception, generally via clickwrap terms and conditions 
which are not negotiable and are of a “take it or leave it” nature.   
It would ensure that the exceptions, once made mandatory, may not be waived by contract. This could be 
seen as a necessary and logical accompanying measure to making them mandatory for Member States.   
To a certain extent, as the French expression goes, “il faut vouloir les conséquences de ce que l’on veut”.    
Disadvantage(s) 
The main disadvantage is that parties lose all margin of negotiation and that this may not facilitate certain 
transactions.  It could lead to a situation where a rightholder, because he cannot reserve some uses 
(exceptions), decides not to grant any licence to the candidate user and that, due to that, some 
transactions which would otherwise have led to some exploitation of a work, are not concluded in the end.    
Another difficulty needs to be assessed, i.e. how should this be reconciled with the existence of moral 
rights.  To some extent, the author will be limited in the exercise of his moral rights if he cannot oppose a 
priori (via contractual terms) quotation or parody of his works, totally or – as this is more likely to happen – 
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partially, for instance in certain contexts (e.g. use of quotations for political propaganda) ?  On the other 
hand, the existence itself of the quotation exception and of the parody exception entails limitations to the 
moral rights of the author (paternity for quotations, integrity for parodies) but this is not new.  And the 
question could be asked as to whether such contractual terms (prohibiting parody or quotations, totally or 
- more likely – partially) would not be held invalid.  On this, like on other issues, a balance needs to be 
struck between diverging rights and interests. 
3. An additional question: who should be the beneficiaries of the exception?  
Independently of the question of whether the exceptions should be made mandatory for Member States 
or unwaivable for parties, the question arises as to who should be the beneficiaries of the exceptions.  In 
our view, the beneficiaries of the exception should only be those who actually “created” the UGC work 
(i.e. relied on a pre-existing work and in some way modified it) and who make no commercial exploitation 
of it (i.e. not derive financial benefits from it, directly or indirectly
1656
).   
The exception should however not benefit third parties who derive commercial benefits from such use by 
the “creators”: for instance, the platform on which the UGC is uploaded and which derives benefits thereof 
thanks to advertising revenues or other forms of revenue streams (e.g. subscriptions) should not be given 
the possibility to find shelter under these exceptions and thereby avoid having to negotiate agreements 
with rightholders to obtain their authorizations for such commercial exploitations and/or to come to 
monetizing agreements with the rightholders.  
Granting the benefit of such kind of exception to commercial exploitations of UGC by large economic 
operators would, at least we think, not pass the three-step test and should not, in our opinion, be 
envisaged.  
When platforms propose to rightholders some sort of monetizing arrangements, it is on the assumption 
that they may run into problems if the rightholders ask to “take down” their contents, which will at the 
same time make the platform less attractive for visitors and thus generate less advertising revenues.  The 
system of exceptions, if it is adapted to facilitate/promote UGC, should not have as a result that the 
content-sharing platforms on which the UGC works have been uploaded may feel sheltered thanks to the 
change of legislation and have then no more reasons to come to terms with rightholders and share part of 
the revenues generating by the views of the videoclips.  This entails that, if one adapts the exception to 
excuse UGC made by certain users, a distinction must be kept between commercial and non-commercial 
uses or maybe between different categories of beneficiaries.  So, even if the end-user’s (non commercial) 
act is considered as not infringing, the exception should not benefit the platform (which is making a 
commercial use of the user’s UGC).  The platform would be reproducing/communicating a non-infringing 
work but should still be liable because it does so for commercial purposes.  The platform’s reproduction or 
communication entails no creativity on the part of the platform, and is commercial, so the basis for non-
liability which would excuse the end-user would not exist for the platform. 
This objective may not be very easy to implement into new legal provisions, because various questions 
can be raised, at the crossroad beween the InfoSoc Directive and the e-Commerce Directive:  in which 
cases is there no involvement of a platform? Could the platform be liable and the user not be, while the 
work at issue (uploaded by the user and hosted on the platform’s website) is the same?  What about the 
posting of UGC on one’s own website or blog (which will often not be commercial?  What about platforms 
that operate on a non-commercial basis (certain news groups, Internet fora etc.)?   This raises questions 
regarding contributory liability (which is not a harmonized concept), and liability of intermediary service 
providers under the Electronic commerce Directive and its safe harbour provisions?  Could there be 
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cases where a platform is under the obligation to obtain a licence from the rightowner of the initial work 
while at the same time not be obliged (because no initial copyright infringement by the user occurs on the 
platform of the service provider) to act expeditiously to take the content (UGC) down?  And if the platform 
is not under such obligation to take the content down, will there still be sufficient incentive for platforms to 
negotiate monetizing agreements and other forms of licences with the rightholders (which is a 
development which should be encouraged)?   
It may thus be that in order to arrive at this result, some additional provisions will be needed.  It is not 
impossible that this may require some fine-tuning or changes to the eCommerce Directive.  We cannot 
examine this at this stage but this clearly deserves due consideration before any decision on the 
preferred course of action is taken.        
Another issue which may deserve the attention of the Commission, when analyzing the monetizing 
arrangements proposed by the major platforms, is that, as far as UGC works are concerned, our 
impression is that the sharing of the revenues takes place between the platform and the authors of the 
pre-existing work, but much less with the creators of the UGC work, such as the parodists.  Yet, in some 
instances, even if a recent report from the IPO
1657
 shows that the number of views of parodies remain 
almost insignificant in regard of the number of views of the original work, one could think of a situation 
where much more creative effort was put in the parody and/or where little remains of the initial work in the 
UGC parody, so that it would seem fair that the sharing of the revenues takes place between the three 
actors in the game: the author of the initial (parodied) work, the creator of the UGC work and the platform 
on which the UGC work (the parody) has been uploaded (and not just between two actors).  Wikipedia 
mentions some examples where the user is rewarded by explicit (financial) rewards, which incentives 
include financial payment, entry into a contest, a voucher, a coupon, or frequent traveler miles
1658
; this 
issue might deserve further consideration (for if the creator is being remunerated, would that not conflict 
with the basis for finding the UGC creator not liable?) 
C. Adopting an explicit UGC exception 
Another route which the Commission could decide to suggest is to create a new provision in the Directive 
to deal with UGC.  This should normally be done via the addition of a new specific exception to the list of 
article 5.2. 
It is worth mentioning that, to our knowledge, only one country has embarked upon this avenue, i.e. 
Canada, via the new article 29.21 of its Copyright Act
1659
.   It is sometimes said that other countries 
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 The article reads as follows : 
Non-commercial User-generated Content 
29.21 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which 
has been published or otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new work or other subject-matter in which 
copyright subsists and for the individual — or, with the individual’s authorization, a member of their household — to use the new 
work or other subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary to disseminate it, if 
the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes; 
the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author, performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or other 
subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so; 
the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was 
not infringing copyright; and 
the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, 
financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on 
an existing or potential market for it, including that the new work or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one. 
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(Israel, South Korea) also have a UGC exception
1660
 while in fact these countries rely therefor on a “fair 
use” approach but not on a specific UGC exception.  The non-commercial UGC exception, often referred 
to as the “YouTube exception” or “mashup exception”, was one of a series of new provisions introduced 
into the Canadian copyright legislation to increase consumers’ rights. 
The new Copyright Act (Bill C-11, entitled the “Copyright Modernization Act”) came into force on 
November 7, 2012.  The other consumer oriented provisions include the addition of education, parody, 
and satire as fair dealing purposes, time shifting (recording of television shows), format shifting, and the 
making of backup copies. 
Under the new Canadian law, a safe harbor is created for both UGC uploaders and sites hosting such 
UGC content provided that basically the following conditions are met: 
- The pre-existing work had been published; 
- It is used to create a new work (so the mere copying is not covered by this provision); 
- The use of the new work if done solely for non-commercial purposes; a commentator stated that 
that such non-commercial purpose is only required from the creator of the UGC work, and not 
from the intermediary (like Facebook or other content-sharing platforms)
1661
; considering the 
comments by the Canadian Government (see hereunder), this statement might not be correct, 
since the Government stated that “this provision applies only to the UGC creator of such works 
and only for non-commercial purposes”
1662
; 
- The source and name of the author are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances to do 
so; 
- The person had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work (or other subject-matter) 
was not infringing copyright; 
- The use (meaning both the upload by the user or the hosting by the intermediary) of the new work 
does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential 
exploitation of the pre-existing work or on an existing or potential market for it, including that the 
new work or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one. 
The law, when adopted, was described as “a bill (…) that has its flaws but also creates some of the most 
expansive copyright user rights in the world”
1663
.  
Not surprisingly, the bill has not been welcomed by all.  The Writers’ Rights Coalition stated the following 
(before the adoption of the bill): “ (…) there is nothing to ensure that any such new use will be fair. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Definitions 
(2) The following definitions apply in subsection (1). 
“intermediary” means a person or entity who regularly provides space or means for works or other subject-matter to be enjoyed by 
the public. 
“use” means to do anything that by this Act the owner of the copyright has the sole right to do, other than the right to authorize 
anything. 
1660
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Professional writers may not object in principle to others incorporating reasonable excerpts from their 
works into new creative works as long as they are credited and the use is truly non-commercial and if the 
new work does not interfere with the market for the original work. However, distribution of these so-called 
“mash-ups” by commercial disseminators such as Facebook or YouTube without payment encroaches 
peremptorily and unfairly on writers’ rights. Whether there is “a substantial adverse effect” on the original 
work, which would result in an infringement, will not be known until too late and may depend on how 
many others create “mash-ups” using the same work. This feature of C-32 represents an erosion of rights 
that does not exist anywhere else in the world and that would certainly put Canada in breach of the Berne 
Convention and similar international obligations.”
1664
 
The Canadian Government commented by stating that “the Bill permits the use of legitimately acquired 
material in user-generated content (UGC) created for non-commercial purposes. This applies only to 
creations that do not affect the market for the original material. Examples include making a home video of 
a friend or family member dancing to a popular song and posting it online, or creating a "mash-up" of 
video clips. This provision would not permit such activities as simply adding a few lines to an e-book or a 
brief introduction to a song and then posting the copy for free online, or re-ordering the tracks on an 
album and selling CDs at a flea market. Creators’ moral rights would also continue to be respected. 
Moreover, this provision applies only to the UGC creator of such works and only for non-commercial 
purposes”.
1665
 
Mihàly Ficsor, quoting both the (2003) WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention
1666
 and Sam Ricketson and 
Jane Ginsburg
1667
, recall that Member States to the Berne Convention must provide for an exclusive right 
of adaptation which must at least cover changes of the original work resulting in a derivative work
1668
, 
challenges the comments made by the Canadian Government (as quoted above) and concludes that the 
UGC provision of the Canadian Copyright Act is in breach of international treaties
1669
.  He is of the opinion 
that the Canadian Act does not respect the moral right of integrity provided for by the Berne Convention 
nor the adaption right nor the making available right provided for by (i.a.) Article 8 of the WCT. 
The authors of the present report generally agree with Ficsor when he states that : “it is only in respect of 
the freedom of creating and using parodies where there may be truly a need for legislative clarification but 
that the new provision of the Bill on parody would have been sufficient to address and settle the issue. It 
goes without saying that the author's position is the same in respect of the acquis; in view of Article 
5(3)(k) of the Information Society (Copyright) Directive on an exception for the purpose of caricature, 
parody or pastiche it is quite doubtful that a specific "UGC exception" might be necessary and justified”.   
In our view, there are already important exceptions in the Directive which could be useful for UGC 
purposes; we mentioned them before (parody, quotation, incidental inclusion).  If such exceptions were 
better harmonized and made compulsory throughout the Union, there would in our view be no need for a 
specific UGC exception which, as Ficsor illustrated, may also raise questions regarding its compatibility 
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with the three-step test, due i.a. to a lack of a sound legal-political reason justifying a “special case” under 
such three-step test
1670
.  The authors of this report also agree with Ficsor when he states that “the mere 
reason that a derivative work is created and made available and that therefore it should be free in order to 
guarantee the freedom of expression is hardly an acceptable reason alone since Article 12 and 14(1) of 
the Berne Convention provide for an exclusive right of adaptation which “by definition” covers the creation 
of derivative works”
1671
. 
The lack of evidence of any real chilling effect of the existing legal framework – at least as far as we could 
identify it – renders it unnecessary to provide for a new sweeping UGC exception.  A solution based upon 
the existing exceptions should prove sufficient to guarantee both a sufficient protection of the authors and 
sufficient freedom for the users.  
Advantage(s) 
There are clear advantages to a specific UGC exception, particularly from the point of view of users: a 
specific exception normally brings more clarity and transparency to users. However, we think that, for a 
specific exception to be adopted, there must be sufficient reasons and factual evidence that there is a 
need for such new exception.  At this stage, it is not our view that this is the case.  The quasi-inexistence 
of any case-law and the growing use and putting into place of voluntary arrangements (monetization 
agreements, micro-licences, etc.) do not plead in favour of a specific exception.  The Canadian precedent 
is too recent to assess the benefits and drawbacks of their UGC exception. 
Disadvantage(s) 
It is difficult to find substantial factual and policy considerations that would justify an explicit UGC 
exception; it is also difficult to see how a UGC specific exception could be made sufficiently clear and 
compatible with international provisions like the three-step test.  A new text would unavoidably create new 
uncertainties regarding its scope, conditions of application, etc.   
D. Adopting a new and “horizontal” exception or a fair-use or “fair-use like” kind of 
exception 
Even if they are both based on the same international copyright instruments, the Anglo-American 
copyright system and the European droit d’auteur regime differ significantly on the question of copyright 
limitations. Continental European countries provide for a closed catalogue of carefully-defined limitations, 
whereas the American tradition allows for an open-ended fair use system that provides generic criteria left 
to the appreciation of the courts (to determine individual cases of exempted unauthorized uses). The 
British tradition of fair dealing, also applicable in other states of the Commonwealth, is sometimes 
assimilated to fair use. It is arguably closer to the European system, because the purposes eligible for 
exemption are exhaustively listed by law whereas a similar list provided by the fair use doctrine is only 
indicative. 
Under the American fair use system, the use of a copyrighted work is permissible if it is made for 
purposes such as (without this list being limitative) criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship or research, and where the evaluation of four criteria strikes in favour of the user : (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The evaluation of these factors is an open-ended 
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and context-sensitive inquiry; they all must be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright, i.e. ‘Promoting the Progress of Science and Useful Arts’.  
In the Copyright Directive, the European Union has made the choice to set out a closed list of optional 
exceptions, the application of which must further comply with the three-step test.  
In a nutshell, an open-ended system like fair use tends to be more evolutionary, as it allows for more and 
new limitations to emerge along with technical evolutions and new socially accepted uses of the works. 
By contrast, a system of narrowly defined exceptions tends to favour legal security and it makes it easier 
to figure out which uses of a copyrighted work are allowed without the authorization of the author and 
which are not. 
Authors have criticized the system adopted in the EU system, claiming that it combines the downsides of 
both legal traditions without the advantages thereof
1672
. According to them, the current system lacks 
flexibility, as it limits the freedom of Member States to adopt exceptions to a closed list. It also lacks legal 
security for potential beneficiaries of the exceptions because national implementations thereof may still be 
challenged on the basis of an open-ended norm, the three-step test. 
The Gowers Review
1673
 has expressed the view that the current system is marked by “a lack of flexibility 
to accommodate certain uses of protected material that a large proportion of the population regards as 
legitimate and which do not damage the interests of rights holders”
1674
 and has recommended “that 
Directive 2001/29/EC be amended to allow for an exception for creative, transformative or derivative 
works, within the parameters of the Berne Three-Step Test”
1675
. The Hargreaves report
1676
 came up to the 
conclusion that “the lack of progress in achieving an adaptative copyright framework will impose mounting 
costs” and has recommended exploring, at the EU level, “a new mechanism in copyright law to create a 
built-in adaptability to future technology” (which covers mainly other more technological developments 
than just UGC, which is not really a “technological development” as such).  
It is however worth mentioning that authors have underlined the possibilities to find more flexibility in the 
copyright regime at the national level rather than at the core EU-level. They argue that the system of 
exceptions set out by the current legal framework (article 5 of the directive) offers room for flexibilities 
which is not used by Member States at its full potential. Firstly, not all exceptions are implemented by all 
Member States. The Hargreaves report of 2011, for instance, has pressed the British Government to 
“realise all the opportunities within the EU framework” by implementing exceptions for format shifting, 
parody, non-commercial research and library archiving
1677
.  Secondly, because the concerned provisions 
of the Directive are in many cases categorically worded prototypes rather than precisely circumscribed 
exceptions. In various cases, Member States have opted for more narrowly circumscribed wording of said 
exceptions in their national implementations, which tends to rigidify the system. Instead, they may choose 
to transpose the literal, broad wording of the EU exceptions into their national laws, in combination with 
the three-step test. In this sense,  it has been suggested that several limitations set out by the Directive 
could be combined, at the national level, in a semi-open provision like the following: “it does not constitute 
an infringement to use a work or other subject-matter for non-commercial scientific research or 
illustrations for teaching, for the reporting of current events, for criticism or review of material that has 
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already been lawfully made available to the public, or quotations from such material serving comparable 
purposes, for caricature, parody or pastiche, or the incidental inclusion in other material, provided that 
such use does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder”
1678
.  
At the European level, a complete switch from the current European system of legally defined exceptions 
to an open-ended, fair-use like regime, does not receive much support from academics and 
stakeholders
1679
. First, because it makes little sense to completely abandon a legal tradition that has 
existed from hundreds of years, to adopt a system that is not familiar at all to European lawyers. Then, 
because it would imply the creation of legal uncertainty at a large scale, which is highly unwelcome. Legal 
uncertainty in the US fair use system is mitigated by more than two hundreds of years of binding case-
law, which provides thousands of examples of application of the fair use criteria in particular cases. The 
adoption, from scratch, of a similar system in the EU would lack this fundamental element and leave 
practitioners and courts in great uncertainty when it comes to predict the application of, and to apply such 
a norm to individual cases. We follow the views expressed by Ian Hargreaves in his 2011 review that 
promoting a Fair Use Copyright exception in the EU is not the best solution, because the economic 
benefits of a more adaptative copyright regime are more likely to be attained in practice otherwise and 
because there are genuine legal doubts about the viability of a US case law based legal mechanism in a 
European context.  
One may think of combining both worlds by keeping the (closed) list of exceptions and supplementing it 
with a flexible, “fair-use like” provision. Such exception would be applicable to uses which are not covered 
by listed exceptions, but for which good reasons exist to place them outside of the control of the copyright 
holder.  It is however far from certain that such system would comply with the international three-step test 
set out, i.a., by the Berne Convention and the WIPO treaties.  Risks also exist that such provision causes 
legal uncertainty, possibly increased litigation.  Furthermore, it would not fit easily in many Member States 
traditions and legal background regarding copyright law.    
Authors have expressed doubts about the compatibility of a specific UGC exception with the three-step 
test
1680
; the same reasoning may apply, so we think, to a residual “fair-use”-like provision.  In these 
authors’ opinion, most UGC eligible for protection would already be covered by existing exceptions 
(mostly quotation and parody), so that it is very hard to identify which other UGC works, not covered by 
existing exceptions, would fall under a new UGC exception if this exception has to qualify as applying 
only to “special cases” as required by the first step of the test
1681
.  
A slight variant of this option, more interesting in our opinion, would be the opening of the current list of 
exception to “similar cases”. This solution is promoted in article 5.5 of the “Wittem Code”, a model 
European Copyright Code drafted by several academics
1682
. The authors justify this solution as follows: 
“On the one hand, the extension to similar uses provides the system with a flexibility which is 
indispensable in view of the fact that it is impossible to foresee all the situations in which a limitation could 
be justified. On the other hand, the possibility of flexibility is narrowed down in two ways. Firstly, the 
extension applies to uses ‘similar’ to the ones expressly enumerated. Thus, a certain normative effect is 
bestowed on these examples: the courts can only permit uses not expressly enumerated insofar as a 
certain analogy can be established with uses that are mentioned by the Code. Secondly, such similar 
uses may not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and not unreasonably prejudice the 
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legitimate interests of the author or rightholder, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties”
1683
.  Arguably, this solution is more likely to comply with the first step of the three-step test, as 
cases “similar” to those explicitly listed in the directive may still be considered as “special” cases ; authors 
have however expressed doubts in this regard
1684
. The two other steps of the test are expressly 
implemented as conditions to benefit from the “analogous” exceptions and must therefore be investigated 
in every particular case.  
Another academic initiative pursuing similar objectives is the “Declaration on the three-step test” signed 
by a number of European scholars (who some consider as “predominantly pro-user”)
1685
. The authors 
propose an interpretation of the test under which existing exceptions and limitations within domestic law 
are not unduly restricted and the introduction of appropriately balanced exceptions and limitations is not 
precluded. Amongst other principles stated in this declaration, its authors express the view that the three 
steps are to be considered together and as a whole in a comprehensive overall assessment, that the test 
does not require exceptions to be interpreted narrowly and that the first step of the test does not prevent 
the application of existing statutory exceptions to similar factual circumstances. Whereas such approach 
is disputed by certain authors
1686
, others find the idea “charming” to turn the three-step test into a positive 
reading to some extent
1687
. They support the idea that the test could also be used to extend existing 
exceptions and create new ones, and not only to narrow down the scope of existing exceptions.  
Advantage(s) 
The different options examined above pursue the same objective: creating more flexibility in the European 
system of exceptions. The current exhaustive list of optional exceptions, narrowed down by the three-step 
test as drafted in the Directive, is considered too rigid by a number of commentators.  
The main advantage of modifying the current legal framework in a more flexible direction is the 
enhancement of adaptability of copyright law. A more flexible system would allow the exceptions to 
evolve according to technological changes, to social needs, to new socially accepted uses of copyrighted 
works or to changes in the acceptability of certain uses, and to the moving impact of certain uses on the 
authors’ interests.  
Arguably, many UGC would fall within the scope of one or the other exception if one was to apply a 
flexible system of exceptions based on an analogical approach of existing limitations, framed by the 
conditions of the three-step test to avoid harming the author’s interests.   
Also, a more flexible system may evolve over time, to cover new practices and uses of copyrighted works 
- as long as they do not deprive authors from potential markets and do not harm their legitimate interests.   
Disadvantage(s)  
More flexibility in the system of exceptions entails less legal certainty to some extent. Open norms, 
depending on generic conditions, are also less predictable in their actual application. Users or businesses 
willing to justify certain (new) uses of copyrighted works on the basis of open norms will probably have to 
take the risk of being ultimately found liable for copyright infringement if legal proceedings go wrong.  
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This risk of increased legal uncertainty goes along with a risk of multiplication of legal proceedings, 
because Courts will be responsible for applying flexible norms in particular cases. Arguably, the number 
of legal proceedings concerning the exceptions will increase with the adoption of a more flexible provision 
on this matter, at least until the amount of case-law is sufficient to draw clear guidelines for their 
application. 
A switch from the EU system of legally defined exceptions to an open, fair-use like system is thus, in our 
opinion, not desirable, because of the huge legal uncertainty that it would unavoidably create.  It would 
also most probably be detrimental for the functioning of the Internal Market (as a result of the difficulty to 
ensure a proper cross-border effect to exceptions that have not been substantially harmonised).  
On a more practical point of view, one must not underestimate that any attempt to introduce flexibility 
within the system of copyright exceptions would, for the time being at least, be politically very hard, if not 
impossible to materialise at an EU level and will attract much opposition.    
It is also not currently proven that all exceptions existing in the current list need more flexibility. In the 
frame of the current Study, which is limited to UGC, we support the idea that more flexibility in the 
application of certain exceptions (mostly quotation, parody and incidental inclusion) would help securing 
the legal dissemination of UGC. It does not necessarily mean, however, that a general provision 
broadening the scope of all exceptions to analogous cases is needed or even desirable in any cases. The 
impact of such a provision should certainly receive careful assessment. For the needs of this Study, we 
consider that a horizontal provision bringing more flexibility to all exceptions goes beyond what is needed 
for securing the legal status of UGC.  
A more flexible system may also have a negative impact on harmonization, if open norms or criteria 
receive different interpretations by the Courts across the Member States. Ultimately, the CJEU would 
bear the responsibility to unify these interpretations but it will likely take many years and cases to achieve 
this objective. Also, the CJEU may be snowed under with a large number of cases concerning the 
application of open principles to very particular cases, which is arguably not its intended role.  
The equitable compensation foreseen in favour of the authors by certain exceptions may be significantly 
more complicated to apply in a system where analogous application of the exceptions is allowed. Firstly, 
certain cases may be similar to more than one exception, which do not set out the same mechanisms of 
compensations (if any). Then, compensation that is justified for a specific case covered by an existing 
exception may not be justified for different, but somehow similar cases. On the opposite, it may be 
justified to allow compensation to the authors in cases which are similar to those covers by exceptions 
where no compensation is foreseen. It would be important to fix this issue, because a system where 
courts may decide to allow or deny compensation and to set the amount thereof on a case by case basis 
would be highly impracticable.   By comparison, fair use, US-style is an “all-or-nothing” system.  Either 
there is infringement or not, and there is no middle ground of compensation.  In a mixed system like the 
InfoSoc  Directive, in which some uses are unpaid and others require compensation, one must be careful 
that opening up the unpaid uses may have undesirable repercussions on the system of compensated 
uses.  Asking for more flexibility without assessing the impact on the compensated uses should not be at 
the risk of potentially violating the 3d step of the 3-step test. 
To sum up, the adoption of a flexible, horizontal exception or of a provision which would introduce some 
kind of flexibility to the exceptions within the list seems attractive, but may ultimately give rise to more 
questions than it will provide answers. It will be politically hard to adopt, practically hard to apply and, 
arguably, give rise to more litigation. It will affect the application of exceptions far beyond the limited 
domain of UGC on internet and its effects should be carefully assessed. We consider therefore this 
solution as not proportionate, in the frame of this Study, for clarifying the legal status of UGC. We do 
support, however, the idea that at least certain exceptions (essentially the three exceptions that we have 
examined throughout this report) should be applied with more flexibility if the need to secure the creation 
and dissemination of UGC was established. More precisely, we support the trend observed in the recent 
case-law which mentions the effective application of the exceptions and the balance of interests that 
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should be made between the interests of the right holders and those of the beneficiaries of the 
exceptions, especially where their fundamental rights (like freedom of expression) are at stake.  
E. Dealing with UGC via the e-Commerce Directive 
Finally, another option which the Commission might want to consider is to deal with UGC, and more 
particularly with the often mentioned “chilling effect” of the legal regime on UGC (if such chilling effect 
exists – which we could not find much substantiated evidence about; see the first part of our report), could 
be to deal with that concern in the context not of a review of the Information Society Directive but of the 
announced review of the e-Commerce Directive
1688
. 
A possible abusive use of notice-and-take down procedures is one of the issues mentioned in the context 
of the reassessment of the e-commerce directive, with a public consultation being launched on how 
notice-and-take-down procedures are applied and should be improved, i.a. to guarantee more respect for 
the rules of due process and the right to be heard
1689
.  It is worth mentioning that, in this context, the 
“notice and take down” procedures are one of the topics of the Consultation launched by the Commission.  
The summary of the results of this Consultation indicates that rightholders complained about the trend 
towards the “monetization” of NTD (notice and take down) procedures, “which could be characterized as 
the development of a “notice-and-revenue-share” procedure”
1690
. 
As the revision of the e-Commerce Directive is out of scope of our Study, we shall not explore this route 
much further but there would be room for action in that sector, should it be decided not to amend the 
Copyright Directive. 
Advantage(s) 
One advantage is that a modification of the NTD procedures to allow a right of reaction by the uploader 
before some content is taken down should bring down the number of abusive uses of such NTD 
procedures (yet, as already said, we have not seen really convincing figures, at least as regards NTD 
demands based on alleged copyright infringements), without having to introduce any new exception to the 
Copyright Directive.  It may thereby avoid to open the Pandora’s box of exceptions. 
Disadvantage(s) 
It is uncertain, as some have already stated, that users whose UGC content is being removed will insist 
and ask that it be put back.  Most users might prefer to refrain from doing so and avoid the risk of a legal 
action.  This disadvantage has however mostly been put forward in the US, where users face – at least in 
theory - the risk of high (punitive) damages in such legal actions, which is not the case in Europe.  More 
importantly, as the e-Commerce Directive adopts a horizontal approach, does not aim at harmonizing any 
copyright rules and is based on (exemptions of) liability principles, the divergences observed in the 
Member States’ legislations on the exceptions which are relevant for UGC would continue to exist, with all 
consequences attached thereto. 
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IV. Conclusions 
As preliminary conclusions to the first part of our Report, we had made the following observations: 
UGC has grown exponentially in the last few years.  A major part of UGC which may be found on the 
internet requires in principle a prior licence from the rightholders (whether it be for the reproduction right, 
the adaptation right or the right of making available).  The exceptions which exist presently in copyright 
law and can be relevant (parody, quotation, incidental use) could only be invoked for a relatively small 
number of UGC materials; and the legal arguments which could be found outside of copyright would 
provide relief in an even smaller number of UGC cases.  Some said that the European legal framework 
“leaves a lot of uncertainties for the parties concerned”
1691
; on the other hand, when analyzing concrete 
UGC cases and wondering whether there is a potential copyright infringement, there are, in our opinion, 
much more instances where the answer may clearly be “yes” than cases where the answer will be “no” or 
will be uncertain. 
Yet, there is very little (if any) case-law and apparently not much opposition from rightholders.  It proved 
very hard to find cases, as the Commission had asked us to investigate, where UGC should have been 
accepted by courts while it has not been, or even cases where UGC cases were rightfully rejected. 
The obvious lack of opposition (at least via court proceedings) by rightholders may have various reasons: 
they may consider that such use does not cause them any noticeable harm (at least, not of such 
importance to justify court proceedings), or that it increases their reputation and public exposure
1692
.  
Also, the lack of opposition may be explained by the fact that, in many cases, a monetization agreement 
has been concluded between the rightholder and the platform. It seems that rightholders adopt a sort of 
“wait & see” approach or generally do not mind the UGC uses.   
As conclusions to this second part of our Report, we will make the following observations: 
We distinguished between the actions which could take place within the current legal framework, i.e. 
without making any changes to the existing texts and to the Directive and the actions which would involve 
changes to the existing legislation and/or to the Directive. 
We first examined the possible actions which the Commission could take without changing the legislative 
framework.  While “not taking action” was not considered a desirable option, it is already outdated anyway 
since the Commission launched its “Licences for Europe” initiative which will extend throughout 2013.  It 
is premature to say if such initiative will prove fruitful but it was certainly a first, if not last, necessary step 
to take, i.e. to try to collect factual information and gather stakeholders’ positions on UGC.  If this series of 
meetings ends up in initiatives which increase users’ understanding and knowledge of the applicable 
rules on UGC or which are turned into an MoU between stakeholders
1693
 on best practices in the UGC 
sector, it will have proven useful as such. 
We consider that it would be useful to have a Commission’s Communication on UGC, in which the 
Commission would give its own views as to what UGC uses are allowed or not, and would give its own 
interpretation of the relevance (or not) of the existing exceptions for UGC.  Even though not binding, such 
Communication would help in increasing users’ understanding of the rules of the game and provide useful 
(even if not binding) guidance to practitioners and judges.  However, such Communication could not, as 
such, provide a solution to the not harmonised situation regarding exceptions in the Member States.  
                                                     
 
1691 IDATE, TNO & IVIR, User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information Society, SMART, 2007/2008, p. 27 to 174.  
See also the OECD Report, OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy, Participative Web: 
User Created Content, 12 April 2007, p. 183. 
1692
 See in this sense the recent report on parody commission by the IPO; cf. supra. 
1693
 Let us insist that UGC cases almost always involve three actors : the rightholder, the user and the platform.  This triangular 
relationship should always be remembered when discussing UGC issues. 
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Similarly, encouraging education and information initiatives aimed (mainly) at users would also be useful 
but would neither be sufficient, given the uncertain and not harmonised situation amongst the Member 
States, which entails that the messages to be passed on to the users may be hard to draft in a clear 
manner and thus hard to understand by their recipients.   
We then examined the legislative initiatives which the Commission could take (always in the instance that 
the chilling effect to UGC of the current legal framework was established). 
We come to the conclusion that the most proportionate manner to deal with UGC, to increase clarity 
and ensure that copyright is rightfully invoked for what it is meant, would be to suggest amendments to 
the Copyright Directive by: 
- Further harmonizing the exceptions which are relevant for UGC, being quotation (article 5.d), 
incidental inclusion of a work or other subject-matter in other material (article 5.i) and use for the 
purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche (article 5.k), since the interpretation to be given to these 
articles has proved uncertain, and relatively slight adaptations to these exceptions might prove 
sufficient to deal with the UGC cases which are the most worthy of attention; 
- Making these exceptions (meant to benefit users, not commercial platforms) compulsory for 
Member States and making two of them (quotation and parody) (at least to some extend) 
unwaivable by contract (subject to this being compatible with moral rights) to ensure that they 
reach their intended purpose
1694
 and that users are confronted with the same rules throughout the 
Union. 
- Ensuring that the beneficiaries of the exception are only the UGC creators and  not commercial 
platforms (which needs further thinking including in relation ot the application of the e-commerce 
Directive)  
Another, more horizontal, approach could be to add to the closed list of exceptions a provision which 
would introduce some kind of flexibility to the list itself or to the exceptions within the list.  Such initiative 
may seem attractive and, from a theoretical point of view, may seem justified to ensure that copyright 
keeps pace with the evolving technological context and social uses.  However, one may expect that such 
attempt to introduce flexibility within the system of copyright exceptions would, for the time being at least, 
be politically impossible to materialise at an EU level
1695
 and will attract much opposition from many sides; 
secondly, one may fear that, regardless of the efforts put in the wording of such provision, the “flexibility” 
objective will practically give rise to more questions than it will answer and will lead to increased litigation 
(i.a. on its compatibility with the three-step test).  Furthermore, its impact would obviously go way beyond 
the UGC sector and it may well be that, in some sectors, it leads to unexpected but undesired results – a 
concern which we could not examine within the limits of this UGC related report.  Finally, as indicated, it is 
an unfamiliar concept for copyright in most Member States and it is likely that it would have an adverse 
impact on the functioning of the Internal Market  
Our opinion on a “horizontal exception” or on the idea of introducing more flexibility in the list of 
exceptions should however not be understood as meaning that judges should, in our view, refrain from 
                                                     
 
1694
 Exceptions to copyright must, according to the EUCJ, be interpreted in order to achieve their intended purpose.  See Premier 
League case, par. 163 : “None the less, the interpretation of those conditions must enable the effectiveness of the exception thereby 
established to be safeguarded and permit observance of the exception’s purpose as resulting in particular from recital 31 in the 
preamble to the Copyright Directive and from Common Position (EC) No 48/2000 adopted by the Council on 28 September 2000 
with a view to adopting that directive (OJ 2000 C 344, p. 1)”.  
1695
 This is thus without prejudice to initiatives which Member States might decide to take, at their own national level, to introduce 
more flexibility in the list of exceptions.  Such trend may i.a. clearly be observed in The Netherlands: the Minister of Economy has 
presented in November 2012 a study entitled “Flexible Copyright” to make the system of exceptions more flexible.  The Ministry of 
Justice and Security and presented to the Parliament the recommendations of the Dutch Copyright Commission on UGC, which 
suggests to include UGC within the scope of the quotation exception. 
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the growing tendency of operating a “balance of interests” when dealing with a dispute involving a 
copyright exception (when such dispute leaves room for interpretation); this tendency is, in our opinion, a 
manner by which copyright will in the long run maintain its legitimacy, in a world when such legitimacy is 
more often questioned than in the past. 
Instead of a horizontal approach, one could think of introducing a UGC specific exception.  As we 
indicated, there does not seem to be sufficient problems in practice to justify such new exceptions.  Many 
mechanisms have already been put in place to authorize UGC uses (even if some scrutiny may be 
justified, on a case-by-case basis, to verify that they are balanced in regard of all parties’ rights and 
legitimate interests).  A UGC exception remains in our view a premature option. 
Lastly, an alternative route could be to work alongside the review of the e-Commerce Directive and the 
improvement of the notice-and-take down procedures. 
To sum up: a further harmonization of the existing exceptions which are relevant for UGC would be 
desirable if the need to act is established.  From an (very incomplete) market analysis and from looking at 
the (very little caselaw), it does not seem that the need is really pressing.  On the other hand, for the good 
faith user who wishes to engage in creating UGC works while fully respecting all legislations, the game 
may be hard to play
1696
.  In the meantime, and because one may expect that quite some time may be 
needed  before such harmonization actually reaches the national legislations, an interpretative document 
by the Commission on the interpretation which the Commission thinks should be given to these 
exceptions would be useful.  As an alternative to such further harmonization in the Copyright Directive, an 
improvement of the notice-and-take down procedures in the e-Commerce Directive would only be a 
second-best option.  In parallel, if the (still shy) signal given by the EUCJ to interpret exceptions in a way 
which ensures their effectiveness is being confirmed, together with the trend of courts to operate a 
“balance of interests”, the outcry about an unbalanced evolution of copyright would certainly diminish. 
 
  
                                                     
 
1696
 For the EU legislator, the question is thus whether this is worth suggesting a change to the Directive.  It is more a political than a 
legal question, we would suggest. 
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Terms of reference 
1. Article 5(3)(c) of the Directive provides, in its first part, for an exception for the “reproduction by 
the press, communication to the public or making available of published articles on current economic, 
political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other subject-matter of the same character, in cases 
where such use is not expressly reserved, and as long as the source, including the author's name, is 
indicated”. 
The scope of this Study is focused on the so-called press review exception, the first part of article 5(3)(c). 
We were not asked by the Commission to analyse the second part of the provision, usually referred to as 
the reporting of current events, which provides for an exception for the use of works or other subject-
matter in connection with the reporting of current events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose 
and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be 
impossible. In the Study, when we mention the exception, we always mean the first part of article 5(3)(c). 
The Terms of reference of this Study explain that “ w hile in principle the beneficiaries of this press review 
exception should be limited to “news media” such as the press or broadcasters, some Member States 
have adopted a wide definition of entities that constitute the “press”. For example, in the Netherlands, 
“any other medium serving the same purpose” can benefit from the exception. In Germany, a copyright 
limitation that exempts digital in-house press-clipping services has been found to be compatible with 
Article 5(3)(c).” 
The output to provide is then described as follows: 
Output : For the assessment of this Study, 3 cases should be examined: the offer of press clippings (1) 
by an organisation to its employees, (2) by a (commercial) entity to its subscribers and (3) by any legal 
entity or natural person to the general public. It should be examined how these practices have been 
assessed in the selected Member States and, for each case, whether it meets the conditions set out in 
art. 5(3)(c) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
The object of this Study is thus mainly focused on the beneficiaries of the exception for press review.  
We were not asked to analyse other provisions of the Directive that can benefit the press, such as article 
5(3)(f) of the Directive for the use of political speeches and extracts of public lectures or article 5(3)(d) for 
quotation for purposes such as criticism or review.   
I. The exception for press review in the Information Society Directive 
2. Article 5(3)(c) of the Directive provides for an exception for the reproduction by the press, 
communication to the public and making available rights for press review and the use of works in 
connection with the reporting of current events; for example, a press company which reproduces news 
articles on economy, politics or religion published by colleagues to inform its own readers; a broadcast 
organization or a web information agency, which rebroadcasts current news reports.
1697
    
Such exception is indeed necessary to avoid copyright infringements: many acts by principle restricted 
under copyright are required for the press or other similar entities in order to disseminate information. In 
                                                     
 
1697
 BUYDENS, M, « La nouvelle directive du 22 mai 2001 sur l’harmonisation de certains aspects du droit d’auteur et des droits 
voisins dans la société de l’information: le régime des exceptions », A&M, 4/2001, p. 438. 
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principle, the prior consent of the author (or holders of rights related to copyright) should be acquired – 
unless an exception covers the uses.  
3. The Member States are allowed to include such exception in their national laws, to the extent that 
the outer limits set by the Information Society Directive are not exceeded. These are expressed in art. 
5(3) of the Directive : 
Exceptions and limitations 
(…) 
3. Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 
and 3 in the following cases: 
(…) 
(c) reproduction by the press, communication to the public or making available of published 
articles on current economic, political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other subject-
matter of the same character, in cases where such use is not expressly reserved, and as long as 
the source, including the author's name, is indicated, or use of works or other subject-matter in 
connection with the reporting of current events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose 
and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be 
impossible; 
(…) 
5. The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in 
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder. 
This exception is optional (rec. 34 of the Directive): 
Member States should be given the option of providing for certain exceptions or limitations (…), 
for purposes of news reporting (…). 
4. The InfoSoc Directive did not aspire to control all modalities or conditions of the exception.  As 
explained in the comments to the articles in the initial proposal, it was considered that the Directive 
should give a margin for some exceptions, such as the exception for quotations or reporting of current 
events: “In view of their more limited economic importance, these limitations are deliberately not dealt with 
in detail in the framework of this proposal.  It only sets out minimum conditions of their application, and it 
is for the Member State to define the detailed conditions of their use, albeit within the limits set out by 
these paragraphs and this Article”
1698
.   
A. Origin   
5. The Commission’s original proposal included only eight optional exceptions;
1699
 the exception for 
press review was not among them, but the exception on reporting of current events was: 
3. Member States may provide for limitations to the rights referred to in Articles 2 and 3 in the 
following cases: 
(…) 
                                                     
 
1698
 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the Information Society, COM(97) 628 final, Explanatory Memorandum, 10 December 1997, p. 32. 
1699
 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the Information Society, COM(97) 628 final, OJ, C-108, 7 April 1998, p. 6. 
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(c) use of excerpts in connection with the reporting of current events, as long as the source is 
indicated, and to the extent justified by the informatory purpose;
 
 
The Council included the exception for press review in article 5(3)(c) in its Common Position of 28 
September 2000.
1700
 The exception was drafted following the model of article 10bis(1) of the Berne 
Convention
1701
 and may thus logically be interpreted in the light of this article of the Berne Convention
1702
. 
In the Commission’s amended proposal (see also Parliament’s amendment 43), article 5(3)(c) had been 
inspired by the exception provided for in article 10bis(2) of the Berne Convention. The Council, however, 
decided to incorporate in this clause both of the exceptions provided for in article 10bis of the Berne 
Convention and to follow more closely the language used in the latter.
1703
 In short, the first exception 
provided for in article 5(3)(c) regarding press review was included in the Directive following article 
10bis(1) of the Berne Convention, while the second exception on reporting of current event follows the 
wording of article 10bis(2). 
The Council did not reproduce article 10bis(1) of the Berne Convention literally.
1704
 While the Berne 
Convention only allows reproduction and communication to the public, the Directive also allows making 
available. The Council did not specify, as the Berne Convention did, that the articles are published “in 
newspapers or periodicals”. And the Directive is more restrictive than the Berne Convention regarding the 
indication of the source, since the mention must indicate the author’s name. 
The Berne Convention contained from its beginning exceptions for the press and it has always been a 
subject of debate.
1705
 The first Act of 1886 provided that articles published in any country of the Union 
“may be reproduced in original or in translation” in the other countries of the Union “unless the authors or 
publishers have expressly forbidden it” (art. 7).
1706
 It is in 1908, at the Berlin Revision Conference, that 
“the freedom to reproduce newspaper articles was restricted to other newspapers: it did not apply to 
individuals. This last restriction owed much to the advocacy of the Belgian Government which, prior to the 
Conference, had concerned itself with ascertaining the views of journalists and newspaper editors on the 
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 Common Position (EC) n°48/2000 of 28 September 2000 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a view to adopting a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ, 
C-344, 1 December 2000, p. 18. 
1701
 Berne Convention of 9 September 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, completed at Paris on 4 May 1896, 
amended at Berlin on 13 November 1908, completed at Berne on 20 March 1914, amended at Rome on 2 June 1928, at Brussels 
on 26 June 1948, at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, at Paris on 24 July 1971, and amended on 28 September 1979. 
1702
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legal regime that most readily accommodated their professional activities.
1707
 The freedom to reproduce 
articles from newspaper to newspaper, except where this was expressly prohibited, was regarded as 
essential, particularly where small newspapers, with limited resources, were concerned.
1708
” 
1709
 
B. Objective 
6. The exception for press review is inspired by the promotion of the free flow of information.
1710
 It 
facilitates the dissemination of news, by allowing the reproduction of articles by newspapers and 
periodicals under certain conditions.  
For Advocate General Trstenjak, in her opinion in the Infopaq case: “the particular objective on which that 
exception is based is informing the public about current events; it is however also the case that this 
exception does not exclude the at least indirectly commercial objective (of the press) of providing 
information on current events.”
1711
 A press organisation can thus also have a commercial purpose by 
disseminating information; its activity can also be lucrative, “at least indirectly”. 
In the case Painer, she said that article 5(3)(c) seeks to strike “a balance between protection of 
intellectual property and freedom of the press”. That balance must therefore be taken into consideration in 
interpreting this provision.
1712
  
As we already said, the source of inspiration of the exception (article 10bis(1) of the Berne Convention) 
has been subject to changes. The right balance between copyright and the press freedom has notably 
been searched and strongly negotiated by the delegations during the Stockholm Conference, where the 
previous version of article 9(2) was revised. In fact, it was proposed to delete it, because: “ i n our day, … 
it can hardly be compatible with the moral principles recognized in the press to reproduce an article 
published in another newspaper without having first obtained the author’s permission”
1713
. Besides, the 
press “was still free to give reports on protected works where this was required without infringing 
copyright – in the form of summaries – and where literal reproduction was required this was assured by 
an appropriately drawn right of quotation.”
1714
 This proposal was supported by the International 
Federation of Journalists, but received opposition based on the promotion of the free flow of information 
by several delegations.
1715
 It was argued that the exception was of particular value for isolated regions, 
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and that quotation could not sufficiently help its purpose.
1716
 Finally, it was decided to keep the exception, 
now article 10bis(1), and to extend it to broadcasts.
 1717
 
As stated in the IViR Implementation Study, “ t he possibility for a newspaper to reproduce articles 
published in other newspapers or periodicals always had an important economic component, apart from 
contributing to the free flow of information.
1718
 The basic idea behind this limitation is the fact that 
newspaper publishers and broadcasting organisations constantly borrow articles from each other, and 
that through this quid pro quo, the limitation ultimately does not affect their respective interests.”
1719
 
Following IViR, the exception formalizes a common practice of the press members, which frequently 
republish articles of colleagues. Consequently, if the exception is broadened to other beneficiaries than 
the press, without any exchange of content in favour of the press, the quid pro quo disappears; the 
balance would be broken and those beneficiaries could take unfair advantage of the press. 
C. Conditions   
7. The InfoSoc Directive allows national exceptions within the conditions of article 5(3).  Conditions 
may concern works, use, beneficiaries and restrictions as we will explain hereunder. 
8. Works. The exception is restricted to published articles on current economic, political or religious 
topics or of broadcast works or other subject-matter of the same character.  
Entire works can be taken. The exception is not limited to parts a work.
1720
 
All kinds of works and other subject-matter are covered, not only published articles and broadcasts.
1721
 
“Other subject-matter” can be those of the four European neighbouring rights.
1722
 
 “Published articles”: it also covers publications by electronic means.
1723
 The Berne Convention specifies 
that the articles must be published “in newspapers or periodicals” which is not mentioned in the Directive. 
Does the Berne Convention also cover online publications? Following article 10(2) of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (“WCT”) and the Agreed statement concerning article 10,
1724
 article 10bis of the Berne Convention 
may cover online publications, provided that the use comply with the three-step test.
1725
 For J.C. Ginsburg 
and S. Ricketson, after having said that the term ‘broadcast’ in the article of the Berne Convention would 
not cover “online publications that are available on demand”,
1726
 they conclude that there is nothing in 
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article 10bis(1) that excludes the extension of the provision from traditional hardcopy newspapers and 
periodicals to electronic versions that are made available online, and that it would finally be a matter of 
national legislation.
1727
  
Articles on “economic, political or religious topics”: these only three topics exclude many works. Articles 
on other subjects are not covered, for example a review of films or of art exhibits, articles on scientific 
news or technical matters or sport reports.
1728
  
 “Current” topics: The word “current” “means of immediate importance, rather than topics discussed within 
a longer-term framework.”
1729
 They “are events that take place close to the time of use and, within this 
time frame, still have an informatory value and interest for the public”
1730
. The works in question “must be 
of immediate importance, as the purpose behind the exception was to expedite the free flow of 
information on current events.
1731
 Longer articles which review these topics in a longer-term framework 
should not therefore be included”
1732
. 
Broadcast works or other subject matter “of the same character” also refer to current economic, political 
or religious topics.
1733
 
To deal with all kind of works referred to in the Directive, which can be the object of press review 
including press clippings (see paragraph 14 below), we will in this Study speak about “news works”, 
because it is broader than only articles published in newspapers and magazines. 
9. Use.  The exceptions may apply to all uses, i.e. acts of reproduction, communication to the public 
or making available (art. 2 and 3 of the Directive). In case the Member States make an exception to the 
reproduction right, they are free to provide the same exception to the distribution right (art. 5(4) of the 
Directive)
1734
. 
10. Beneficiaries. The exception to the reproduction right should be meant to benefit the press 
(confer article 5(3)(c) “reproduction by the press”).  
In accordance with the wording of the Directive, we consider here as “beneficiaries” the press. One could 
also consider as beneficiaries the ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. the readers of the news works, but this is not 
the notion of beneficiaries that is used in the Directive, nor in this Study. 
The notion of press is not defined in the Directive. 
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In everyday language, “the press” covers the newspapers, magazines, television and radio that broadcast 
news, or journalists who work for them, viewed collectively.
1735
 
Under “the press”, one traditionally understands the print media, such as newspapers and magazines, 
and also TV, news programs. However, legal commentators state that it does not in principle prevent 
extension to online editions of newspapers and magazines, i.e. the electronic press.
1736
  
It would in any case be a difficult exercise to draw a clear-cut definition of the “press”. There will always 
be borderline cases and it may have an impact in other sectors than copyright (freedom of expression, 
defamation, right of response, etc.). The same remark can be made about journalists.  
To be qualified as a member of the press, there is a need of a human intervention; a minimum of editing 
process is required (see below, point 24). 
At the Council of the European Union meeting on 15 September 2000, the Netherlands delegation 
recalled that Member States remain free to further define in their legislation the notion of "press" in article 
5(3)(c).
1737
  
While “reproduction” seems limited to “the press”, the “communication to the public” and “making 
available” may in theory be carried out by anyone.
1738
 Technically, it is however rather difficult to imagine, 
in the current state of the art, any communication to the public or any making available that does not 
involve any reproduction. The only possibility we can imagine would be a direct broadcast, but it is 
uncertain that such is technically possible. As a consequence, the restriction following which the 
reproduction of a work has to be made “by the press” also applies in practice to communication to the 
public and making available. 
We will study the beneficiaries of the press review exception more deeply below. 
11. Restrictions.  The permitted use should be restricted to cases where the use is not expressly 
reserved, and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated. 
“Expressly reserved”. The right holders of the works can prevent the effects of this limitation by expressly 
reserving the rights described in art. 5(3)(c). For some authors, since such a reservation concerns the use 
of an individual work, the indication of the source “has to be made with regard to each individual article or 
each individual broadcast,”
1739
 “a rightholder must equip each individual article or other subject matter 
with an express reservation, rather than making a general reservation in, for example, a masthead”
1740
. 
For others, “ t he provision does not describe in which way such reservation is required and thus leaves 
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flexibility to determine by national law any particular way of reserving right, including whether it must be 
related to each individual article, broadcast work, or other subject matter, or whether it may be generally 
expressed in respect of all works or achievements of a right holder.”
1741
 
“Indication of the source”. The source must indicate at a minimum the author’s name. The text of origin in 
the Berne Convention did not mention “including the author's name”. In part 2 of the article, the indication 
of the author’s name is not required if it is impossible (“for example, due to the news reporting format or 
the extraordinary effort it would take to identify the source”
1742
). “Given the declaratory nature of this 
phrase, it may, however, be concluded that the absence of this phrase in this context does not translate 
into any specific meaning”.
1743
 
Exceptions in the national copyright laws should be in conformity with the three-step test. The obligation 
to pay an equitable remuneration will weigh on the balance under the three-step test. We will examine 
this below.  
D. Article 5(3)(c) in the case law of the European Court of Justice  
12. Up until now, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the “CJEU”) has no case law 
regarding the exception for press review. Article 5(3)(c) is not affected by any preliminary ruling. But 
companies offering media monitoring services intervened in several cases regarding copyright, such as 
Infopaq
1744
 or Meltwater
1745
. 
In those cases, the Court was not interrogated on the interpretation of art. 5(3)(c). However, Advocate 
General Trstenjak in the case Infopaq examined the applicability of the article to the case. Her answer 
was that the reproduction in part of newspaper articles in the form of extracts could not be justified on the 
basis of the two exceptions provided for in article 5(3)(c).
1746
 We will examine her position below. 
II. Press clippings 
The three cases we will examine in chapter IV and V of this Study have in common the offer of “press 
clippings” to different kinds of beneficiaries, other than the “press” in its traditional meaning. 
In the present chapter, we will thus briefly explain what is a press clipping (and some related concepts), 
who are the stakeholders involved in the press clippings activity and whether press clippings are 
protected by copyright. 
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A. Notion of press clippings and related concepts 
13. In everyday language, a press clipping is a paragraph or a short article cut out of a newspaper 
or magazine.
1747
 Press clipping services frequently imply that not only one work but a number of them are 
subject to clipping. In our view, press clippings can also constitute an excerpt of a broadcast, a video or of 
a photograph report. All the works referred to in article 5(3)(c) of the Directive (also called here “news 
works”) can thus be the object of a press clipping.  
For decades, a business grew on the offer of press clippings of news works, by firms offering media 
monitoring services and more recently news aggregation websites (Google News, Yahoo! News, etc.).  
The activity of press clippings is called press review when there is an editing processing of the clippings, 
an arrangement of them (indexing, compilation, presentation of the clippings e.g. with the headline, a 
short abstract, the source, links between the clippings etc.). This activity may include the selection, 
reproduction, compilation, distribution, display of the news works, integrally or in part, by paper or digital 
means. The press clippings can be emailed, posted on an intranet, spread in the Internet, send through 
an RSS feed, etc.
1748
 
Traditionally, press clippings often include press summaries (in French “résumés” or “synthèses”, as in 
the French translation of the Infopaq cases: “synthèses d’articles de presse”). A summary usually does 
not comprise any reproduction; it only copies the ideas of a work (e.g. a press article, a news report on 
TV), which are not protected by copyright. As agreed by the parties in the Infopaq cases “summary writing 
per se is lawful and does not require consent from the rightholders”
1749
. 
A media monitoring service (or a press clipping service) provides its clients with press clippings or 
press reviews, which are of particular interest to them.  
News aggregators compile press clippings and display them on the internet in a single place. They 
provide most of the time titles and ”snippets” of articles (i.e. extracts of articles, e.g. the 4 or 5 first lines 
which are often “catchy” and describe the content of the article) they link to. Their users can rank and 
display the information requested according to their search criteria. The services may be offered for free 
or under subscription. News aggregators generally generate revenues from online advertising on their 
websites.
 1750
 
There are different types of news aggregators. K. Isbell describes four different types of them: feed 
aggregators, specialty aggregators, user-curated aggregators and blog aggregators.
1751
 A “feed 
aggregator” like Google News (http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/about_google_news.html) or Yahoo! 
News (http://news.yahoo.com/) “is closest to the traditional conception of a news aggregator, namely, a 
website that contains material from a number of websites organized into various “feeds,” typically 
arranged by source, topic, or story. Feed Aggregators often draw their material from a particular type of 
source, such as news websites or blogs, although some Feed Aggregators will contain content from more 
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than one type of source.”
1752
 A “specialty aggregator” “is a website that collects information from a 
number of sources on a particular topic or location.”
1753
 A user-curated aggregator “is a website that 
features user-submitted links and portions of text taken from a variety of websites. Often, the links on a 
User-Curated Aggregator will be culled from a wider variety of sources than most news aggregators, and 
will often include links to blog posts and multimedia content like YouTube videos, as well as links to more 
traditional media sources”
1754
. Finally, a “blog aggregator” “looks the least like a traditional news 
aggregator. Blog Aggregators are websites that use third-party content to create a blog about a given 
topic”.
1755
  
For institutions or businesses, to read all the press, visit all the news websites every day is time-
consuming. It is thus very useful and faster for them to read a report of headlines or abstracts on selected 
topics. This is the same for the general public, who can have access to more information in a shorter 
version. 
B. Stakeholders involved 
14. The importance of national and European case law, such as the Google cases or Infopaq cases, 
shows that the problematic between media monitoring services, news aggregators on one side, and 
authors (journalists, press photographers…) and publishers on the other side is significant. 
There are many discussions about the impact of the media monitoring services and news aggregators on 
the press, but it is not the object of this Study to try to solve the multiple problems between the 
stakeholders involved. Besides, we do not have (and that would be necessary for such exercise) an 
exhaustive and accurate market analysis on the issues. 
Before answering the question of the applicability of the exception to some particular cases, it is important 
to know if – and in which conditions – newspaper articles and their clippings are protected by copyright. 
C. Protection of press clippings 
15. News works, as well as their titles and abstracts, are susceptible to be protected by copyright to 
the extent that they are original literary or artistic works.
1756
 
Copyright does not protect “news of the day or miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of 
press information” (art. 2(8) of the Berne Convention). This provision “is pivotal to press uses because the 
subject matter it disqualifies is the standard grist of the press mill”
1757
. Thus facts or news items as such – 
as original as they may be – cannot be copyrightable nor any idea.
1758
 Summaries, which borrow and 
communicate only ideas (or miscellaneous facts) of another news item, do not infringe copyright.  News of 
the day and miscellaneous facts are part of the public domain.
1759
 But the news article or the video report 
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selecting and arranging the news give them an expression. This expression of the facts will be protected 
if it is original. 
The CJEU said that a subject-matter is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual 
creation.
1760
 
Concerning newspaper articles, “their author’s own intellectual creation is evidenced clearly from the 
form, the manner in which the subject is presented and the linguistic expression”.
1761
 “It is only through 
the choice, sequence and combination of those words that the author may express his creativity in an 
original manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual creation.”
1762
 For example, the newspaper 
articles monitored by the company Infopaq are, as such, literary works covered by the Directive.
1763
 
Following the Infopaq cases, the Court said that words, as such, do not constitute elements covered by 
the protection.
1764
 But certain isolated sentences, or even certain parts of sentences in a newspaper 
article, are susceptible to come within the scope of the protection provided for in the Directive. A work 
comprising 11 words may communicate to the reader an element which is, in itself, the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of that article.
1765
 
The act which consists of storing an extract of a protected work and printing out that extract, is such as to 
come within the concept of partial reproduction within the meaning of the Directive, if the elements thus 
reproduced are the expression of the intellectual creation of their author.
1766
 
In conclusion, as confirmed by the cases Infopaq, press clippings communicate works protected by 
copyright, if they communicate to the reader an element which is, in itself, the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of the news article or broadcast. 
III. Application  
16. In this part we will examine, at the request of the Commission, whether three cases meet the 
conditions set out in art. 5(3)(c), i.e. the offer of press clippings by an organisation to its employees (A), 
by a (commercial) entity to its subscribers (B) and by any legal entity or natural person to the general 
public (C).  
We have found no CJEU decisions on article 5(3)(c) and little scholarly literature on the notion of 
beneficiaries of the exception.  
For each case, we will examine the compatibility of the use with the three-step test. 
17. We saw above who the beneficiaries of the news reporting exception are (paragraph 11 above). 
As a reminder, reproduction of published articles is only allowed if it is carried out by the “press”, but 
communication to the public and making available may in theory benefit anyone. Communication to the 
public and making available in the framework of article 5(3)(c) can thus be carried out by the three kinds 
of potential beneficiaries in the cases identified by the Commission. But acts of communication to the 
public and making available imply reproduction.  
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The press traditionally comprises journalists, newspapers, periodicals and broadcasting organisations. 
In 2007, analysing the implementation and the effect in Member States’ laws of the Directive, IViR 
described in its study two manners to interpret the press review exception. “A narrow interpretation of the 
news report exception in principle restricts the possibility to reproduce newspaper articles and broadcast 
commentaries only by press or broadcasting entities of the same nature”.
 1767
  
Following this strict interpretation by IViR, none of the three cases would be allowed. A narrow 
interpretation of the beneficiaries of article 5(3)(c) prohibits organisations or employers, commercial 
entities which are not press entities to reproduce, to communicate to the public and make available news 
works without the consent of the right holders. 
A broad interpretation, said IViR, would extend the exception to institutions and enterprises for their 
subscribers or employees. Thus, case A and B would be allowed, but not case C, still too permissive. 
18. The question of the present Study focuses on the beneficiaries of the exception (see Terms of 
reference above). We recall here that to benefit from the exception, the three cases of uses of the works 
examined in this Study also need to fulfil the other conditions set forth in article 5(3)(c) (see paragraph 8 
above).  
We will assume here that all the other conditions of article 5(3)(c) are met in the three cases of 
application, notably on the topic (economic, political or religious) of the current event and the mention of 
the source of the work.  
19. Since this Study is limited to the assessment of article 5(3)(c) of the Directive, we will not examine 
in details whether other exceptions can be applicable to the offer of press clippings. We will simply briefly 
mention the quotation limitation contained in article 10(1) of the Berne Convention and article 5(3)(d) of 
the Directive. 
Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention states the following:  
It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made 
available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent 
does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and 
periodicals in the form of press summaries.
1768
 
Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention is mandatory for the Members of the Union (contrary to article 
10bis(1)). According to this, Members of the Berne Union are obliged to allow “mere quotations” and 
“quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries”, regardless of 
whether their national laws are broader or narrower
1769
. Since all Member States of the European Union 
are also Members of the Berne Convention, they all provide for such an exception for quotations from 
newspaper articles and periodicals, if it is done to the extent justified by the purpose and provided that 
their making is compatible with fair practice.
1770
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This provision and article 5(3)(d) of the Directive make no reference to particular beneficiaries. Quotations 
can thus be made by anyone. 
Article 5(3)(d) of the Directive makes no reference to press summaries as such: 
3. Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 
and 3 in the following cases:  
(…) 
(d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work or 
other subject-matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public, that, unless 
this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the author's name, is indicated, and that their 
use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose; 
Does the reference to the purposes of “review” imply the making of press clippings? Arguments can be 
raised for and against it.
1771
  
The exception is facultative for Member States, which are free to implement it or not. 
A. The offer by an organisation to its employees 
20. The question here is to know whether article 5(3)(c) authorises an organisation or an employer to 
provide a press-clippings service to their employees. It is often called “in-house press clippings”. 
A narrow interpretation of the beneficiaries of article 5(3)(c) prohibits organisations or employers who 
are not press entities to reproduce, communicate to the public and make available news works without 
the consent of the right holders. In this sense, M. Walter and S. von Lewinski said that “if companies that 
are not press companies produce in-house electronic press clippings, it is rather doubtful whether they 
are covered by lit (c), or under any other exception or limitation under Article 5.”
1772
 
As the IViR said, a broad interpretation of the beneficiaries of article 5(3)(c) would allow organisations, 
commercial or not, to offer in-house press clippings; “a broad interpretation of this limitation extends the 
privilege to institutions and enterprises that offer second-hand information on selected topics to their 
subscribers or employees in the form of collections of newspaper clippings”.
1773
 
We did however not find any other scholarly literature or case law arguing that article 5(3)(c) could be 
broadly interpreted.  
According to the CJEU’s case law, the exceptions to copyright must be interpreted strictly, since they are 
derogations from the general rule established by the Directive.
1774
 The fact remains that the interpretation 
of the conditions of application of an exception must also enable the effectiveness of the exception 
thereby established to be safeguarded and its purpose to be observed.
1775
 But this little margin does not 
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allow in our opinion to extend the benefit granted to the “press” to any employer or institution. This is not 
the purpose of the exception. 
21. Would the offer of press clippings to employees meet the conditions of the three-step test?  
Following article 5(5) of the Directive and in line with the international instruments,
1776
 the exceptions of 
article 5 apply, (1) only in clearly specified special cases which (2) are not contrary to a normal 
exploitation of the work and which (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holders. 
The first step requires that the limitation be restricted to “certain special cases”. That condition means 
that the exceptions must be clearly defined and must be based on specified particular objectives.
1777
 
Authors converge on the view that the requirement stems from a qualitative understanding and favours 
exceptions that are of public interest.1778  
Article 5(3)(c) of the Directive constitutes a special case in the sense of the three-step test, because it 
draws on article 10bis of the Berne Convention.
1779
 Hence, the exception passes the first condition of the 
test.  
If article 5(3)(c) of the Directive was not restricted to the press, but broadened to the internal uses of 
press clippings in an organisation, would it still pass the first step? The offer of press clippings to the 
employees of a company has the objective to inform them about current events. The organisation can 
also have a commercial objective, the press clippings being then able to improve the commercial 
efficiency of the organisation.  
According to Advocate General Tstenjak in the Infopaq case, it can be stated that a reproduction of 
extracts from newspaper articles does not correspond entirely to the objective of informing the public and 
that its primary objective is commercial. However, when a journal publishes an article from another journal 
or when one hears on the radio a part of a newspaper article, these media use the works not only to 
inform the public, but also for commercial advantage. One can therefore, in the Advocate general’s 
opinion, also state concerning the reproduction of extracts from newspaper articles that, when they are 
used to draw up summaries of those articles, they are used to inform the public.
1780
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Consequently, it seems that the internal use of a news work can be found to be a ”special case” and the 
first step could be considered as fulfilled.  
The second step requires that the use does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work. For to 
the WTO Panel, “normal exploitation” includes both current and potential future uses of the work and 
must be judged for each exclusive right individually.
1781
 Advocate General Trstensjak explains that “ t he 
normal exploitation of newspaper articles means that the newspapers in which the articles are published 
are sold and that a profit is made therefrom; the economic advantages which may be made from 
newspaper articles must go to the copyright holders. If the effect on the newspaper market is noticeable 
and the sale of newspapers diminishes, this goes against normal exploitation”.
1782
 
About article 5(3)(c) of the Directive, a commentator said that when an article on current topics is used, a 
“potential major source of royalty revenue need not be expected”.
1783
 Besides, the use of those articles 
can be reserved. Article 5(3)(c) is therefore, when limited to uses by the press (confer the quid pro quo 
rationale argument explained below, paragraph 24), not in conflict with a normal exploitation and the 
exception passes the second step of the test. 
Concerning the application of the second step to the offer of press clippings to employees, it makes no 
doubt that the internal use of press clippings constitutes an important source of royalty revenue for the 
right holders. Those uses conflict, in our view, with a normal exploitation of the work within the meaning of 
the second condition of article 5(5) of the Directive. 
If it is decided to extend the actual article 5(3)(c) of the Directive to the offer of press clippings within 
organisations, it must be provided for a measure to overcome the conflict with the second condition of 
article 5(5) of the Directive. The requirement of the second step could possibly be met by the payment of 
an equitable remuneration to the right holder, i.e. turn the exception into a remuneration right (yet there is 
controversy on whether introducing a remuneration right per se is sufficient to avoid a conflict with the 
three-step test). 
The conditions set forth in the three-step test are cumulative. Because the second condition is not met, a 
judge would not analyse if the third condition is fulfilled .  
The third step requires that the use does not unreasonably prejudice the right holder’s legitimate 
interests. For Advocate general Trstensjak, an effect on the legitimate interests of the right holders is not 
sufficient but it cannot be unjustified. The quantitative and qualitative nature of the effect must be taken 
into account.
1784
 
If article 5(3)(c) is interpreted as allowing uses of press clippings inside a company or an organisation, a 
substantial quantity of press clippings would be produced. In our opinion, this would cause an 
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holders. The third condition would thus not 
be fulfilled either. 
In conclusion, the offer of press clippings by an organisation to its employees does not, as such, pass the 
test of article 5(5) of the Directive. To pass the test, the conditions of the provision should be arranged, 
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e.g. by providing an equitable remuneration to the right holders. And even so, it is not clear if the three-
step test would be passed. 
B. The offer by a (commercial) entity to its subscribers 
22. The offer of press clippings by an entity, commercial or not, to its subscribers can for example be 
a media monitoring company which offers press clippings to its clients or an association to its members. It 
can also be the case of a news aggregator who sends RSS feeds to its subscribers 
(https://support.google.com/news/answer/59255?hl=en).
 
 
As for case A, only a broad interpretation of the notion of press can allow those entities to benefit from the 
exception.  
The Advocate General Trstenjak asked the question of the application of the exception provided for in 
article 5(3)(c) to the uses made by Infopaq, a media monitoring company.
1785
  
Infopaq offers media monitoring and analysis services to its clients. Its business consists primarily in 
drawing up summaries of selected articles from Danish newspapers and other periodicals (represented 
by the Danske Dagblades Forening or “DDF”, a professional association of Danish daily newspapers). 
The summaries were based on press clippings. More precisely, Infopaq was doing reproduction in part of 
newspaper articles in the form of extracts of 11 words.  
For the Advocate General, the press review exception “cannot justify such reproduction as it is not 
reproduction in the press as newspapers and magazines traditionally come under”
1786
. She added that for 
her, the case does not concern distribution to the public or making published articles available to the 
public.
1787
 
By excluding a media monitoring company, Advocate General Trstenjak is thus in favour of a strict 
interpretation of the notion ‘press’. For him, the offer of press clippings in case B (and a fortiori also case 
C – except press clippings offered by press entities to the general public) does not meet the condition of 
the beneficiary of the press review exception. 
We did not find any case law or scholarly articles advocating a broader interpretation of the notion of 
press (except the IViR Study, which actually only evoke it, without justifying it). 
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However, the Court of justice mentioned in Infopaq II when referring to the drafting of press summaries 
that: “In respect of the lawful or unlawful character of the use, it is not disputed that the drafting of a 
summary of newspaper articles is not, in the present case, authorised by the holders of the copyright over 
these articles. However, it should be noted that such an activity is not restricted by European Union 
legislation. Furthermore, it is apparent from the statements of both Infopaq and the DDF that the drafting 
of that summary is not an activity which is restricted by Danish copyright legislation.”
1788
 
As L. Guibault says, “[u]nfortunately, this sole mention of the lawfulness of Infopaq’s drafting of 
summaries does not say much about the admissible scope of the press exception under European law. 
The whole case shows, however, that the emergence of digital news monitoring services constitutes a 
serious threat for traditional newspaper publishers.”
1789
 
Regarding the question if the opening of the exception of article 5(3)(c) of the Directive to the offer of 
press clippings by a (commercial) entity to its subscribers meet the conditions of the three-step test, we 
can refer to the reasoning of Advocate General Trstenjak in the case Infopaq.
1790
  
For the same reasons as for the offer to employees (see point 22 above), the first condition is fulfilled.  
According to the Advocate General, the reproduction of extracts from newspaper articles affects the 
normal exploitation of those newspapers (as a reminder, we here speak about an extract of an article and 
not a summary, which is not an infringement to copyright).  
The reproduction of extracts from newspaper articles allows Infopaq to identify rapidly which 
articles are important and of which a summary must be drawn up. Infopaq can thus draw up 
summaries of all newspaper articles, for which reason its customers no longer need to buy 
newspapers.
1791
  
The second condition of article 5(5) of the Directive is consequently not fulfilled. 
Advocate General continued and analysed the third condition of the test, which provided that the 
particular cases in which the exceptions and limitations apply do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the rightholders. He also concluded that concerning the printing of extracts from 
newspaper articles the condition was not fulfilled. He explains that: 
[i]n the context of the third condition, the mere effect on the legitimate interests of the rightholders 
– who are ultimately affected by each exception and limitation – is not sufficient; that effect cannot 
on the contrary be unjustified. On this occasion the quantitative and qualitative nature of the effect 
must be taken into account.
1792
 
In the present case, an extract from a newspaper article is produced for all of the articles 
containing the relevant search words. If the search word appears frequently in those articles, that 
means quantitatively that extracts from newspaper articles may be produced for numerous 
articles. If several different search words appear in the same article, that also means that several 
extracts may be produced for an article. I have already found when analysing the second 
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condition of Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29 that the reproduction of those extracts has an 
indirect effect when summaries are produced on the sale of the newspaper articles, for which 
reason the copyright holders also have a legitimate interest in the profits made by Infopaq. Given 
that the extracts are produced for a large number of articles, that constitutes in my opinion an 
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the rightholders.
1793
 
As for the offer to employees, we will conclude that the offer of press clippings by an (commercial or non-
commercial) entity, without the consent of the right holders, does not comply with the three-step test. 
C. The offer by any legal entity or natural person to the general public 
23. This third case, which aims the offer of press clippings by any legal entity or natural person to the 
general public, includes the practice of news aggregators website, such as Google News (on the notion of 
news aggregators, see point 14 above). It also covers journalists, online newspapers, bloggers or people 
communicating on social networks.  
Could those services be considered as the “press” in the sense or article 5(3)(c)? 
For journalists and online newspapers or periodicals, it makes no doubt that there are an integral part of 
the press and may benefit from the exception if they respect the other conditions of article 5(3)(c)
1794
. 
Concerning the reuse of news works by news aggregators, the IViR explained very pertinently in its 
Implementation Study, that it may put under pressure the quid pro quo rationale underlying the limitation. 
In fact, the ratio legis of the exception (besides the objective of the free flow of information) lies in the fact 
that press entities (newspapers or broadcasting organisations) constantly borrow news works from each 
other.
1795
 Following the IViR, “ i f second-comers can freely reproduce articles of newspapers and 
periodicals without offering the original newspaper publisher with the opportunity to do the same, then the 
quid pro quo rationale underlying the limitation is put under pressure.”
1796
  
The IViR continued by saying that “ o n the other hand, distinguishing between value-added news media 
that ‘deserve’ to benefit from the exemption, and other media that do not, bears the risk of passing 
judgment on the social value of the media, and would therefore rest uneasily with freedom of expression. 
Consequently, it is uncertain whether services like Google News would be covered by the limitation of 
article 5(3)c) of the Directive, in the countries that have implemented it. The direct consequence of the 
prevailing legal uncertainty regarding the (un)lawfulness of Google’s use of copyrighted newspaper 
articles, drawings and photographs has been to launch the company on the path of negotiations with the 
newspaper publishers, photographs and journalists in order to contractually determine the conditions for 
the use of copyrighted material on its different services.”
1797
 
While we agree with the remark of the IViR on the quid pro quo rationale of the exception which could be 
put under pressure, we do not fully agree with its conclusion saying that, because of the risk of a 
judgment on the media, it is uncertain whether Google News would be covered by the exception of article 
5(3)(c) of the Directive. It is true that the provision has as original objective to facilitate the free flow of 
information and that Google News aims to inform the public. Though, the exception was made in favour of 
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the press, and a news aggregator does not have the same needs and objectives as a press organ (or 
organs of the same nature). An important difference between them is the fact that a news aggregator 
does not write or publish articles, it just borrows them and indexes them with automatic algorithms, with 
no – or minor – human intervention. News aggregators do not themselves always wish to have the status 
of press and to have to go by the duties attached to the press activity. With respect to the objective of the 
provision and the differences between news aggregators and the press, it is thus in our view justified to 
not assimilate them and prohibit news aggregation to benefit from the exception as it is currently drafted. 
The uses by the bloggers and users of social media, who are not members of the press, could barely be 
covered by the exception. Given the aim of the exception, those natural persons may not invoke it. 
Besides, consider that they could benefit from the press review exception could render the quotation 
exception inoperative.  
24. Finally, concerning the application of the three-step test to the offer of press clippings by a legal 
entity or a natural person to the general public, we refer to the considerations above about the offer of 
press clippings to employees or subscribers. In our opinion, the conclusions are identical. Those cases 
aim “certain special cases” but they may “conflict with a normal exploitation” of the work. Therefore, those 
uses of press clippings are not compatible with the three-step test.  The same holds for press clippings by 
a natural person: one thing is to observe ex post that they are in practice and presently not facing many 
risks of being sued in court because the impact of their activity remains limited, another thing would be to 
exonerate them ex ante from any such risk by introducing a new exception.
 
 
IV. Practices in the selected Member States 
25. The Terms of reference require examining whether the offer of press clippings in the three cases 
examined above has been assessed in a series of selected Member States. 
The eleven selected Member States are: Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary 
and Benelux. 
This chapter summarizes the implementation of article 5(3)(c) in these countries. It draws the attention to 
recent judicial decisions, which may be relevant to one or several of the three cases. 
26. Article 5(3)(c) has been implemented in the selected Member States in many different ways. The 
review of the implementation is not simple, notably because article 5(3)(c) contains two different 
exceptions in favour of the press with different conditions. Some Member States have implemented both 
exceptions, others did not implement the first exception for press review at all. All the selected Member 
States implemented the second part of article 5(3)(c) of the Directive about the reporting of current 
events, but this exception is not the object of this Study. 
Among the selected Member States, five of them (a minority) implemented the press review exception 
with similar terms, that is to say: Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland. 
The scope of the exception differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For IViR, “Important variations exist in 
the way Member States have implemented the first part of article 5(3)c), even though the text of the 
provision would seem to be rather explicit. Some Member States have failed to require the mention of the 
source or of the author’s name; others have attached the obligation to pay fair compensation; while others 
have included translations within the scope of the provision. Moreover, although courts are bound to 
interpret the provisions in their law in conformity with the text of the Directive, it is important to point out 
that important differences can still arise in the judicial interpretation of the provision throughout the 
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Member States.”
1798
 As the focus of this Study lies in the beneficiaries of the exception, we will not 
analyse how the other conditions of the exception have been implemented in the national legislation. 
It is interesting to see that, among the selected Member States which implemented article 5(3)(c), some 
of them provided for an equitable remuneration of the right holders. This is the case in Germany (art. 
49(1) of the Copyright Act)
1799
 and in Poland (art. 25(1)(1)(b) of the Copyright Act). 
27. Several national legislation of the selected Member States did not implement article 5(3)(c) of 
the Directive (or article 10bis(1) of the Berne Convention). Any making of press review of an original work 
in the sense of the exception, will thus in principle fall under the exclusive rights of the right holders. For 
those copyright laws, we must consider that there are against any offer of press clippings inside a 
company or an institution, without the right holders consent, unless they provide for a “national” exception 
in that sense, like in Denmark for internal uses within a company or an institution. 
Amongst the selected Member States, Belgium,
1800
 Denmark,
1801
 France, Luxemburg,
1802
 Spain and the 
United Kingdom did not implement the press review exception as such. However, those Member States 
usually offer the possibility to cite a work for purposes of review. They thus open the right to make press 
reviews, not through the conditions of article 5(3)(c) of the Directive (which is dedicated to the press), but 
through those of the quotation exception.  
For example in Spain, the making of press clippings shall be deemed quotation, albeit subject to a 
specific regime and the reproduction of press clippings for commercial purposes is subject to an equitable 
compensation (art. 32.1, 2° of the Intellectual Property Act).
 1803
 
While the French Intellectual Property Code does not contain a provision similar to article 5(3)(c) of the 
Directive, it states that the author cannot prohibit press reviews (art. L. 122-5, 3°(b)
1804
. 
The French courts have interpreted this article allowing press reviews quite restrictively.
1805
 For the 
Supreme Court, a press review implies “a joint and comparative presentation of several commentaries 
from different journalists concerning a common theme or a same event.”
1806
 The press review exception is 
thus reserved to press organs and focuses on one single subject.
 
The press review does not cover the 
compilation of newspapers or periodicals articles on one or more topics by non-press organs, called in 
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France “panoramas de presse”, and subject to the authorisation of the authors (managed by the Centre 
français d’exploitation du droit de copie (CFC)).
1807
  
For example, newspapers sued a website, which was displaying a chronological list of articles, with a 
short presentation, the title, the source, the first lines and a short summary of the article.
1808
 The judges 
dismissed the exception for press review, because the list of articles were all related to different topics, 
there was no plurality of opinions on a same topic and a comparison of opinions. On the other side, the 
exception for short quotation has been accepted. 
Similarly to France, Member States which have a restrictive interpretation of the press review exception 
are a priori against the making of press clippings inside a company or an organisation. Consequently, 
those countries will also not permit the offer of press review to employees (case A), clients (case B) or to 
the general public (case C).  
28. In many Member States, the actors of the press clippings market have found contractual 
solutions to the selling of press clippings. Press clippings agencies have concluded deals with 
representatives of the newspaper publishers and in turn license users to copy extracts from newspapers 
and periodicals, and collect fees on behalf of authors and publishers. For example, Copiepresse, 
Mediargus and Reprocopy in Belgium, the Centre français d’exploitation du droit de copie (“CFC”) in 
France, the Copyright Licensing Agency (“CLA”) and the Newspaper Licensing Agency (“NLA”) in the 
United Kingdom.  
In The Netherlands, to follow technological developments, media organisations have innovated in their 
contractual practices and found news ways of sharing news. An “experimental on-demand news 
fragments channel” has been launched by the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation (NOS), “where websites of 
newspapers and more general news websites can now add for free NOS video footage to their own 
content”.
1809
  
Also in the Netherlands, “to facilitate the grant of licences and the payment of fair compensation by 
newspaper clipping services, a majority of Dutch newspaper publishers have joined in the new ‘Copyright 
Licentie- en Incassobureau PRO’ (CLIP) created under the auspices and with the support of the Dutch 
Publishers Association (NUV).
1810
 CLIP collects on behalf of and distributes fees to publishers and 
freelance journalists who have entrusted it with the right to grant licences to suppliers of newspaper 
clipping services. The collective arrangement set out by CLIP governs the use of articles from daily and 
weekly newspapers and magazines by clipping services.”
1811
 
After this general information about the implementation of article 5(3)(c) in the Member States, we will 
now examine the national legislations and case law regarding the three cases of offers of press clippings, 
as requested in the Terms of reference. 
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A. The offer by an organisation to its employees 
29. Among the selected Member States which implemented the press review exception, the 
Netherlands and Germany have produced case law about the offer of press clippings inside 
organisations. After having described those national court decisions, we will present the Danish provision 
in favour of the internal uses of press clippings. 
1. The Netherlands 
30. Article 15 of the Dutch Copyright Act authorises the use of works from a press media (written, 
radio, TV and internet press included) to another.  
More specifically, article 15 permits the use of “news items, miscellaneous items or articles on current 
economic, political or religious topics or works of the same nature which have been published in a daily or 
weekly newspaper or weekly or other periodical, radio or television programme or other medium that has 
the same function”, “by a daily or weekly newspaper, a weekly or other periodical, a radio or television 
programme or other medium that has the same function”. The expression “of the same function” refers to 
news websites that are periodically renewed, emailed newsletters and news services via mobile 
phones.
1812
 
31. In the landmark case “Knipselkranten” of 1995, the Dutch Supreme Court adopted a flexible 
interpretation of article 15 of the Dutch Copyright Act containing the press review exception.
1813
 The Court 
said that the exception “also applied to the production of newspaper cuttings, including in cases where 
this only involved selection work by an institution that could not be regarded as a ‘press organ’ in the 
everyday sense of that term”
1814
. This solution did not however apply to digital press reviews, but only to 
print services.  
The facts were the following: the Foundation for Reprography Rights (“Stichting Reprorecht”) sued the 
Association of Dutch Libraries and Reading Centres (“NBLC”) and the Province of North-Brabant because 
they did not has the consent of the right holders (through a licence) to reproduce and communicate press 
clippings to the employees of the Province.  
The Supreme Court considered that article 10bis of the Berne Convention, which is the source of the 
Dutch article 15, reserved the definition of “the press” to the members of the Union. She turned to the 
parliamentary debate of article 15 to interpret the notion of press. The Explanatory Memorandum stated 
that press review services would fall under the scope of article 15.
1815
 In conclusion, the Supreme Court 
decided that analogic press reviews services were allowed under the exception. This interpretation of the 
Dutch legislation differs from the other member States.
1816
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This case met strong critiques from the doctrine, commentators reproached that the reciprocity on the 
ground of the exception had been neglected,
1817
 they “feared that the economic interests of newspaper 
publishers would increasingly be put at risk because it basically encouraged second-comers to free ride 
on the creative efforts of others.”
1818
 And “[w]ith the emergence of digital networked technology, the wind 
started to turn for the providers of newspaper clipping services”
1819
. In fact, as we will see below, the more 
recent case law is in disfavour of free internal press clippings. 
32. In 2005, the District Court of The Hague had to deal with a case about internal scanning and 
communication of copies of press articles in ministries.
1820
 Several Dutch newspaper publishers sued 
the State for copyright infringement. The Court judged that the making of electronic newspaper clippings 
was in contravention with the three-step test of the Directive. The uses of the electronic newspaper 
clippings conflicted with the normal exploitation of the newspapers and unreasonably prejudiced the 
legitimate interests of the publishers.
1821
 The Court considered that because the digital press review 
practice does not comply with the three-step test, the exception could not apply.
1822 
 
33. In 2011, the Dutch newspaper publishers sued the Province of Flevoland because its 
employees were making and distributing in-house paper press clippings from Dutch newspapers.
1823
 The 
rights on the articles were expressly reserved. The province of Flevoland based its defence on the 
“Knipselkranten” case (see paragraph 32 below). This unauthorized making of paper press clippings was 
judged to infringe copyright. 
The parties did not dispute the fact that the province of Flevoland has to be considered as “press” or not. 
The question at stake was about the scope of the reservation rights and the interpretation of “news 
reports and miscellaneous reports”. On the contrary of the “Euroclip” case (see paragraph 40 below), the 
Court said that the fact that the province had no commercial interest by making the press clippings was 
not relevant. The relevant issue was the fact that the right holders were missing revenues when the 
province used articles without paying remuneration.
1824
 For L. Guibault, “[t]his is a very interesting 
conclusion indeed, for Article 15 of the Copyright Act does not foresee the payment of fair compensation 
to the rights owners and no court has ever ruled exactly in this sense before. Of course, too strict a 
prohibition on the making of newspaper clippings would have risked receiving bad press because of its 
inevitable encroachment on the free flow of information.”
1825
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2. Germany 
34. Article 49(1) of the German Copyright Act authorises the reproduction, distribution and 
communication to the public of articles from newspapers concerning current political, economic or 
religious issues, provided that an equitable remuneration is paid (through collective rights societies). The 
use of short extracts of several commentaries or articles in the form of an overview is not subject to 
compensation.  
35. This German exception allows for analogue press-clipping services, against the payment of an 
equitable remuneration paid. The question whether the exception covers electronic press-clippings was 
asked in 2002 to the German Federal Supreme Court, in the “Elektronischer Pressespiegel” case.
1826
 
According to the Supreme Court, the limitations permit in-house electronic press-clippings by a company 
or an administration. The case was concerning “the scanning and storing of press articles for internal e-
mail communication in a private company”.
1827
 The Supreme Court “limited the scope of the statutory 
exception to scans which the subscriber to the press-clipping service could systematically search, in order 
to ensure that the use-intensity of the copies legally made under the copyright limitation did not exceed 
what the historical legislature had intended to exempt from exclusive copyright control”
1828
. 
In respect of those in-house press clippings, the German Federal Supreme Court decided that the 
limitation under German law that exempts digital in-house press-clippings services, which is combined 
with a statutory remuneration right, complied with article 5(3)(c). However, the Court did not address the 
problem that article 5(3)(c) only relates to reproductions made ‘by the press’ (in the Elektronischer 
Pressespiegel case the beneficiary was not a press company). To comply with article 49(1), the Court 
said that “(f)irst, only transmissions inside a company or governmental department (so-called in-house 
press reviews) are allowed. Second, the external articles may only be transmitted in graphic files or files 
in which the several articles are integrated as facsimile, for these formats allow just as little systematic 
searching possibilities in the transmitted documents as analogue documents do.”
1829
 
“To overcome the problem of an outdated wording of § 49(1) that seemed to indicate the limitation’s 
confinement to press reviews on paper,
1830
 the Court stated that, in view of new technical developments, 
a copyright limitation may be interpreted extensively.
1831
 Taking these considerations as a starting point, 
the Court arrived at the conclusion that digital press reviews were permissible if articles were included in 
graphical format without offering additional functions, such as a text collection and an index. This 
extension of the analogue press review exception to the digital environment, the Court maintained, was in 
line with the three-step test
1832
”.
1833
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Amsterdam, 2011, p. 24. 
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The Court said that the limitation also complies with article 5(5) as long as the national copyright law 
provides for compensating the right holders.
1834
 “(T)he Court gave a further example of its flexible 
approach to the three-step test. It held that digital press reviews had to be deemed permissible under § 
49(1) of the German Copyright Act just like their analogue counterparts, if the digital version – in terms of 
its functioning and potential for use – essentially corresponded to traditional analogue products.”
1835
 
3. Denmark 
36. Denmark provided for, in article 14 of the Copyright Act, a limitation for public or private 
institutions, organisations and business enterprises, which reproduce descriptive articles (which is an 
additional condition), and other works for internal uses. The limitation provides for an extended collective 
licence (in article 50 of the Copyright Act). Article 14 reads as follows: 
(1) Public or private institutions, organisations and business enterprises may for internal use for 
the purpose of their activities by photocopying, etc., make or have copies made of descriptive 
articles in newspapers, magazines and collections, of brief excerpts of other published works of 
descriptive nature, of musical works and of illustrations reproduced in association with the text, 
provided the requirements regarding extended collective license according to section 50 have 
been met. Such copies may be used only for activities which are covered by the agreement 
presumed in section 50. 
(2) If disputes arise on whether an organisation approved according to section 50(4) to make 
license agreements according to subsection (1), proposes unreasonable terms to such a license 
agreement, each party to the license agreement is entitled to bring the dispute before the 
Copyright License Tribunal cf. § 47. The Tribunal may lay down all the terms of the said license 
agreement, including terms relating to remuneration. 
The Danish Copyright Act has another peculiarity, it provides for a special treatment for press releases 
(art. 72): 
Press releases supplied under contract from foreign news agencies or from correspondents 
abroad, may not without the consent of the recipient be made available to the public through the 
press, the radio or in any other similar manner until after 12 hours after they have been made 
public in Denmark. 
B. The offer by a (commercial) entity to its subscribers 
37. We did not find legislation or case law in the selected Member States allowing the offer of press 
clippings by an entity (commercial or not) to its subscribers or clients.  
You will find here some case law prohibiting the offer press clippings to subscribers without the consent of 
the right holders. 
It is probably worth noting that representatives from this sector do recognize the importance of copyright 
and the need to conclude agreements with publishers
1836
. 
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1. The Netherlands 
38. In 1995, the District Court of The Hague
1837
 refused to apply the Dutch exception for press review 
to a CD-ROM containing reviews "clipped" from Dutch newspapers (LiteROM).
1838
 
39. In the case “Euroclip” of 2004, the District Court of Amsterdam took distance from the 
“Knipselkranten” case (see paragraph 32 above). “Euroclip offered its clients a service of digital 
newspaper clippings tailored to their individual needs – scanning and sending clients a selection of 
articles on specific topics.”
1839
 Newspaper publishers introduced proceedings against this press clipping 
service. The Court “rejected the defendant’s argument based on the press exception. According to the 
court, Euroclip’s service was not eligible for the press exception because of its commercial purpose. The 
court ruled that given the substantial commercial interests of the defendant, the newspaper clipping 
service could not qualify as publications issued for the promotion of the free flow of information. In this 
light, the interests of the defendant did not weigh more than those of the plaintiffs to protect their 
copyright. This judgment gave rise to critique: while commentators agreed with its outcome, they strongly 
disapproved the motives. Newspapers and periodicals are also published for commercial purposes; and 
these are precisely the media covered by Article 15 of the Act and the underlying Article 10bis of the 
Berne Convention.
1840
 The court’s argument, if followed, would have excluded the vast majority of 
newspapers and periodicals from the application of the press exception.”
1841
 
2. Italy 
40. The Italian Law “expressly prohibits the systematic reproduction of published or broadcast 
information or news, with gainful intent, by newspapers or other periodicals or by broadcasting 
organizations”
 1842
. 
About article 65 of the Italian Copyright Act, the Supreme Court “confirms that this exception does not 
cover press reviews made for gainful intent, such as those produced by specialized firms on distinct 
topics or themes on behalf of their customers”
1843
.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
countries.  The Federation states the following on its website: “FIBEP respects the requirement of our media partners and other 
rights owners to protect their copyright in published news stories. FIBEP recognises the investment our media partners make in 
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owners to ensure we are able to meet our customers' needs and deliver content to them in a fair and ethical way.  By the same 
token, we look to rights owners to acknowledge the added value we create by searching, selecting, sorting, presenting and 
evaluating articles of interest to our customers”. 
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rd
 ed., 
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to legal aspects of knowledge-economy business models, Springer, The Netherlands, 2012, p. 145, note 156. 
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3. Germany 
41. In Germany, “an appeal court ruled that Article 49(1) did not permit the making of subscription 
press-clipping services.”
1844
  
4. Denmark 
42. As we already said, the Court of justice has not been interrogated on the interpretation of article 
5(3)(c) of the Directive in its landmark cases Infopaq, involving a media monitoring company. However, 
both arrests mentioned the article under the title “Legal context. European Union Law”, just as the opinion 
of the Advocate General. 
It seems that Denmark did not include the first part of the exception of article 5(3)(c) of Directive 2001/29 
as such in its national legislation. But it provided for other exceptions in favour of the internal uses of 
works of descriptive nature, as we already saw above.  
After eight years of dispute, the Danish Supreme Court rendered its final judgement in March 2013 in the 
Infopaq case.
1845
 The Supreme Court asked twice for a prejudicial decision on questions regarding acts of 
reproduction (art. 2 of the Directive) of parts of news articles and of acts of temporary reproduction 
(exception of art. 5(1) of the Directive). Based on the prejudicial answers, the Supreme Court decided in 
favour of the Danske Dagblades Forening. The services of Infopaq occasionally involve reproduction of 
texts protected by copyright, which are not covered by the exemptions in article 5(1) of the Directive. They 
are thus infringing copyright. 
5. United Kingdom 
43. An important case coming from the United Kingdom is now before the Court of justice.
1846
 It 
opposes Meltwater, a media monitoring company (similar to Infopaq), to the Newspaper Licensing 
Agency (“NLA”), a licensing agency that represents British newspapers.
1847
 The preliminary questions 
associated to this case however are not linked to interpretation of article 5(3)(c), but rather to the act of 
browsing and whether it is, as such, covered by Article 5(1) (transient/temporary copies). 
Meltwater monitors media websites to identify articles that interest its clients. It sends emails to its clients 
with a link to the articles, their headlines, the opening words and an extract of the articles. The clients can 
also access to the monitoring reports through Meltwater’s website.  
The United Kingdom did not implement article 5(3)(c) for press review, this case is thus not directly 
relevant for the cases of this Study. However, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act provides for an 
exception for quotation for the purpose of review (art. 30(1)). Press reviews, which do not meet the 
conditions set forth in the quotation exception, fall under the exclusive rights of the authors.  
Following the decision in the Belgian Google v. Copiepresse case (see paragraph 53 below), the lower 
court and the Court of Appeal decided that there was a lack of critical analysis necessary to partake in 
review. The methods of Meltwater and the intention of the end-users to view the articles were not seen to 
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be for the purpose of reviewing (nor criticising) the works. Besides, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the 
uses by the clients did not meet the conditions for reporting current events.
1848
 
To avoid infringing copyright, Meltwater had to obtain a license from NLA, what it did. But Meltwater 
refused to purchase an “end-user” licence, for the uses done by its subscribers.
1849
 The question at stake 
is thus whether Meltwater’s clients need a license to receive the monitoring service if the service is only 
available on Meltwater’s website. This question of the mere viewing (or “browsing”) of contents on the 
internet is fundamental for the working of the internet and the protection of copyright.
1850
 The Supreme 
Court decided to refer the case to the Court of justice for a preliminary ruling.  
C. The offer by any legal entity or natural person to the general public 
44. In general, national provisions implementing article 5(3)(c) of the Directive do not allow the offer 
of press clippings to the general public. The use of press review is, in the most “permissive” cases, 
reserved to the press or organisations that fulfil the same function, as in the Netherlands or Spain.  
45. We did not find any national provision implementing article 5(3)(c) or any national case law 
allowing the use of the press review exception to bloggers or other individuals publishing content on 
internet (websites, social networks…), while they are not journalists or qualified as the “press”. In 
accordance with the Berlin Revision Conference of 1908, the freedom to reproduce news items is 
restricted to newspapers and does not apply to individuals (see paragraph 6 above). This goes in favour 
of the exclusion of natural persons (except journalists) from the benefit of the exception. 
Several cases in The Netherlands tried to apply (but in vain) the exception of article 15 of the Copyright 
Act to websites, through the possibility to apply the exception, not only to “daily or weekly newspaper or 
weekly or other periodical, radio or television programme”, but also to “other medium that has the same 
function” (art. 15, 1, 1°).  
In the Spanish Copyright Act, “works and articles on current events” disseminated by the communication 
media may be reproduced, distributed and communicated to the public by “any other media of the same 
type”, subject to compensation, unless the authors has opposed to it (art. 33.1).
1851
 The studies and 
articles on current events include those disseminated online, as well as in any other format.
1852
 The 
expression “another media of the same type” covers media that conveyed the original news (Google 
News is thus excluded).
1853
 We did not find case law trying to apply the exception to non-press entities or 
journalists, like bloggers.   
46. Search engines or news aggregators do not benefit from the exception and either are infringing or 
have negotiated with the right holders. However, a new German law now regulates the relationships 
between press publishers and search engines. 
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For R. Xalabarder who analysed the question in details, “news aggregation activities do not benefit from 
any specific statutory limitation and can hardly fit in the existing ones in favour of press summaries (…); 
Obstacles being diverse and varying according to the interpretation of the statutory language.”
1854
  
1. The Netherlands 
47. Five years after the “Knipselkranten” case of 1995 (see paragraph 32 above), the District Court of 
Rotterdam applied the press review exception to an online press review service.
1855
  
In this case called “Eureka”, “several newspaper publishers brought action against the makers of a 
website, www.kranten.com, which presented a selection of news items and links to articles from the 
plaintiffs’ newspapers. The defendant’s website contained the names of the plaintiffs’ national 
newspapers, accompanied by a list, updated daily, of titles of news items and articles that appeared on 
the websites of the respective newspapers. When clicking on the titles or the lists, the user was directly 
linked to the corresponding news item or article on the newspaper’s website, thereby bypassing the 
newspaper’s respective homepage and advertisements. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s 
activities constituted an infringement of their copyright in the articles and of their sui generis right in the 
database, as well as an act of unfair competition. The court rejected all claims. Assuming that titles and 
lists were copyrightable subject matter, the court held that the defendant, Eureka, qualified as a press 
organization, the press reviews of which were covered by the exemption of Article 15 of the Act”
1856
. 
48. More recently, some case law tried to let several websites benefit from the exception for press 
review, invoking the application to “other medium fulfilling the same purpose”. 
The District Court of Dordrecht
1857
 considered that a website using news articles could not be said to have 
the same function as a daily or weekly newspaper, but rather one of archive (the articles were stored for 
years on the website).
1858
 In the same sense, the benefit of the exception was denied to a website that 
“did not have as primary goal to bring daily news on various topics, but rather, as the defendants 
themselves asserted, to offer a platform where anyone can post his own story for free. Information could 
be found on the website on product testing, hostels, or travel insurance. Only a small section of the 
website pertained to news and the exception of Article 15 of the Copyright Act could therefore find no 
application.”
1859
 Finally, about a website of which the purpose and main objective was not to generate 
news, the District Court of Amsterdam concluded that “(t)he fact that on the website (some) news is 
generated did not mean that the site could therefore be counted as ‘the media’. Nor did the fact that 
defendant wrote articles on www.nujij.nl and any other digital newspapers entail that the site was 
therefore a press organization. This meant that the first condition was not met and the exception was 
therefore not applicable.”
1860
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The District Court of Amsterdam judged that a media company that runs a news website (“GeenStijl”) 
could benefit from the exception, because the reproduction of an interview on its website could qualify as 
a reproduction made by another medium that fulfils the same function.
1861
 
49. Finally, we note that in the Netherlands newspapers are protected as such by article 10(1)1° of 
the Copyright Act. All writings are protected even if there are not original; this is the so-called 
“Geschriftenbescherming”, a sort of neighbouring right for the publishers.  
A bill abolishing this protection of non-original writings has been proposed in February 2013.
1862
  
It is interesting to see that this draft legislation is in opposition with the so-called “Google Lex” in Germany 
(see below). 
2. Germany 
50. On March 1, 2013, Germany amended its Copyright Act to deal with the management of 
copyright content by search engines and news aggregators.
1863
 The new articles (new sections 87f and 
87g of the Urheberrechtsgesetz) create a neighbouring right for press publishers to improve the 
protection of press products on the Internet.
1864
 The main intention of this change is to limit the free use of 
news content by search engines and news aggregators.
1865
 This amendment of the copyright act is also 
known as “Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverlage”, the “Lex Google” or the “Google Tax” law.  
This law came under much pressure.
1866
 
Search engines and news aggregators can provide access to content from newspapers after having paid 
a licence fee.
1867
  
In reaction to this law, Google announced that it would change its system to "opt-in" in Germany, instead 
of the "opt-out", to avoid copyright fees.
1868
 The switch was expected on 1 August 2013, the same date as 
the entering into effect of the amendment of the Copyright Act. 
However, many German news publishers declared that they will still opt-in in Google News.
1869
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The rights granted to publishers include the making available of press products or parts thereof for 
commercial purposes. “Where the press product was made in (not necessarily ‘for’) a corporate entity, the 
owner of such legal entity is deemed the owner of the right. The term ‘press product’ is further defined. It 
encompasses, broadly, the ‘technical-editorial’ fixation of journalistic contributions, provided these 
contributions are published under an existing journal or newspaper title that is published periodically.”
 1870
 
3. France 
51. In France, following the German example, legislative initiatives were launched in 2012 to create a 
neighbouring right for press organisations. A press lobby IPG (“Information politique et générale”, 
representing media companies and newspapers) wrote a draft legislation providing for an equitable 
compensation, in exchange for the right to make hyperlinks to the websites of press organisations.  
After months of negotiations, a settlement was found on 1
st
 February 2013 with Google. First, publishers 
will have “attractive conditions” to use the platforms of Google. Secondly, Google will create a fund for 
innovation in the online press (funded 60 millions of euros). The project of legislation was thus 
abandoned.
1871
  
4. Belgium 
52. As we already said, legislation and case law of the selected Member States always require the 
consent of the right holders to offer press clippings to the general public. 
We will mention here the famous Belgian Copiepresse case regarding Google News.  
During six years, publishers and authors’ collecting rights societies on one side, and Google Inc., on the 
other side, fought about the reuse by Google of content (titles, headlines, images, etc.) in its Google 
News service.    
The Belgian exception contained in article 22 § 1, 1° of the Copyright Act did not implement the exception 
for press review, but well the exception for news reporting (or report of current events), contained in the 
second part of article 5(3)(c) of the Directive. Nevertheless, Google asked the Court of appeal of Brussels 
to apply this exception for news reporting to the news aggregating website.
1872
 For the Court, both 
services at stake in the case, Google News and the cache function, amount to unauthorized 
reproductions, which do not benefit from any exception and furthermore infringes the three-step test. 
The Court refused to apply the exception of article 22, § 1, 1° to Google News. The Court explained that 
the aim of article 22, § 1, 1° « was not to extend the quotation right, but to include an exception in favour 
of the information media that do not have the time to ask the author’s authorisation. »
1873
 The Court 
concludes that the article must be interpreted restrictively and can only apply to cases where, because of 
a « need of a rapid information », no authorisation could be asked. Since the articles of Google News stay 
30 days on the website, the exception can not apply. 
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In first instance, the judge highlighted that Google did not make any comment of the current events, it just 
collects titles and articles by themes. For the judge, the exception can only work – as for the quotation 
exception – if the protected works are the accessory of a report and not its principal object.
1874
 
The Court of appeal also said that Google cannot pretend that it can materially not obtain the consent of 
the right holders to reproduce abstracts of news articles in Google News. Since collecting societies 
representing newspapers and authors in Belgium are entitled to conclude general contracts with the users 
for the exploitation of copyrighted works, Google can do the same to exploit press clippings in Google 
News. 
In December 2012, the parties finally settled the case.  
53. Lastly, in 2008, one should mention that Copiepresse, which manages the copyright of the 
French and German speaking newspapers publishers, one of the applicants in the other Copiepresse 
case seen below, sued the European Commission (Joint Research Centre Internal and External 
Communication Unit) about a website which monitors press articles (“Europe Media Monitor”, 
http://press.jrc.it and http://emm.jrc.it). Copiepresse invoked infringements to the copyright of its members 
both in proceeding on the merits and in injunction proceedings before Belgian courts. 
Both judges declined jurisdiction in the proceedings, on the ground of article 235 and 288 (2) of the 
European Economic Community Treaty (now articles 268 and 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union). Following their interpretation, the claims of Copiepresse had to be filed in front of the 
CJEU, because the CJEU is exclusively competent for the repairing of damages resulting from the extra-
contractual liability of the European institutions.  
Copiepresse appealed the decisions, and the cases were joined by the Court of appeal of Brussels. On 
17 May 2013, the Court of appeal of Brussels rejected the appeals on the same basis as the judges of 
first instance. Since the Court declined its jurisdiction, it just analyses the procedure provision on its 
competence and did not discuss the substantive questions (and even less the possible exceptions the 
defendant could invoke). We thus need to wait for a possible action of Copiepresse in front of the CJEU. 
V. Conclusions 
54. As we have seen, the exception on press review which can benefit “the press” has not been 
implemented in all Member States and, when it has been implemented, it has not always been 
implemented in a similar way.  The resulting situation is a remaining absence of harmonization of this 
exception. 
This unavoidably creates difficulties for users who wish to produce or reproduce press clippings without 
infringing copyright, particularly when the clippings originate from newspapers originating from different 
Member States. 
Initially, it was probably so that an important part of users was only interested in press clippings 
originating from local (i.e. from their own jurisdiction’s) newspapers and more marginally from newspapers 
from other Member States, and that only a smaller part of users was willing to receive press clippings 
taken from newspapers of other Member States; it is probable that the bigger users will in many cases be 
larger organizations, with more resources and possibilities to investigate how to obtain authorizations 
covering the Member States from which they wish to receive information via press clippings and press 
reviews.  However, with the development of Web aggregators, this might not hold true anymore since 
many individuals (and companies) will e.g. go to Google News’s portal, including sometimes for 
commercial purposes. 
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In the three scenarios that we were asked to examine, our view is that none of them falls under the 
exception of article 5(3)(c) of the Directive, except of course for the legal entities or natural persons, 
which qualify as being part of the “press”, which has to be interpreted restrictively. Similarly, the national 
implementations of article 5(3)(c) do not permit any of the three cases we examined, with the exception of 
in-house press-clippings in Denmark (extended collective license) and in Germany under certain 
conditions.  Besides, new German provisions allow news aggregators to reuse news items, after having 
paid a licence fee.  
The consequence is thus that, in each of the cases examined, except in the situations just mentioned, 
authorizations must be obtained from the rightholders on the news items.  
This does not, in our view, have to be regretted: 
- the fact that enterprises or institutions wishing to have press reviews distributed internally to 
their employees need to obtain licences from rightholders to do so unarguably entails a price 
to be paid for, but the added-value and the competitive advantage which the making available 
of such press information does give to these companies represents an asset for which these 
enterprises or institutions should be ready to pay a price; 
- press clipping companies which base their entire business model on the distribution (in print 
or more and more often in electronic formats) to their clients on the basis of a paid 
subscription do fulfill a useful role in society, for it is certain that their clients would in many 
cases not have the resources to do such research work themselves or the means (nor the 
will) to subscribe to a whole range of newspapers and periodicals.  But since these 
publications do constitute the raw materials from which the press clipping companies derive 
their benefits, it does not appear illogical that they also pay a price for the possibility to offer 
such services to their clients;  
- finally, news aggregators, like press clipping companies, certainly do contribute to the 
dissemination of press information and to a better informed society at large, but it is important 
to remember that they do so for a commercial purpose, they derive revenues therefrom and 
they do not themselves create any additional content; there also, it is not abnormal that, by 
application of copyright rules, they have to obtain licences from the rightholders to be able to 
do so1875.   
Furthermore, enlarging the scope of the exception to cover any of these three situations would, we think, 
very unlikely pass the three step test. Those uses would certainly conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work within the meaning of the second condition of article 5(5) of the Directive (and of the three-step test 
“family”). Any enlargement would indeed undoubtedly have significant negative financial repercussions for 
the existing press. As far as natural persons (such as bloggers) are concerned, because the impact of 
their activity is less important, they are less likely to come under scrutiny of rightholders and be sued in 
court and they can in certain cases rely on some other exceptions (quotation, parody); in other cases, 
allowing them to copy/paste news items on their blogs/websites by providing for an exception would also, 
in our view, be against the three step test. 
It is also important to recall that many concrete solutions (licenses) exist in Member States and that no 
market failure seems to be deplored.  
For the time being, the written press still plays an important role in democratic societies.  The emergence 
of the Internet has confronted the written press with difficult challenges for years.  It is trying to find new 
business models to adapt to the new situation created by the development of the Web but it is a well-
known fact that the traditional written press has suffered and is suffering from the competition of the 
Internet, that a number of titles have disappeared or are struggling to survive.  New “pure players” web 
press companies are emerging but are also in search of feasible and sustainable business models.  The 
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reasons for this critical situation are mainly the downturn in advertising expenditures and to a lesser 
extent the decline in readership, falling cover sales and subscriptions. 
Enlarging the press review exception to any other beneficiary than “the press” would make the existing 
situation more difficult from a financial point of view for the existing press (print or Web-based). A large 
exception could a priori be seen as being of benefit to the society at large, because it would facilitate the 
free flow of information.  But by ignoring copyright on the reuse of news items, i.e. the raw material of 
media monitoring agencies and news aggregators, it would significantly undermine one of the revenue 
streams of the press, which is already struggling in the digital environment, and would thus eventually be 
detrimental rather than beneficial to the information society and in general to access to information. An 
economic analysis of the damages which would thereby be caused to the press would help in this debate 
on the right balance to find between creators of content and second-users.  
The existing print press may have taken some time (and still be somewhat reluctant) to grant licences for 
the reuse of its contents by companies (for internal use) or by press clipping agencies and news 
aggregators.  But one may observe that licences are progressively available, that more and more deals 
are concluded between the press and e.g. news aggregators that newspapers collectively have been able 
to resort to court and obtain injunctions against illicit uses of their contents – which has, in turn, brought 
news aggregators (and search engines) to the table of negotiations.  This does not lead us to conclude 
that the exception should be enlarged in any manner. 
Uncertainties and difficulties do remain, due to the fact that newspapers are in certain countries not 
organized collectively to grant licences and to the fact that what “the press” (and by the same token what 
“a journalist”) means is not always clear (so that borderline situations will unavoidably exist regarding the 
beneficiaries of the exception).  But the first difficulty (absence of representative organizations granting 
licences for a catalogue of newspapers) is evolving and it is our view that it evolves in the right direction 
(even if this may still take some time); and as far as defining what “the press” means, there are many 
obstacles (and possibly dangers) to a rigid definition, so that it is very uncertain that a legal definition 
would be a welcome development.  A case-by-case approach and an assessment by courts in 
accordance with the factual circumstances of each case is most probably a safer option. 
One may however regret that the exception is implemented in different manners and/or not at all in 
Member States and wish that the situation evolves towards a more harmonized playing field.  As for a 
number of the other exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive, a compulsory exception would make sense and 
bring clarity and more legal certainty to the picture, which is something which users are entitled to.  It may 
be however that, before making it compulsory for all Member States, a review of the text should be made: 
it is not certain, for instance, that targeting “current economic, political or religious topics” remains as 
relevant now as it was when the text of the Berne Convention on this exception was adopted. 
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